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Beginning with an analysis of Northrop Frye’s concept of modal progression (i.e., 
the cycle from myth to irony—and back again) and an application of modal theory to 
an analysis of postmodern narrative forms, the need to revise Frye’s concept of 
modal progression becomes apparent. Rather than following the cyclical pattern Frye 
proposes, the course of modal progression appears to be fixed to an axis of 
experience: a certain normative threshold which describes the narrator’s and/or the 
narrative protagonist’s power of action relative to an assumed neutral audience. How 
the narrative depiction of the narrator and/or the fictional protagonist relates to this 
threshold determines the characteristics of the literary mode. As argued in this 
dissertation, the increase in the hero’s power of action (typical of late modern and 
postmodern literature) does not necessarily indicate an abrupt return to the mythic 
mode (as predicted by Frye). Instead, what is seen to emerge is a decidedly advanced 
species of narrative irony, or, “high irony” that, while maintaining its distinctly 
ironic qualities, displays a remarkable tendency to disassemble/reassemble precedent 
narrative forms (e.g., myth, nonfiction, realistic fiction) into a self-reflexive, highly 
metafictional form of parody. As the absurd, parodic chaos of the high ironic mode 
shares several significant traits with both myth and nonfiction, these overlapping, 
parodic relationships are of great literary importance and theoretical interest. These 
modal connections and disconnections are what this dissertation attempts to explore 
and clarify. To that end, this dissertation charts the various ways that myth and 
nonfictional forms have been put to parodic use in the high ironic metafictions of 
Donald Barthelme, Robert Coover and Ishmael Reed, three writers whose seminal 
mid-20th century works did much to shape and direct the course of contemporary 
American literature. Of special emphasis in this study is the American postmodern 
preoccupation with revision and the politics of literary subversion that attends this 
revisionary impulse. The final hypothesis reached by this dissertation is that the 
literary repercussions of these mid-20th century excursions into ironic, metafictional 
abstraction have not led to a return to myth, but rather to a discernable tendency 
among 21st century American writers to return to previously eschewed forms of non-
ironic narrative. This trajectory thus marks a movement away from forms of 
narrative irony (as well as away from the mode of myth) and an emerging tendency 
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Language, after all, still remains the deepest habit of our mind, our most thorough 
inheritance from dead or vanished gods. 
 




Locating the Postmodern 
 
The research in mid-twentieth century, postmodern American poetics 
described in this dissertation concerns an analysis of narrative irony as it is employed 
by a group of highly influential American writers whose most innovative 
explorations of this mode of literature were published between the mid-1960s and the 
early 1970s. Following in the postmodern aftermath of the violence visited upon the 
mimetic referentiality and the direct, narratorial authority of the conventional form of 
the novel by early twentieth century writers such as James Joyce, Gertrude Stein, 
Virginia Woolf, and William Faulkner, mid-twentieth century writers such as Robert 
Coover, Donald Barthelme, and Ishmael Reed—among a host of other 
contemporaneous American authors, including Thomas Pynchon, William H. Gass, 
John Barth, Stanley Elkin, Clarence Major, William Gaddis, Joyce Carol Oates, 
Richard Brautigan, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.—found themselves the heirs to a tradition 
of literature that had moved the literary from a discourse on subjects to a discourse of 
objects.  
The novel-as-world forms, exercises in parallax, and the dizzying labyrinths 
of time, place, and perspective previously investigated by the modernist writers of 
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the early twentieth century, were, in the postmodern period, extended to also include 
the reader, the narrator, and the text itself—metafictionally and self-reflexively—in 
the intertextual environment of narrative discourse. It is this metafictional world of 
self-reflexive, ironic narrative discourse that this dissertation anatomizes through an 
investigation of the early postmodern works of Coover, Barthelme, and Reed.  
 
Outline of Dissertation Methodology and Significance  
With the objective of conducting an in-depth critical analysis of the mode of 
narrative irony as it is deployed by these three American authors, this dissertation 
applies a synthetic approach to the study of narrative irony involving the modal 
theory proposed by Northrop Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism and the method of 
literary history outlined by Hayden White in “The Problem of Change in Literary 
History,” paying careful attention to what White defines as the “four prime elements 
of the literary field”: the context, the audience, the artist, and the work (106). 
According to White’s assessment, these four elements provide the “multivariant 
field” of relations that make up a literary history engaged with the language of 
literature as “an account both of change in continuity and of continuity in change” 
(105). As White indicates in his study of these processes, in order to avoid “the 
obscurantism of ontological speculation on the one side or the reductionism of 
scientistic distortion on the other,” it is necessary to view the literary as an ever-
shifting dialectic of the written and the spoken, the textual event and the speech act 
(106). As White explains: 
The dialectic of literary history, then, must be construed as the 
dialectic between literature (however defined) and language (however 
conceived). And any history of literature which does not place this 
dialectical relationship at the center of its problematic will necessarily 
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be driven to false reductions on the one side or to false inflations on 
the other. For language is the medium that binds the work, the artist, 
and the audience together in a common mode of praxis which is at 
once the expression and the reflection of a shared experience of the 
world. (“The Problem of Change in Literary History” 106) 
 
And it is toward a scholarly understading of (and personal curiosity regarding) the 
narratological significance of this language of “shared experience”—as well as its 
centrality in the formulation of the literary—that this dissertation directs its enquiry. 
However, although Frye’s theory of modes and White’s theory of the 
relationship of literature and language are discussed in this dissertation and provide 
the methodology followed in this dissertation’s subsequent analysis of the context, 
the audience, the artist, and the work of narrative irony (with special attention to the 
role each element plays in the development of the literature of the postmodern 
period), this dissertation is not primarily concerned with the forwarding of a new 
theory of literature or language as such. Neither is this dissertation in any way an 
attempt to narrow the mode of irony down to a mathematical network of 
metalinguistic equations.1 Nor is this work an attempt to sketch out the intricacies of 
irony’s development as a trope (as in D. C. Muecke’s in The Compass of Irony, 
1969), as a matrix of rhetorical maneuvers and figures of speech (as in Wayne C. 
Booth’s in A Rhetoric of Irony, 1974), or as a form of critical self-consciousness (as 
in Gary J. Handwerk’s Irony and Ethics in Narrative, 1985)—though all of these 
perspectives have certainly shaped the contours of the argument forwarded in this 
dissertation. Neither is the analysis in the following chapters an attempt to map out 
the incredible scope of the postmodern as an ideological paradigm, or, as a discrete 
philosophy of the contemporary moment; several interesting, highly articulate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Eggington, “Cervantes, Romantic Irony and the Making of Reality,” 1048-49; Poggi, Cavicchio 
and Caldognetto, “Irony in a Judicial Debate,” 217; Tittler, “Approximately Irony,” 40-41. 
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approaches to the question of the postmodern are already available—a selection of 
which are discussed at some length in this dissertation.2 Instead, this dissertation 
represents an attempt to critically engage with, synthesize, and extend the critical 
discourse surrounding the mode of narrative irony—especially as this discourse is 
advanced in Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism (1957), Hayden White’s 
Metahistory (1973), Mas’ud Zavarzadeh’s The Mythopoeic Reality (1974), Linda 
Hutcheon’s Narcissistic Narrative (1984), and Patricia Waugh’s Metafiction (1984).  
Through a close reading of a selection of exemplary postmodern texts and an 
analysis of the parodic structure of narrative irony as explored in these texts, the 
characteristics of this mode of narrative are analyzed and compared to the 
characteristics of concurrent and precedent modes of narrative. This analytical 
mapping of the dominant mode of mid-twentieth century literature not only fills a 
significant gap in contemporary literary scholarship, it also clarifies several aspects 
of the linguistic, formal, and ideological relationships that are shared between 
modernist, postmodernist, and post-postmodernist forms of narrative discourse. Also 
of significance is this dissertation’s synthesis of previous attempts to critically 
analyze the structure of metafiction (e.g., as forwarded in the works of Hutcheon, 
Waugh, and Zavarzadeh listed above). In addition, this dissertation’s detailed 
assessments of the literary mechanics and the literary politics of parody, especially as 
they play out in the metafictional forms of the postmodern period, are absolutely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  The list of contemporary texts pertinent to the area of “postmodern theory” is extremely extensive 
and would be pointless to enumerate here. However, some of the key “postmodern theory” texts 
concerned with the concept, history, and/or genealogy of the postmodern that are cited in this 
dissertation include (chronologically): Brian McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction (1987), Linda 
Hutcheon’s A Poetics of Postmodernism (1988), Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, The Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Explained to Children 
(1992), Hans Bertens’s The Idea of the Postmodern (1995), Andrew Gibson’s Towards a Postmodern 
Theory of Literature (1995), and Simon Malpas’s The Postmodern (2005). 
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essential to a thorough understanding of the “poetics of postmodernism” (to borrow 
from Hutcheon) and the transideological revisions of myth and history that occurred 
during the period. 
Although previous, similar attempts to investigate the structure of metafiction 
have been made, for example, by Robert Scholes in Fabulation and Metafiction 
(1979), Christine Brooke-Rose in A Rhetoric of the Unreal (1981), and Larry 
McCaffery in The Metafictional Muse (1982)—each of which are acknowledged 
and/or confronted in the chapters that follow—these works do not adequately 
recognize the centrality of parody and other ironic narrative forms in the 
metafictional mechanism. Nor do these works sufficiently recognize the significance 
of the radical shifts in narratorial agency that typically attend the progression from 
one dominant literary mode to the next. It is this critical deficit that this dissertation 
seeks to address through its anatomy of the ironic mode of literature and its close, 
critical analyses of the parodic metafictions of Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, 
and Ishmael Reed. 
 
Locating the Mode of Irony 
With an eye to the matrix of literary and linguistic constructs surrounding and 
informing the context, the audience, the artist, and the work of narrative irony, the 
first chapter of this dissertation (“Chapter One: Myth, Metafiction, and the High 
Ironic Mode”) sets out to position a selection of the early works of Coover, 
Barthelme, and Reed in terms of their narrative mode. As discussed in detail in 
chapter one, discussion of these works in terms of their narrative mode offers the 
critical advantage of opening them up to a range of narratological discourses not 
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available to a strictly rhetorical, semantic, or semiotic approach to narrative. This 
range is absolutely crucial to any thorough analysis of narrative irony because, as 
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni very succinctly expresses in, “L’Ironie comme trope,” 
“irony requires of its reader a triple competence: linguistic, rhetorical or generic, and 
ideological” (Qtd. in Hutcheon: A Theory of Parody, 94).3 And in answer to the 
questions posed by each of these competencies, a balanced analysis of narrative 
irony requires a critical approach capable of describing each of these points of 
contact between the object of the text and the reader’s shared experience with that 
textual object. Also, as described in detail in the initial chapters of this dissertation, 
analysis of narrative irony in terms of its relation to precedent modes of literature 
offers the advantage of allowing the critic to account for the “change in continuity 
and of continuity in change” specified by White as requisite to a thorough 
understanding of how a text negotiates the gap between what is written and what a 
text’s words might actually mean at a specific time and place in history—a 
distinction that is important to consider when dealing with the dual-voiced, 
paradoxical mode of narrative irony. 
The critical range afforded by modal analysis—when properly adjusted (as 
discussed in the following chapter)—also allows the critic of narrative irony to 
investigate the parodic and satirical forms of ironic narration and how they relate, 
narratologically, to the narrators and narratorial devices employed in concurrent and 
precedent modes of literature. This narratologically comparative, modal approach to 
the analysis of the linguistic, rhetorical, and ideological matrix of narrative irony is 
necessary due to the fact that, as Linda Hutcheon writes in Irony’s Edge (quoting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms, 94; Catherine 
Kerbrat-Orecchioni, “L’Ironie comme trope,” 116. 
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White and extending Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s tripartite system of ironic competencies), 
analysis of the dual-voiced structure of irony requires a critical appreciation of the 
“transideological” nature of the parodic relations inherent in ironic narrative (10).4 
For, in Hutcheon’s definition of irony and its transideological discourse, irony 
occurs, or, “happens,” in the space “between the said and the unsaid,” in the void that 
both connects and separates ideas and ideologies (Irony’s Edge 11). Hutcheon writes, 
“irony happens as a part of a communicative process . . . [and] comes into being in 
the relations between meanings, but also between people and utterances, and, 
sometimes, between intentions and interpretations” (Irony’s Edge 11-13). Irony 
involves a language that transideologically evokes and revokes its own literality and, 
in literature, employs a network of semiotic, rhetorical, and narrative strategies that 
maneuver meaning from a direct transfer of (the author’s) communicative intention 
and (the reader’s) interpretive reception towards the problematic space between 
intention and reception, or, in other words, irony involves a movement towards the 
performative, dialectical space wherein meaning is created.5  
 
Self-Reflexivity, Indeterminacy, and Parody 
As maintained in this dissertation, the radical indeterminacy that develops in 
this dialectical space makes narrative irony a powerful weapon of critique. Indeed, 
the subversive application of narrative irony has long been a technique of literary 
rebellion and countercultural protest (a topic returned to in the concluding section of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 38. 
5 Hutcheon writes: “From the point of view of the interpreter, irony is an interpretive and intentional 
move: it is the making or inferring of meaning in addition to and different from what is stated, 
together with an attitude towards both the said and the unsaid. The move is usually triggered (and 
then directed) by conflictual textual or contextual evidence or by markers which are socially agreed 
upon.” See Hutcheon, Irony’s Edge, 11. 
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this dissertation). From proto-modernist works of narrative irony such as Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky’s Notes From Underground (1864) to the late-modernist otherness of 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952), and from the game-changing parodies of 
cultural and social myth in Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) and Woolf’s The Waves (1931), 
respectively, to the antebellum annihilation in Faulkner’s Light in August (1932) and 
Absalom, Absalom! (1936), irony and parody have long been the weapons of choice 
in the literary rebel’s attack on the dangers located within and/or associated with 
certain linguistic, rhetorical, and ideological constructs. However, where the works 
of postmodern writers such as Coover, Barthelme, and Reed differ from their 
modernist predecessors, as this dissertation seeks to show, is in their exaggerated 
foregrounding of the linguistic, rhetorical, and ideological mechanisms of narrative 
itself. Through metafictional parody and deconstructive forms of narrative self-
reflexivity, these writers incorporate the text’s own interpretation of itself within the 
scope of the dual-voiced ironic process of meaning creation. This process 
complicates the reader’s construction of a definite reading of events, creating a 
profound doubt as to the veracity of any stable system of interpretation. 
This self-reflexive indeterminacy is often achieved, as Hutcheon writes in A 
Theory of Parody, through parodic and/or intertextual narrative structures and 
metafictional forms that allow the narrative to explore a wide area of ontological and 
epistemological constructs and to deploy a multivariant approach to the narratorial 
perspectives and narrative voices guiding the events of the text. As Hutcheon 
describes it, in contemporary metafiction: 
. . . parody is frequently joined to manipulative narrative voices, 
overtly addressing an inscribed reader, or covertly maneuvering the 
reader to a desired position from which intended meaning 
(recognition and then interpretation of parody, for example) can be 
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allowed to appear, as if in anamorphic form. (A Theory of Parody 86) 
 
As this dissertation serves to demonstrate, investigation of the works of Coover, 
Barthelme, and Reed reveals that this “intended meaning” (as well as the “desired 
position” from which this meaning is derived) is often, itself, foregrounded as little 
more than another system of relations that must be negotiated and ultimately 
accepted, rejected, or ignored during the reader’s interaction with the text. This can 
often be a disorienting experience for the reader, as the clues to the decoding of the 
irony are not always what they seem (i.e., because these clues are often self-
reflexively aware of their status as clues to the decoding of the parodic mechanism of 
an ironic narrative). As is argued in this dissertation, ironic metafiction is not simply 
fiction about fiction, it is fiction about fiction that is also self-consciously critical of 
the fact of its own fictionality.  
The highly parodic, metafictional structure of the mode of narrative irony 
most frequently employed in the works of Coover, Barthelme, and Reed—the mode 
of “high irony,” as it is conceived in the first chapter—appeals to parody in part 
because the works of these writers are actively engaged in an antagonistic, highly 
revisionary form of critique. As described in the chapters that follow, the high ironic 
metafictional critiques of Coover, Barthelme, and Reed are aimed at playfully 
undermining the institutionalized myths and authorized histories that exist within 
linguistic, narrative, and other socio-cultural constructs. Through dual-voiced forms 
of metafictional parody and radical alterations to both the narrator’s and the 
protagonist’s narrative agency, the works of these writers reveal the politics and 
ideologies contained within myth and history. It is precisely this act of revelatory, 
critical revision that is scrutinized in this dissertation. 
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Outline of the Authors and Texts Considered 
Following the first chapter’s placement of the postmodern and its 
metafictional mode of critical revision, in “Chapter Two: From the Pseudo-Sacred to 
the Pseudo-Historical: A Typological Approach to the Analysis of Metafiction,” the 
narrative structures involved in this metafictional process of critical revision are 
compared with the structural components of mythopoesis and low ironic narrative. 
Through a brief comparative analysis of the various mythical revisions and outright 
ironic overhauls that have been visited upon the traditional “Blackbeard” narrative 
pattern, other concurrent modes of the postmodern period (e.g., low irony and myth) 
are traced through contemporary versions of the tale as it is adapted by Angela 
Carter, Robert Coover, and Donald Barthelme. As argued in this chapter, the critical 
revisions of myth that occur in the high ironic mode are also frequently paired with a 
similar deconstructive approach to the narrative structures and ideological 
mechanisms of nonfictional narrative, historiographic discourse, and other 
epistemologically authoritative linguistic and rhetorical constructs. In playing these 
mythical and historiographical constructs against each other, high ironic metafiction 
seeks to dispel the fallacious prospect of some complete truth or comprehensive 
reality beyond the linguistic confines of narrative by shattering and re-shattering the 
very structures that bind meaning to its message. 
Following on from the second chapter’s analysis of metafiction as a critical 
intermediary between myth and history, the metaphorical structure of Coover’s 
deconstructive “demythicization” is analyzed and discussed in “Chapter Three: 
Robert Coover: Metafictional Parody and Metaphorical Immersion in Pricksongs & 
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Descants.” Focusing on Coover’s attacks on literary myth in Pricksongs and 
Descants (1969), this chapter analyzes the dynamics of cultural and aesthetic 
precedent, the metaphorical transmission of ideological content, and the place of 
these metaphorical structures within the subversive politics of postmodern narrative. 
The various ways in which Coover re-appropriates these loaded metaphorical 
structures for his own transideological ends is then compared to similar political 
renderings in the works of Barthelme and Reed.  
“Chapter Four: Donald Barthelme: Anecdote, Adventure & Performance in 
the Narrative Collage,” extends the analysis of metaphor forwarded in the third 
chapter and centers on Barthelme’s subversive deployments of collage narrative. 
Through an exploration of Barthelme’s fracturing of form and his humourous uses of 
intertextual citation, this chapter investigates the narrative politics of collage through 
an analysis of a selection of illustrated stories from Unspeakable Practices, 
Unnatural Acts (1968), City Life (1970), and a critical reading of the collage 
structures and fragmented narrative components of Barthelme’s Snow White (1967). 
This chapter focuses on the various ways that Barthelme deconstructs myth and 
history through the use of multiple narrators, radical changes in syntax, and his self-
reflexive dismantling of the narrative object. 
In “Chapter Five: Ishmael Reed: (Afro-)American History Broke-Down,” this 
metafictional matrix of metaphor and collage is approached from the perspective of 
the African-American tradition of “signifyin(g).” Through a close reading of Reed’s 
The Free-Lance Pallbearers (1967), Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down (1969), and 
Mumbo Jumbo (1972), this chapter describes the network of linguistic, rhetorical, 
and ideological structures involved in the game of signifyin(g) play and compares 
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this network of relations to the parodic, intertextual structures and deconstructive 
practices at work in the high ironic metafictions of Coover and Barthelme. In this 
chapter it is proposed that Reed’s concept of “neo-HooDoo” takes the signifyin(g) 
relations of ironic play in a new directions and anticipates the post-postmodern shift 
towards more sincere and/or non-ironic forms of narrative. 
In the final section of this study, “Conclusion: Post-Postmodernism and the 
Legacy of the High Ironic,” the uncertain future of the mode of high irony is 
discussed. Through a brief analysis of the after-effects of postmodern literary 
innovation and the consequences of narrative self-reflexivity, the change from the 
postmodern to the post-postmodern is followed through examples from the works of 
Kathy Acker, Lynne Tillman, Bret Easton Ellis, and David Foster Wallace. Of 
special importance in this concluding chapter is the contemporary American attitude 
towards irony and the subversive politics of ironic narrative, for as is very 
convincingly argued by Wallace and a number of his contemporaries, the question of 
the future of irony is of tremendous cultural relevance. As Wallace writes in “E 
Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” analysis of narrative irony is essential 
because “irony and ridicule are entertaining and effective, and . . . at the same time 
they are agents of a great despair and stasis in U.S. culture, and . . . for aspiring 
fictionists they pose terrifically vexing problems” (171). This chapter will attempt to 
trace the implications of these “vexing” literary problems and examine irony’s 
capacity (or incapacity) to address them. 
In this somewhat polemical conclusion, it is proposed that the modal ascent 
(as indicated by the protagonist/narrator’s expanded power of action) sparked by the 
high ironic movement into the realm of abstraction has failed to usher in a new 
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dominant mode of myth. Rather than a return to myth, the contemporary decline of 
the high ironic mode suggests a potential trajectory of modal descent back towards 
the threshold of experience. Should this descent occur, it would likely lead to a 
further curtailment of the protagonist/narrator’s power of action and, presumably, a 
return to a more conventional, mimetic mode of narrative discourse (along with its 
attendant forms of referentiality). In this final section, the post-postmodern gesture 
towards a more sincere “depth of feeling,” as well as the post-postmodern 
proposition of “anti-ironic” narrative forms, are considered and some of the 
problematics surrounding the nature of these contemporary developments are 
discussed.6 Of special emphasis in this concluding assessment of the post-
postmodern is the sense, shared by many twenty-first century fiction writers and 
critics, that the age of irony has come to a close. 
Although the age of irony may or may not be on the wane, its many self-
reflexive textual effects and dissimulative rhetorical affects remain very active within 
the televisual, hypertextual, and metafictional worlds of contemporary American 
culture and society. And with this general “ironicisation” of the socio-cultural 
landscape (i.e., the establishment of a radically orthodox consumer irony),7 changes 
in the direction of literature must inevitably follow. Nevertheless, as the works of 
theorists and literary historians such as Frye, White, and Hutcheon, have made 
apparent throughout their own attempts to accurately describe and interpret the 
complex network of relations that contribute to the direction of literary change, a 
critical sensitivity to the ever-shifting relationship between language and literature is 
essential to any thorough analysis of literature.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Charles B. Harris, “PoMo’s Wake, I”; Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram.” 192-93. 
7 See Morgan, “Learning to be a Man: Dilemmas and Contradictions of Masculine Experience,” 112. 
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Through a close, critical investigation into where the high ironic mode exists 
in relation to precedent forms, in relation to contemporaneous events and contexts 
(both historical and linguistic), and, transideologically, in relation to the self-
reflexive discourse it conducts with both the reader and itself, this dissertation 
conducts an analysis of the mode of irony and suggests that the multiple trajectories 
of 21st century American fiction are underwritten and informed by the narrative 



























Revolutionary periods are times in which the linguistic code of a generation or 
dominant social group of a culture comes under attack and gets revised. 
 




Crisis, Change, and the Context of Postmodern Metafiction 
Not only were the 1960s a decade of extreme social change, political 
upheaval, and cultural/sub-cultural/counter-cultural revolution in America, this 
period witnessed a complete re-evaluation of the human experience and the ways and 
means of communicating that experience. Through the use of mind-altering drugs 
and spiritualities, through the manipulation of various types of media and 
technology, through psychological explorations of self, identity, and persona, and 
especially through a comprehensive overhaul of literary, linguistic and socio-cultural 
systems of discourse, young American writers of the sixties co-opted, subverted, and 
attempted to re-draft the very concept of reality.8  
As Patricia Waugh writes in Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-
Conscious Fiction, the sudden emergence in the sixties of a highly influential youth 
counter-culture, “with an attendant growth in political and psychological awareness 
about issues such as race, war, gender and technology,” led to a disavowal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In the foreword to his Lost in the Funhouse (1968), John Barth writes: “The High Sixties, like the 
Roaring Twenties, was a time of more than usual ferment in American social, political, and artistic 
life. Our unpopular war in Vietnam, political assassinations, race riots, the hippie counterculture, pop 
art, mass poetry readings, street theater, vigorous avant-gardism in all the arts, together with dire 
predictions not only of the death of the novel but of the moribundity of the print medium in the 
electronic global village – those flavored the air we breathed then, along with occasional tear gas and 
other contaminants.” See Barth, Lost in the Funhouse, vii-viii. 
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orthodox literary practices and precepts (especially those incapable of articulating 
this new awareness) and initiating a turn towards absurdism, black humour, and 
innovative literary means of parodic subversion (115). The consequence of this 
literate, self-critical, and highly psycho-politicized awareness, Waugh states, “has 
been a strong tendency in US writers to respond to the anonymous, frenetic and 
mechanized society they see around them with fiction that is similarly 
depersonalized, hyperactive and over- or under-systematized” (115-16). And the 
literary form that emerged from this frenetic matrix is what is now referred to as 
“metafiction.”9 
According to Waugh, the metafictional impulse that began in the sixties 
“represents a response to a crisis,” a crisis not simply in culture, but also a crisis in 
the act of narrative communication itself (65). The metafictional response to this 
crisis that developed in the sixties represents an attempt to, in Waugh’s words, 
“‘defamiliarize’ fictional conventions that have become both automated and 
inauthentic, and to release new and more authentic forms” (65). The young American 
vanguard that ushered in this age of metafiction applied parodic means to attack 
these “automated and inauthentic” literary structures because, as Waugh explains, 
“Parody, as a literary strategy, deliberately sets itself up to break norms that have 
become conventionalized” (65). In the sixties, metafictional practice became an 
invaluable mechanism of change by virtue of its capacity to expose and make explicit 
these literary norms—through parody and other ironic formal inversions—thereby, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 William H. Gass’s original definition of the neologism, “metafiction,” is also perhaps the most 
insightful. In Fiction and the Figures of Life (1971), Gass writes: “There are metatheorems in 
mathematics and logic, ethics has its linguistic oversoul, everywhere lingos to converse about lingos 
are being contrived, and the case is no different in the novel. I don’t mean merely those drearily 
predictable pieces about writers who are writing about what they are writing, but those . . . in which 
the forms of fiction serve as the material upon which further forms can be imposed.” See Gass, 
Fiction and the Figures of Life, 24-25. 
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facilitating a critical interrogation of the “implicit cultural and literary codes” that 
were discovered to be imbedded in these literary conventions (66, Waugh’s 
emphasis). Through this fundamentally meta-fictional process of critical 
deconstruction and ironic reconstruction, Waugh writes, “parody thus discovers 
which forms can express which contents, and its creative function releases them for 
the expression of contemporary concerns” (69, Waugh’s emphasis). For many 
American writers in the sixties, metafictional parody was seen as a powerfully 
subversive literary tool and an innovative means of describing authentic experience. 
Paradoxically, this new and supposedly more authentic means of articulation 
is also, by virtue of its meta-fictional nature, more fictional, more artificial, and even 
makes this artificiality the very selling point in its claims of enhanced authenticity. 
However, the ironic feedback of this paradox is an awareness that articulated 
experience is no less vital and authentic for its inherent artificiality, further, 
articulated experience is reality to the extent that reality is capable of being or 
becoming manifest through articulation (artificial or otherwise) — recalling Paul 
Ricoeur’s reminder in Time and Narrative that, “human action can be narrated . . . 
because it is always already symbolically mediated” (57) and Claire Colebrook’s 
statement in Irony in the Work of Philosophy, that, “Speech is not some act of 
representation added on to the world, speech itself is an event of the world’s own 
force and becoming” (58). And if reality is, indeed, an inherently manufactured, 
narrative construct, the closer one gets to that event, to that precise act of articulation 
or narration, the closer one gets to the vital moment of experience itself. As Jacob 
Horner states in John Barth’s The End of the Road (1958): 
To turn experience into speech — that is, to classify, to categorize, to 
conceptualize, to summarize, to sanctify it  is always a betrayal of 
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experience, a falsification of it; but only so betrayed can it be dealt with 
at all, and only in so dealing with it did I ever feel a man, alive and 
kicking. (366-67) 
 
The upshot of this realization of a fundamentally narrative/narrated reality, as 
Mas’ud Zavarzadeh points out in The Mythopoeic Reality, is an awkward, 
postmodern awareness of the impossibility of any “central, all-encompassing view” 
or “comprehensive scheme of reality” (9). As a result, such totalizing, grand 
modernist paradigms as monadic subjectivity, autonomy, and institutionalized 
“authoritative discourse” suddenly lose their ethical and political sustainability and 
are replaced by the proliferating idiolects, rhizomatic multiplicities, and globalized 
paranoias of postmodern discourse.10 “Consequently,” Zavarzadeh writes, “the forms 
of recent narrative literature have changed so radically that the present seems to be 
more a mutation than a continuation of the past” (9). But, given that literary and 
cultural change is constant, has this radical postmodern “mutation” of consciousness 
and literary practice actually distanced the present from the past, experience from 
articulation, or has it brought them closer together? 
According to Hayden White, this type of revolutionary mutation is a 
necessary element of literary innovation and signals a “historically significant” re-
assessment of the linguistic nature of culture and human experience. As White 
claims in “The Problem of Change in Literary History”: 
Literary innovation must be presumed to be going on all the time, in the 
same way that speech innovation must be conceived to be continuous. 
But historically significant literary innovation is possible only at those 
times in which the potential audiences for a given form of literary work 
have been so constituted as to render unintelligible or banal both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a description of the socio-cultural implications of what Jean-François Lyotard terms 
“metanarrative” and what M. M. Bakhtin describes as “authoritative discourse,” see Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, xxiii-xxv; Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, 342-
346.  
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messages and the modes of contact that prevailed in some preceding era. 
(108, White’s emphasis) 
 
This revolution of the literary field through deconstruction, White argues, “represents 
a transformation in the relationship between ‘literature’ and ‘language in general,’” 
such that the “whole linguistic code” becomes an object of revisionary attack and, 
once transformed, gives rise to an entirely new sense of reality (“The Problem of 
Change” 110-11). As this process takes place, antiquated systems of communication 
are jettisoned and new linguistic connections are established. And central to this 
transformation is the expansion of the act of narration (discussed in greater detail 
later in the chapter), which places an increased emphasis on the participative 
experience of the reader’s involvement with the text and institutes an entirely new 
relationship between author and audience.   
 This literary revolution, White contends in Metahistory, occurs at the level of 
mode, specifically the mode of irony (10-11). Essentially following the cyclical 
system of modal progression proposed in Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism, 
White alleges that the rhetorically and tropologically subversive nature of modal 
irony, concordant with its “awareness of its own inadequacy as an image of reality,” 
anticipates an imminent return to the mode of myth (10, White’s emphasis). 
However, does a return to the mode of myth adequately explain the postmodern 
metafictional project of deconstructing and parodically re-articulating the narrative 
structure of reality?  
As the following section of this chapter will attempt to illustrate, critical 
analysis of this theory of modal progression (i.e., the cycle from myth to irony and 
back again to myth), examination of the Aristotelian basis of this theory, and the 
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application of modal theory to metafictional practice indicates an urgent need to 
revise this concept of modal progression.  
Rather than following the prescribed cyclical pattern that Hayden White, 
Northrop Frye, and other theorists have proposed,11 the course of modal progression 
appears to be fixed to a threshold of experience: an experientially normative axis 
which describes the narrative protagonist’s and/or the narrator’s power of action 
relative to an assumed neutral audience. Analysis of this revised course of modal 
progression reveals that as the self-contained, textual object of modern fiction 
changes to the self-reflexive, intertextual vehicle of postmodern metafiction, there 
occurs a definitive shift in the active presence and agency of the narrative voice such 
that the narration itself begins to inhabit and expand the role of protagonist. Not only 
does this shift correspond to the postmodern movement away from more directly 
representational means of literary practice (especially discernable in the 
metafictional elevation of the semiotic signifier over the signified, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter and the chapter to follow), it also suggests the 
appearance of a new dominant ironic mode.12 
As will be argued, the increase in the narrator’s power of action typical of 
postmodern metafictional literature does not necessarily indicate an abrupt return to 
the mythic mode (though it does suggest a number of shared characteristics). Instead, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 While the theory of a cyclical modal structure is most famously expounded in Northrop Frye’s 
Anatomy of Criticism (1957) and Fables of Identity (1963), this theory of a modal cycle also plays a 
prominent role in the narratological studies of Hayden White’s Metahistory (1973), Robert Scholes’s 
Structuralism in Literature (1974), and Robert Foulke and Paul Smith’s An Anatomy of Literature 
(1972). 
12 In the introduction to Narcissistic Narrative Linda Hutcheon comes to a similar conclusion: “If 
language, as these [metafictional] texts suggest, constitutes reality (rather than merely reflecting it), 
readers become the actualizing link between history and fiction. But this does not occur on the model 
of traditional historical fiction, where history is meant to authenticate fiction on a product, or 
representation, level, but in a new (or at least newly articulated) mode.” See Hutcheon, Narcissistic 
Narrative, xiv. 
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what emerges is a decidedly advanced mode of “high irony” that, while maintaining 
its distinctly ironic quality, displays an enhanced tendency to deconstruct and 
reconstruct myth, nonfiction, and other precedent narrative forms and archetypal 
elements (including popular media iconography, historical artifacts, and other 
culturally resonant miscellanea such as jokes, nursery rhymes, and fairy tales) into a 
discursive, highly self-reflexive type of parody. This high ironic parody, as will be 
discussed in this and subsequent chapters of this dissertation, is especially noticeable 
from the mid-sixties onward and is frequently encountered in (though not by any 
means limited to) the metafictional works of Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, and 
Ishmael Reed. In order to precisely define the characteristics of this emergent mode 
and explore its literary and theoretical implications, subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation will follow the high ironic mode through a selection of key metafictional 
texts including Barthelme’s Snow White (1965), Reed’s The Free-Lance Pallbearers 
(1967), and Coover’s Pricksongs and Descants (1969)—a selection of works that 
display the early development of this mode and anticipate many of the metafictional 
practices that characterize the American writing of the late 20th century and that 
continue to shape the forms and formulations of contemporary fiction today. 
As the parodic, metafictional structure of the high ironic mode may or may 
not lead to a return to the mode of myth—attendant with the significant political, 
ethical, and social ramifications of such a return—such an hypothesis remains merely 
a presumption until a substantial connection is proved to exist. It is this modal 
connection that this dissertation proposes to scrutinize through an analysis of the 
high ironic mode in postmodern theory and in metafictional practice. 
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Modal Theory and its Basis in Aristotelian Poetics 
 
In the first essay of his Anatomy of Criticism Northrop Frye enumerates what 
he terms the five modal elevations of the fictional hero’s “power of action” (33). 
Beginning, ostensibly, with the mode of myth, the fictional hero descends from an 
initially powerful state of divine eminence and supremacy into a cyclical pattern of 
ever-diminishing agency. According to Frye, this cycle essentially follows a 
progression of “plausible adaptations” or “displacements” whereby the narrative 
patterns of each mode are subsequently re-cast in ever more realistic terms (51).13 
With each modal descent the hero’s power of action gradually dwindles, culminating 
in the mode of irony where the hero is rendered all but powerless. 
These five modes and their respective protagonists (taken in fragments from 
Frye’s analysis) may be paraphrased along the following lines:  
1. Mythic hero: “superior in kind both to other men and to the 
environment of other men, the hero is a divine being.”  
 
2. Romantic hero: “superior in degree to other men and to his 
environment, the hero is the typical hero of romance.”  
 
3. High mimetic hero: “superior in degree to other men but not to his 
natural environment, the hero is a leader.”  
 
4. Low mimetic hero: “superior neither to other men nor to his 
environment, the hero is one of us.” 
 
5. Ironic hero: “inferior in power or intelligence to ourselves, so that 
we have the sense of looking down on a scene of bondage, 
frustration, or absurdity.” (Anatomy 33-34, Frye’s emphasis) 
 
Frye goes on to employ this table as the basis for his formulation of a revolving 
model of modal shift (Anatomy 35). He claims that the re-emerging “dim outlines of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In Northrop Frye and Critical Method, Robert D, Denham explains: “‘Displacement’ is the term 
Frye uses to describe the tendency of fictions progressively to move, throughout the sequence of 
modes, from myth to verisimilitude.” See Denham, Northrop Frye and Critical Method, 17. 
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sacrificial rituals and dying gods” indicates the “reappearance of myth in the ironic,” 
and concludes that: “Our five modes evidently go around in a circle” (Anatomy 42).  
From such an analysis one might assume that the increasing incidence of mythical 
figures, fragments, and traces within the ironic mode presupposes a cyclical return to 
the mode of myth. 
One immediate problem with this revolving, circular conception of modal 
shift is the fact that, if indeed the literary center of gravity has followed this rotating 
tendency to strip the fictional hero of his power of action and has progressed directly 
from mythopoesis to verisimilitude (Anatomy 52), how then does the ironic hero 
spuriously affect to scramble back onto the vacant mythic throne and re-proclaim his 
ascendancy? And further, does the ironic appraisal of the mythic mode  attendant 
with its characteristic inter-twisting of satirical critique, philological pastiche, and 
other parodic deconstructions of archetypal structures  necessarily imply its direct 
proximity to the mythic mode? 
Consideration of these problems reveals a number of significant weaknesses 
in this proposed cycle of modal progression.  
Firstly, in considering the progressive fall in the hero’s power of action from 
the mode of myth to that of irony, would not a direct modal shift from the ironic back 
into the mythic mode suggest an interminable erosion of the hero’s power of action? 
And, ignoring the possibility for some completely random leap in power of action, 
what kind of mythology could support such an impotent, anti-heroic protagonist? 
Furthermore, where does the problematic duplicity of postmodern metafiction figure 
into Frye’s structural mechanism? For example, what are we to make of such 
parodic, metafictional “possessings” of literary myth and archetype as John Barth’s 
 
	   38	  
Chimera, Donald Barthelme’s Snow White, Robert Coover’s Briar Rose, Ishmael 
Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo, and Kathy Acker’s Don Quixote?14 And finally, assuming 
that the progressive shift in the dominant mode has not yet completed its full return 
to myth, then, where are we now, and why is contemporary narrative still so ironic? 
The answer to these riddles is found—in part—in the very basis of the theory 
of modal shift that Frye derives from Aristotle’s Poetics. Summarizing the second 
paragraph of the Poetics (1448a, 1-5),15 Frye writes that, “In some fictions, 
[Aristotle] says, the characters are better than we are [spoudaios], in others worse 
[phaulos], in still others on the same level [toioútos]” (33).16 While scholars of the 
Poetics tend to vary in the definition of these terms, a general translation of 
spoudaios (σπουδαῖος) is likely to include: serious, of high character, heroic, 
figuratively weighty – and a definition of phaulos (φαῦλος) might include: frivolous, 
of low character, ordinary, figuratively light.17 Although the precise English 
definition of these terms appears elusive, what this paragraph does clearly indicate is 
that in Aristotle’s dialectical assessment of the protagonist’s power of action a 
definite threshold of experience is implied as an axis.  
This threshold, which marks the line between Aristotle’s opposed classes of 
spoudaios and phaulos, not only designates the point at which these terms 
diverge/converge, but might also perform the role indicated by Aristotle’s mysterious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 While this study will be focusing primarily upon American metafiction, it is important to recognize 
that similar Anglophone trends in metafictional parody and postmodern “mythical revisionism” have 
also developed in Canada (Margaret Atwood, Chris Scott, and Rudy Wiebe), Britain (including works 
by Angela Carter, Tanith Lee, Terry Prattchet, and A.S. Byatt) and Australia (Margo Lanagan and 
Angela Slatter). 
15 See R. Kassel, ed., Aristotle's Ars Poetica, 1448a, 1-5. 
16 Robert Scholes presents a similar synthesis of Aristotle in his Structuralism in Literature: “These 
primary modes of fiction are . . . based on three possible relations between any fictional world and the 
world of experience. A fictional world can be better than the world of experience, worse than it, or 
equal to it.” See Scholes, Structuralism in Literature, 32. 
17 See Butcher, ed., Poetics, 11; Else, Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument, 68, 77-78; Frye, Anatomy of 
Criticism, 33; and House, Aristotle’s Poetics, 82. 
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intimation of an ordinary average or “third class” (Else 79).18 Although highly 
contested, this third class is inferred through Aristotle’s use of the term toioútos 
(τοιοῦτος) in the phrase, “ἦ καί τοιοῦτος” (1448a5), which has been rendered as: “or 
also men like (it?)” (Else 68), “or exactly as they are” (Twining 7), and “or exactly 
such as we ourselves are” (Warrington 5). Seeing this to indicate an independent 
category, this passage has been interpreted by Johannes Sykutris as a suggestion of a 
tripartite synthetic rather than a bipartite analytic (Else 79, n.54) and by Augusto 
Rostagni as a discrete “Mean” or intermediate character type in Aristotle’s system 
(Aristotele Poetica 9).19 However, regardless of whether this phrase indicates an 
intermediary type, a synthesis, or simply represents an awkward addendum to the 
original (as has also been proposed),20 Aristotle’s dichotomy makes a threshold not 
only logically necessary as a means of delineation between spoudaios and phaulos, 
but also necessary as a means of relating the specific conditions of this delineation to 
an audience that might provide the normative function of projecting itself as an 
intermediary device, and thereby, in a very real sense, becoming the threshold itself. 
Such a threshold of experience would suggest that the shift in the level of the 
fictional hero’s power of action is always relative to this projected, normative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument, Gerald F. Else outlines the subtleties of Aristotle’s ethical 
distinction: “1. The dichotomy is moral, but not in the Platonic, much less in a Christian sense. 2. It 
denotes, not virtue and vice as states, but two different attitudes toward virtue. The spoudaîoi are 
those who strive for it, who spend their lives, and if necessary lose them, for the prize of aretê. The 
jaûloi are those who do not. They are not vicious but ‘no-account,’ those who spend their lives 
making money, or ‘having fun,’ or both.” See Else, Aristotle’s Poetics, 77. For a more thorough 
analysis of the centuries long debate over the various renderings and interpretations of spoudaios and 
phaulos. See also Golden “Aristotle, Frye, and the Theory of Tragedy,” 50; Reeves, The “Aristotelian 
Concept of the Tragic Hero,” 172-188; and Smithson, “The Moral View of Aristotle's Poetics,” 3-17. 
19 Else challenges the veracity of these claims, stating: “The dichotomy is… absolute and 
comprehensive. All men who act… are necessarily either spoudaîoi or φαῦloi; there is no room for a 
third class.” See Else, Aristotle’s Poetics, 77. 
20 Else, Aristotle’s Poetics, 79-82. 
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audience (i.e., a reader presumed to be more or less neutral in power of action).21 As 
a normative axis or “degree zero” to the protagonist’s power of action, this threshold 
also marks the border between two separate realms of literature, referred to here as 
the realm of identification (marked by the forms relating to the phaulos) and the 
realm of abstraction (marked by the forms related to the spoudaios). As far as the 
fictional hero’s power of action is concerned, the realm of identification contains and 
is defined by those narrative modes wherein the hero or narrator’s power of action 
and level of experience is either inferior to or equivalent with that of an assumed 
neutral audience, such as in the low mimetic and ironic modes. Likewise, the realm 
of abstraction contains and is defined by those narrative modes wherein the hero or 
narrator exhibits a power of action discernibly superior to that of an assumed neutral 
audience, such as in the high mimetic, romantic and mythic modes. 
However, in order for the power of action dialectic that this threshold 
delineates to have any stable critical application at all, a revised model of modal shift 
must permit the literary mode to tend toward the mythic not as the next stage in a 
rotating cycle of “eternal recurrence,” but only when describing a helical pattern of 
perpetual, repetitive difference. In this revised model it is proposed that the dominant 
fictional mode passes from dominant modal phase to dominant modal phase ever 
downward into the realm of identification—charting the decrease in the hero’s power 
of action as observed in the shift from the high mimetic into the low mimetic and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In An Anatomy of Literature, Robert Foulke and Paul Smith refer directly to the reader’s normative 
function in their interpretation of mode: “We will define the term mode as a conventional assumption 
about the nature and limits of a central character’s power of action. The definition implies something 
like an agreement between the author’s preliminary ideas and the reader’s consequent expectations of 
a fictional world. When we read a literary work and respond to its mode, we attempt to reconstruct the 
conditions or terms under which such a concept of action is possible. We become part of that audience 
contemporary with the writer to the extent that we understand and for the moment assent to his 
assumptions about what men can do or think that they can do.” See Foulke and Smith, An Anatomy of 
Literature, 14. 
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ironic—before entering a pre-mythic stage of modal ascent—marking the 
discernable increase in the narrator’s power of action as the mode shifts from the 
ironic to the higher modal position that it inhabits in the postmodern and post-
postmodern periods. As the dominant mode follows this spiral movement through the 
realms of this dialectic, narrative patterns, archetypes, and other aesthetic forms of 
the past are projected diachronically forward through the matrix of the constantly 
evolving dominant mode, providing the linguistic fundament upon which each 
successive literary or linguistic act is superimposed, like beams of light being cast 
from the lower levels of a spiraling glass staircase, reflecting, refracting, and sending 
up shadows from the depths of literary precedent.  
This spiral structure explains the profound presence of the mythic in the high 
ironic mode, for from a certain perspective (i.e., looking diachronically back through 
the modal matrix), these two modes appear to occupy a similar modal and semiotic 
position, however, the temporal distance between these modes (i.e., the time taken 
for this spiraling modal progression to return to a similar dialectical location) 
explains their obvious differences in epistemology and linguistic structure. Though 
this model indicates that an actual return to the mode of myth might be deferred 
indefinitely, such a model would suitably account for both the temporal component 
of epochal gravitation (i.e., the perpetual progression of the dominant mode through 
the two realms of the dialectic) and the modal variance in power of action without 
resulting in the inexplicable “leap” that would obtain in the resolution of Frye’s 
modal cycle.   
As indicated above, such a dialectical spiral would preclude any kind of 
dominant shift towards the mode of mythical narrative discourse as it is already 
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known in precedent forms of mythopoesis. In place of this return what is seen to 
develop as the dominant mode ascends, during the postmodern period, into the realm 
of abstraction is an advanced mode of irony, or “high irony,” wherein the protagonist 
is expanded out of a specific narrative position and into the language used to portray 
his/her actions while the narrative voice also begins to exhibit a power of action that 
tends to be equivalent to or greater than that of the reader. Within this emergent 
mode of irony, the narrative environment surrounding the protagonist/narrator is also 
typically subject to compositional modulations that alter both the protagonist’s and 
the narrator’s power of action, identity, and narrative environment. As a result, the 
line separating the protagonist/narrator and the narrative environment often appears 
arbitrary, absent, or reversed, such that the narrative world seems to morph and twist 
capriciously, without apparent purpose to the progress of the narrative, or simply at 
the whim of the protagonist/narrator.  
As the following passages illustrate, these alterations to the protagonist’s 
and/or narrator’s power of action, identity, and narrative environment result from the 
ironic foregrounding of the linguistic and rhetorical artificiality of the narrative as a 
verbal construct. This high ironic current of self-reflexive narration runs the gamut 
from zany slapstick, as in Robert Coover’s “Cartoon,” from A Night at the Movies 
(1987): 
With a heavy heart (what a universe!), he goes into the bathroom to flush 
the cartoon car down the toilet and discovers, glancing in the mirror, that, 
above the cartoon napkin still tucked into his collar like a lolling tongue, 
he seems to have grown a pair of cartoon ears. They stick out from the 
sides of his head like butterfly wings. Well, well, he thinks, wagging his 
new ears animatedly, or perhaps being wagged by them, there’s hope for 
me yet . . . (139) 
 
… to the deranged, quotidian meanderings of Richard Brautigan’s Trout Fishing in 
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America (1967): 
        Around five o’clock in the afternoon of my cover for Trout Fishing 
in America, people gather in the park across the street from the church 
and they are hungry. 
        It’s sandwich time for the poor. 
        But they cannot cross the street until the signal is given. Then they 
all run across the street to the church and get their sandwiches that are 
wrapped in newspaper. They go back to the park and unwrap the 
newspaper and see what their sandwiches are all about. (2) 
 
… to the dialogized, macabre of Joyce Carol Oates’s eponymous parody of Henry 
James’s “The Turn of the Screw,” from her 1972 story collection, Marriages and 
Infidelities: 
Tuesday, July 6. 
A Wide stony beach. Pebbles 
big as hands. Here the sky is 
bluer than it is at home. Got 
out of the hotel before anyone 
could say hello – need to be 
alone after last night. Uncle 
and his hacking cough! Stayed 
up most of the night with him. 
His coughing is like the noise 
of the earth [ . . . ]  
Tuesday, July 6. 
Alone here, hidden, sick at 
heart. Away from that horrible 
numerosity. The oppression of 
the London sky, terraces bathed 
in evil light, the tonnage of 
history, too many horizons 
brought up short . . . . 
Chimneys that mock, beckon. 
Stained and weathered like 
cheeses. . . . (363) 
 
While each of these metafictional texts develops a vastly different plot, syntax, and 
aesthetic, they each parodically explore a set of conventions (Coover, the vocabulary 
of pop-culture fantasy; Brautigan, literary journalism; Oates, 19th century stylistics). 
And as these passages demonstrate, within the high ironic mode, this type of critical, 
parodic exploration can be led wherever the narrator sees fit: from one parodic frame 
to another, from one system of logic to another, and from the comfortable confines of 
literary convention to the linguistic disintegration of reality.  
But even as reality dissolves, there is running through each of these passages 
a distinct, almost familiar sense of interiority, a sense of being inside the moment of 
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experience as it becomes language and (through articulation and enumeration) 
changes into narrative. Gone is the paralyzing omniscience of the low ironic, 
totalizing gaze, replaced by the psychotic perspective of sub-persona imminence, of 
being allowed behind the mask (yet still being shown the world through the linguistic 
eye-holes of that mask) and even at times being allowed into the neurotic viscera of 
the narrative mind in production, and there, within, “discovering design in its 
seeming formlessness as a viewer of the night sky might read in its starry splatter the 
hidden pattern of the universe” as Coover puts it in “On Mrs. Willie Masters” (20). 
Through a foregrounding of language and syntax and a parodic overlapping of 
contradictory perspectives, parodic texts like those above intimate that from within 
the “seeming formlessness” of experience will always emerge the interpretive design 
of narrative. 
Analysis of the linguistic process behind this parodic metafictional practice 
reveals that the extreme heightening of the degree of the artificiality—through 
structural innovation, the use of bizarre vernacular or nonsense language, random or 
protracted digression, disorienting shifts in narrative direction or point of view, 
emphasis on the arbitrary nature of the narration, etc.—has the effect of enhancing 
the degree of the narrator’s power of action by severely undermining any 
presupposed limitations to the exercise of that power.22 And attendant with this sense 
that anything could happen at any moment, the expansion of the narrator’s power of 
action suggests a modal trajectory away from the realm of identification and ever 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Larry McCaffery writes: “These formal features, along with more blatant devices (such as having 
the narrator of a work engage the reader in a dialogue about the book he is reading), force us to 
consider the book we are reading as an artifact, undercutting the realistic impulses of the work and 
turning it into a ‘self-reflexive’ creation in that it not only takes art as its subject but tries to be its own 
subject,” quoted in Currie, Metafiction, 183. 
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further into the realm of abstraction.  
These shifts in the protagonist’s and narrator’s power of action thereby appear 
to maneuver the mode to an intermediary position between the mode of “low irony” 
(i.e., Frye’s “ironic mode”) and myth. However, unlike the low ironic mode, which 
typically derives its narrative structures through “the application of romantic 
mythical forms to a more realistic content” (Frye 223), the high ironic mode is more: 
the displacement of precedent narrative forms—especially myth and nonfiction —to 
a parodically self-reflexive context. And as a more abstract and narratorially 
expansive mode of ironic narrative discourse it is more open to the free mixing and 
re-configuration of parody and parodic forms—political satire upon picaresque 
lampoon, such as in Kathy Acker’s Don Quixote or Donald Barthelme’s The King, 
parody upon parody, as in William H. Gass’s Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife, or 
even the risus purus of parody upon parody upon parody, as in Robert Coover’s “On 
Mrs. Willie Masters”23—thereby offering a means of simultaneously interrogating 
precedent forms of narrative and bringing the subversive edge of irony to bear on the 
text’s own formulations.  
As Linda Hutcheon writes in A Poetics of Postmodernism, “The collective 
weight of [postmodern] parodic practice suggests a redefinition of parody as 
repetition with critical distance that allows ironic signaling of difference at the very 
heart of similarity” (26, Hutcheon’s emphasis). And few modes of narrative are more 
open for metafictional parody than myth and nonfiction. However, rather than simply 
“re-telling” forms of myth or history in a contemporary and, therefore, automatically 
ironic setting (as is common in low ironic parody and in works of postmodern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In Watt, Samuel Beckett writes “the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, the laugh laughing at the 
laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the highest joke. . . .” See Beckett, Watt, 48. 
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mythopoesis), high ironic parody is typically an accentuation of the already fabulous 
and/or grandly authoritative narrative source material and is most often set in a 
mutated world of factual and fictional equivalencies—a world certainly unlike any 
world previously experienced by the reader in any kind of extra-textual context.   
The semiotic transparency of myth and the concrete materiality of history 
make both of them ideal narrative templates for metafictional parodic re-
appropriation. However, rather than dealing with both sets of parodic relations at 
once, this dissertation will first consider the structure of the high ironic re-
appropriation of mythical forms prior to returning to the question of high ironic re-
deployments of history and nonfictional forms in the following chapter. 
 
Myth as a Formal Template 
According to Claude Lévi-Strauss’s analysis in “The Structural Study of 
Myth,” its revisable flexibility of form and amenity to new narrative formats are 
some of the defining characteristics of myth. Lévi-Strauss writes: 
[The] substance [of myth] does not lie in its style, its original music, or 
its syntax, but in the story which tells it. Myth is language functioning on 
an especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at “taking 
off” from the linguistic ground on which it keeps rolling. (430-31, Lévi-
Strauss’s emphasis) 
 
Because myth is made to be passed from generation to generation, voice to voice, 
place to place, in an always already adaptive style of narrative transmission, its 
ephemeral, easily manipulable semiotic structure makes myth a ready template for 
metafictional parody.24 Within this mode myth becomes, in a sense, a formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In Narcissistic Narrative, Linda Hutcheon writes: “Parody, according to the formalist theoreticians, 
is the result of a conflict between realistic motivation and an aesthetic motivation which has become 
weak and has been made obvious. The consequence is the unmasking of the system or of the creative 
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“stencil” to be traced and refashioned to suit whatever target the parodist deems 
worthy of attack. Case in point is Donald Barthelme’s parodic Snow White (for a 
more thorough analysis of Barthelme’s Snow White, see also Chapter Four).  
Although Donald Barthelme’s Snow White could never, by any stretch of the 
imagination, be categorized as a more realistic reinterpretation of Jakob and Wilhelm 
Grimm’s “Little Snow-White” (1812), nor even an adaptation of the version 
forwarded in Walt Disney’s Snow White and the Seven Dwarves (1937), Barthelme 
certainly owes the reader’s familiarity with the tale’s characters and plot structure to 
precedent versions of the tale.25 As Barthelme remarks in an interview with Larry 
McCaffery, “Again, the usefulness of the Snow White story is that everybody knows 
it and it can be played against. . . . Every small change in the story is momentous 
when everybody knows the story backward. . . .” (in LeClair and McCaffery 42-43). 
And as is typical of narrative irony, this familiarity (e.g., the reader’s expectation that 
the princess be lovely, the witch evil, the dwarves loyal) is methodically drawn upon 
and subverted during the course of the novel. But what makes Barthelme’s high 
ironic version of the tale more of a parody on parody — rather than a formal low 
ironic parody or a simple retelling of the myth — are the following:  
1) Barthelme’s Snow White employs a host of shifting narrators (each 
character randomly throwing in a new voice and perspective), thereby 
constantly undermining the development of any sense of narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
process whose function has given way to mechanical convention. It is as if a dialectic were 
established, as if this parodied material were background to the new forms and thus a formal synthesis 
effected. If a new parodic form does not develop when an old one becomes insufficiently motivated, 
the old form tends to degenerate into pure convention; witness the popular traditional novel, the best-
seller.” See Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative, 24. 
25 For an exhaustive overview of the many varieties of “Snow White” and other variations of Aarne-
Thompson-Uther type 709, see D. L. Ashliman’s Folklore and Mythology: Electronic Texts website 
hosted by the University of Pittsburgh. <http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/type0709.html>. 
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coherence or narratorial identity and, thereby, expanding the narrative 
agency of the narrator beyond a single position. 
2) Barthelme’s Snow White maintains a self-conscious, deceptively 
transparent attitude towards its borrowed theme, the narrative forever on 
the verge of establishing thematic parallels to the traditional form of the 
narrative only to see them systematically destroyed. 26  
3) Barthelme’s version uses the hollowed-out shell of the myth to conduct 
carefully structured intertextual attacks on the very cultural discourses 
that directly and indirectly act to maintain the “Snow White” narrative 
pattern and system of logic as cultural institutions (e.g., phallocentrism, 
psychoanalysis, rationality, courtly love).27  
4) Barthelme’s Snow White relies more upon the rhetorical mixing and 
juxtaposing of various patterns and forms than upon the dislocation of a 
single narrative pattern (e.g., Barthelme’s paraphrase of Freud’s “On the 
Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” which 
introduces Snow White’s exhaustive list of potential princes [82-83]).  
Another important feature of the multi-layer parody used in Barthelme’s Snow White 
derives from the fact that, because the historical time period within the narrative has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In a certain sense, complex parody of this kind exists more as an example of meta-irony than pure 
irony while also giving the distinct impression of being more meta-myth than myth; a reminder of 
Lévi-Strauss’s statement that, “we define the myth as consisting of all its versions; to put it otherwise: 
a myth remains the same as long as it is felt as such.” See Lévi-Strauss, “The Structural Study of 
Myth,” 435.  
27 The politically critical approach of high irony often assumes an apostatic attitude towards 
simulation, superficially feigning to inhabit the anagogic structures that it parodies while 
simultaneously evacuating them of stable, a priori meaning. However, as Lutz Röhrich points out in 
Gebärde – Metapher – Parodie, new meaning is created through revision: “Parodistische 
Veränderungen vorgegebenen Traditionsmaterials dürfen nicht nur negativ als Zersungenes oder 
Zersagtes angesehen werden. Sie offenbaren zugleich auch einen Prozess sprachlicher Umbildung und 
Neubildung” [Parodic modifications of given traditional material may not only be regarded negatively 
as destroyed solutions or destroyed speech. They reveal at the same time also a process of linguistic 
reorganization and reformation] (my translation). See Röhrich, Gebärde – Metapher – Parodie, 221. 
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been warped beyond recognition, the contemporary idioms, items, and historical 
references scattered throughout the novel (e.g., references to trench warfare [63], 
Snow White as a “goddamn degenerate” [98], National Geographic [124], etc.) 
never seem to resonate any “real world” environment, nor even a recognizable 
“fairytale world” environment. Instead, these items and idioms act to establish a 
hybrid, fairytale-meets-quotidian “textscape” that seems ever on the verge of 
collapsing under the weight of its own bloated linguistic structures. 
Barthelme’s use of parody as a platform for the forensic dissection of fairy 
tale archetypes and, indeed, the narrative act itself (both as a formal network of 
linguistic relations and as a socio-culturally responsive matrix of ontological and 
epistemological systems), provides a perfect example of the attitude many 
postmodern authors have towards myth and mimesis as the mode tends ever more 
towards what Mas’ud Zavarzadeh describes as, “. . . a zone of experience where the 
factual is not secure or unequivocal but seems preternaturally strange and eerie, and 
where the fictional seems not at all that fictitious, remote and alien, but bears an 
uncanny resemblance to daily experience” (The Mythopoeic Reality 56). Although 
this topsy-turvy zone between factual fiction and fictional fantasy can be, at times, a 
disorienting experience for the reader to navigate, it is a necessary reminder that 
there is not, nor could there ever be “an accurate representation of the way the world 
is in itself” (Rorty 4). There are only the narrative accounts of encounters with this, 
that, or another world — all of which can be read ironically. 
According to Hayden White’s assessment in Metahistory, the intermediary 
stage of ironic modal development that attends this narrative rendering of reality, 
“prepares consciousness for its repudiation of all sophisticated conceptualizations of 
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the world and anticipates a return to a mythic apprehension of the world and its 
processes” (10). However, White’s anticipation of a return to “mythic apprehension” 
need not require a literary return to the mode of myth in order to be encountered—
myth continues to exist along side, within, and perhaps even through, its inversion 
and parodic deconstruction. Indeed, no qualification is required in stating that myth 
is resilient, regenerative, and as simple and prolific as a virus (to borrow an analogy 
from Burroughs). However, rather than acting as a generative narrative host for the 
material of myth, the parodic mythical forms of high ironic metafiction only share as 
much linguistic and rhetorical material with myth as is necessary to show that this 
material is not as empty and innocent as it might appear. Herein lies the critical 
difference between the mode of myth and the mode of high irony. For where 
narrative myth typically foregrounds its formal structures as a means of masking, or, 
camouflaging its hidden ideological content (a topic returned to in the following 
chapter), high ironic metafiction foregrounds its formal structures in order to display 
to the reader the various ways that ideology can be contained within and subverted 
by language.  
As the following section will discuss, metafiction performs a similar semiotic 
function to myth in its capacity to shift the reader’s attention toward the form. 
However, unlike the semiotic structure of myth, which conceals its message behind a 
perpetually changeable screen of empty signifiers and detached, transcendent 
signifieds, in the high ironic narrative this emphasis or foregrounding of form is 
instead aimed at magnifying the denotative instabilities and ironically variable 
connotations of the signifier and, thereby, multiplying the potential semiotic relations 
between the signifier and its myriad possible signifieds.  
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The discernable postmodern imbalance between signifier and signified, as 
Julia Kristeva points out in her essay, “Postmodernism?” characterizes metafiction as 
a literature of paradoxical expansion and reduction, a “literature which writes itself 
with the more or less conscious intention of expanding the signified, and thus human, 
realm” (137), yet is articulated to a such a diverse “degree of singularity” that “we 
are faced with idiolects, proliferating uncontrollably” (141). The result is a critical 
reduction of all conceptualizations of the world (whether “sophisticated,” “human,” 
or otherwise) to narrative descriptions of varying vocabulary and imaginative scope. 
At the same time, this shift also puts greater emphasis on the writer’s paradoxically 
expanded, “singular” capacity to explore the nature of this vocabulary and the 
ideological content that exists within these imagined narrative structures.  
Yet, even within the realm of abstraction, there seems to be a happy medium 
between a slide back towards convention and a complete loss of orbit. For as the high 
ironic mode ascends above the threshold of experience, narrative appears to increase 
in its meta-fictionality relative to its semiotic position above this threshold. This 
process occurs to the extent that increased proximity to the signifier and distance 
from the signified indicates the linguistic intensity of the metafiction. But when the 
signifier has been so completely detached from the signified that meaning creation is 
denied and the text begins to dissemble little more than itself, the signifying function 
of the narrative dissolves into complete incoherence.  
The type of text resulting from such a complete semiotic dissolution might be 
thought of as akin to what Roland Barthes refers to as “receivable,” the text beyond 
the denotative and connotative capacities of the “readerly” or “writerly,” the 
indecipherable text that is only capable of exerting an uncertain sense of verbal 
 
	   52	  
presence:28  
The receivable would be the unreaderly text which catches hold, the red-
hot text, a product continuously outside of any likelihood and whose 
function—visibly assumed by its scriptor—would be to contest the 
mercantile constraint of what is written; this text, guided, armed by a 
notion of the unpublishable, would require the following response: I can 
neither read nor write what you produce, but I receive it, like a fire, a 
drug, an enigmatic disorganization. (Roland Barthes, 118, Barthes’s 
emphasis) 
 
This often happens at the extreme metafictional edge of the realm of abstraction and 
notable examples might include Ihab Hassan’s random, computerized mash-up of the 
last 333 words of James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake and the last 333 words of Samuel 
Beckett’s The Unnamable in the third section of Hassan’s Paracriticisms: 
It them so then still though my one old words nor me silence go going 
until a hair soft whish nor the mad never two on and I it’s abandon my 
hang last she far hang it mere wake two again full said of on  . . . . (70-
71) 
 
The “receivable” is also immediately apparent in texts such as Nigel Tomm’s The 
Blah Story (running to an utterly catatonic 11,300,000 “words”):29 
blah to blah her for blah dared to blah 
somewhenotodayoundressomecologicalinenumerousexyeslowillingnessh
otstrangereactioneglectabulationumberightonightomorrowidoweremembe
rsufficientogethernessobviousoomphilariousayourself. . . . (Volume 19, 3) 
 
In “receivable” texts such as these, the relationship of denotation and connotation, 
signifier and signified, has been so completely removed as to render them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In “The Semiotics of the Foreseen: Modes of Narrative Intelligibility in (Contemporary) Fiction,” 
Zavarzadeh writes: “Barthes adds the mode of ‘receivable’ to the ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ as the edge 
of intelligibility where the narrative’s interrogation of the prevailing patterns of sense making is not 
yet conceptualized.” See Zavarzadeh, “The Semiotics of the Foreseen,” 611. For a definition of these 
terms in their original context, see Barthes, S/Z, 3-5; and Barthes, Roland Barthes, 116-19. 
29 According to Wikipedia, Nigel Tomm’s novel ranks second for longest self-published or 
controversial novel, situated between Mark Leach’s Marienbad My Love – 13 million words – and 
Henry Darger’s The Story of the Vivian Girls – 9 million words. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of  
_longest_novels>: 23 September, 2011. 
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functionally unintelligible.30 The form of the form itself is taken as the focus and 
then zoomed in on to obscurity, re-/disorganized, or un-syntaxed to, thereby, separate 
the token from the referent, the signifier from the signified, essentially producing a 
pure textual object (i.e., Barthes’s “product continuously outside of any likelihood”) 
through a process of extreme auto-referentiality. But if a text is so semantically void 
that it can only obliquely refer to itself, is it still narrative? 
According to Paul de Man’s assessment in Romanticism and Contemporary 
Criticism, the crucial aspect of narrative that these “receivable” texts displace (or 
conspicuously misplace) is not so much their referentiality to an external reality or a 
sense of vraisemblance, but rather a discernable point of view. As de Man states 
bluntly, “There can, indeed, be no narrative without point of view” (14). While this 
truism might appear to stand on its own as a reasonable point of narrative definition, 
de Man explores the case further and asks: 
. . . since the correlative of all narrative is the constitution of a “point of 
view” to be occupied by the narrator, what then is the subjective 
necessity that prompts the creation of such a privileged view point? 
Instead of showing that point of view exists for the sake of narrative – 
which is tautological – one should ask how and why narrative (in itself 
useless) exists for the sake of point of view. (14-15) 
 
This one of the theoretical questions that high ironic metafiction attempts to critically 
investigate. And, as the next section of this chapter will argue, investigation of this 
question not only helps to define the semiotic location of metafiction in relation to 
both mythical and more representational forms of narrative, it also goes a long way 
in explaining the auto-critical orientation of metafictional parody as well as the 
radical repositioning of character and narrator that occurs in the high ironic mode.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Mas’ud Zavarzadeh terms texts such as these, “(deliberate) ill-formedness.” See Zavarzadeh, 
“Semiotics of the Foreseen,” 611. 
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Towards a Semiotics of Metafiction 
Firstly, in order to accurately define the characteristics of metafiction within 
the high ironic mode, it is necessary to locate it in comparison to other categories of 
contemporary narrative. By applying the revised structure of modal progression 
discussed earlier in the chapter to the semiotic model of narrative intelligibility that 
Zavarzadeh proposes in his essay, “The Semiotics of the Foreseen: Modes of 
Narrative Intelligibility in (Contemporary) Fiction,” the precise delimitations and 
semiotic characteristics of nonfiction, metafiction, myth, realistic fiction become 
easier to compare (see Figure 1). 
“In the first encounter with a narrative,” Zavazadeh writes, “the reader’s 
attempts to understand it evolve around situating the narrative on a grid of narratives 
with which he is familiar” (609). This process separates textual literature into four 
distinct zones of intelligibility, based initially upon the reader’s reaction to the 
narrative at the linguistic level. According to Zavarzadeh’s analysis: zone I, 
“Nonfiction,” indicates a heightened emphasis being placed upon the direct, 
referential relationship between signifier and signified; zone II, “Metafiction,” 
indicates a heightened emphasis upon the signifier but a lessening of emphasis upon 
the signified; zone III, “Myth,” indicates a lessening of emphasis upon both signifier 
and signified; and zone IV, “Realistic Fiction,” indicates a heightened emphasis upon 
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Figure 1. Diagram representing the semiotic relations between Zavarzadeh’s four modes of narrative 
intelligibility: nonfiction, metafiction, myth, and realistic fiction. Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, “The Semiotics 




Following Zavazadeh’s model, the realm of identification (corresponding to 
zones I and IV), in a semiotic sense, indicates a significant proximity to the signified. 
Likewise, the realm of abstraction (corresponding to zones II and III) is marked by 
distance from the signified; and for metafiction specifically, distance from the 
signified and a proximity to the signifier. As the dominant mode tends towards one 
or another of these semiotic zones, the linguistic qualities (as well as the rhetorical 
tropes and figures that attend these qualities) shift accordingly. Furthermore, 
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tendency towards one or the other of these two realms indicates either a “centripetal” 
or “centrifugal” force, as Zavarzadeh explains: 
If the narrative foregrounds the conventions of narration and writing and 
consequently becomes an allegory of its own composition and internal 
semiosis, it is designated by readers as a centripetal narrative which is 
self-engendering and is preoccupied by its own materiality, or to use 
Saussure's term, the shape of its “signifier.” On the other hand, if the 
fiction uses the conventions of narration and writing merely as a means 
for reaching outside those conventions, and therefore in the process of its 
semiosis conceals its own narrative apparatus, it is regarded by the reader 
as a centrifugal narrative. The centrifugal fiction is that which promises 
the discovery of an extra-textual terrain of experience and as such is 
centered on what it claims to represent, namely, its “signified.” (“The 
Semiotics of the Foreseen” 614) 
 
Because they are both essentially “centripetal” forms of narrative (i.e., revealing 
rather than concealing the semiotic forms and linguistic processes that constitute 
narrative structure), metafiction and myth share a common movement away from any 
kind of “extra-textual terrain of experience” and instead interpret and represent 
experience in an intertextual, symbolic and/or metaphorical manner. Most 
metafictional texts, however, resist a complete detachment from the signified and 
instead rely heavily upon a symbolically regulated, metaphorical gravitation back 
towards the signified for the establishment of intelligibility; hence the second order 
quality implied by the “meta-” prefix of metafiction. Ideally there is a constant 
feedback maintained between the metafictional proximity to the signifier and the 
force of the signifier’s conceptual pull towards completing the semiotic loop; hence 
the centripetal tendency towards the “zero point.”  
This also explains, to some extent, the perpetual rotation of modal 
progression around the threshold of experience. For Zavarzadeh’s “zero point” and 
the proposed threshold of experience should be thought of as analogous points of 
normative delineation; each describing a moment of intertextual and experiential 
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connectivity with a normative “ideal reader” and, in Zavarzadeh’s system, the point 
from which this naturalizing process of narrative intelligibility is initiated (“The 
Semiotics of the Foreseen” 608). In metafiction there is a constant tension with this 
threshold or “zero point,” a tension that keeps the mode from floating off into the 
indecipherable darkness of the “receivable,” and yet locates and establishes the mode 
at a critical distance to mimetic convention.    
Unlike the other three zones of narrative intelligibility that Zavarzadeh 
describes, each pulling in its own fashion away from this “zero point” — myth in its 
constant refusal of semiotic groundedness (despite its supposedly centripetal nature), 
nonfiction in its impossible desire for perfect semiotic groundedness, and realist 
fiction in its representational illusion of semiotic groundedness — metafiction 
attempts to tentatively ground itself in the experience of the reader. As Linda 
Hutcheon writes in Narcissistic Narrative: The Metafictional Paradox: — 
The linguistic self-reflexiveness or even self-generation of the text are 
forms of resistance to the act of reading, shifting attention to the 
semantic, syntactic, and often also phonetic texture of the words which 
actually serve to structure as well as constitute the work. This centripetal 
pull, however, does not cut the reader off from what has here been called 
‘vital’ of life experience. While it is true that the work becomes a self-
contained artificial unit, nevertheless, the extramural link is made 
through the process of fiction-making in language, the creation of worlds 
in words. (119) 
 
And in requiring the reader’s participative interaction with these “worlds in words,” 
metafiction projects itself as a synthetic means of uniting and multiplying discourse 
by directly engaging with the fact that, as Zavarzadeh puts it, “one may never be able 
to move out of language systems” (“The Semiotics of the Foreseen” 620). Thus, 
more “receivable” examples of metafiction — in being covert attempts to move out 
of these language systems — fail to connect meaningfully to this centripetal 
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intertextuality and, in severing all semiotic ties binding signifier and signified, cause 
these textual structures to spin away from the forms and structures of intelligible 
narrative, becoming in the process merely arbitrary collections of symbols signifying 
nothing but themselves. 
In metafiction, this constant binary pull towards and away from the threshold 
of experience (or “zero point”) is regulated by the critical function of its 
fundamentally parodic nature. As Zavarzadeh stipulates, “Metafiction and other 
modes of self-reflexivity in narrative are grammatological interrogations of 
intelligibility itself, especially the public intelligibility as appropriated and narrated 
in mimetic fictions” (621); hence the metafictional tendency to parodic forms of 
grammatological and syntactical interference within this mode. And by virtue of its 
central semiotic position between myth and nonfiction, metafiction is capable of 
subjecting both to intense linguistic scrutiny, playing one off of the other, and then 
turning the interrogation in on itself (Zavarzadeh 621; Gasche 177-215). The 
inherently interrogative, critically self-reflexive, and ironically multiple nature of this 
mode make it, therefore, an ideal narrative environment for parody. 
So how does the parodic nature of metafiction relate to de Man’s query as to 
the how and why of narrative as a vehicle for point of view? Metafiction answers this 
question by way of its emphasis of the reader’s role in the construction of point of 
view. And as a participative agent in the linguistic construction of this point of view, 
the reader’s own perspective becomes just as important as the point of view 
tentatively offered and/or fractured by the metafictional narrative.31 Indeed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In her own analysis of de Man, Claire Colebrook states, “The awareness of point of view . . . is 
given in ironic literature. It is only through the linguistic event of narration that points of view are 
effected.” See Colebrook, Irony in the Work of Philosophy, 154-55. 
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metafiction turns de Man’s question on its head and replies that point of view does 
not simply exist for the sake of narrative, nor does narrative exist merely as a vehicle 
for a privileged point of view, but rather, it is the reader that links the narration to the 
narrative, because it is the reader’s active interaction with the narrator, as well as the 
interpretative strategies followed by the reader, that allow the narrative to exist in the 
first place.  
As seen in the examples forwarded previously, by distancing the reader not 
only from conventional mimetic forms but also from conventional reading practices, 
metafiction intensifies the hermeneutic obligations, indeed, the ultimate hermeneutic 
responsibilities of the reader. And parody sets up a perfect environment for this 
process through its basic requirement that the reader develop a decoding strategy. 
This sets the reader at a critical distance to the text from the very outset, immediately 
changing the reader’s direct relationship with the text (i.e., reader — text — stable 
meaning) to an indirect relationship mediated by reader’s capacity to effectively 
navigate the forms of the parody, the encoded language, and the text’s own 
interpretations of the parodic narrative (i.e., reader — parodic code — decoding 
strategy — indefinite meaning[s]). As Linda Hutcheon writes: 
. . . the parody and self-reflection of narcissistic narrative [i.e., 
metafiction] work to prevent the reader’s identification with any 
character and to force a new, more active, thinking relationship upon 
him. It becomes increasingly clear that, though free to interpret, the 
reader is also responsible for his interpretation. (Narcissistic Narrative 
49) 
 
In metafiction this process is further highlighted by the writer’s insertion of 
“metacommentary” into the narrative: self-reflexive observations, usually by the 
narrator, applied either as an imbedded self-critical device or as a frame-breaking 
 
	   60	  
technique.32 The reader of metafiction is thus charged with the double task of 
interpreting the narrative and then interpreting the narrative’s imposed critique of 
that interpretation.  
In many ways analogous to the writer’s own self-conscious awareness of the 
fiction-making process, the reader’s interaction with metafictional narrative requires 
a similar self-consciousness during the reading experience. This new, interactive 
reading experience, Hutcheon explains in Narcissistic Narrative, “is not one of being 
a consumer of stories, but rather one of learning and constructing a new sign-system, 
a new set of verbal relations” (14). Through this new set of verbal relations, the 
reader’s historically passive role as the member of a voyeur audience — peeking 
through the lens of the narration at the trompe l’oeil of the fictional world — is re-
structured into an active task of decryption. For as the work of metafiction draws 
both narrative and reader into the parodic realm of the ironically encrypted signifier, 
“The novel becomes a new and strange kind of code written almost in hieroglyphs 
and analogous in process to primitive myth or fairy tales” (Narcissistic Narrative 
14). However, unlike in myth, where the narrator’s point of view is secondary or 
even incidental to the context of the story, in high ironic metafiction these roles are 
reversed and point of view, in a very real sense, becomes the context of the story. 
According to Hutcheon, “This results in an added emphasis on diegesis, on the act of 
storytelling. In such fiction, the reader is temporally and spatially oriented in the 
fictional world by the act of narrating itself; the narrating figure is the centre of 
internal reference” (Narcissistic Narrative 51). In high ironic metafiction, point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Jameson, “Metacommentary,” 13. 
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view is raised to a primary position, greatly enhancing the narrator’s power of action 
and expanding the imaginative potential of the narrative.  
Few events in the evolution of literature have been more vital in multiplying 
the forms and formulations of narrative consciousness (and self-consciousness) than 
the advent of this expanded diegetic world-view. But by the same token, few events 
have gone so far to discompose and complicate these same structures. As Alan Wilde 
writes in “Irony in the Postmodern Age”:  
Confronted with the world's randomness and diversity, [narrative 
irony] enacts an attitude (urbi et orbi) of what can most accurately be 
called suspensiveness. The tolerance, that is to say, of a fundamental 
uncertainty about the meanings and relations of things in the world 
and in the universe. (9) 
 
The instability of this postmodern condition of “fundamental uncertainty” seems to 
compel writers working within the mode of high irony to gravitate beyond the 
threshold of experience in search of a means of articulating human experience that is 
capable of expressing its inherent ambiguity, turmoil, grotesqueness and beauty, and 
yet manages to escape the seductive inertia of literary voyeurism.  
The low ironic “looking down upon” is thus revised to a “looking out from,” 
a narrative approach that creates suspensive insight (as it is often fractured, 
incomplete, or inconsistent) into the protagonist’s or narrator’s selective point of 
view and thereby participatively involving the reader in the production of meaning. 
Another similar device common to high ironic fiction is the use of a narrator that 
seems interchangeable with the “author” and intermittently switches back and forth 
between the two;33 the narrative voice is even frequently intimated to be the reader as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  According to David Lodge, this skeptical attitude to the concept of “the author” is in some measure 
a defensive or even self-conscious reaction to contemporary theory. Lodge writes, “The 
foregrounding of the act of authorship within the boundaries of the text, which is such a common 
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well, inserting a second-person “you” into the narration in a direct act of 
implication.34 All of these breaks in perspective and identity, as Alan Wilde argues, 
lead to an uncanny naturalization of difference:  
No longer poised juridically above the world he surveys, the 
postmodern ironist is, typically, involved in, though not necessarily 
with, that world: a part of, even though he may be apart from the other 
objects in, his own perceptual field. . . . The symmetry of modernist 
disorder gives way to the apparent randomness of simple contiguity; 
omniscience of understanding to an indecision about the very 
meanings and relations of things . . . to an attitude that takes for 
granted, more, naturalizes, the abyss as one constituent among others 
of the new, prolific, and dumb reality. (“Barthelme Unfair to 
Kierkegaard: Some Thoughts on Modern and Postmodern Irony” 47-
48) 
 
This high ironic problematizing of identity transforms the passive, voyeuristic 
bondage of low irony into an aggressive form of high ironic performativity. 
Likewise, the existential frustration witnessed by the low ironic protagonist (e.g., 
Camus’s Meursault, Dostoyevsky’s underground man, Hemingway’s Jake Barnes, et 
al.) in high irony is attended by the (reader’s) experiential frustration which obtains 
in the removal of the stable referentiality that once radiated from the linear, causal, 
chronological rationality of static narration.35  
As Raymond Federman writes in Surfiction: Fiction Now…and Tomorrow, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
feature of contemporary fiction, is a defensive response, either conscious or intuitive, to the 
questioning of the idea of the author and of the mimetic function of fiction by modern critical theory.” 
See Lodge, “The Novel Now: Theories and Practices,” 133. 
34 This technique of the “engaging narrator,” having had notable use during the 19th century in the 
works of such writers as Balzac, Carroll, Dickens, Dostoyevsky, and Hawthorne (to name but a few), 
in contemporary metafiction is used less as a rhetorical aside than as a direct insertion of the reader 
into the narrative. For a more extensive analysis, see Warhol, “Toward a Theory of the Engaging 
Narrator,” 811-18. 
35 Alain Robbe-Grillet comes to a similar conclusion in his essay, “On Several Obsolete Notions,” 
stating that: “All the technical elements of the narrative – systematic use of the past tense and the third 
person unconditional, adoption of chronological development, linear plots, regular trajectory of the 
passions, impulse of each episode toward a conclusion, etc. – everything tended to impose the image 
of a stable, coherent, continuous, unequivocal, entirely decipherable universe. Since the intelligibility 
of the world was not even questioned, to tell the story did not raise a problem. The style of the novel 
could be innocent.” See Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel, 32. 
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once a certain doubt is cast upon the authority of the text (i.e., the singular 
intentionality of the author), it becomes the reader’s task to align correspondences 
within the narrative itself and come up with a personal means of constructing and 
verifying his or her own systems of interpretation:  
. . . no longer being manipulated by an authorial point of view, the 
reader will be the one who extracts, invents, creates a meaning and an 
order for the people in the fiction. And it is this total participation in 
the creation which will give the reader a sense of having created a 
meaning and not having simply received, passively, a neatly 
prearranged meaning. (Surfiction 14) 
 
This “total participation” in the semi-private manufacture of meaning is of critical 
importance during the reader’s interactions within this advanced mode of high irony; 
a mode of irony which straddles the line between mythical ontology and nonfictional 
epistemology, and exists within a literature that deals less in fiction per se than in 
fictionalization, in the replication of replicas (Barth’s regressus in infinitum),36 and 
in literary events that engender extraordinary doubt.  
According to Richard Pearce’s assessment in “Enter the Frame,” this 
radically new mode of fiction (which Pearce, following Federman, refers to as 
“surfiction”) has developed as a direct result of these changes in perspective. In this 
new fiction, the rules of the literary game become blurred, the traditionally static 
roles of author, text, and reader are shuffled, and everything appears to issue forth 
from the fictional mind of the narrator. As Pearce writes:  
The narrator is no longer situated between the subject and the reader, he 
no longer stands on a fixed vantage, and he no longer encloses the 
subject within the frame of his visual imagination. Indeed, as he enters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In “Life-Story” from Lost in the Funhouse, Barth writes: “Another story about a writer writing a 
story! Another regressus in infinitum! Who doesn’t prefer art that at least overtly imitates something 
other than its own processes? That doesn’t continually proclaim ‘Don’t forget I’m an artifice’? That 
takes for granted its mimetic nature instead of asserting it in order (not so slyly after all) to deny it, or 
vice-versa?” See Barth, Lost in the Funhouse, 117. 
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the frame, the medium asserts itself as an independent source of interest 
and control. (“Enter the Frame” 48) 
 
As the narrator is placed at critical distance from the narrative itself, the standard 
omniscience of the narrative voice is replaced by a narrator that is no longer reliable, 
that frequently changes the direction of the narrative, and is even heard to argue with 
(or brutally harangue) the characters of the story, the reader, and the “real” author. 
The result of this change in narration, Pearce states, is that:  
. . . what the reader sees is no longer a clear picture contained within the 
narrator’s purview, but an erratic image where the narrator, the subject, 
and the medium are brought into the same imaginative field of 
interaction, an image that is shattered, confused, self-contradictory but 
with an independent and individual life of its own. (“Enter the Frame” 
48) 
 
And as narrator, subject, and medium are brought together under the unified heading 
of a more complete, more authentically fictitious reading experience, this newly 
liberated narrator expands into a whole cocktail of new roles: meta-character, 
pseudo-author, pseudo-reader, intrusive interlocutor, reading companion, and on and 
on. 
This expanded narrator even seems to have the capacity to merge into the text 
itself, disappearing between the lines like Barth’s Polyeidus, popping in and out of 
the word world, as Patricia Waugh puts it, through a playful act of “self-begetting” 
(14). This is possible, Waugh argues, because, “To make a statement in fiction is to 
make a character” (92). Indeed, in Waugh’s analysis, statement and character are 
fused to the extent that, “statements have ‘meaning’ in relation to the context in 
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which they are uttered,” and in fiction, “statement is the character in context” (92).37 
Waugh continues: 
Thus characters in metafiction may explicitly dissolve into statements. 
They may act in ways totally deviant in terms of the logic of the 
everyday ‘commonsense’ world, but perfectly normal within the logic of 
the fictional world of which they are a part. They may travel in time, die 
and carry on living, murder their authors or have affairs with them. Some 
may read about the story of their lives or write the books in which they 
appear. Sometimes they know what is going to happen to them and 
attempt to prevent it. (Metafiction, 92-93)38 
 
As the narrator crosses the ontological divide between the fictional and the “real,” 
the narrator no longer serves the function of integrating these two opposed and yet 
contingent worlds, but rather works to problematize delineation, according to 
Waugh, “by commenting not on the content of the story but on the act of narration 
itself, on the construction of the story” (131). This fracturing of the narrator’s steady 
remove from the narrative world shifts the narrative focus from the content to the 
context, as Linda Hutcheon also observes, “by either making the ‘narration’ into the 
very substance of the novel’s content, or by undermining the traditional coherence of 
the ‘fiction’ itself” (Narcissistic Narrative 28).  This dissertation ventures that the 
high ironic metafiction of the early postmodern period engages in this revisionary 
process in order to gain critical access to the ideological substance concealed beneath 
traditional systems of coherence and within the structural content of narrative. 
Through an expanded narratorial agency made possible via radical shifts in 
narratorial perspective, voice, and idiom, and through a metafictional focus on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Hutcheon makes a similar claim: “The voice of the narrator is not an exterior authenticating 
authorial one; it is the voice of a character.”  See Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative, 63. 
38 Narrators of this variety often populate the biographies of imaginary writers such as in Vladimir 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962), Alan Friedman’s Hermaphrodeity (1972), and Stephen Millhauser’s 
Edwin Mullhouse (1972); and effectively run the show in metafictional, pseudo-autobiographical 
reflections such as Ronald Sukenick’s Up (1970), Steve Katz’s The Exaggerations of Peter Prince 
(1968), and sections of John Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse (1968). See also McCaffery in Currie, 
Metafiction, 183. 
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narrative structure that transforms its parodic source material into a self-reflexive 
matrix of manipulable metaphors, figures, and tropes, narrative within the high ironic 
mode foregrounds its own fictional status and expands the scope of the fictional to 
include all linguistic constructs, speech acts, and narrative events. In so doing, the 
artificial structure of the text is revealed to the reader and the critical implications of 
this self-reflexive critique, thereby, expanded beyond the content of the work to also 
include the relationship of this content to the socio-cultural context surrounding and 
informing the metaphors, figures, and tropes employed in the narrative. This critical 
function designates metafiction as an ideal means of deconstructing the structures 
that make narrative so useful as an ideological delivery device. As discussed in the 
next chapter, it is precisely this critical function that sets high ironic metafiction apart 






















FROM THE PSEUDO-SACRED TO THE PSEUDO-HISTORICAL: 
A TYPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF METAFICTION 
 
 
Tale is the underbelly of myth. Myth is head, tale body; myth power, tale resistance; 
myth nice, tale naughty; myth structure, tale flow; myth king, tale fool; myth sacred, 
tale profane; myth father, tale child (though the child, as always, is the father’s 
father); myth tragic, tale comic. Myths are communal dreamlike fantasies (Freud’s 
“daydream of the race”); tales are more about a person’s waking life. Where 
animals talk, magic abounds, and revenge is sweet. 
 
--- Robert Coover, “Tale, Myth, Writer” 




Semiotic Trajectories and Narrative Tendencies 
 
The above epigraph is significant in a number of ways. It is a reminder of the 
intimately intertwined nature of structure and ideology, paradigm and dogma, within 
the realm of the mythopoeic. It is a reminder that culture (in all of its socio-political 
incarnations, traditions, anxieties, crises, and mechanisms of power) will always play 
a definitive role in the proliferation and interpretation of narrative. It is also a 
reminder that, although myth and (fairy) tale pull in opposite directions, they are 
inseparably connected to one another as the divergent poles of a common axis — tale 
straining violently toward the zero-point of experience, myth pressing outward and 
away from experience, toward the very limits of human comprehension. 
This dual mythopoeic spectrum also assists in clarifying the semiotic 
relationships between the various zones of narrative discourse as introduced in the 
previous chapter. For, as the following diagram illustrates, there is a significant 
correspondence between the tendencies and semiotic characteristics of each of these 
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zones of narrative discourse; each containing its own binary narrative spectrum of 
centripetal and centrifugal currents (see figure 2). 
 
                      
Figure 2. Diagram illustrating the four zones of narrative discourse and their respective centripetal and 
centrifugal tendencies.  
 
 
As illustrated in the diagram above, each of the four zones of narrative discourse 
contains a central spectrum that describes both an inward and an outward tendency. 
Depending on the semiotic characteristics of a given narrative, this tendency 
indicates either a centripetal movement towards the zero-point of experience or a 
centrifugal movement away from the zero-point towards a more extreme 
manifestation of the zone’s semiotic function (i.e., nonfiction [I] S+s+; metafiction 
[II] S+s-; myth [III] S-s-; realistic fiction [IV] S-s+). As described in the previous 
chapter, each of these zones contains either a dominant centrifugal or centripetal 
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movement, however, the presence of this dominant tendency in no way precludes the 
construction of texts that indicate a counter movement. As cultures, popular tastes, 
and dominant theoretical paradigms change, this counter movement can even affect 
such an influence on narrative discourse that a new dominant takes precedence. This 
shift in dominance may, in fact, be currently taking place within the zone of 
nonfiction (I). 
The zone of nonfiction (I) contains two distinct tendencies. One is a 
centrifugal movement that tends towards the pure abstraction of mathematical 
discourse, where token and referent, signified and signifier (word and world) are 
managed into a rigorous, conventional agreement (Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus [1921] might be taken as an archetypal example of this centrifugal 
trend). Moving in the opposite direction is the centripetal tendency of this narrative 
spectrum. This movement tends toward a more experiential type of signification, one 
that is less abstract, less conceptually fixed, but no less rigorous in its projection of 
epistemological solidity. As such, the inner end of the nonfiction spectrum is most 
often the location of biographical and historiographical types of narrative — 
systematic articulations of the world that offer an ordered, logical, if not completely 
technical interpretation of experience; narrative that tends toward the precision of 
scientific method in its assignment of meaning (hence the centrifugal dominance).  
Over the course of the 20th century and well into the 21st there has been a 
discernable trend towards the inner end of this nonfictional spectrum. This trend 
clearly reflects a growing scepticism towards grand, totalizing generalizations of 
society, culture and human nature. Among other things, this scepticism has led to a 
radical re-thinking of Enlightenment theories regarding the stadial structure of 
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history and the influences of causality, contingency, agency and temporality. But 
perhaps most importantly, this scepticism has called for a critical re-appraisal of the 
narrative structure of history itself. Concurrent with this scepticism, this period has 
also seen a steady increase in academic as well as popular interest in the 
anthropological, psychological, and sociological historiographies of the minority 
subject, the subcultural and countercultural subject, and the subject at the social 
periphery. This change in cultural emphasis not only indicates a shift away from the 
dominant centrifugal tendency of the “master narrative” and/or the controlling 
“metanarrative” (as identified and defined by Fredric Jameson, J. F. Lyotard, and 
Hayden White), it also reflects a greater interest in “microhistories” (as defined by 
historians such as Georg G. Iggers, Giovanni Levi, and Carlo Ginzberg)39 and the 
analysis of the singular event and the singular individual. These new developments 
in epistemology, historiography, and the theory of history have problematized 
nonfictional claims to facticity and historicity, drawing this zone of discourse all the 
more into the realm of narratological and semiotic enquiry. This shift in emphasis 
also suggests that a new centripetal dominant may well be in the process of 
establishing itself. This inward tendency, as will be discussed in greater detail later in 
the chapter, is also significant for its movement of the dominant area of nonfictional 
discourse ever closer to the zone of myth (III) and the blending of “historical” legend 
and cultural lore that occurs on the centripetal end of its spectrum.  
Indeed, one of the points argued in this chapter is that, although myth (III) 
and nonfiction (I) are directly opposed zones of narrative discourse (myth pulling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the 
Postmodern Challenge, London: Wesleyan UP, 1997. See also Levi, “On Microhistory,” 93-113; and 
Ginzburg, "Microhistory, Two or Three Things That I Know about It", 93-214. 
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away from the event of experience towards the ontological groundlessness of the 
indescribable and nonfiction pulling away towards the epistemological groundedness 
of scientific observation and precise description), these zones of discourse are in no 
way disconnected. While their courses run in opposite directions, these zones of 
discourse mirror each other in a number of interesting ways, and, like the 
correspondences between legend and history, the sublime infinity of the divine and 
the sublime infinity of quantum physics, these methods of discourse both relate to a 
common, unifying impulse, though myth finds it in utopianism (unified natural 
being) and nonfiction in empiricism (unified natural law). 
Traditionally the arbitration of this interaction has fallen to the discourse of 
realistic fiction (IV). Borrowing elements from both myth and nonfiction, realistic 
fiction proposes a subjective means of interpreting experience via the mimetic 
projection of a world that claims and/or pretends to accurately “reflect” reality. This 
zone of narrative discourse primarily describes a centrifugal movement away from 
the zero-point of experience towards a semiotic grounding that privileges a singular 
perspective and/or a singular definition of the relation of word and world (i.e., a 
grounding that places specific emphasis on detailed characterization, the aesthetics of 
style, and the lexis of the subjective “lens” of reflection; George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life might be taken as a narrative archetype for 
this singular perspective). In direct opposition to the withdrawal from the linguistic 
signified that takes place within the zone of metafiction (II), the spectrum of realistic 
fiction indicates a movement towards the concrete, referential, phenomenological 
signified and away from the abstract verbal representation and the linguistic 
multiplicity of the signifier. However, as in each of the respective zones of narrative 
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discourse, realistic fiction displays two distinct trajectories. The inward movement of 
the spectrum of realistic fiction is more clearly experiential and tends toward directly 
autobiographical forms of narrative such as the diary and the memoir, whereas the 
outward end of this spectrum, describing the dominant centrifugal pull, indicates a 
movement toward the signified that typically places emphasis upon the narrative’s 
fundamental, mimetic nature as a poetic instantiation of reality.  
In opposition to the mimetic discourse of realistic fiction, the zone of 
metafiction (II) contains a spectrum that, on the outer end, tends toward the utterly 
nonsensical, purely absurd silence of the “receivable.” Similar to the breakdown of 
language at the esoteric fringes of the spectrum of myth, at its centrifugal extreme, 
discourse within the zone of metafiction manifests itself as a complete dissolution of 
the signified aspect of the narrative and its replacement with a purely linguistic, 
infinitely self-referential collection of signifiers. The inward movement of the 
metafictional spectrum, however, like the inward movement in each of the zones of 
narrative discourse, is more toward the immediate experiential relation of the 
phonological and the phenomenological, or, in other words, denotes a movement 
towards the actual “event” of experience. As such, the inner end of the metafictional 
spectrum marks a distinct tendency towards a return to the zone of realistic fiction 
(IV). This tendency, as described later in this chapter, explains the shift in power of 
action as the narrative mode descends from the middle point of the zone of 
metafiction, occupied by the high ironic mode, toward the more experiential mode of 
the low ironic. While both narrative modes are characterized by their application of 
the distinctly metafictional mechanism of parody, the self-reflexivity of the low 
ironic is significantly less than that of the high ironic. And as the high ironic mode of 
 
	   73	  
narrative expands toward the centrifugal end of the spectrum, it not only increases 
discernably in its distance from the zero-point of experience, the extremity of its self-
reflexivity also increases, requiring it to draw all the more on the forms and source 
materials of its neighbouring zones of narrative discourse, namely myth (III) and 
nonfiction (I). 
However, instead of arbitrating the terms by which myth and nonfiction relate 
to the world by backgrounding the linguistic nature of narrative (as is typical of 
narrative within the zone of realistic fiction), the metafictional project foregrounds its 
linguistic forms and structures and proposes a purely fictional means of relating to 
the inherently textual, always already semiotically encoded experience of the world. 
As such, the mode of high ironic narrative, which serves as the central mode of the 
zone of metafiction, is notable for its movement away from the kind of detailed 
characterisation and stylistic/lexical mechanisms of mimetic illusion that define 
realistic fiction and more toward an emphasis upon the act of narration that 
pronounces its fictional, contingent nature as an intertext among intertexts, or, as is 
often the case, an intertext about intertexts. And in place of the smooth melding of 
mythopoesis and historiography that occurs in realistic fiction, in metafiction there is 
instead the development of a highly volatile parodic friction that tends toward textual 
fragmentation, multiplicity, and indeterminate transideological self-critique. 
It is precisely high ironic metafiction’s parodic manipulation of mythical and 
historiographic source materials that this chapter proposes to explore. By first 
defining the narrative characteristics of the spectrum of myth (III) and delineating the 
in-built subversive mechanism of mythopoesis from the parodic mechanism of high 
ironic metafiction, this chapter then compares this parodic mechanism with the types 
 
	   74	  
of intertextual critique present in other narrative modes such as contemporary 
(postmodern) mythopoesis and low ironic parody. Following this comparison, the 
focus of this chapter then shifts to an analysis of high ironic metafiction’s parodic 
approach to nonfictional and historiographical forms of narrative. This chapter 
argues that not only does high ironic narrative take a radically disruptive approach to 
both mythical and nonfictional forms, but more importantly, it also critically 
responds to the ideological content of these forms. It is the subversive, 
transideological nature of this critical response that defines metafiction as a zone of 
narrative discourse and places the high ironic as a mode within this zone. By 
establishing the characteristics of this response and its central importance to 
metafictional narrative (as an inherently parodic process), it is possible to better 
understand the ways in which metafiction communicates with other zones of 
discourse and the subversive nature of that communication.  
 
Charting the Mode of Myth 
Primary to an understanding of the parodic processes that occur within the 
high ironic mode is the location of the structural forms and ideological devices of the 
source material being parodied. Therefore, this analysis will begin with an in-depth 
examination of the spectrum of narrative discourse that occurs within the zone of 
myth (III) before exploring its wider ramifications and influences.  
As illustrated in the diagram above, there is a wide spectrum of semiotic 
variation within the zone of myth (III). This spectrum encompasses two distinct yet 
interconnected tendencies. On the interior end of the spectrum there is the pull of the 
fairy tale narrative back toward the zero-point of experience and a tendency toward 
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the reification of foregrounded exoteric signification (or, in other words, the iterative 
moment or “event” of experience within an historiographically specified time and 
space). And the outer end of the mythopoeic spectrum describes a movement away 
from such experiential and/or linguistic foregrounding and a tendency towards the 
sacred mystery of the timeless, space-less esoteric.40 This is the outer edge of poetics 
where, as Lévi-Strauss argues in “The Structural Study of Myth,” meaning 
disengages with and transcends language; the point at which, “There is no logic, no 
continuity. Any characteristic can be attributed to any object; every conceivable 
relation can be found. . . . [and] everything becomes possible” (429). 
However, although the sacred, esoteric myth pulls the reader in an opposite 
direction from that of the fairy tale, it would be misleading to believe that they are in 
any way disconnected. As Mircea Eliade argues in Myth and Reality, they are 
actually more intimately related than might be readily apparent. Eliade contends that 
while the tale is often profane (especially in comparison to the mysterious, “pure 
presence” of religious myth), this does not indicate an absence of the sacred or a 
“desacralization” of the text (191). Rather, the sacred mythic content of the tale 
operates covertly, or, as Eliade maintains, it is “camouflaged” (200).41 According to 
Eliade, under the cover of this metaphorical “camouflage,” myth continues to exert 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As Zavarzadeh indicates in “The Semiotics of the Foreseen”: “The complete opposite of the type of 
narrative in which both the signified and the signifier are foregrounded [i.e., zone I] is the one in 
which both are concealed or backgrounded, the fictions of zone III. These narratives claim to be 
situated not in the common ‘reality’ of this world but in a higher transcendental reality, the ultimate 
site of Truth, and present themselves as essentially un-written narratives - narratives that are pure 
presence, unmediated by such worldly practices as ‘writing’ and inscription.” See Zavarzadeh, “The 
Semiotics of the Foreseen,” 619-20. 
41 Jack Zipes also gives some space to the analysis of Eliade’s concept of “camouflage”; see Zipes, 
Fairy Tale as Myth: Myth as Fairy Tale, 1-4. 
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its transcendent influence on the reader.42 In fact, Eliade proposes, the narrative 
mechanism of the fairy tale may well have developed (perhaps at an incredibly early 
stage) as an “easy doublet” for the initiation myth and rites, becoming, in a sense, a 
popular or secularized version of the myth in the common vernacular (202). This 
popular version, Eliade argues, essentially serves the purpose of “re-creating the 
‘initiatory ordeals’ on the plane of imagination and dream” (202).43 According to 
Eliade’s analysis: 
The tale takes up and continues ‘initiation’ on the level of the 
imaginary. If it represents an amusement or an escape, it does so only 
for the banalized consciousness, and particularly for that of the 
modern man; in the deep psyche initiation scenarios preserve their 
seriousness and continue to transmit their message, to produce 
mutations. All unwittingly, and indeed believing that he is merely 
amusing himself or escaping, the man of the modern societies still 
benefits from the imaginary initiation supplied by tales. (202)  
 
While this form of amusing “imaginary initiation” is praised as beneficial by Eliade 
and is even seen as performing an essential role in the balanced development of the 
healthy psyche by writers and theorists such as G. K. Chesterton, Bruno Bettelheim, 
and David Elkind,44 others such as Friedmar Apel and Christian Zimmer are more 
reticent in their appraisal of this type of mythical amusement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In No Souvenirs, Eliade writes: “When something sacred manifests itself (hierophany), at the same 
time something ‘occults’ itself, becomes cryptic. Therein is the true dialectic of the sacred: by the 
mere fact of showing itself, the sacred hides itself.” See Eliade, No Souvenirs: Journal, 1957-1969, 
268. 
43 This initiatory concept is also echoed and developed in the works of Max Lüthi and N. J. Girardot. 
See Lüthi, Once Upon a Time: On the Nature of Fairy Tales, 59-60; Girardot, “Initiation and Meaning 
in the Tale of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,” 274-300. 
44 See Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles, 50-53; Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning 
and Importance of Fairy Tales, 23; Elkind, Miseducation: Preschoolers at Risk (New York: Knopf, 
1987). See also Temple, C., Martinez, M., Yokota, J. and Taylor A., Children’s Books in Children’s 
Hands. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002. 
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Indeed, it is precisely this type of banalized, mythical amusement that 
Friedmar Apel warns against in his Die Zaubergärten der Phantasie. Directly 
refuting Eliade’s claims, Apel writes:  
[More contemporary] endeavours to portray the marvellous with the 
traditional means of fairy tale and other fantastic stories only serve to 
amuse the imagination and can no longer fulfil the old functions of 
conveying a sublime interpretation of life and a way of putting the 
meaning into practice. (273)45 
 
Apel qualifies this stance by comparing the unifying function of the fairy tale to the 
narrative function of other genres such as the novel and lyric poetry. Apel argues 
that, whereas other genres are capable of relativizing and/or negating any sense of 
the possible unity of the world and the soul (without compromising the integrity of 
the genre), “the fairy tale requires the possibility of conceptualizing this unity as a 
starting point, no matter how relativized it becomes” (272). As this sincere sense of 
unity loses its plausibility, and 19th century innocence recedes into 20th century 
pragmatism, Apel claims, the fairy tale degenerates into “entertainment literature by 
feigning harmony and thus losing all connection to actual life” (273). This loss of the 
connective “folk” aspect of folklore, compounded with what he sees as the fairy 
tale’s naïve disregard of fundamental shifts in human perception (especially in 
relation to the contextual and ontological changes inherent in the shift from the 
romantic to the modern to the postmodern), Apel argues, is its own indictment.  
Zimmer, on the other hand, finds the danger of this type of imaginary 
amusement not in its ontological emptiness, but precisely in its very nature as an 
ontological device. In Cinema et politique, Zimmer writes: 
[Ideology’s] supreme ruse is to delimit a kind of preserved sector, 
which it has named diversion [divertissement] and which it has cut off 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See Zipes, Fairy Tale as Myth, 140. 
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from reality by decree – always menaced, as such, by subversion – 
and where it moves so comfortably that all the disguises it assumes 
have the double alibi of innocence and concern for the general good 
(moreover it plays between two worlds: that of everyday life and that 
of forgetting the everyday through dreams and imagination). 
Diversion is a direct creation of ideology. There is always potential 
alienation. To be diverted is to be disarmed. (138, Zimmer’s 
emphasis, my translation)46 
 
Thus disarmed and “diverted” (in the sense of being both entertained and distracted), 
Zimmer clearly indicates, the audience becomes at once a creative accomplice in the 
consumption and reproduction of ideology and also an agent of its continuous 
proliferation. In this way the passive audience becomes an unwittingly active 
participant in the expansion of a system of ideological programming. What Zimmer 
finds especially insidious about this deceptively innocent form of ideological 
transmission is its implicit manipulation of the imagination and the unconscious 
mind. Though Zimmer clearly agrees with Eliade regarding the serious nature of the 
messages being transmitted and the tremendous, mutative influence this type of 
activity has upon the audience, Zimmer is considerably more suspicious of the 
potential benefits of such an activity.47 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Christian Zimmer, Cinema et politique. Paris: Seghers, 1974: “[Le] ruse suprême [de idéologie], de 
delimiter une espèce de secteur préservé, qu’elle a nommé divertissement, qu’elle a, par décret, coupé 
du reel – et où elle se meut d’autant plus à l’aise que tous les déguisements qu’elle y revêt ont le 
double alibi de l’innocence se du bien général (elle joue en plus sur les deux tableaux: celui de la vie 
quotidienne et celui de l’oubli de quotidien du rêve, de l’imaginaire). Le divertissement est ainsi une 
création direct de l’idéologie. Il est donc toujours alienation en puissance. Se diverter, c’est se 
désarmer.” See Zimmer, Cinema et politique, 138. See also Zipes, Fairy Tales and the Art of 
Subversion: The Classical Genre for Children and the Process of Civiliation, 34-35. 
47 It is worth noting here that, while Eliade’s mythical “camouflage” hides the sacred beneath the 
secular, and Zimmer’s “diversion” hides the ideological beneath the entertaining, Lévi-Strauss 
triangulates these terms via his assessment of the unique temporality of mythical constructs and their 
contemporary place within politics. As Lévi-Strauss writes in “The Structural Study of Myth”: “. . . a 
myth always refers to events alleged to have taken place long ago. But what gives myth an operational 
value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; it explains the present and the past as well as 
the future. This can be made clear through a comparison between myth and what appears to have 
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It is precisely this type of suspicion that has informed the postmodern re-
appraisal of the mode of myth as an ontological repository and the fairy tale as an 
ideological delivery device. On a sociological level this postmodern re-appraisal is a 
timely and very necessary reminder that the initiatory function of the fairy tale 
narrative continues to play an active role in the normatization, dissemination, and 
regulation of socio-political modes of thought and behaviour. However, as Zimmer 
points out in the passage above, within this constantly mutating process of socio-
political initiation is also the constant possibility of subversion (138).  
These ideological structures are always threatened by subversion due to the 
fact that they are, to a significant degree, predicated upon: 1) the transformative 
and/or subversive opposition to some type or set of socio-political paradigms (e.g., 
arbitrary tyranny, matriarchal hierarchy, Pagan cosmology, etc.) and 2) the 
simultaneous installation and/or affirmation of an another type or set (e.g., 
democratic government, patriarchal hierarchy, Christian cosmology, etc.). As 
Cristina Bacchilega observes in Postmodern Fairy Tales: 
As folk and fairy tale, the tale of magic produces wonder precisely 
through its seductively concealed exploitation of the conflict between 
its normative function, which capitalizes on the comforts of 
consensus, and its subversive wonder, which magnifies the powers of 
transformation. (7; Bacchilega’s emphasis) 
 
In other words, each new innovation subverts the previous structuring and prescribes 
an alternative version of the world and/or an alternative socio-political approach to 
the structuring of the world. 
Following a more or less traditional pattern of subversive innovation, 
contemporary writers have continued to revise the fairy tale canon to more accurately 
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reflect the changing perspectives and politics of the 20th and the 21st centuries.48 
Widespread changes in social attitudes towards gender and sexual relations — 
especially following the various women’s liberation movements of 1960s and 1970s 
— are reflected in narratives that reverse and/or undermine the stability of patriarchal 
gender-role assignments.49 Likewise, anthropocentric approaches to the fairy tale 
have also undergone significant redesign in recent years. No more is the woodland 
necessarily considered a place of darkness and dread; increased ecological awareness 
has moved this anxiety toward the spread of urbanization, deforestation, and 
pollution.50 Contemporary re-tellings sensitive to this environmentalism are more 
likely to celebrate animalism, bio-diversity, and the delicate interconnectedness of 
biological systems.51 Furthermore, socio-economic factors such as class, wealth, and 
aristocratic status have also seen major revision. Monetary wealth and symbols of 
hierarchical status (such as titles, privileged hereditary rights, and other familial 
connections to positions of power) are no longer automatically linked to any positive 
or even desirable set of characteristics. As such, the postmodern fairy tale king, for 
example, cannot claim superiority simply on the basis of his social status, but must 
prove the relative worth of his character through his words and deeds.52  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Though this is not a new or even novel thesis, it finds articulate expression in Maria Tatar’s 
introduction to The Classic Fairy Tales, ix-xviii; see also Zipes, Fairy Tale as Myth, 139-161. 
49 For a comprehensive selection of feminist fairy tale “renovations” and critical literature, see Jack 
Zipes, Don’t Bet on the Prince, Aldershot: Gower, 1986; see also Claire L. Malarte-Feldman, 
“Adaptation,” in The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Folktales and Fairy Tales, 2-3. 
50 This type of eco-political revision even extends into the area role-reversal such as in Jon Scieszka’s 
The True Story of the 3 Little Pigs (1989) and Eugene Trivizas’s The Three Little Wolves and the Big 
Bad Pig (1993). 
51 See, for example, Garner’s “Little Red Riding Hood,” in which the wolf is embraced and the 
woodcutter executed for his own crimes of ignorant violence. James Finn Garner, Politically Correct 
Bedtime Stories, 1-4. 
52 See Garner’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in Politically Correct Bedtime Stories, 5-8; see also 
Carter’s “The Donkey Prince,” in Zipes, Don’t Bet on the Prince, 62-72. 
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While the fairy tales that emerge from this on-going (timeless?) revisionary 
process certainly exert a new socio-political influence upon the reader, it is important 
to locate these modified narratives within the mode of myth and to view their 
“postmodern” status merely as a periodizing marker. Furthermore, as the next section 
of this chapter will demonstrate, it is crucial that the metafictional treatment of myth 
and fairy tale be considered apart from—and a direct, critical response to—this  
essentially traditional method of mythopoeic contemporization. 
Among the many contemporary authors who have engaged in this type of 
revisionary process might be counted writers such as Margaret Atwood, A. S. Byatt, 
Italo Calvino, Angela Carter, Roald Dahl, Samuel R. Delany, James Finn Garner, 
Anne Sexton, James Thurber and Jane Yolen (to name but a few); each, in his or her 
own way, transforming mythopoesis to better serve the psychological and initiatory 
needs of their postmodern readers and, thereby, directly influencing the course of 
mythopoeic development (not to mention its critical reception and continued 
dissemination). However, while it might be a fairly safe generalization to place the 
magic tales of these writers within the tradition of mythopoeic contemporization and 
categorize the magic tales of Kathy Acker, John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Robert 
Coover, and Ishmael Reed more within the metafictional realm of the postmodern, 
such a dichotomy would not be of much use in defining the characteristics and 
formal attributes of either of these closely related areas of literature. Furthermore, 
such a generalization would ignore the fact that the majority of the writers listed 
above have published works belonging, variously, to both of these literary traditions. 
Equally dangerous would be acquiescence to the course charted by folklorists such as 
Jack Zipes, who seem to view the trajectory of the magic tale as running through the 
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17th, 18th, and 19th century tales revised and embellished by H. C. Anderson, 
Giambattista Basile, Carlo Collodi, Charles Perrault, and the Grimm brothers straight 
into such 20th century re-visions as Anne Sexton’s Transformations (1971), Olga 
Broumas’s Beginning with O (1977), Jane Yolen’s Sleeping Ugly (1981), and Martin 
Waddell’s The Tough Princess (1986) — to repeat some of the postmodern fairy tale 
titles cited by Zipes.53  
And yet, despite the postmodern “anti-mythic” tendency recognized by Zipes, 
the “demythologising” professed by Angela Carter and Robert Coover, and the 
inherently subversive condition of “re-tellings, re-evaluations, and re-figurings” 
acknowledged by Bacchilega, the writers listed above are often too easily fit into the 
area of postmodern mythopoesis without any significant acknowledgement of the 
fundamental differences in form and narration that set the works of these authors—as 
well as the discrete realms of myth and metafiction—apart.54  
Adding to the already muddied waters of contemporary fairy tale theory, 
recent critical analyses by Catriona McAra, David Calvin, and Anna Kérchy have 
done little to clarify these issues. And instead of making the differences between 
myth and metafiction more apparent, these critics typically conflate and/or equate the 
latter with the former, often portraying metafiction as merely one feature of the 
“reverse discourse” occurring within the contemporary fairy tale genre (McAra and 
Calvin 3). In Anti-Tales: The Uses of Disenchantment, McAra and Calvin even go so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Acccording to the method followed by Zipes this list might also be expanded to include 
Barthelme’s Snow White (1965]), John Gardner’s Grendel (1971), Carter’s The Bloody Chamber 
(1979), Atwood’s Bluebeard’s Egg (1983), James Finn Garner’s Politically Correct Bedtime Stories 
(1994), as well as Coover’s Briar Rose (1996), Stepmother [2004], and A Child Again (2005). See 
Jack Zipes, The Brothers Grimm: From Enchanted Forests to the Modern World (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 215-18. 
54 See Zipes The Brothers Grimm, 209, 216; Carter “Notes from the Front Line,” 71; Coover, 
Pricksongs and Descants, 61; Bacchilega, Postmodern Fairy Tales, 24. 
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far as to claim the prevalence of metafictional re-inventions and postmodern fairy 
tale adaptations as indicative of an expansion of the mythic into the anti-mythic — 
the classic fairy tale, subversively re-worked, emerging as the “anti-fairy tale” (3). 
Following similar assertions by Wolfgang Mieder and Aidan Day,55 McAra and 
Calvin present “the anti-fairy tale and its source form as two sides of the same coin” 
(3). McAra and Calvin then proceed to typologically define this “anti-fairy tale” 
through a list of characteristic reversals, opposites, and contradictory traits that 
directly link the source form (i.e., the “classic” fairy tale) to its derivative inverse 
form (see figure 3).  
 
Fairy Tale Anti-Fairy Tale 
- Optimism - Pessimism 
- Teleological, anticipatory - Retrospective, subversive 
- “Once upon a time” - Real-world context 
- Initiation - Dissonance 
- Pedagogical - Lessons unlearnt 
- Infantalised, bowdlerized - Adult themes, cynicism 
- Telling - Untelling 
- Cultural mirror - Breaking the mirror 
- Parabolic - Anti-parabolic 
- Black and white morality - Grey morality or amorality 
- Fixed point of view - Shifting perspectives 
- Independent narrative - Intertextual, metafictional 
- Bourgeois - Avant-garde 
- Patriarchal - Feminist 
- Mythologises - Demythologises 
- Enchantment - Disenchantment 
 
Figure 3. Catriona McAra and David Calvin, eds., Anti-Tales: The Uses of Disenchantment 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2011): 3. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Aidan Day, Angela Carter: The Rational Glass, 132-33; and Mieder, “Anti-fairy tale,” 50. 
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Although it must be conceded that, from a folklorist’s perspective, such a 
typology offers a seductive means of categorization and assistance in the 
comparative analysis of mythopoeic forms and types, nevertheless, metafiction is too 
easily thrown into the mix without any account made for its fundamental differences 
in formal and narratorial structure.56 Neither does the approach forwarded by McAra 
and Calvin adequately recognize the various roles of irony and parody in the reversal 
of source-form and anti-form. For example: while the dauntless, masculine hero of 
old is, indeed, often portrayed as a pathetic, chauvinist anti-hero in many postmodern 
adaptations — both mythopoeic and metafictional — there is a fundamental 
difference between having the socio-political tables turned on a character via a socio-
politically aware external narrator (as is common in the mythopoeic works of Dahl, 
Garner, Sexton, and Thurber) versus having that same character become self-
consciously aware of his anti-heroic nature and directly comment on it as an aspect 
of the overall narration (as common in the metafictional parodies of Barthelme, 
Coover, and Reed).57  
Another problem avoided by this type of analysis is the fact that the act of 
subversion often leads to the establishment of an inverse ideology or characteristic 
by default — pessimism, feminism, and amorality not so much established positions 
per se, but rather the potential implications of an active subversion of optimism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This confusion over the best means of including metafiction into the context of folklore studies and 
narratological theory is also reflected in studies such as Jessica Tiffin’s Marvelous Geometry (2009), 
in which Tiffin completely misrepresents the form of metafiction with its function. Tiffin writes: “. . . 
the unashamed presentation of the marvelous, as well as the unrealistic use of pattern and repetition in 
describing events, similarly draws attention to a nonrealist form of representation. . . . In this sense, 
then, fairy tale has some inherently metafictional elements” (23). See Jessica Tiffin, Marvelous 
Geometry: Narrative and Metafiction in Modern Fairy Tale, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
2009. 
57 The subtleties of this narratorial dialectic and its relation to anti-heroic self-consciousness are 
played out in an interesting way in Coover’s Briar Rose (1996). In Coover’s tale, the fairy-godmother, 
the princess, and the hero are pitted against each other in a tense, complicated battle for primary 
narratorial agency. 
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patriarchy, and conventional morality (though this implied reversal can just as easily 
become the subject of ironic doubt or the doubt of doubt, such as occurs when the 
narrator’s ironically self-consciousness irony begets a decidedly uncertain sense of 
sincerity).58 Unfortunately, these narratological disparities are not taken into account 
by this “anti-fairy tale” typology, the inverted characteristics of which, otherwise, 
relate quite closely to several aspects of the pseudo-mythical and pseudo-historical 
parodic structures occurring within high ironic metafiction.  
However, before moving this chapter’s analysis toward the metafictional 
approach to nonfiction—the topic that concerns the latter portion of this chapter—it 
is necessary to locate and define the difference between the mythopoeic and the 
metafictional. As discussed above, it is not merely the anti-mythical reversal that sets 
the various applications and manipulations of mythical narrative forms at odds with 
metafiction. The anti- is always already present in the mythical matrix. So what 
exactly is it that places the metafictional, pseudo-mythical approach in a separate 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Carter’s American Ghosts & Old World Wonders (1993), Garner’s Politically Correct Bedtime 
Stories (1994), and Coover’s Stepmother (2004) are replete with such doubly ironic situations, where 
being ironic about being ironic about being optimistic, for example, becomes, through a kind of 
rhetorical double-negative, an absurd return to optimism. From this perspective, the analysis 
forwarded by Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar in The Madwoman in the Attic (1979), especially in 
the chapter entitled “Snow White and Her Wicked Stepmother,” might also be read as a critique of 
pro-patriarchal authority via anti-matriarchal suppression (36-43) – patriarchy as anti-matriarchy – 
this dynamic is also supported by Maria Tatar’s approach in The Hard Facts of the Grimms’ Fairy 
Tales (3-38). However, as Zipes points out, the ideology forwarded within any mythopoetic text will 
always present the case for the suppression of some type of “evil,” whether it is the pagan subtext 
cleansed and re-tooled to suit the Grimms’ own Christian dogma (Tatar 35-38) or the sexist metaphors 
deployed and ridiculed for comedic effect by Garner. That is how the fairy tale is capable of staying 
fresh, culturally resonant, and worth the effort of perpetually reproducing and exploiting as an 
ideological delivery device. 
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Response, Correspondence, and Core-Response 
Although Anna Kérchy’s study, Postmodern Reinterpretations of Fairy Tales 
(in many ways a parallel project to that of McAna and Calvin)59 does not stray from 
the path already charted by Zipes, et al., it does, somewhat inadvertently, offer a 
direction out of this typological miasma. In the editorial preface to her 2011 
collection, Kérchy writes, “Past and present, originals and rewrites, texts, intertexts 
and metatexts (co-)respond to each other . . .” (xvi). While this otherwise fairly 
orthodox claim may or may not be the case, the important question raised by such a 
statement (despite Kérchy’s attempt to synthesize some kind of meta-semantic 
cohesion between the two) is whether correspondence and response should be linked 
without qualification. Does a similarity in form necessarily indicate a similarity in 
message? If so, would that not preclude and deny the mechanism of parody? In an 
attempt to answer these questions it should become apparent that the negotiation of 
this overlapping relationship is, perhaps, the most important location of the 
difference between the subversive anti- current of contemporary mythopoesis and the 
critically parodic, pseudo-mythical forms of metafiction.  
It is precisely this space between correspondence and response that is 
neglected by the materialist cum historicist approach taken by Zipes when he states, 
as he does in The Brothers Grimm, “Each innovative retelling and rewriting of a 
well-known tale in the cultural heritage is an independent human act seeking to align 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Both of these projects evolved out of the debates and discussions initiated at the “Fairy Tale After 
Angela Carter” conference held at University of East Anglia in 2009 and continued at the “Anti-Tales: 
The Uses of Disenchantment” conference held at University of Glasgow in 2010. See Karin 
Kukkonen, review of Postmodern Reinterpretations of Fairy Tales: How Applying New Methods 
Generates New Meanings, 274; see also Defne Cizakca, review of Anti-Tales: The Uses of 
Disenchantment, item TKR7-13. 
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itself with the original utopian impulse of the first-told tale” (215).60  Though this 
statement traces the same line of approach followed by Kérchy, the crucial 
connection is the point at which Kérchy’s sense of correspondence/response aligns 
with what Zipes frames as the “original utopian impulse.” This alignment seems to 
beg the introduction of an intermediary term, a utopian core to which a “core-
response” could be said to relate, thereby delineating the formal correspondence of 
texts from the ideological (and/or transideological) response of texts. Applying this 
term to the folkloric approach taken by Zipes (a concept also supported by Eliade, 
Apel, and Zimmer, as seen previously), the original utopian impulse can be thought 
of as the definitive ontological core that links the myth to its mode.61 This indicates 
that texts that formally relate to the mythopoeic can be said to correspond if a 
significant link can be established that demonstrates a common relationship to this 
mythopoeic core (frequently manifest through the formal appropriation of narrative 
elements or the repetition of certain aspects of a distinct narrative pattern, archetype, 
or central metaphor, such as that which links Basile’s “Sun, Moon, and Talia” [1634] 
to Coover’s Briar Rose [1996]). However, the definitive characteristic that locates a 
text either within or without the mode of myth is not this formal correspondence, but 
rather the text’s reaction to this ontological core, its core-response, or, in other 
words, its capacity to reify or recuperate the “original utopian impulse.” 62 When the 
core-response is one of utopian reification or recuperation (no matter how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In his conception of an “original utopian impulse, Zipes is condensing and synthesizing similar 
statements made by Friedmar Apel and Michel Butor. See Zipes, Fairy Tale as Myth, 140, 142; Apel, 
Die Zaubergärten, 272-73; Michel Butor, “On Fairy Tales,” 352. 
61 Zipes writes: “The contemporary myth is not only an ideological message but also a fairy tale that 
cannot totally abandon its ancient utopian origins.” See Zipes, The Brothers Grimm, 215. 
62 It is important to note that, although presented in somewhat different terms (and even retracted at 
some points), this concept of “recuperation” was first introduced by Jack Zipes. See Zipes, Fairy Tale 
as Myth, 157-59. 
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stylistically revisionary and/or transideologically subversive), the narrative response 
is one that maintains the ontological core of myth—it both corresponds to and 
responds as a work of mythopoesis. However, when this utopianism and the 
ideologically loaded semiotic systems that support this utopianism become the 
subjects of profound transideological doubt, are rendered indeterminate, or are 
eschewed altogether, the narrative can no longer be said to conform to the mode of 
myth and must, therefore, be placed within a separate mode and typological 
category. 
The reversal of the terms of this utopianism and other radical inversions of 
the ideologically loaded semiotic systems that support this utopianism (e.g., the shift 
from patriarchal authority [à la Perrault] to matriarchal authority, such as in Carter’s 
The Bloody Chamber and Other Stories, or the shift from anti-pagan Christian 
ideology [à la the Grimm brothers] to anti-Christian pagan ideology, such as in 
Sexton’s Transformations) only act as demythologizing and/or disenchanting agents 
to the extent that they directly subvert such fallacious notions as the timeless totality 
of myth and the unchanging universality of the ideological messages being 
conveyed. The “myth” that these texts destroy — or, at least, do violence to — is not 
the mythopoeic mode of narrative, but the sense of myth in which, as Roland Barthes 
describes it, actual experience is “overturned” (Image-Music-Text 165).  
During the myth-making process, Barthes states, society, culture, ideology, 
and history are stolen and replaced by a simulacrum or “reflection” of the natural 
world (Image-Music-Text 165; Mythologies 128-29, 131).63 Barthes writes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 In a reference to this same passage in The Brothers Grimm, Zipes writes: “Myth is a collective 
representation that is socially determined and then inverted so as not to appear as a cultural artifact.” 
See Zipes, The Brothers Grimm, 209. 
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This reflection . . . is inverted: myth consists in overturning culture 
into nature or, at least, the social, the cultural, the ideological, the 
historical into the “natural”. What is nothing but a product of class 
division and its moral, cultural and aesthetic consequences is 
presented (stated) as being a “matter of course”; under the effect of 
mythical inversion, the quite contingent foundations of the utterance 
become Common Sense, Right Reason, the Norm, General Opinion, 
in short the doxa (which is the secular figure of the Origin). (Image-
Music-Text 165, Barthes’s emphasis) 
 
It is this false, manipulated “reflection” that writers such as Carter and Coover see as 
dangerously deceptive. As Carter has maintained on several occasions, “I’m in the 
demythologizing business. I’m interested in myths . . . because they are extraordinary 
lies designed to make people unfree” (qtd. in Sage 79). In attempting to call myth’s 
bluff, so to speak, and invert the already inverted in order to reveal the artificiality of 
the “natural” façade of this doxa, the demythologizing project is an effort to return to 
some kind of pre-mythical, regressive, or semiologically “retrospective” cultural 
space (to combine Barthes with McAna and Calvin).  
This space, Barthes argues, exists beneath the surface of the mythologized 
sign, in the metaphorical workings and significations that make the rose something 
more than a red-petaled plant with thorns, the leaf motif something more than a 
quaint design flourish, and the cigar always more than just a cigar (Mythologies 113). 
However, apart from the purely synthetic, epistemological language of mathematics 
(which equates thing and world, signifier and signified, without adding any semiotic 
depth beyond the direct correlation of the arbitrary symbol to its abstract referent),64 
Barthes claims that it is only the “anti-language” of essentialist poetry that is ever 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 “When the meaning is too full for myth to be able to invade it, myth goes around it, and carries it 
away bodily. This is what happens to mathematical language. In itself, it cannot be distorted, it has 
taken all possible precautions against interpretation: no parasitical signification can worm itself into 
it. And this is why, precisely, myth takes it away en bloc; it takes a certain formula (E=mc2), and 
makes of this unalterable meaning the pure signifier of mathematicity. We can see that what is here 
robbed by myth is something which resists, something pure.” See Barthes, Mythologies, 132. 
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successful in penetrating the semiotic surface and transforming the word back into 
the very thing itself, whereby meaning is restored to its natural quality (Mythologies 
133).65 And yet, as he is also quick to recognize, this refusal, this turning back to the 
essential quality of the word, this “[occupation of] a position which is the reverse of 
that of myth,” is also its undoing; for, “by fiercely refusing myth, poetry surrenders 
to it bound hand and foot” (134). According to Barthes, this inadvertent surrender 
occurs because in reverting to the essence of the signified, the signifier is at once 
emptied and refreshed. Despite the poetic reversal being an attempt to return a 
measure of purity to the word, Barthes argues, the poetic word, in the final analysis, 
is only ever an addition to the history of its own usage and, therefore, a restoration of 
the first-order language-object from which myth parasitically derives its second-
order metalanguage (134-35). Or, to put it another way, even in its most un-cooked, 
primitive state (like the raw material of the social, the cultural, the ideological, and 
the historical), language is always unavoidably at the mercy of mythical 
appropriation. 
Even when this mechanism of mythical appropriation is exposed and twisted 
in new directions, as it is in the postmodern texts of writers such as Barthelme, 
Carter, and Coover, the demythologizing project differs greatly depending on the 
narrative forms, narratorial perspectives, and various core-responses of each text. 
Indeed, analysis reveals that even between these highly subversive, ironically allied 
writers there is little agreement between their respective approaches to the 
demythologizing project.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Barthes notes, in reference to Jean-Paul Sartre’s Saint-Genet: Actor and Martyr (283): “We are 
again dealing here with meaning, in Sartre’s use of the term, as a natural quality of things, situated 
outside a semiological system.” See Barthes, Mythologies, 133 n.11. 
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A Comparative, Postmodern Reading of “Blackbeard” 
Taking the Bluebeard tale type as a point of comparison, a number of 
interesting similarities and contrasts become apparent. Carter’s “The Bloody 
Chamber,” for example, reveals a very different core-response when compared to 
such parodic adaptations of the tale as Coover’s “The Last One” and Barthelme’s 
“Bluebeard.” Likewise, Coover’s low ironic treatment of the mythical material also 
leads to an alternative configuration of correspondence and response when compared 
to Barthelme’s high ironic version of the tale. By tracing how each of these writers 
deals with the “Bluebeard” tale type, a useful comparison between the low and high 
ironic modes of narrative can be made and a more practical typological delineation 
between myth and metafiction can be established.  
Throughout the tales collected in The Bloody Chamber and Other Stories 
(1979; hereafter The Bloody Chamber), Angela Carter engages in what has now 
become a familiar postmodern act of mythopoeic concretization. Like the darkly 
skewed, dubiously magical worlds of Barthelme and Coover, Carter’s The Bloody 
Chamber transubstantiates a frighteningly real dreamworld. However, the tangible 
nature of Carter’s dreamworld is not materialized through metafictional 
fragmentation and ironic jolts in mood and metaphor as it is in Coover and 
Barthelme, but through an immersion in the lexical environment and stylistics of the 
mythopoeic. Carter’s approach to the mode is so deceptively subtle in its subversion 
of the fairy tale form and artful in its sleight-of-hand shifts in the ideological 
messages contained therein that these stories seem re-made from the inside out. In 
fact, the fundamental issue facing the critic of Carter’s The Bloody Chamber is 
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whether Carter’s professed de-mythologizing project should not more accurately be 
viewed as a re-mythologizing project. For the result of Carter’s forays into fantasy is 
not a collection of decapitated folkways and eviscerated fables (such as in Sexton’s 
Transformations, for example) but instead an entirely unique set of tales, beautifully 
told, displaying a mastery of both form and message. As such, the question one is 
forced to ask when dealing with Angela Carter is this: does the core-response of the 
Bluebeard narrative in The Bloody Chamber truly differ from the “classical” tradition 
as formulated in versions such as Charles Perrault’s rendering of the tale?66 
As discussed previously, the process of myth-making is a constantly 
regenerative process. In order for myths to remain vital and the language of myth to 
work its affect on the reader, they must be re-worded, revised and updated so as to 
continue to organize and influence the interpretation of experience. Perrault’s “La 
Barbe Bleüe” (“Bluebeard”; AT311, AT312), for example, interprets — through an 
omniscient, masculine narrator — a 17th century world of male dominance and 
attempts to influence the prolongation of that same male dominance by making it 
appear to be the natural order of things. In a similar fashion, Carter’s “The Bloody 
Chamber,” interprets—through a first-person, female narrator—an early 20th century 
world of shifting gender roles and new feminist agencies and, like Perrault, Carter, 
too, attempts to influence the prolongation of a certain balance of power by 
portraying it as the natural, normal, proper order of things. And just as the tales of 
Perrault re-construct a robust, Christian, patriarchal doxa from the tenuous, pagan, 
matriarchal raw materials of the folk balladry and provincial lore that preceded it, so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Though it should be acknowledged that the term, “classical,” is inherently problematic in any kind 
of folkloric discourse, Bacchilega cites the Perrault version of the tale type as “the most authoritative 
version,” as it is the earliest, most well-known and most widely published construction of the tale 
type. See Bacchilega, Postmodern Fairy Tales, 106.  
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too does Carter’s collection grapple with the raw materials of Perrault’s Histoires ou 
contes du temps passé, avec des moralités (1697) in an attempt to propose a new 
interpretation of history and forge a new set of moralités.67  
Though there are many obvious differences between Perrault’s and Carter’s 
respective renderings of the Bluebeard narrative (Carter’s version even interposing a 
new tale type between AT311 [Sister Rescue] and AT312 [Brother Rescue]—311A, 
Mother Rescue),68 nevertheless, both versions contain “innocent persecuted heroine” 
figures, structures of female objectification and possession, and masculine symbols 
of brutal virility. While these items are framed somewhat differently by each of these 
two authors, both tales clearly correspond to a common tradition. However, it is 
important to point out that, despite Carter’s shift of perspective from Perrault’s 
prurient narrator to the heroine’s private view point, and despite Carter’s alterations 
to the ending of the tale, the core-response of “The Bloody Chamber” is clearly one 
of adherence to the “original utopian impulse.”  
While the agent of victory has changed, the basic terms of the victory have 
not. Instead of the Bluebeard figure being run through by the heroine’s two brothers 
(the action that releases the heroine from bondage and secures the financial 
betterment of her family, as it is formulated in Perrault’s version),69 in Carter’s 
telling, the brazen, murderous Marquis is vanquished by a motherly bullet through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Bacchilega’s analysis in the “Be Bold, Be Bold, But not too Bold” chapter of her Postmodern Fairy 
Tales, offers a number of interesting comparisons between these two versions of the Bluebeard 
narrative (Aarne-Thompson types 311, 312, and the “Robber-Bridegroom” type 955) and the various 
renderings of its “moral” message by Perrault, Carter, Zipes, Bettelheim, and A. E. Johnson. See 
Bacchilega, Postmodern Fairy Tales, 104-38. 
68 Bacchilega notes: “While I do not know of any ‘Bluebeard’ version in which the mother alone 
comes to the heroine’s rescue, it is clear that in the folk tradition various possibilities are available and 
they are not gender-exclusive.” See Bacchilega, Postmodern Fairy Tales, 186 n.51. 
69 See Andrew Lang, “Blue Beard,” 290-295; from Charles Perrault’s "La Barbe bleüe," in Histoires 
ou contes du temps passé, avec des moralités: Contes de ma mère l'Oye (Paris, 1697). 
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the brain, and a new world order of non-retinal love, extra-sensory perception, and 
selfless humanism is allowed to prevail (40). No more an object to be possessed, 
Carter’s heroine becomes the subject-possessor, clearly superior in agency to the 
poor, blind piano-tuner (Jean-Yves, her would-be, common-law husband), and, in the 
final assessment, a woman who esteems herself as a benefactrix without being a 
bourgeoise (40-41).70 Though differently arranged, in both versions of the tale the 
heroine’s monomythic cycle is successful, the elixir of social healing is attained, and 
the threshold of resurrection and return is triumphantly crossed (to borrow liberally 
from Joseph Campbell).  
In fact, each of the tales in Carter’s 1979 collection follows a similar pattern 
of retrieval and redress. The terms of the innocent persecuted victim’s collapse 
and/or the origins of the loathly lady’s torment are re-claimed, re-contexualized, and 
given a new perspective or a narrative voice that was absent or previously silent. In 
so doing, feminine attributes are turned from hamartic failings of character (i.e., 
flaws either directly or indirectly implied as being inherent in the female character) 
into faculties ignored and perversities excluded from precedent renderings. In this 
way, Carter’s The Bloody Chamber plucks the fairy tale from its patriarchal, root-
bound constraints, and places it, whole, in the fresh soil of a new utopian doxa. As 
such, The Bloody Chamber not only formally corresponds to the mythopoeic 
tradition, its core-response—despite its subversive reformulation of the utopian terms 
of the tradition—also remains primarily within the mythopoeic narrative mode.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 While the AT 312, 311, and 955 traditions typically end with the death of the monster and the 
passage of his wealth into the control of the surviving wife, Carter is careful to amend the tidy re-
marriage and re-possession of the heroine in her telling, phrasing the heroine’s casual relationship to 
Jean-Yves as more concerned with “setting up house” than with the exchange of vows. See Carter, 
The Bloody Chamber, 41. 
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Recasting the Bluebeard tale type within the low ironic mode, Robert 
Coover’s “The Last One” (collected in A Child Again) is stylistically similar to both 
Carter’s “The Bloody Chamber” and Perrault’s “La Barbe Bleüe,” though Coover’s 
adaptation is decidedly less realistic in its denouement than either of these precedent 
versions. Told in the first-person from the perspective of the beastly Bluebeard 
figure, Coover’s re-telling of the tale transposes Carter’s emphasis on the heroine 
and presents Bluebeard as a misunderstood, anti-heroic protagonist of sorts. Rather 
than reveling in his misdeeds, Coover’s murderous Bluebeard is revealed to be a 
hopeless romantic, wracked by regret, in search of a redemptive love capable of 
sealing him off from his own memory and, thereby, sealing the door of the bloody 
chamber in the process.   
In a sardonic reply to the sentimental anguish of the Bluebeard figure, 
Coover’s heroine, far from being curious, repays the beast in kind by requesting a 
private room of her own, wherein, the Bluebeard figure is led to believe, she intends 
to keep a collection of cherished items from her childhood. He, of course, agrees to 
this simple request and is at first quite pleased with his young wife’s capacity to 
control her curiosity; she shows no interest whatsoever in his forbidden chamber and 
seems content with their agreement of mutual secrecy. Eventually, however, the 
locked room in the sole possession of his wife begins to affect his thoughts to such a 
degree that he becomes obsessed. And as the narrative progresses, his own secret 
chamber becomes less of an issue while the secret chamber possessed by his wife 
increasingly drives him to distraction. One morning he is certain that he hears voices 
on the other side of the locked door and, losing his wits completely, he smashes his 
way into the chamber only to find a miniature estate peopled with tiny bearded men 
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not unlike himself. The story closes as his wife picks him up by the head and, with a 
sigh of disappointment, places him among the others. 
While it is clear that Coover’s version formally corresponds to the tradition 
from which it is derived (it could not effectively deliver its surprise ending 
otherwise), analysis of Coover’s version of the tale faces the difficulty of 
determining whether these changes simply constitute an adjustment to the utopian 
terms of the mythopoeic material, as in Carter’s approach, or represent a more 
fundamental break from the utopian core.  
A somewhat literal reading might see the reversal of the concluding scene as 
an exchange in the dynamics of power — the deceptive beast undone by the superior 
deception of his wife. Such a reversal would indicate that the patriarchal ideology 
suppressing the objectified wife (the persecuted female figure forever at risk of death 
at the hands of a more socially and physically powerful male figure) has been 
checked and replaced with a utopian ideology that calls for a more equal social 
and/or domestic balance of power. Such a reading would also see the young wife, not 
as an innocent persecuted victim, but as the self-saving champion of her own destiny. 
Instead of relying on the assistance of others for her salvation, the clever heroine 
orchestrates the terms of her own triumph from the very outset and, thus, 
reconfigures the Bluebeard figure into little more than a petty, depraved 
anachronism. 
While the text might, to a limited extent, support such a complicated 
feminist-utopian reading, this approach would not adequately recognize the 
mechanism of the reversal and the ideological fracturing that actually takes place 
within the narrative. For, as Coover’s ironic version takes the central metaphor of the 
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Bluebeard narrative and parodically re-appropriates the myth, a fundamental shift 
occurs in the narrative response to the utopian core. Indeed, as the victimizer 
becomes the victim, and vice versa, the ethical framework supporting any type of 
utopian reading is complicated by the fact that the reader can no longer be certain of 
where to place his or her sympathies. At best, the selection of either of the main 
characters as the protagonist would be a vicarious choice between one duplicitous 
anti-hero and the other. Furthermore, the narrative does not ask the reader to make 
such a decision, but instead derives its subversive power from this irresolvable 
imbalance. 
Though Coover’s low ironic version establishes a clear correspondence to the 
tradition from which it derives its parody, instead of a triumphal (utopian) return to 
the social realm (typical of narrative myth, fairy tale and romance), the supposed 
protagonist-narrator’s power of action is drastically curtailed at the close of the tale 
and, thus, the Bluebeard figure is closed off from any sort redemptive resolution to 
what has, ostensibly, become his initiatory cycle. Suddenly no longer the champion 
of his own destiny (even in terms of the ritual death sequence that usually attends the 
AT312 tale type), Coover’s Bluebeard figure is undone by the absurdity of his 
situation and becomes (like Kafka’s Josef K., Mann’s Aschenbach, or Eliot’s 
Prufrock) little more than a dupe in a loaded game. And in the place of Perrault’s 
conceited moralizing and Carter’s sentimental didacticism, Coover heaps reversal 
upon reversal and leaves the reader, like the diminished Bluebeard figure, dangling 
in the enchanted grasp of an ironic mode of parodic discourse.  
Unlike the “happily ever after” supplied by Carter’s version, the narrative 
pattern that Coover employs in “The Last One” is quite clearly an anti-heroic pattern 
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of perpetual alienation rather than one of heroic return (i.e., following the low ironic 
pattern of “ironic descent” as described in the previous chapter). Coover’s Bluebeard 
figure is rendered as little more than a member of a set of ambiguous victims (and 
not likely to be the last addition to that set either). This not only extends the 
indeterminate quality that attends the surprise reversal of the story’s conclusion, the 
inverted structure of Coover’s narrative also acts as a critique of Eliade’s concept of 
“camouflage” by throwing both subject identity and mythical content into question. 
And by frustrating any attempt to locate the subject of the narrative’s initiation, 
Coover complicates the reader’s process of imagining a utopian social function for 
the few archetypal remnants of the initiatory process that are retained.71 The result is 
a parodic simulacrum of the mythical material — a magic mirror that manipulates 
the structure of the narrative through an ironic re-evaluation of the structure of the 
Bluebeard tale type. And by treating the core of the myth as little more than a 
reversible artifice, Coover is able to strip back the thin layer of camouflage to reveal 
a glimpse into the occult mechanisms of possession and obsession hidden beneath 
the mythical surface.  
While Coover’s “The Last One” strategically manipulates the Bluebeard 
narrative structure in the service of complicating the ideological delivery mechanism 
of mythopoesis, ironic parody is seldom (if ever) empty of its own antagonistic 
transideological agenda. As Coover states during an interview with Frank Gado, the 
paradoxically transideological nature ironic narrative often involves an attempt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The reader’s capacity to imagine a possible social function for the initiation (whether narratological, 
experiential, or otherwise) is prerequisite to the delivery of its magical message. As Bacchilega writes 
(synthesizing the theories of Eliade and Zimmer): “The tale of magic enacts on the level of the 
imagination and with enjoyable lightness the symbolic initiatory functions of ritual and myth; as such, 
these tales narratively intertwine physical, psychological, and social processes.” See Bacchilega, “An 
Introduction to the ‘Innocent Persecuted Heroine’ Fairy Tale,” 9. 
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critically investigate the sacred, re-open closed areas of discourse, and reveal the 
doxa as a distinctly human creation:  
Most of the society's effort goes into forging the construct, the 
creative form in which everybody can live – a social contract of sorts. 
. . . Whatever form they set up is necessarily entropic: eventually it 
runs down and is unable to propel itself past a certain point. When it 
does that, it becomes necessary to do everything that has been taboo: 
wear women's clothes, kill the sacred animal and eat it, screw your 
mother, etc. A big blast reduces everything to rubble; then something 
new is built. . . . Artists re-create: they make us think about doing all 
the things we shouldn't do, all the impossible, apocalyptic things, and 
weaken and tear down structures so that they can be rebuilt, releasing 
new energies. (First Person 157) 
 
Although Coover’s low ironic version of the Bluebeard tale definitely takes a step 
toward this type of subversive re-creation, in Barthelme’s high ironic version of the 
tale several animals actually do, quite literally, fall victim to the full explosive force 
of revisionary violence. But rather than eat them, Barthelme festoons their sacred 
carcasses in designer eveningwear. 
While the absurdity is turned up considerably in Barthelme’s “Bluebeard” 
(collected in Forty Stories)72 there are a number of striking similarities linking his 
adaptation to the versions discussed above. The narrative pattern of Barthelme’s 
version, for example, like the events in Coover’s version of the tale, also concerns a 
mysterious husband confounded by an infuriatingly incurious bride. However, 
instead of locating the narrative voice within the Bluebeard figure, Barthelme’s 
narrating protagonist, like the first-person narrator in Carter’s telling, is the young 
bride herself. But unlike Carter’s protagonist, who is every inch an icon of innocence 
(irrespective of her remarkably progressive socialist agenda), Barthelme’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Barthelme’s “Bluebeard” originally appeared in the June 16, 1986 issue of The New Yorker. 
However, the version cited in this study will take all quotations and references from the version 
published in the 2005 Penguin edition of Barthelme’s Forty Stories. See Barthelme, Forty Stories, 82-
87. 
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journalistically disinterested protagonist seems to be all too aware of her situation 
and is even portrayed as having the presence of mind to set up a number of practical 
contingency plans should her marriage to Bluebeard fall through (or should his 
financial security falter at any point). 
Apparently disaffected by her privileged life among the various baubles and 
curios hoarded by her strange husband (“a cut-pile Aubusson fire-extinguisher 
cover” [82], “Baroque rickrack in the manner of Vanbrugh and Hawksmoor” [83], 
“Buen Retiro white biscuit clock” [84], “Maxim gun” [85], etc.), and conscious of 
her own status as little more than an addition to this collection, Barthelme’s heroine 
seems content enough to spend her days leafing through Benz-Daimler automobile 
catalogues and puttering about the grounds. And despite having arranged for a series 
of exact replicas to be made of the key to the forbidden chamber (one duplicate 
hidden by her lover, the chaplain, behind each of the fourteen Stations of the Cross in 
the mansion’s chapel [86]), she seems in no haste to actually use any of them for any 
other purpose than as a means to continue her extra-marital liaisons.73  
This situation incenses her husband to the extent that he finally confronts her 
one morning over breakfast, “Will you never attempt the door?” he asks (83). To 
which she answers:  
I repeated what I had told him previously: that I had no interest in the 
door or what lay behind it, and that I would gladly return the silver 
key he had given me if his mind would be eased thereby. “No, no” he 
said, “keep the key, you must have the key.” (84) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 This element of the tale is clearly a satirical literalization of psychological approaches to the 
Bluebeard narrative such as Bruno Bettelheim’s assessment in The Uses of Enchantment: “However 
one interprets ‘Bluebeard,’ it is a cautionary tale which warns: Women, don’t give in to your sexual 
curiosity; men, don’t permit yourself to be carried away by your anger at being sexually betrayed. 
There is nothing subtle about it; most of all, no development toward higher humanity is being 
projected” (301-2). To which Bacchilega replies, “When considered within a folkloristic framework, 
however, such cautionary readings [as Bettelheim’s] appear narrow and unconvincing. . . .” See 
Bacchilega, Postmodern Fairy Tales, 106. 
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Suddenly conflicted by what she comprehends to be her husband’s desire that she 
visit the forbidden chamber, yet not having any stomach for viewing the gory display 
she imagines within, she contrives to lose the original key “. . . in the vicinity of the 
gazebo” (84). 
This arrangement suffices for a time, but eventually, while in the middle of a 
game of croquet, Bluebeard pronounces: “You must open the door . . . even though I 
forbid it” (86). Though she protests, her husband insists (allowing Barthelme to work 
in an overtly parodic variation on Perrault’s second moral):74 
“I change the exhibit from time to time,” he said, grimacing. “You 
may not find, behind the door, what you expect. Furthermore, if you 
are to continue as my wife, you must occasionally be strong enough to 
go against my wishes, for my own good. Even the bluest beard 
amongst us, even the blackest nose, needs on occasion the correction 
of connubial give-and-take.” (87) 
 
Forced to the point more by her husband’s prurience than by her own, the young 
bride asks for the return of the key (which Bluebeard had found by trolling the 
grounds with a horseshoe magnet [84]) and makes her way to the chamber. Finally at 
the threshold (after being briefly waylaid by a coded message from her financial 
advisor [87]), she unlocks the door only to discover:  
In the room, hanging on hooks, gleaming in decay and wearing Coco 
Chanel gowns, seven zebras. My husband appeared at my side. “Jolly, 
don’t you think?” he said, and I said, “Yes, jolly,” fainting with rage 
and disappointment . . . . (87) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The second moralité of Perrault’s “La Barbe Bleüe,” as translated by Andrew Lang in his 1889 
collection, The Blue Fairy Book, is rendered: “Apply logic to this grim story, and you will ascertain 
that it took place many years ago. No husband of our age would be so terrible as to demand the 
impossible of his wife, nor would he be such a jealous malcontent. For, whatever the color of her 
husband’s beard, the wife of today will let him know who the master is” (295). The translation of this 
passage selected by Bacchilega, however, is somewhat closer to Perrault’s original sense: “Then the 
husband ruled as a king. / Now it’s quite a different thing; / Be his beard what hue it may— / Madam 
has a word to say!” See Bacchilega, Postmodern Fairy Tales, 105. 
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From Benz-Daimler catalogues to dead zebras, Barthelme’s “Bluebeard” seems more 
like a comically anachronistic reprise of Richard Hamilton’s iconic Just What Is It 
That Makes Today's Homes So Different, So Appealing? (1956) than a fairy tale in 
the tradition of Perrault. And like Hamilton’s Pop-art collage, Barthelme’s collage 
narrative is an equally de-constructive, pervasively media-saturated critique on the 
spectacle of contemporary existence. Taking the Bluebeard tale type more as a 
metaphorical template than a tradition, Barthelme dismantles and reorganizes the 
central metaphor of the source tale into a subversively redirected set of items, events, 
and characters. The resulting tale both satirizes the bourgeois foibles of 
contemporary Western society (by pointing an ironic finger at any reader that might 
sympathize with or share the same blasé, elitist values held by the narrator) while 
also compounding its primary, intertextual parody with a secondary, parodic critique 
of the cultural context of its own publication (i.e., as a piece in The New Yorker).  
This secondary layer to the parody (using the primary level of the parody as a 
kind of textual platform) deepens the tale’s satirical evaluation of 20th century 
consumer culture by directing its subversive attack against the immediate textual 
environment of the magazine in which it was published. By parodically and 
stylistically ridiculing the narratorial voice of high society reportage (as well as the 
uniquely New Yorker-esque, weekly-magazine world of non sequitur humour, 
fashionable historiography, luxury advertising, and op-ed commentary), Barthelme’s 
high ironic version of the Bluebeard myth enacts a doubly parodic engagement with 
both the formal content of the mythical tale type and the pop-media context of its 
dissemination.  
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Although there is an obvious structural correspondence between Barthelme’s 
adaptation and the other versions previously discussed, the core-response of 
Barthelme’s version is in no way a reification or recuperation of any type of utopian 
impulse. Instead of a recuperation of this impulse, in Barthelme’s tale this impulse is 
re-cast in the form of an excessively effete, epicurean consumerism. It is within this 
consumerism (with its characteristic blend of hubristic emptiness, insatiable appetite 
for novelty, and a tendency towards fetishism and paraphilia) that the privileged and 
ultimately problematic terms of the utopian core are located and satirized. In 
Barthelme’s “Bluebeard,” the wantonly consumerist and essentially self-consuming 
ideology surrounding this diseased, utopian core, far from presenting a means of 
unifying or perfecting the balance of society, leads only to the desolation of 
disposable experience and moments of obligatory communication, both of which 
come together in the absurd “exhibit” described at the tale’s conclusion. And in place 
of the archetypal experience of initiation and the mythical resonance of ritual 
(traditionally symbolized in the Bluebeard narrative pattern by the blood-stained key, 
the discovery of the dismembered brides, and the final threshold conflict) 
Barthelme’s tale substitutes the obscene kitsch of anthropomorphic taxidermy and 
the trivial comedy of a gallery opening with an exclusive guest-list of one.  
In contrast to Carter’s careful adherence to the formal structure and literary 
stylistics of the fairy tale tradition, both of which aid in strengthening the revised 
ideological message of her tale, Barthelme’s explicitly parodic approach to the 
tradition is in constant antagonistic dialogue with its own message. Eschewing the 
type of recuperation attempted by Carter, Barthelme’s transparent manipulation of 
form and style makes no effort to redress or subtly re-adjust the ideological terms of 
 
	   104	  
the mythical source material. Barthelme’s parodic version is instead directed at 
exposing and ridiculing, unapologetically, the moralism of the tale’s questionable 
messages of privilege, possession, and desire. And different, also, from the distinctly 
low ironic pattern of tragic irony in Coover’s claustrophobic version of the narrative 
(which limits its intramural critique to a self-alienating immersion into the world of 
the mythical parody), Barthelme’s high ironic approach to the Bluebeard tradition 
foregrounds its explosive, extramural satire and extends the terms of its parody 
beyond the confines of the mythical to include the cultural and commercial contexts 
of its own production as well. 
In Barthelme’s “Bluebeard” the critical scope does not end with this dual 
parody of the sociocultural and socioeconomic systems of myth production; 
Barthelme’s critique is also extended to the realm of nonfiction as well. For not only 
is the tale pieced together with the accouterments of an imaginary 1910 bourgeois 
lifestyle, it is also peopled with a curious mélange of historical and pseudo-historical 
figures. The names of artists and designers such as Poussin, Bronzino, and Le 
Corbusier rub shoulders with the likes of Jules Grévy75 and the Bishop of Troyes 
(Saint Lupus of Troyes?). And at one point in the narrative, Bluebeard (while waving 
around a bottle of tequila) even accuses his wife of having an affair with Doroteo 
Arango (Pancho Villa) after the two are revealed as having become acquainted at the 
Paris residence of the narrator’s aunt, Thérèse Perrault (85). While this “Perrault” is, 
by all accounts, completely fictional and seems to be included in the narrative 
primarily as a means of alluding to Charles Perrault, the uncertainty that attends 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 It must be noted that although François Paul Jules Grévy (President of the French Third Republic; 
in office 1879-1887) is alluded to in the text only as: “M. Grévy, the Finance Minister” (87), the fact 
that this French president has his name attached to a rare species of zebra (Grévy’s zebra, Equus 
grevyi) makes such an auspicious, if somewhat incidental, connection unavoidable. 
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Barthelme’s conflation of the historical and the pseudo-historical directly affects the 
epistemic stability of the narrative environment by incorporating an erratic, highly 
mythicized trace of “fact” into the narrative.76 
Rather than acting to establish a sense of authentic historicity or a set of fixed 
temporal boundaries, Barthelme’s eclectic assemblage of notables is thrown together 
with as much attention to biographical development and temporal fixity as an 
autograph collection.77 Yet the point worth noticing here is not merely that each of 
these names is invested with a token significance that says little or nothing about its 
own temporal relation to the year 1910 (a year, incidentally, not without its own 
blend of mythical, historical, and literary significance), but more importantly that 
each of these names operates at the nexus of an unstable synthesis of historical 
referent and mythical subject, both of which are textually inseparable.78 By tapping 
into the historico-mythical resonance of these names and recognizing the central role 
of narrative in arbitrating the terms of this balance, Barthelme’s tale gestures towards 
the continuous link uniting the spectrum of myth with the spectrum of nonfiction and 
historiography. This gesture is, on one level, a form of structural buttressing for the 
tale’s secondary, contextual parody of the high society gossip-column genre (i.e., 
performing the role of a fantasy who’s-who list of famous historical acquaintances 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 In Hayden White’s essay, “Postmodern and Textual Anxieties,” White argues that one of the major 
aporias that is “transcended” by the shift from the traditionalist view of history (which believes in a 
sense of historical fixity) to the postmodern, or, “textualist,” view of history (i.e. history as a linguistic 
construct) is the fact/fiction dichotomy. White writes: “Since facts are themselves linguistic 
constructions, ‘events under a description,’ facts have no reality aside of language. So while events 
may have happened, the representation of them as facts endows them with all the attributes of literary 
and even mythic subjects.” See Hayden White, The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, 
Literature, and Theory, 1957-2007, 313. 
77 White describes the postmodern treatment of history as “a reserve of curiosities and ‘collectibles,’” 
and continues: “These [‘collectibles’] can be wrenched from their historical contexts and inserted into 
any of various presentations of the past—less as documents, relics, monuments, or indices thereof 
than as merely virtual past objects or objects of a virtual past.” See White, Fiction of Narrative, 308. 
78 Fredric Jameson brings up a similar point in the context of E. L. Doctorow’s use of historical names 
in Ragtime (1975). See Jameson, Postmodernism, 23-25. 
 
	   106	  
and in-crowd connections). However, the narratological implications of this gesture 
are also significant for its subtle equation of history and myth, and its subordination 
of both to the agency of the narrator. 
This privileging of the narrator’s agency and narratorial purview, described in 
the previous chapter as an expansion of the narrator’s and/or protagonist’s power of 
action, is perhaps the most definitive characteristic of the high ironic mode of 
narrative and one that allows for an important delineation between the types of 
parody employed in these three tales.  
As should be apparent, Carter’s neo-traditional revision of the tale curtails 
this narratorial expansion and finally maneuvers her tale toward a kind of tentative 
realism. While the mode of myth, in which Carter’s tale operates, offers the potential 
for a similar expansion of the narrator’s power of action, adherence to the central 
utopian core of the mythic requires the tale to progress in one of two directions: an 
outward movement toward the sacred, esoteric end of the mythic spectrum (with a 
concurrent increase in power of action), or an inward movement towards the profane, 
exoteric, experiential zero-point of the spectrum (with an attendant decrease in power 
of action). Carter’s movement in the experiential direction, while facilitating the 
“real world” terms of her revision of the tale type’s moralistic agenda, nevertheless 
precludes any substantial expansion of the narrator’s power of action.  
Barthelme’s “Bluebeard,” on the other hand, operates along the spectrum of 
metafiction and, as such, is faced with a slightly different choice of narrative 
progression: an outward movement toward the absurdly nonsensical, unrestricted, 
“receivable” end of the spectrum (with a coincident increase in power of action), or 
an inward movement toward the more voyeuristic, experientially limited area of 
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metafiction (with a concurrent decrease in power of action). Barthelme’s high ironic 
tale, in its disregard for conventional temporality and with its multiple layers of 
parody, follows the outward trajectory, whereas the low irony of Coover’s “The Last 
One” clearly corresponds to the inward tendency. Although both of these tales 
operate from within the metafictional spectrum, what marks the key difference 
between these two versions is the tragically ironic collapse that confounds the 
narrator at the end of Coover’s tale. And in contrast to Coover’s curtailment of 
narratorial agency, Barthelme’s unresolved, comic interpretation does not indicate or 
imply any limits to the expansion of the narrator’s power of action. In Barthelme’s 
“Bluebeard” there is no final realistic condensation, no anti-heroic collapse, but 
instead the implication of a continuous narratorial expansion. And just as there is 
nothing present in Barthelme’s text to inhibit the narration from conjuring anything 
at all into the textual environment of the narrative (from motorcar infatuations to Le 
Corbusier quotations), so too does the parodic scope of the narrative extend beyond 
the mythical framework and into the realm of historiographic discourse.  
This playful extension of the narrative into the nonfictional realm of 
historiographic discourse is not a sentimental exercise, nor is it in any way an 
attempt to legitimize, accurately contextualize, or establish a stable historical context 
for the narrative. As with its parodic subversion of myth, the high ironic approach to 
nonfiction represents an attempt to reveal and subvert the ideological messages 
hidden behind the camouflaged surface of historiographic language. And, also akin 
to its engagement with myth, the high ironic version of history pretends to take its 
nonfictional fragments “as is,” with all implied connections and cultural connotations 
left intact. Eschewing a more covert, satirical approach, the high ironic approach is 
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immediate, deceptively overt, and angled towards a treatment of history that 
complicates the correspondence between symbol and coded meaning, which leaves 
much of the interpretation up to the connections made by the reader.  
However, instead of inserting a coded metonymic model as a stand-in for the 
ideology being subverted — symbol (A) referring to figure (B) which represents 
ideology (C) (e.g., in the manner of Jonathan Swift and Laurence Sterne), high ironic 
works such as Barthelme’s “Bluebeard” often skip directly to stage (B) and parade 
the historical figure, citation, or situation into the narrative without any attempt made 
to encode it. The result, while certainly more direct, is much less directed by the 
author’s choice of figurative encoding. Barthelme, for example, presents Pancho 
Villa and Le Corbusier without masks, like cameo walk-ons entering the text as 
themselves. This undirected use of history as a metaphor for itself is far less stable 
than the traditional approach to satire, which is typically regulated by the author’s 
choice of metonymic symbolism. And by removing this primary symbolic layer and 
presenting the fragments and figures of history “as is,” the primary interpretation of 
how these pieces of history relate to the narrative is left up to the interpretive 
capabilities of the reader. Although it would be false to claim that all works of high 
ironic narrative deal with history in as explicit a manner and with as many direct 
citations as appear in Barthelme’s “Bluebeard,” nevertheless, it is safe to say that 
narrative in this mode typically betrays a discernable anxiety regarding its own 
temporal location within history—an anxiety that directly affects the epistemological 
stability of the fragments and figures cited in the high ironic text.  
By challenging the mutual exclusivity of history and myth, Barthelme not 
only locates his text within the metafictional space between them, the awkward 
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blending of discourses in “Bluebeard” also aligns this tale with the type of 
postmodern parody variously described as “historiographic metafiction” (Hutcheon), 
“postmodern romance” (Elam), and “metahistorical romance” (Elias).79 Although 
Barthelme’s short story does not explore the complicated area of postmodern 
historiography to the epic lengths of Barth’s The Sot-Weed Factor (1960), Reed’s 
Mumbo Jumbo (1972), or Coover’s The Public Burning (1976), it does introduce 
many of the same critically parodic mechanisms and engages in a similar act of 
anachronistic juxtaposition. 
In Romancing the Postmodern, Diane Elam argues that this anachronistic 
juxtaposition of disparate events, figures, literary genres, and narrative modes is not 
merely a postmodern problematizing of such high modernist concerns as causality, 
temporality, objectivity, and historicity, it also represents the baffled awareness that 
postmodernism has of itself and its own inherently paradoxical historicity as both 
preceding and following modernity (12). The upshot of this is that postmodern 
narrative finds itself in the very awkward position of being, simultaneously, its own 
literary antecedent and consequence, forever caught in the gap between the 
narratological traces of a projected past and the manifold arbitrations of the present.80 
According to Elam, these defining temporal disjunctions are reflected in the 
fractured, metahistorical temporalities and structural multiplicities of the mode of 
narrative that develops within the historical vacuum of postmodernism. Elam writes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 As is described in greater detail in chapter 5 of this dissertation, while differing slightly in 
emphasis, these terms overlap sufficiently to qualify their correlation to the mode of high irony as it is 
defined here. For a precise definition of “historiographic metafiction.” See Hutcheon, A Poetics of 
Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction, 110; for “postmodern romance,” see Elam, Romancing the 
Postmodern: Romance, History, and the Figure of Woman, 12-13; and for “metahistorical romance,” 
see Elias, Sublime Desire: History and Post-1960s Fiction, xviii. 
80 Jean-François Lyotard makes a similar observation: “Postmodern would be understanding 
according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo).” See Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Explained to Children: Correspondence 1982-1985, 24. 
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The juxtaposition of differing historical periods is not simple 
contradiction; postmodernism does not simply reaffirm traditional 
narratives against modernism, [nor does it] return to the past in order 
to separate the medieval or the mythic from the modern. . . . What we 
are dealing with here is the breakdown of an overarching historical 
sequence, of the possibility of “metahistory” itself, in Hayden White’s 
terms. Postmodernism is . . . the coexistence of multiple and mutually 
exclusive narrative possibilities without a point of abstraction from 
which we might survey them. . . . [It] is an ironic coexistence of 
temporalities. (13, Elam’s emphasis) 
 
This “ironic coexistence” of multiple, often conflicting temporalities, Elam argues, 
amounts to a synchronic re-construction of events, which she defines as “ironic 
temporality” (50).  This “ironic temporality,” she explains, is not so much an 
exercise in ahistorical fantasy as it is a critical response to the unquestioned, material 
“reality” of culture and a radical interrogation of the relationship between history and 
its pretense of realism (50). The type of narrative that operates within this “ironic 
temporality,” Elam writes, takes its narrative shapes and archetypal patterns from 
romance and applies them to a transformation of history that refuses to ignore the 
“unreality of the event,” and which, through this refusal, exchanges this problematic 
“unreality” for “the potential of an otherness too alien to be ‘reality’” (50). And 
emerging from within the warped space-time of this narratologically re-configured 
continuum, Elam maintains, is the genre of “postmodern romance.”  
As Elam describes it, within this genre: 
History stops making sense. The aesthetics and politics of postmodern 
romance are bound to the transgressive relationship it forges between 
a theory of history and a theory of culture. . . . [It] attempts to revisit 
culture by refusing to dismiss the challenge of the past, by refusing to 
represent it either objectively (realistically) or subjectively (as a 
matter of attitude). . . .The ironic temporality characteristic of the 
postmodern condition means . . . that we can never take hold of the 
“now”. . . . Postmodernism is not a “now” but a haunting, excessive 
return of past events. (50) 
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Elam’s recognition of the “transgressive” re-imagination of history that occurs within 
“postmodern romance” is important for its highlighting of the postmodern obsession 
with past events as well as for its formulation of the profound doubt that marks this 
type of narrative and generally characterizes the high ironic mode of narrative 
discourse.   
Also significant is the direct connection of Elam’s analysis to the definition 
of postmodern parody forwarded by Linda Hutcheon in The Politics of 
Postmodernism. As Hutcheon famously contends, “[The postmodern] reprise of the 
past of art is not nostalgic, it is always critical” (89). According to Hutcheon, the 
postmodern parodic reprise of precedent forms is not a de-historicizing displacement 
or a complete removal of historical context, it is rather “a double process of installing 
and ironizing” (89). Through this ironic process of citation and critical appraisal, 
Hutcheon writes, “parody signals how present representations come from past ones 
and what ideological consequences derive from both continuity and difference” (89).  
Although this process plays somewhat less than a prominent role in the works 
selected from Carter and Coover, it is clearly evident in the example taken from 
Barthelme. In Barthelme’s high ironic “Bluebeard,” every aspect of the source 
material is installed and methodically ironized: from the tale’s “classical” context as 
a product of 18th century, French salon culture to its postmodern re-designation as 
magazine content, from its visceral message of desire to the aesthetic, psychological, 
and commercial ideologies surrounding the interpretation of that desire, and, most 
importantly, from its place in the fictional spectrum of myth to its place within the 
nonfictional spectrum of history—each of these contexts makes an appearance and is 
confronted and ironically addressed. 
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Hutcheon’s dialectical pairing of “continuity and difference” is also an 
incredibly efficient reply to the question of correspondence and response that opened 
the analysis of these three works. However, like the concept of core-response 
forwarded in this chapter, Hutcheon’s dialectical framing of postmodern parody is 
equally conscious of the aporia that obtains between an adherence to traditional form 
versus formal deconstruction on one side, and ideological dissemination versus 
transideological subversion on the other. Nevertheless, Hutcheon’s emphasis upon 
the critical nature of the postmodern parodic mechanism is crucial to an appreciation 
of the various differences, both formal and ideological, that are revealed when the 
core-response of the parody is taken into consideration. This core-response, in the 
case of high ironic metafiction, is not simply made as a counter to the central utopian 
impulse of the mythopoeic, this subversive response — and the profound doubt that 
attends it — is also present in its parodic interactions with the questionable 
epistemology of historiographic discourse as well. 
This analysis of correspondence and response also makes it clear that such 
abstract narratological terms as “anti-fairy tale,” “demythicization,” and 
“(co)respondence” do present seductive detours for the folklorist seeking to remain 
up-to-date with contemporary trends in the use (and, perhaps, also the perversion) of 
mythopoesis. Nevertheless, these detours are not necessarily the most accurate means 
of describing the various formal currents and transideological counter-currents active 
in contemporary literature. In an attempt to redress these inaccuracies, this chapter 
maintains that by establishing the literary characteristics of metafiction, defining its 
location in relation to other varieties of narrative discourse, and identifying the 
literary modes that employ metafictional narrative structures, the concept of 
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metafiction can be retrieved from a merely tropological and/or rhetorical designation 
and placed in a more prominent and, therefore, more narratologically useful position. 
This typological re-classification is essential to a clear assessment of postmodern 
narrative and its myriad forms of ironic literary praxis. 
While the critical approach taken in this chapter is by no means an exhaustion 
of the debates surrounding metafiction, postmodern parody and narrative irony, it 
does introduce a number of the key issues that are considered at greater depth in the 
chapters to follow. Primary among these issues, as outlined in these initial chapters, 
is the high ironic expansion of the protagonist’s and/or the narrator’s power of 
action. In the following chapter, this is traced through the high ironic exploration of 













































ROBERT COOVER: METAFICTIONAL PARODY AND METAPHORICAL 




I am personally convinced, if you will permit me, that there is a middle road, 
whereon we recognize that innovations find their best soil in traditions, which are 
justified in their turn by the innovations which created them. I believe, then, that law 
and custom are essential, but that it is one’s constant task to review and revise them. 
In spite of that, however, some things still make me puke! 
 
--- Robert Coover, “The Marker,”  




Undressing the Metaphor 
 
Robert Coover’s works repeatedly remind the reader that language and 
literature, myth and metaphor are human constructs and, as such, are contained 
within the imaginary boundaries of vocabulary and socio-political convention. 
However, his fiction argues (with a clear voice of its own), these systematically 
bounded and ultimately dogmatic constructs do not necessarily indicate an absolute 
limit to the innovative potential of language and literature. These constructs are also 
the very basis upon which innovation differentiates itself from innovation in an 
endless progression of linguistic growth and narrative renewal. Though the 
boundaries of the system cannot be destroyed, as they exist only in the collective 
imagination, they can be attacked, holes punched in walls, lewd graffiti composed, 
violent changes made to the internal architecture, all of which plays — and play 
should be emphasized here — a direct role in altering the structure of language and 
the nature of the narrative that emerges from that altered language. 
 
	   116	  
While this concept of continual renewal and differentiation runs throughout 
Coover’s prodigious list of works, nowhere is it more distilled than in the 1969 short 
story collection Pricksongs & Descants. Here the punched holes and graffiti become 
the very frames of viewing the mangled mythic interior of narrative itself, Coover’s 
prurient narration guiding the reader through the squat-house of language, from room 
to room, tale to tale, metaphor to metaphor.  
However, before launching into a full-scale analysis of this extremely varied 
and complex collection of stories, it is important first to consider Coover’s writing as 
a linguistic process before considering it as a literary product. For, although the 
obvious way of approaching and comprehending Coover’s interior re-/deconstruction 
project in Pricksongs & Descants is through its parodic manipulation of precedent 
narrative forms, Coover consistently denies the label of parodist, insisting that it is 
actually within the more intimate space of metaphor that his craft takes place. As he 
states in a recent interview: 
Everything is parody in a sense. We’ve got one story and we tell it 
over and over. So we unavoidably parody even as we try not to 
parody. But I never think of what I do as parody, at least not in any 
programmatic or satirical sense. I tend to start with a metaphor and 
this metaphor contains a parcel of imagery that needs to be unpacked. 
Sometimes something like a pre-existent form seems to open up as a 
kind of container for it, bringing with it other elements with which to 
play. Rather than consciously parodying another form, one discovers 
oneself embraced by it. And trying not to be engulfed. (“An Interview 
with Robert Coover”) 
 
Coover implies that the very act of writing (indeed, language itself) is, by default, an 
exercise in parody — a manipulation of form within form — each metaphor being 
contained within and calling up other metaphors, each with its own specific set of 
attributes. Finding a way to structure and manipulate these attributes without being 
manipulated by them, Coover warns, is both the writer’s vocation and predicament. 
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For Coover, the only fundamental quantity in the writer’s reality is this 
quantum persistence of metaphor — functioning in many ways like a kind of 
narrative atomic particle that can be combined with other particles for magical effect 
— each metaphor containing its own unique valences and potential for volatility 
when its structural integrity is compromised.81 As Coover remarks to Larry 
McCaffery in Anything Can Happen: 
They’re the germ, the thought, the image, the idea, out of which all 
the rest grows. They’re always a bit elusive, involving thoughts, 
feelings, abstractions, visual material, all at once. I suppose they’re a 
little like dream fragments, in that such fragments always contain, if 
you analyze them, so much more than at first you suspect. . . . Some, 
when you pry them open, have too little inside to work with. Others 
are unexpectedly fat and rich. (66) 
 
And like a postmodern Democritus, pairing literature down to its constituent parts, 
Coover’s interest lies in the metaphor as a unit of meaning that can be isolated and 
“pried open” — each metaphor a clue to unraveling the mystery of cognition. As 
McCaffery notes in The Metafictional Muse, “Coover is hoping to illuminate not 
only the process through which narrative art is created but also the broad base of 
metaphor through which the universe is comprehended” (26).  
This process, McCaffery argues, is comparable to Colin Turbayne’s 
analytical dissection of metaphor and analogy in The Myth of Metaphor. In this 
study, Turbayne deconstructs the grammatical mechanisms of Descartes’s mind-
body dualism and Newton’s universe-as-machine analogy and contends that it is 
absolutely essential to consider the linguistic structure and precise syntax of accepted 
theory (or that of any concept posing as “Truth”), for in order to fully comprehend 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Robert Scholes writes: “Coover's technique is to take the motifs of folk literature and explode them 
into motivations and revelations, as the energy might be released from a packed atomic structure." See 
Scholes, “Metafiction,” 113. 
 
	   118	  
such concepts as works of metaphorical articulation rather than as epistemological or 
ontological absolutes, one must locate and “undress” the metaphor that actually 
contains the concept. Turbayne describes the three basic steps of this process as 
occurring along the following lines: 
First, the detection of the presence of the metaphor; second, the 
attempt to “undress” the metaphor by presenting the literal truth . . . 
and third, the restoration of the metaphor, only this time with 
awareness of its presence. (The Myth of Metaphor 56) 
 
According to McCaffery, the similarity of method between Coover and Turbayne is 
found in their mutual concern for the disguised, latent, or nascent content of a given 
metaphor and the importance of detecting, undressing, and restoring it or, in 
Coover’s terms, prying it open and unpacking it to get a better look at what’s actually 
inside.  
In Anything Can Happen, Coover argues that this deconstructive process is a 
crucial means of reminding the reader that narrative (in speech, writing, and even 
memory) is always a reduction of the world into an isolated, comprehensible unit. 
These narrative units that circulate as stories, which order our place in the world and 
condition our understanding of it, can only ever represent an artificial and, therefore, 
inherently limited perspective of the world: 
 All of them . . . are merely artifices—that is, they are always in some 
ways false, or at best incomplete. There are always other plots, other 
settings, other interpretations. So if some stories start throwing their 
weight around, I like to undermine their authority a bit, work 
variations, call attention to their fictional natures. (Anything Can 
Happen 68) 
 
According to Coover, this structural encounter with the nature of narrative not only 
involves a critical analysis of its fundamental artificiality, this encounter also 
embodies the recognition that: “If storytelling is central to the human experience, 
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stories about storytelling, or stories which talk about themselves as stories, become 
central, too” (Anything Can Happen 68). In the works of Coover, this concept often 
plays out in novels that are painfully aware of their own fictional nature, in parody 
that cannibalizes its own species, and in stories — such as those collected in 
Pricksongs & Descants — which actually appear bent on causing lasting damage to 
the metaphors and narrative mechanisms being applied.  
The aggressive narcissism and skeptical self-reflexivity of Coover’s “stories 
about storytelling” not only foreground the latent psychosexual and/or socio-political 
content of narrative, they also actively foreground the structural processes, or, praxis, 
of the storytelling act: the narration. This emphasis upon the act of narration is 
precisely the mechanism by which the narrator’s power of action is expanded (as 
described in the first two chapters of this dissertation). This paradoxical practice of 
self-reflexive narrative reduction (in the sense of reducing narrative to a set of 
manipulable structures) and narrational expansion places Coover’s metafiction firmly 
within the high ironic mode and, in a manner analogous to Turbayne’s, follows a 
similar process of narrative anatomization.  
In Pricksongs & Descants, this metafictional process includes the following 
components, each of which will be explored during the course of the chapter: 
1.) Privileging of the Signifier: By emphasizing the symbolic variability of the 
linguistic signifier, static, monological interpretation is subverted and the 
reader becomes participatively engaged in a game of linguistic wordplay. 
2.) Undermining of the Metaphor: By ironically contradicting, negating, and/or 
reconfiguring the structure of a given metaphor, the metaphor is destabilized 
as a unit of fixed symbolic meaning. 
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3.) Stylistic Re-Structuring: By parodically re-interpreting and/or over-
interpreting familiar narrative patterns (especially myth and folk traditions), 
new avenues of narrative development become available. 
4.) Fracturing of Identity / Multiplicity of Voice: By expanding the possibilities 
of the narration via the application of intrusive, unreliable, and/or multiple 
narrators, not only is the narrator’s power of action increased, the potential 
development of any stable sense of narratorial identity is problematized. 
5.) Non-Linearity / Multiplicity of Choice: By upsetting the reader’s assumption 
of logical, cause-and-effect progression, narrative non-linearity leads to an 
expanded, more participative reading experience. 
This list, in many ways a compliment to the analyses already presented in the first 
two chapters of this dissertation, represents a further reminder that metafictional 
narrative within the high ironic mode always involves a critical approach to the 
fiction-making process. This critique does not attempt to exempt itself, but, on the 
contrary, serves to spotlight its own artificial nature as fiction through overt self-
reflexivity, fragmentation, and involutional narrative structures that interrupt the 
reader’s reactive tendency to construct hermeneutic strategies for interpretation 
and/or complicate the reader’s creation of cognitive boundaries between the real and 
the artificial. 
 
Privileging the Signifier 
Primary among these metafictional components is perhaps this privileging of 
the linguistic signifier. In fact, the very title of the text in question, Pricksongs & 
Descants, provides a perfect example of Coover’s tactical subversion of monological 
 
	   121	  
hermeneutics and meaning assignation. At the primary level of interpretation (i.e., 
taking these terms at their most literal), Coover’s title appears to metaphorically 
activate a reference to musical notation. The term pricksong, as defined by the OED, 
pertains to “music sung from notes written or pricked.”82 In complement to this term, 
descant is defined as “a melodious accompaniment to a simple musical theme . . . the 
earliest form of counterpoint.”83 The exchange and interplay of this point and 
counterpoint, as McCaffery also observes in his analysis, is a balanced harmony of 
parts (62). While this reading obviously relates to the overall project of Coover’s 
story collection (especially in its orchestration of monad and dyad, tradition and 
variation, precedent and critique), the metaphor doesn’t rest there. These songs and 
cants are also, as the Granny figure reveals in the first tale of the collection: “old 
death-cunt-and-prick songs . . . polyphonies [composed] outa dread and appetite . . . 
eclogues sprung from disaster” (3, Coover’s syntax).84 Thus activated, the words of 
the title become flooded with suggestive innuendo and euphemism. No longer simply 
framed as a quaint exercise in intertextual discourse, the collection’s thematic 
absorption with sex and death emerges like a paranomasic mist, enshrouding every 
tale with an ominous potency and loading every phrase with duplicitous potential.  
Throughout the stories of Pricksongs & Descants (hereafter PD) this flooding 
of the linguistic signifier with interpretive variability prevents the establishment of a 
stable meaning (a metafictional characteristic shared with both Barthelme and Reed, 
as explored in the following chapters). Such variability forces the reader to vacillate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See “Pricksong,” OED, Third edition, March 2007.  
83 “Descant,” OED, Second edition, 1989; online version December 2011.  
84 Also, as should be apparent to folklorists and those familiar with fairy tale genealogy, the root of 
the English word cant also has a direct etymological connection to the French, conte, and the Italian, 
cunti; typically translated as “tale” or “story.” 
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back and forth between exegetic and eisegetic strategies of epistemological 
construction — neither of which is ever completely satisfactory. The result is the 
establishment of a pervasive doubt as to the lexical value, semantic limitations, and 
indeed, the very plausibility of semiological signification as the locus of meaning 
construction.  
This region between exegesis and eisegesis is expanded to darkly comic 
proportions in “Panel Game,” the first of Coover’s “Seven Exemplary Fictions” — a 
series of seven experimental vignettes in which Coover tests the boundaries of 
narrative discourse. Written in the second-person, “Panel Game” involves the fictive 
“you” in a TV game show — also starring a wry, sarcastic “Clown,” a “Lovely 
Lady,” a grossly obese “Mr. America” (whose name later changes to “Mr. Amentia” 
[i.e., retardation]), an automatic “Audience,” and presided over by an evasive 
“Moderator” bent more on inciting anxiety than encouraging any kind of fair-play. 
Though it is clear from the start that some sort of competition is taking place 
(“Situation: television panel game, live audience” [62]), the precise rules of play fail 
to materialize and the result is a frenzied onomatomaniacal scramble to make some 
sense (i.e., to literally manufacture meaning) out of an incomprehensible stream of 
epistemologically volatile, yet essentially arbitrary linguistic signs.85 
Simultaneously, removed from the safety of his/her extratextuality and 
“dragged protesting from the Audience, nondescript introduced as Unwilling 
Participant” (62, Coover’s syntax), both reader and second-person persona become 
engaged in the task of deciphering the Clown’s dubiously meaningful remark: 
“Reminds me of the old story of the three-spined stickleback!” (63). The attempt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Neil Schmitz refers to the explosive signs in Coover’s story as: “Iconic words, ostensible keys to 
ostensible meanings.” See Schmitz, “Robert Coover and the Hazards of Metafiction,” 214. 
 
	   123	  
interpret this remark results in an absurd, linguistic flurry of allusion and pun. 
Homophonic hopscotch and synonymic leapfrog collide (and collude) as the second-
person persona frantically searches for the code within the code:86  
So think. Stickleback. Freshwater fish. Freshwater fish: green seaman. 
Seaman: semen. Yes, but green: raw? spoiled? vigorous? Stickle: 
stubble. Or maybe scruple. Back: Bach: Bacchus: baccate: berry. Raw 
berry? Strawberry? Maybe. Sticky berry in the raw? In the raw: bare. 
Bare berry: beriberi. Also bearberry, the dog rose, dogberry. 
Dogberry: the constable, yes, right, the constable in . . . what? 
Comedy of Errors! Yes! No. (PD 63) 
 
Although the near-miss of Dogberry as a character in Shakespeare’s The Comedy of 
Errors—rather than as the malapropistic constable in Much Ado About Nothing—
might appear to the reader as an absurd, yet vaguely plausible validation of the 
interpretive method being employed (especially in the play’s correspondence to the 
absurdity of the panel game and its similar interplay of identity, disguise, and 
fumbling language), it too becomes a blind-alley as the potential clues continue to 
pile up, conflate, and lead from one dead end to the next in an interpretive maze 
without any apparent exit.87 As Paul Maltby describes the predicament in Dissident 
Postmodernists:  
Typically, the reader seeks the information that will tell him/her what 
the participant does not know – a futile exercise in view of how 
Coover positions the reader; he/she is just as ignorant of the rules of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 In his analysis of “Panel Game,” Paul Maltby writes: “Here the participant frenetically switches 
from code to code (e.g., homophony or synonymity as sources of signification) in an effort to generate 
meaning. Yet, the process of signifiers appears interminable; there is no natural or self-evident 
endpoint at which a definitive meaning emerges,” Dissident Postmodernists: Barthelme, Coover, 
Pynchon (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1991): 82.  
87 On the topic of “the maze without an exit,” Gabrielle Spiegel notes: “It is precisely this mobility of 
meaning, the discontinuous, fractured, and indeterminate nature of writing, that makes it impossible 
for us to establish a fixed point outside of discourse which guarantees its objective reality. Thus the 
text is radically decentered, since there is no referent outside the play of linguistic signifiers, no 
ground outside language which controls its interpretive range. The interpretation of any signifying 
chain (or of any text) produces only another chain of signs, and we enter, as Northrop Frye foresaw, 
‘an endless labyrinth without an outlet’ [Anatomy of Criticism, 118],” see Gabrielle Spiegel, “History, 
historicism and the social logic of the text in the Middle Ages,” in The Postmodern History Reader, 
Ed. Keith Jenkins (Milton Park: Routledge, 1997): 199-200. 
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the game. The reader expects that the clue-words will eliminate the 
possibilities of meaning in the passage to the disclosure of a final 
meaning. Instead, those possibilities proliferate as Coover 
conspicuously manipulates the rules of language. (83, Maltby’s 
emphasis) 
 
Dizzy from the lights and weaving, zooming cameras, unnerved by the jeers of the 
Clown, harried by the impatience of the Moderator and the increasingly hostile 
laughter of the Audience, the fictive “you” continues to search for a basis from 
which to build only to find each carefully reasoned fragment of linguistic structure 
immediately disappear into the ether like the discards of a skydiving poker player. 
And, as Maltby’s analysis implies, analogous to the vertiginous semiotic strife of the 
“Unwilling Participant,” the reader, too, has little choice in the matter—either 
participate (however willingly) in this confluence of cognition, or not (to read, or not 
to read, seems to be the question; Hamlet? Yes! Maybe.).  
Increasing in intensity as Audience laughter overlaps with the quizzical quips 
of the Moderator, this participatory dilemma quickly begins to assume a stark, 
existential character. For as this one-sided game progresses it becomes clear that a 
failure to decode the Clown’s phrase correctly will, in all likelihood, result in 
execution (PD 68). In fact, the entire duplicitous affair, both as a story (for the reader 
to experience) and as a fictional scenario (for the fictive “you” to experience), is 
incrementally revealed as little more than a meaningless preamble to the only 
possible (and therefore, by default, meaningful) conclusion: death. As the Moderator 
mockingly croons: 
Don’t twiddle or piddle   
Or diddle your middle 
While riding a riddle, old Sport— 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
—For the frame is the same 
In fame or in shame 
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And the name of the game—  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
—is La Mort! (PD 69) 
 
And with that, a noose is lowered around the Unwilling Participant’s neck. However, 
just before the lever is pulled, the Moderator cryptically alludes to Much Ado About 
Nothing (PD 70), suggesting that although the protagonist was, perhaps, on the right 
track after all, ironically, the revelation of the answer is completely irrelevant to the 
game now that it has already reached its curtain call.  
While absurdity, bondage, and death mark the trajectory of the second-person 
protagonist’s ironic descent (a narrative pattern typical of the low ironic mode, as 
described in chapters one and two), what sets “Panel Game” apart and confirms its 
placement within the high ironic mode are the story’s overt, metafictional 
manipulations of narrative form, its subversion of its own systems of linguistic 
signification, and its direct, participative engagement with the reader.  
In “Panel Game,” this type of metafictional manipulation tends to lead away 
from the literal sense of the semiotic units being deployed, opening them up for a 
multitude of interpretations and, thereby, privileging the signifier over the 
signified—the latter becoming more of a ghost-like variable than a source of direct, 
semiological meaning.88 This privileging also tends to treat the linguistic sign itself 
like a highly volatile semantic isotope (to repeat an earlier metaphor) that can be split 
to produce other sign types and tokens from the fragments of each fractured sign 
(e.g., “Stickleback . . . Back: Bach: Bacchus: baccate: berry,” as in the passage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 According to similar assessments by David Lodge, Susan Sontag, Roland Barthes, and Christine 
Brooke-Rose, this ghost-like nature tends toward zero with the introduction of irony. See Christine 
Brooke-Rose, A Rhetoric of the Unreal: Studies in Narrative & Structure, Especially of the Fantastic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981): 385-89. 
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above).89 Although this splitting and re-splitting might continue indefinitely, ad 
absurdum, with every split the actual linguistic significance of the initiating signifier 
(e.g., “Stickleback,” in this instance) lessens appreciably, emptying out its 
significance with every division and leaving the reader with little more than a spent 
shell of letters.90  
 
Undermining the Metaphor 
In “The Door: A Prologue of Sorts” and “The Magic Poker” this same type 
type of reactive splitting occurs at the level of the metaphor.91 As described earlier, 
by ironically contradicting, negating, and/or reconfiguring the structure of a given 
metaphor, the metaphor is destabilized as a unit of fixed symbolic meaning. As is the 
case with the privileged signifier, the fracturing of the metaphor is also an effective 
means of emptying out its contents and revealing its textual, intertextual, and 
extratextual connections.  
Coover’s choice of familiar fairy tale patterns as the basis for this critical 
approach to symbol and metaphor is also significant. For beneath the metaphorical 
surface of the fairy tale narrative, cunningly veiled in the moral programming of 
fairy tale power relationships, writhes a world of repressed desires and anxieties. As 
Jack Zipes explains in Why Fairy Tales Stick: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 As discussed later in this dissertation’s chapter on Ishmael Reed, this semiotic volatility exists in 
and, indeed, drives the parodic, intertextual relations that occur in the game of “signifyin(g)” play. 
90 This process, when allowed to proceed unchecked, typically results in the “receivable text,” as 
defined by Barthes and described in the previous chapters of this dissertation. 
91 It is important to note in passing that Coover’s technique of metaphoric destabilization is not 
limited to his short fiction (although it does figure prominently in several stories from A Night at the 
Movies [1987] and A Child Again [2005]), but is extensively practiced in several of his novels 
including: The Origin of the Brunists (1966), The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry 
Waugh, Prop. (1968), Pinocchio in Venice (1991), Ghost Town (1998), and also figures prominently 
in the structure of several of his plays and novellas, such as A Theological Position (1972), Spanking 
the Maid (1982), Briar Rose (1996), and Stepmother (2004). 
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What the fairy tale does . . . is represent basic human dilemmas in 
tangible metaphorical forms that reflect how difficult it is for us to 
curb basic instincts. Fairy tales are all about basic instincts and 
genetic evolution within a civilizing process. (131) 
 
According to Zipes, the fairy tale is a fundamentally metaphorical mode of 
representation that communicates vital information about real-world situations 
through symbolic narrative structures (Why Fairy Tales Stick 95-101). As the “true,” 
literal content of the fairy tale has been deemed too sacred, too carnal, or potentially 
traumatizing to behold in its full actuality, metaphorical narrative forms are 
developed with which to convey this information and patterns devised for its 
practical use or condemnation (depending, of course, on the moral code in place at 
the time).92 Among other important functions (such as entertainment, education, and 
a platform for social change), Zipes argues, these forms also provide the crucial 
service of initiating the unconscious mind to the potential dangers of isolation — 
hunger, abuse, abandonment, murder — as well as the dangers of human society — 
rape, incest, adultery, treachery (Why Fairy Tales Stick 101, 131). Fairy tale narrative 
safely encapsulates each of these tangible dangers in the form of metaphorical 
symbols and figures (e.g., the wolf, the witch, the stepmother, etc.). And by taking 
these metaphorical forms apart, Coover brings these instinctual fears to the surface of 
the narrative, thereby revealing the actual horrors hidden beneath the fairy tale 
façade. 
Similar to the splitting of the privileged signifier, the metafictional 
fragmentation of the metaphor reveals and establishes connections between figures 
and types, foregrounds the fictional artificiality of narrative patterns and structures, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Zipes writes: “Every moral code in every society is constituted by the most powerful groups in a 
community or nation-state and serves their vested-interests.” See Zipes, Why Fairy Tales Stick, 131. 
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and, in Coover’s “The Door: A Prologue of Sorts,” endows the traditionally mute 
symbols and mystified figures of myth and fairy tale with demystifying voices of 
their own.93 
In “The Door: A Prologue of Sorts,” this metaphoric demystification is 
achieved through the characters of Jack and Granny. Coover’s anti-heroic Jack, no 
longer a naïve boy avid at the task of chopping beanstalks to topple giants, is 
rendered in his decline. He is now a frustrated father wracked with paternal regret, 
tortured by his own past glories and the failures of a life that has led him from the 
heights of heroic victory to the toils of an aging woodsman: 
He swung, chanting to himself to keep his stroke steady, and he 
dropped those tall hard trees, but he was all too aware of what he was 
really doing, of what was happening up there, or about to, and how 
the Ogre in him wouldn’t drop away and leave her free. . . . Was it 
envy, was that all it was? Feeling sorry, old man, that all that joy and 
terror is over for you, never to rise again? (PD 1) 
 
To some extent, Jack takes on the familiar form of the fairy tale woodsman (an odd 
composite of Snow White’s huntsman, Red Riding Hood’s lumberjack, alloyed with 
fragments of L. Frank Baum’s heartless Tin Woodsman) and yet there is also 
something unsettling about this character’s fatherly anxiety. His worries about his 
failings as a father seem to revolve around a darker angst, the “Ogre in him,” 
evoking the symbolic beast that lurks in the liminal margins where the clearing meets 
the trees (presaging the mysterious tone of “The Magic Poker,” as discussed in the 
next section of this chapter). Barely contained, it seems, are the werewolf-like 
transformations and insatiable appetites of male sexuality as Jack’s libidinal desires 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Robert Scholes makes a similar observation: “‘The Door’ itself is a critical mass obtained by the 
fusion of ‘Jack the Giant-Killer,’ ‘Beauty and the Beast,’ ‘Little Red Riding hood,’ and other mythic 
fictions. In the heavy water of this mixture there is more truth than in many surface phenomena.” See 
Scholes, Metafiction, 113. 
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conflict with his loving parental concerns (subtly contextualizing the simmering 
torpor of the father figure that appears later in Coover’s “The Gingerbread House,” 
also collected in PD).  
Coover’s enrichment of the hollow figure of the fairy tale woodsman destroys 
the stability of the metaphor attached to that figure. By elaborating upon the 
metaphor of the woodsman and re-substantiating him with human wishes, worries, 
and his own obscure mix of proclivities, the metaphorical woodsman no longer 
continues to exist as a static set of narrative attributes. And following Coover’s re-
animation of the figure, he also can no longer be trusted to fulfill his traditional role 
as a guardian. In fact, little remains of the self-less, timely helper that typically 
abides within the metaphor of the conventional fairy tale woodsman. Instead, 
Coover’s reader is left with a man whose intentions are no longer transparent. Even 
should he arrive on the scene at the expected moment, making his appointed entrance 
as the savior of innocence and slayer of bestial desire, his behavior might not be in 
line with his supposed character. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that an 
expression of the woodsman’s own bestial desires might instead be the result.     
In like fashion, the character of Granny comes across through a similar 
mélange of dueling metaphors, figures, and forms: at once the lovely princess and 
the loathly hag, youthful Belle as well as Red Riding Hood’s decrepit grandmother—
each feminine figure an aspect of Granny’s debauched reminiscence. And like her 
son Jack, Granny is no less conflicted by longing and loss:  
So bless me I’m ruminatin on the old times when virtue was its own 
so-called reward and acquired a well-bejewelled stud in the bargain 
propped up there in the stale limp sheets once the scene of so much 
blood and beauty like I say propped up and dyin away there in my 
four-poster . . . and I’m wonderin where’s my goodies? will I make it 
to the end? where's the durned kid? (PD 3, Coover’s syntax) 
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Left to rot in oblivion and frustrated remembrance, her comely granddaughter on the 
way for a visit, poor Granny falls into a sour, sardonic reverie. Beauty aged beyond 
her bloom, she now finds herself on the edge of death lamenting her years spent 
bedded with a Beast who “never became a prince” (4). As Granny spits: 
…don't speak to me of the revelations of rebirthers and 
genitomancers! sing me no lumpen ballads of deoderized earths 
cleansed of the stink of enigma and revulsion! for I have mated with 
the monster my love and listened to him lap clean his lolly after . . . 
and the basket of goodies? is that you on the path my dear? (PD 4, 
Coover’s syntax) 
 
As with Jack, there is something very disturbing about Granny and, indeed, 
something altogether suspicious about the insistency of her desire for “goodies.” And 
although there is no mention made of any wolf, like the ogre dwelling within the 
woodsman, the beast prowling in Granny’s mind is clearly bent on release.  
This release never arrives. Instead, the tale ends suspensively at the threshold, 
Granny’s granddaughter strangely prescient of the “elaborate game, embellished with 
masks and poetry,” that awaits her within (PD 6). Although many things are left 
hanging, this self-styled “prologue of sorts” makes one thing certain: there will be no 
“deoderized,” Disneyfied denouement in the stories to follow—sex and death, yes; 
filth and complexity, yes; but never the giddy burble of a happily-ever-after. 
In “The Magic Poker,” Coover goes beyond this suspensive suggestion of 
metaphoric depth and proceeds to unearth and undermine the explosive potential of 
the symbolic object itself. Metafictionally framed and semiologically destabilized 
from the very outset, “The Magic Poker” is in many ways a deconstructive portrait of 
the self-reflexive narrative—a congruous piecing together of incongruous fragments, 
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if you will—as its act of self-begetting spontaneously mutates into metaphor, 
devours itself, and recedes. The tale begins: 
I wander the island, inventing it. I make a sun for it, and trees . . . . 
This and more: I deposit shadows and dampness, spin webs, and 
scatter ruins. Yes: ruins. A mansion and guest cabins and boat houses 
and docks . . . . All gutted and window-busted and autographed and 
shat upon. I impose a hot midday silence, a profound and heavy 
stillness. But anything can happen. (PD 7) 
 
The narrator hovers above the scene, upsetting an otherwise realistic depiction of an 
abandoned island estate with a constant reminder of narratorial presence. Wandering, 
inventing, and imposing, the presence of the narrator not only serves to break down 
the reader’s cognitive delineation between fact and fiction, the narrator’s intermittent 
involvement also complicates the reader’s diegetic placement of the narrating 
voice.94 Throughout the story it never becomes clear whether the narrator should be 
interpreted as homodiegetic (i.e., articulated by an agent present in the world that 
their discourse creates), heterodiegetic (i.e., produced by an agent external to the 
story world), or some hybrid mixture of the two (“alterdiegetic”?).95 This 
simultaneous duality of presence and absence imbues the story with an anagogic 
resonance that charges the language with mutative potential and truly activates the 
narrator’s statement that “anything can happen.” For whatever the narrator chooses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Kathryn Hume makes a similar observation in, “Robert Coover's Fiction: The Naked and the 
Mythic,” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 12.2 (1979): 147, see also E. B. Weinstock, "Robert Coover-
'The Babysitter': An Observation on Experimental Writing," Style, 9 (1975): 387. 
95 In her A Rhetoric of the Unreal, Christine Brooke-Rose proffers an addition to these categories of 
narration: “. . . I suggest alterdiegetic, (an observer tells the story, mainly of someone else), to 
distinguish it from the Greek hetero- of the wider ‘narrator absent’ category” (n.33, 413). In the 
context of Coover’s fiction, Brooke-Rose’s parenthetical “mainly” is crucial as it allows for a 
significant movement of narrative voice and, thereby, an expansion of narratorial agency (a point that 
will be returned to later in the chapter), see Christine Brooke-Rose, A Rhetoric of the Unreal: Studies 
in Narrative & Structure, Especially of the Fantastic (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981): 311-38. For 
an in-depth analysis of these forms of narration and their relationship to the postmodern literary 
process, see also Brian Richardson, “Voice and Narration in Postmodern Drama” New Literary 
History 32.3 (2001): 682. 
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to say or do—literally, in every sense—becomes the narrative unfolding before the 
reader.  
The setting now conjured up and the parameters of the story’s diegetic 
dynamism in place, the tale’s intrusive narrator introduces the enchanted object:    
Bedded deep in the grass . . . lies a wrought-iron poker. It is long and 
slender with an intricately worked handle, and it is orange with rust. It 
lies shadowed, not by trees, but by the grass that has grown up wildly 
around it. I put it there. (PD 8) 
 
Thus introduced, the poker instantly becomes ripe with significance and metaphoric 
potential. However, in direct contrast to Neil Schmitz’s analysis in “Robert Coover 
and the Hazards of Metafiction,” which describes the emphatic artificiality of this 
passage as draining the poker of its magic,96 the narrator’s insistence upon the 
artificiality of the poker brings the item into a focus which, if anything, repeatedly 
reminds the reader of its enchanted nature (the qualifier in the story’s title being the 
first hint) and, thereby, setting up an air of suspense around it. The narrator’s focus 
upon this item does not, however, necessarily beg the question of the poker’s 
ontological relevance, as Schmitz argues (215). The “how” of its creation has already 
been established—it has been narrated into its position (whatever position that might 
be). Instead, the rather more pertinent problems of the poker’s epistemological 
relevance—the “why” of its being there and the “what” of its potential agency—are 
more central to the story’s development.  
To draw an analogy, the reader of Arthurian legend does not ask “how” 
Merlin casts the sword in stone (the only valid answer being an echo of Coover’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 It is this sense of magic that, according to Schmitz, Coover spends the rest of the story attempting to 
re-establish: “Coover thus begins by confessing that his poker is a literary artifact (‘I put it there’). So 
described, it is without magic. . . . Coover strives to restore magic to the symbol, to make it strike the 
imagination once more with resonance . . .” See Schmitz, “Robert Coover and the Hazards of 
Metafiction,” 215. 
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narrator: it’s magic, anything can happen), instead the reader’s curiosity is aroused 
by what will occur when the sword is finally plucked from the stone. Likewise with 
the poker, the reader must inevitably accept the bizarre conditions of the poker’s 
metafictional genesis and focus his/her curiosity on what magic qualities the poker 
might possibly possess and who is to unlock these qualities. 
The reader doesn’t have to wait long for an answer. For into this neglected 
wonderland arrive two young women: Karen and her sister, the “girl in gold pants” 
(a metaphor which in itself seems to hint at the invention of a new typological 
nominative: “Goldie Pants”). It is the latter who first discovers the poker while 
following Karen through the woods. This “girl in gold pants,” in typical fairy tale 
fashion, is suddenly presented with a choice of two paths: 
Which way around? To the left it is dark, to the right sunny: she 
chooses the sunny side and there, not far from the path, comes upon a 
wrought-iron poker, long and slender with an intricately worked 
handle. She bends low, her golden haunches gleaming over the grass: 
how beautiful it is! On a strange impulse, she kisses it – POOF! 
before her stands a tall slender man, handsome, dressed in dark slacks, 
white turtleneck shirt, and jacket, smoking a pipe. He smiles down at 
her. ‘Thank you,’ he says, and takes her hand. (PD 11) 
 
Like Arthur’s Excalibur, the wrought-iron poker fulfils its magic promise on the first 
attempt, miraculously transforming. This scenario isn’t allowed to develop any 
further, however, for as soon as the poker is allowed to release its magic the narrator 
hits the narrative pause button, so to speak, rewinds, and this transformation is 
retracted. 
In the next paragraph the discovery of the object is made again. The girl 
crouches to examine a wrought-iron poker bedded in the grass, her golden pants 
glowing radiantly: 
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‘Oh!’ she says softly. ‘How strange! How beautiful!’ Squeamishly, 
she touches it, grips it, picks it up, turns it over. Not so rusty on the 
underside – but bugs! millions of them! She drops the thing, shudders, 
stands, wipes her hand several times on her pants, shudders again. 
(PD 11, Coover’s emphasis) 
 
Switching abruptly from dream to nightmare, the poker’s identity as an enchanted 
object is thrown into confusion—a confusion that continually builds with each 
successive appearance.  
After this incident with the bugs, the subsequent discovery of the poker again 
garners a kiss, several in fact. But only after repeated attempts does the 
transformation take place (12). In another episode the kisses are ineffective, 
“Nothing happens. Only a rotten taste in her mouth. Something is wrong” (12). And 
as the narrative jolts along from one scene to the next, the poker becomes a pipe 
(ceci n'est pas une pipe?), a walking stick, a rifle, a piano leg, a sex toy, and a 
baseball bat (PD 21-23). No longer a stable metaphor with a clear narrative function, 
the poker instantly becomes a metaphor for absolutely anything.  
During one incarnation the handsome prince figure even takes this line of 
thought to its inevitable conclusion—in the metafictional world, everything is 
potentially a metaphor for everything (even itself). As prince implies after thanking 
the “girl in gold pants” for the transformative kiss and apologizing for the foul taste 
of the poker:  
‘What momentary bitterness I might have suffered,’ she responds, 
‘has been more than indemnified by the sweetness of your 
disenchantment.’ ‘My disenchantment? Oh no, my dear, there are no 
disenchantments, merely progressions and styles of possession. To 
exist is to be spell-bound.’ (PD 16, Coover’s emphasis) 
 
And if existence is an enchantment (an anagogic captivation), Coover implies, then 
language is the spell.  
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This spell, an imaginative weaving together of experience and artifice, is 
always a semiological progression from one state to another — from sense to sound, 
signified to signifier — and back again in an endless cycle of impression and 
expression. Just as the sign poker is not, except in a purely imaginary sense, an 
actual, physical poker (the sign merely acting as a doorway between phenomenon 
and phonology), the same sort of enchanted, imaginary connection applies to the 
structure of the metaphor. Only, in the case of the metaphor, the imagined connection 
is one of similarity and additive meaning — a blending of sign and sign, the one 
taking on and/or supplementing the attributes of the other. As the context of the 
similarity is shifted, the additive meaning is also shifted (“a pen is a sword” having a 
very different symbolic composition than “a pen is a bird,” for example). When this 
potential for meaningful similarity is made to appear arbitrary or is shown to take on 
the additive meaning of multiple or contradictory “styles of possession,” as in the 
case of Coover’s poker, the metaphor no longer continues to function as a stable 
metaphor. The result is the transformation of the symbolic poker into an empty 
signifier, a linguistic prop that takes on whatever significance it is given relative to 
the context of its appropriation. 
By compromising the integrity of the poker’s metaphorical content, the 
reader is repeatedly kicked out of the story world, reminded of its fictional 
artificiality, and dissuaded from assigning any stable meaning to the metaphor. 
However, as the poker loses its semiotic stability within the narrative, it takes on a 
higher level of symbolic possibility for the reader, essentially becoming a magic item 
for the reader to discover and unlock, the characters assuming at random the role of 
keys to ostensible incarnations. Here Schmitz’s analysis is to the point: 
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Narrative lines helically converge upon the poker as symbol which 
fuses the time and mode of each line. We see the fragments as 
interrupted only because the symbol itself, the center, is turned. At 
every turn, every approach, it generates schemes of consciousness that 
invariably fail to be conclusive. (“Robert Coover and the Hazards of 
Metafiction” 215) 
 
The comfortable relationship between the character’s narrated experience and the 
reader’s experience of the narration is disconnected. Through the narrator’s world-
bending interruptions in time and metaphorical content, the reader (like the 
Unwilling Participant in “The Panel Game”) is swept along, caught in the capricious 
currents of the story’s fluidity. Whereas the characters experience one reality after 
another without memory (each subsequent reality essentially dissolving into the 
next), the reader is conscious of the shifts taking place and aware of the levels of 
metaphoric meaning building up, replacing, augmenting, contradicting each new 
direction. As Schmitz writes, “The result is the shimmering of imaginative reality, a 
collocation of possibilities in which the historical realm of fact exists, but only as a 
thin surface” (215). And yet, even this “thin surface” of historical fact fails to 
maintain its stability as the narrator insinuates the island into reality before 
disappearing completely: 
I look on the map: yes, there’s Rainy Lake, there’s Jackfish Island. 
Who invented this map? Well, I must have, surely. . . . Yes, and 
perhaps tomorrow I will invent Chicago and Jesus Christ and the 
history of the moon. Just as I have invented you, dear reader, while 
lying here in the afternoon sun, bedded deeply in the bluegreen grass 
like an old iron poker . . . . (PD 25-26) 
 
Finally the story spins through a set of possible conclusions as the entire narrative 
system disappears into the poker like the collapse of some vast morphological sun—
the island and its brief inhabitants (not to mention the reader, Jesus Christ, et al.) 
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caught in the paradoxical singularity of a metaphor so empty and so dense that it not 
only swallows itself, it swallows the known universe along with it.  
Along parallel lines, Jorge Luis Borges conceives a similar metafictional 
cosmology in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” (1940; collected in Ficciones, 1962), 
Borges’s well-known historico-journalistic depiction of an illusory world that 
spontaneously appears in the world of fact.97 Among the many problems and 
paradoxes that confront the reader of this work, Borges’s tale intimates that reality 
(especially any narrative reality pretending to mirror or represent a version of 
extratextual reality) is little more than a convergence of “hrönir,” artifacts imagining 
themselves in and out of being.98 Like Coover’s poker, these “Tlönian” artifacts are 
not only self-generative, they are also infinitely re-generative, caught in the endless 
loop of a search for (and complication of) their own perfection: 
One curious fact: the hrönir of the second and third degree – that is, 
the hrönir derived from another hrön, and the hrönir derived from the 
hrön of a hrön – exaggerate the flaws of the original; those of the fifth 
degree are almost uniform; those of the ninth can be confused with 
those of the second; and those of the eleventh degree have a purity of 
form which the originals do not possess. The process is a recurrent 
one; a hrön of the twelfth degree begins to deteriorate in quality. 
(Ficciones 30, Borges’s emphasis) 
 
In like fashion Coover’s poker repeats and perverts its own synthesis. It resembles 
itself, assembles and re-assembles itself, transmogrifies, becomes its own opposite, 
and even, at one point in the story, inserts itself into a pseudo-mythical lore of its 
own design (PD 27-29). Seeming in many ways to take the genetic pattern of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 This alternative world creation, or what Brian McHale refers to in Postmodernist Fiction as “the 
tension between paramount reality and subuniverses of meaning” (20), runs through many of 
Coover’s novels and stories; the first two of his novels, The Origin of the Brunists (1965) and The 
Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. (1968), being the most in-depth 
explorations of this artificial construction of personal/private realities. See McHale, Postmodernist 
Fiction, 19-21.  
98 See Borges, Ficciones, 29-30, 33. 
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Borges’s “hrönir” as an embedded structural template, Coover’s poker pokes and 
protrudes from and into the liminal margins of historical time, its becoming 
immediately preceded by its having already become in a process of overlapping 
concurrence and repetitive differentiation. 
 
Stylistic Re-Structuring 
It is precisely this subversive process of repetitive differentiation that 
complicates readings of Coover’s metafiction, such as Christine Brooke-Rose’s 
approach in A Rhetoric of the Unreal, which attempt to fit Coover’s writing under 
the heading of stylization (364-89). Though Brooke-Rose is somewhat reticent in her 
use of examples, she firmly assigns Coover to the category of “narrative stylist,” 
insisting that his mimetic repetition of precedent forms—far from involving any type 
of parodic narrative subversion—borders on the direct imitation of these same forms 
(366). In Brooke-Rose’s assessment, Coover’s work comes across as tantamount to a 
kind of postmodern ventriloquism.99 As she writes in her chapter entitled, 
“Metafiction and surfiction: a simpler formal approach”: 
Coover is concerned with history and our constant reinterpretation of 
it (though of course his over-interpretation of it is yet another 
interpretation). . . . One can see him moving from both traditional and 
parodic representation of contemporary problems to stylisation, and in 
his short stories . . . he moved over entirely to stylisation. (A Rhetoric 
of the Unreal 366) 
 
Although it never becomes entirely clear what Brooke-Rose intends by her use of the 
term “stylisation” (her own analysis eventually becoming indistinguishable from that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Although the categorization of Coover’s fiction under the heading of “stylization” is a tenuous one 
at best, certain of his later works (e.g., Briar Rose [1996], Ghost Town [1998], Stepmother [2004]) do 
rely heavily upon tropes of mimicry and formal imitation – albeit in a highly ironized, blatantly 
parodic format. Perhaps only Noir (2010) could be considered as fitting the questionably parodic, 
stylistic paradigm that Brooke-Rose advances in A Rhetoric of the Unreal (364-89). 
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of Olga Scherer’s 1979 study of stylization in the works of William H. Gass, which 
she cites extensively),100 nevertheless, she seems to be making a distinction between 
long-form and short-form metafictional parody (373-74). While making a case for 
long-form, novelistic parody (similar to the variety being advanced here) within the 
works of writers such as Thomas Pynchon, John Fowles, and Ishmael Reed, Brooke-
Rose’s analysis relegates the short fictions of Barth, Barthelme, and Coover to the 
region of false parody, or “stylisation” (a distinction which in many ways predicts 
Fredric Jameson’s similar thesis concerning postmodern pastiche).101 Brooke-Rose 
continues to argue that this “stylisation” effectively amounts to an imitative narrative 
that also manages to stylize the reader’s interpretive process. The result, she 
indicates, is a multiply-stylized narrative that, “is in a sense double, for the other 
model [of the stylisation] is the very process of reading” (372). Not only does this 
assessment needlessly complicate her supposedly “simple formal approach,” it also 
makes her argument of short-form metafiction as direct narrative imitation a very 
difficult position to support.102 And considering the “double” nature that Brooke-
Rose apparently recognizes in short-form metafiction (which is, terminology 
excepted, actually quite similar to the assessment of high ironic parody as it is 
presented in the first chapter of this dissertation — i.e., parody upon parody), one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Olga Scherer’s study, which is somewhat less vague than Brooke-Rose’s in its terminology, does 
make some interesting distinctions between what Scherer calls “qualitative” and “quantitative” 
stylization (the former related to reiteration, the latter to imitation). See Scherer, “La stylization,” 65-
85. 
101 Jameson writes: “Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, 
the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of such 
mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of 
laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, 
some healthy linguistic normality still exists.” See Jameson, Postmodernism, 17. 
102 In the concluding line of her subsection on “stylization,” she even pretends a dismissive 
ambivalence towards this position: “But such imaginings are ‘schemas,’ anathema to these writers, 
which is why I don’t dare draw it, but give it discursively, that it might get lost” (A Rhetoric of the 
Unreal 385).  
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can’t help but question this theory of a stylization of the creative act compounded 
with a stylization of literary models without appealing to parody as a narrative 
mechanism.  
Further, in an attempt to define the parameters of metafiction and account for 
its contradictory currents, Brooke-Rose’s stylistic analysis seems to dismantle the 
very structure of parody. Her argument opposes the repetition of precedent narrative 
structures, the mimicry of compositional style(s) and the parodic tendency toward 
imitation (“stylisations of literary models”) against the satirical and/or ludic ends of 
postmodern parody (“stylisation of the writer’s creative act”) (373-74). This 
opposition not only defuses the inherent tension of metafictional narrative, it also 
defuses the concept of parody in the process. Furthermore, in her splitting of parody 
into its constituent parts, the critically self-reflexive aspect of parody is lost 
completely—arguably the raison d’être of ironic narrative. Following Brooke-Rose’s 
analysis to its conclusion, all one is left with is a weak form of ingenuous comedy on 
the one hand, and a naïve repetition of precedent narrative forms on the other. 
That this is an untenable appraisal should be obvious to the reader of Coover, 
especially in the light of the above reading of “The Magic Poker.” However, the 
question of stylization versus parody within metafiction is not without its 
importance. Brooke-Rose’s analysis is a useful reminder that stylization is crucial to 
the parodic process. In fact, it is often the means by which metafictional narrative 
foregrounds its own structural components, tropes, and rhetorical patterns. But 
whereas stylization, qua stylization, usually ends at the level of convention (i.e., the 
establishment of a familiar or stylistically reminiscent narrative environment), 103 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The OED defines the transitive verb, “stylize,” as follows: “To conform (an artistic representation) 
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parody turns this convention back on itself, re-contextualizes the established 
convention, or applies the convention in a discernably unconventional manner. As 
the OED definition of the term makes clear, parody always involves some kind of 
interference with style and/or convention:  
A literary composition modeled on and imitating another work, esp. a 
composition in which the characteristic style and themes of a 
particular author or genre are satirized by being applied to 
inappropriate or unlikely subjects, or are otherwise exaggerated for 
comic effect. (“Parody”) 
 
While this definition places a significant emphasis upon the imitative aspect of the 
stylization, the key difference between parody and stylization is precisely that, the 
difference, or, as it was phrased earlier, the repetitive differentiation.  
Like rhetorical irony, parody exists within this disjunction of medium and 
message (it shows its own “seams,” as Brian McHale might put it).104 At some point 
during the text it becomes apparent to the reader that the style of the narrative, its 
linguistic content, and its context fail to completely agree. Something is 
inappropriately placed (e.g., a barber’s basin on one’s head), exaggerated (e.g., Irish 
babies as a snack), or contextually out of joint (e.g., philosophizing spermatozoa). 
Often the narrative leaves a trail of clues along the way so as to tip-off the discerning 
reader as to the parody taking place (typical in the works of Nabokov, Pynchon, 
Acker, and Barth), other times the disconnection is so obvious that clues are 
unnecessary (as is common in the works of Katz, Brautigan, Vonnegut, Reed, and 
Barthelme), and in highly sophisticated works of parody the duplicity of the stylistic 
mechanism is such that the parody only ever manifests as a pervasive, yet ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the rules of a conventional style; to conventionalize.” See “Stylize,” OED, Second edition, 1989; 
online version December 2011. 
104 In Postmodern Fiction, McHale writes: “Postmodern fiction . . . seeks to foreground this seam by 
making the transition from one realm to the other as jarring as possible” (90). 
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unanswerable ironic doubt (as in certain works by Borges, Beckett, DeLillo, and 
Gass).  
Although the fictional works of Robert Coover might be said to include each 
of these techniques (a statement which also holds true for each of the authors above), 
it is perhaps in the first category — the clue-strewn parodic trail — where Coover’s 
parody is most often located. This is especially true of the “Seven Exemplary 
Fictions” section of PD. While Brooke-Rose finds these works, specifically, to be 
“clear stylisations of literary models” (373), it is readily apparent that the stylization 
going on in these stories is transparent. Rather than imitating a given convention in 
an attempt to trick the reader (a dubious proposition at best) or mimic a specific 
genre for no other purpose than mimicry (which is just as dubious), Coover’s 
stylization serves to actively focus the reader’s attention on the ironic disconnections 
going on in the narrative.  
Coover’s technique of stylistic re-structuring (as introduced earlier in the 
chapter) represents a parodic re-interpretation and/or over-interpretation of familiar 
narrative patterns. As Coover explains in the foreword to his “Seven Exemplary 
Fictions” (fittingly addressed to Cervantes), these parodic interpretations are aimed 
“as a weapon against the fringe-areas of our consciousness, and as a mythic 
reinforcement of our tenuous grip on reality” (PD 61). Coover continues:  
The novelist uses familiar mythic or historical forms to combat the 
content of those forms and to conduct the reader (lector amantísimo!) 
to the real, away from mystification to clarification, away from magic 
to maturity, away from mystery to revelation. And it is above all to 
the need for new modes of perception and fictional forms able to 
encompass them that I, barber’s basin on my head, address these 
stories. (PD 61) 
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Like Cervantes’s project in his Novelas Ejemplares (1613), Coover’s project is one 
of innovation within renovation, debunking myth through an immersion in myth, 
fighting form with form and content with new context. This “combat” with the 
content of form, as discussed previously, involves an attack on the metaphorical shell 
encasing the fragile human drama hidden beneath. The unfolding of this drama, as in 
Cervantes’s collection, involves the reader directly with questions of the real and the 
ideal, the probable and the improbable, and in so doing, creates something entirely 
new in the process. 
In the stories “The Brother” and “J’s Marriage,” for example, Coover selects 
two well-known tales from the Christian tradition (the story of Noah’s ark and the 
relationship of Mary and Joseph, respectively) and extrapolates, drawing inferences 
from the material and projecting possible conclusions into each of the narratives. Yet 
in no way does Coover imitate the form directly. In contrast to works such as Angela 
Carter’s The Bloody Chamber, which inhabits both the style and the form of the 
mythic material being parodied (as discussed in the previous chapter), the 
interactions with myth taking place in “The Brother” and “J’s Marriage” do not 
attempt to feign biblical diction, syntax, or typography. And yet the reader’s 
interaction with Coover’s pseudo-mythical material is just as immersive as it would 
have been had he attempted a more orthodox program of stylization (perhaps even 
more so, for the form can easily obscure the content in overly stylized parody—as is 
common in musical theater and cinematic parody).105  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Examples of overly stylized parody in musical theater might include Jamaica (1957) and Wicked 
(2003), in cinematic parody, movies such as Don't Be a Menace to South Central While Drinking 
Your Juice in the Hood (1996), Kick Ass (2010), and Your Highness (2011), and animated (and/or 
semi-animated) productions might include Shrek (2001) and Enchanted (2007). Each of these 
productions end up becoming the very thing they begin (or pretend to begin) as a parody of. 
 
	   144	  
Although Coover’s metafictional interactions with myth vary greatly from 
novel to novel and story to story, “The Brother” and “J’s Marriage” both share a 
common adherence to the structural integrity of the source material. In these tales the 
frame tale containing the metaphor is taken as a unit and the central plot structure of 
the metaphor remains intact. By leaving the central components of the plot in place 
(like the trappings and scenery of a deserted stage), the gaps in the original narration 
and subsidiary details of the frame tale can be elaborated upon and/or invented out-
right (e.g., the names and biographies of incidental characters, the psychology of the 
lead protagonists, historical correlations, socio-political and/or sexual subtexts, etc.). 
Through this process the context of the central metaphor is opened up for re-
interpretation. 
“The Brother,” for example, begins in media res and takes the form of an un-
punctuated, stream-of-consciousness account of the labors incurred during the 
construction of Noah’s ark (Gen: 6-9; The Holy Bible: The Old Testament 5-7). In 
Coover’s version, the biblical use of the imperfect tense, the oblique switches from 
active to passive to middle voice, and the archaic verbal jolts in mood from the 
indicative to the subjunctive (all familiar grammatical aspects of the Old Testament 
narrative style) are absorbed and transformed into a barrage of Midwestern American 
hick-speak. And yet this idiomatic transposition doesn’t seem forced or stylistically 
discordant. In fact, the re-setting of the discourse to within the milieu of some 
pseudo-biblical, Midwestern rural farmland fits the tale incredibly well and acts to 
re-contextualize the narrative into an almost parallel idiomatic environment.  
This re-contextualization, however, does not contemporize the tale in any 
way. As described in the preliminary analysis of Barthelme’s Snow White (in chapter 
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one), the high ironic shift from one word-world to another is never simply a lifting 
and setting down into a new temporal setting. As in Barthelme’s novel, the textual 
environment of Coover’s “The Brother” is a hybrid — a mixture of mythic incident 
and modern diction existing in a purely fictionalized world. And although the tale 
does offer a perspective on the events that could conceivably be termed a more 
“realistic” account (due to its Americanized language, a scattering of modern terms, 
and a narration which, in contrast to the Old Testament episode, has a discernable 
source), such a reading is problematic in that the scope of Coover’s narrative does 
not venture very far beyond what is already patterned in the biblical source material 
and certainly does not describe a common order of experience. But the crucial 
difference, as in all high ironic parody, exists in what is being displaced through the 
narration. 
The story’s first-person narrator, immediately revealed to be Noah’s brother, 
relates the tale from the perspective of an incredulous though ultimately sympathetic 
sibling caught up in a series of events beyond his comprehension. Though he aids 
Noah in the building of the ark, he mocks the ridiculous nature of the task and takes 
every opportunity to belittle his brother for the insanity he sees in building a boat at 
the top of a hill: 
. . . God knows how he ever found out to build a damn boat lost in his 
fog where he is Lord he was twenty when I was born and the first 
thing I remember was havin to lead him around so he didn’t get 
kicked by a damn mule him who couldn’t never do nothing in a 
normal way just a huge over size fuzzyface boy . . . (PD 75, Coover’s 
emphasis and syntax) 
 
The brother’s undoing, it becomes apparent, is his blind adherence to a set of rational 
notions that render him incapable of relating to Noah’s epiphantic calling. Like the 
“human wickedness” that ostensibly brings the flood (Gen. 6:5; The Holy Bible: The 
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Old Testament 5), the brother’s pragmatic rationality is implied as the hamartia that 
results in his destruction. The irony of this situation exists in the fact that the only 
alternative to the brother’s rationality is an equally blind obedience—an obedience 
that, as the passage above makes clear, comes across as equivalent to mental 
retardation.  
Ultimately incapable of communicating with each other, Noah abandons his 
brother and leaves him to drown. And like Noah’s brother, the reader, too, is left 
stranded. Waters rising, boat lost on the horizon, the reader is caught in the double-
bind, meta-allegory of Noah’s idiotic zealotry on the one hand and the brother’s 
nihilistic rationalism on the other. In many ways reminiscent of the absurd collapse 
of reason that occurs at the close of “Panel Game,” this tale also concludes as a 
searing indictment of the human condition, damning in equal terms both the religious 
(onto-theological) and rational (epistemological) impulses.  
While most of the biblical elements have been maneuvered to the margins of 
the tale (or paraphrased into submission), the removal of the authoritative voice of 
the divine does little to upset the bizarre nature of the events.106 On the contrary, the 
events take on a terrifyingly surreal sense of suspensive possibility — the real and 
the impossible engaged in open combat throughout the course of the tale. And 
though the impossible always seems to have the upper hand, the urgency of Coover’s 
attack upon the “unconscious mythic residue” (PD 60) contained in such pervasive 
mythic forms critically alters the reader’s perception of the myth and the motivations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 As McCaffery notes: “Because we know what will follow, our reaction to even the humourously 
reported scenes is strained; certainly the fact that there is no biblical logic provided to help justify 
what is happening emphasizes the human aspects of the scene and makes Noah’s refusal of aid to his 
brother seem cruel and cold.” See McCaffery, The Metafictional Muse, 64. 
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of its principle characters. By insinuating an ironic doubt into the mind of the reader, 
Coover’s tale undermines (however slightly) the integrity of the myth. 
This program of mythic attack follows a similar course in “J’s Marriage.” 
Told in an indirect style of narration, this story allows the reader an intimate glimpse 
into the yearnings and disappointments of the protagonist, nominally referred to 
simply as “J” (though the context makes it clear that the character should be taken as 
the biblical figure of Joseph, husband to Mary and surrogate father of Jesus). As the 
narrative unfolds, J recounts the circumstances surrounding his marriage, the 
incredible events encountered by his wife, and the conditions of their eventual failure 
as a couple. Incapable of getting each of the pieces to correspond, J traces and re-
traces the course of his married life, anxiously searching for some way of 
comprehending or at least coming to terms with his baffling experiences as a 
husband, a father, and a man. 
In many ways a “parodic forerunner of the modern existential man,” as 
McCaffery notes in his analysis of the tale, “Joseph’s bewildered and annoyed 
reaction to the pattern of his life gives us a new outlook on this story” (The 
Metafictional Muse 62). This revised perspective allows the narrative to propose a 
series of ironic solutions to questions raised (but omitted or left unanswered) in the 
myth. As McCaffery enumerates:  
. . . what, for example, was their sex life like after they were married? 
(nonexistent, except for one instance which may have been only a 
dream). What sort of relationship did Jesus have with Joseph? (they 
ignored each other). How did Joseph die? (of consumption in a tavern, 
his face resting in a glass of [red] wine). (The Metafictional Muse 62) 
 
As these more or less prosaic issues are confronted and their circumstances 
elaborated upon with a tremendous subtlety of detail, a picture emerges of a man 
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thoroughly unprepared for divine intrusion into the otherwise satisfactory affairs of 
his daily life. 
Though by all accounts a man given to constant contemplation, nothing in his 
experience seems to have prepared him for the enigma of deific cuckoldry (as told in 
Luke 1: 26-38; The Holy Bible: The New Testament 53-54). As J describes:  
She explained to him simply that her pregnancy was an act of God, 
and he had to admit against all mandates of his reason that it must be 
so, but he couldn’t imagine whatever had brought God to do such a 
useless and, well, yes, in a way, almost vulgar thing. J always thought 
about everything a great deal . . . and about this, to be sure, he thought 
even more that usual. (PD 98, Coover’s emphasis) 
 
And yet such obsessive contemplation does little to assuage the deepening 
bewilderment J experiences as he strives to make sense of Mary’s immaculate 
conception: 
. . . no power of mental effort provided a meaningful answer for him; 
it was simply unimaginable to him that any God would so involve 
himself in the tedious personal affairs of this or any other human 
animal, so unutterably unimportant were they to each other. (PD 98) 
 
Finding it beyond his meager human means to discover the significance of his wife’s 
supernatural encounter, J allows the issue to stand, “. . . he simply gave in to it, 
dumped it in with the rest of life’s inscrutable absurdities . . .” (98). And yet the 
question continues to nag him to his very dying breath. In fact, the narrative implies, 
it is in this final bout de souffle that J finally puts the pieces together into some 
semblance of order. Just before he expires in a fit of consumptive laughter, “he had a 
rather uncharacteristic thought about the time she, the wife, fell asleep, or apparently 
so, that morning following the wedding night” (101). What this thought might have 
been and whether it has any significant bearing on the strange events of J’s existence 
(or is simply the fantasy of a desperate old man) are questions left to the speculation 
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of the reader. Nevertheless, one implication of this last laugh is remarkably clear. J’s 
doubt has remained intact to the very end.  
Despite the graceful subtlety of the prose, especially in comparison to the 
brazen, vernacular monologue of “The Brother,” “J’s Marriage” is perhaps the more 
mythically destructive of the two stories. J’s eloquent surveys of his doubt and his 
articulation of this doubt to the reader certainly affects the theological veracity of the 
mythic source material. In his torturous examinations of God’s liaison with his wife, 
J’s comments cut away at the metaphor with exacting precision, bringing to the 
surface the latent “vulgarity” of the annunciation and the “unutterable unimportance” 
of man in relation to God. 
Perhaps more so than Noah’s brother’s vitriolic rants against the illogicality 
of his lot, J’s arguments have a persuasive cogency that lends them a certain tentative 
epistemological weight. Although both characters appeal for the reader’s sympathy, 
it is easy to take the brother lightly, as a self-righteous buffoon not unlike Noah. J, on 
the other hand, commands a somewhat deeper sympathy. Further, J’s anger (if it can 
be called that) is not directed outward at God, Mary, the world, etc., but inward, at 
his own incapacity to comprehend the seemingly incomprehensible. His inherently 
inquisitive nature not only critically re-interprets the events surrounding his own 
piece of myth, so to speak, it also serves to remove the story from its esoteric 
element, thereby, in Coover’s words, “conduct[ing] the reader to the real, away from 
mystification to clarification” (PD 61).107   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 The use of “to” in this phrase (if not taken as completely and deliberately ironic) might be more 
accurately replaced by “towards,” as clarification and reality are destinations seldom reached in 
Coover’s fiction. 
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While Schmitz claims that the “skillful tricks of interpretation,” which occur 
in “The Brother” and “J’s Marriage,” actually evade the question of truth and are, 
therefore, reducible to “irreligious jest” (“Robert Coover” 213), this concept of truth 
as a category confined to the purely literal or the purely imagined is precisely what 
Coover’s narrative debunks.108 In setting up a tone of pervasive doubt throughout 
each of the “Seven Exemplary Fictions,” Coover chips away at this distinction by 
showcasing the fact that, as a fundamentally creative act, there is no point at which 
fiction divorces itself from imagination. And in its assertion that the literal becomes 
fiction at the point of iteration, Coover’s parody eloquently displays that, while 
literal truth may enter the realm of fiction, only imaginative truth can ever re- 
emerge. 
Behind this syllogism, however, lurks the fact that this supposedly 
fundamental imaginative truth is just as unstable as literal truth in the world of 
fiction. As Coover’s writing makes readily apparent, what is written can be just as 
easily be unwritten through irony, contradiction, paradox, and doubt. Likewise, the 
iterating voice of the narrator (to say nothing of the inherent inadequacy and 
inconstancy of the author’s perspective) is just as fluid in its potential to extend 
and/or restrict the scope of the narrative. As the previous analyses of “The Magic 
Poker” and “The Door” have already introduced, the teeming fecundity of the 
narrative act is limited only by its own artificially self-imposed constraints.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 It is actually quite odd that Schmitz would call for such clarity, as it is Schmitz that brings up R. P. 
Blackmur’s analogous observation in his study of Wallace Stevens: “By attempting not to set up a 
tone, the tone of truth is secured for statements literally false. Fairy tales and Mother Goose use the 
same language. Because there is no point where the statements stop being true, they leap the gap un-
noticed between literal truth and imaginative truth.” Quoted in Schmitz, “Robert Coover,” 213; from 
R. P. Blackmur, Form and Value in Modern Poetry, 194. 
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Multiplicity of Voice 
In works such as “The Elevator” and “The Babysitter,” Coover shows that, 
while these constraints only hold as much weight as they are given in the moment of 
their iteration, the subversion of these constraints does not necessarily lead to a 
disintegration of narrative. Instead, the free-form manipulation of narrative point of 
view that occurs in these stories effects a radical fracturing of narratorial identity. 
The resulting multiplicity of voice (as introduced at the beginning of the chapter) 
expands the possibilities of the narration beyond any singular position or narratorial 
perspective. Through the use of intrusive and/or unreliable narrators (such as in “The 
Magic Poker,” “Klee Dead,” and “The Milkmaid of Samaniego”),109 as well as 
through the splitting of the narration into a multiplicity of narratorial positions (as in 
“The Door,” “The Elevator” and “The Babysitter”), the typical narrative conventions 
of stable narratorial identity and sustained character development are problematized. 
Throughout the stories collected in PD character traits and plot tendencies are 
constantly threatened by erasure or the superimposition of alternative traits and 
tendencies. And yet, this refusal to play the identity game by the rules does not result 
in the end of identity construction. On the contrary, through this act of destabilization 
narratorial identity is expanded; it has new levels and narrative possibilities 
extending beyond the limits of (mono-)logical perception (as Virginia Woolf 
famously phrased it, “My name is Brown. Catch me if you can”; Coover takes this a 
step further and asks: What happens when Brown tries to catch Brown?).110 By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 In “Klee Dead,” Coover’s narrator skirts the very issue of narratorial responsibility by eluding his 
own omniscient position, digressing, and ultimately refusing to perform the role of primary 
interpreter. A similar process occurs in “The Milkmaid of Samaniego,” the narrator tinkering with and 
erasing details so as to display the act of narration in situ.  
110 Virginia Woolf, “Character in Fiction,” 409. 
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pushing a set of narrative events to the point at which they invert and become 
abstract, the narratorial development of a fictional identity is opened up to myriad 
possibilities.  
In “The Elevator” Coover shows that as the rules of the identity game are 
subverted and inverted during the course of the narrative, the narrator’s power of 
action increases in proportion to the level of this abstraction. The narratorial 
multiplicity of “The Elevator,” takes full advantage of this paradoxical relativity. 
And with each fracture in the continuity of the protagonist’s development, the 
familiar “situation-transformation-situation” dynamic of narrative progression (as 
Robert Scholes terms it)111 is re-cast as an indefinite progression of transformation-
transformation-transformation without the possibility of any conclusive denouement. 
Each identity formulation, once established, simply leads to other alternative 
formulations, and with each transformation of character, narrator, and narrative 
environment, the narratorial power of action is continually expanded.  
In “The Elevator” this expansion occurs on three contingent levels. Firstly, 
the establishment of a stable narrative progression is structurally subverted; 
secondly, the boundaries between the character, narrator, and narrative environment 
are rendered transparent through abrupt fluctuations in diegetic perspective (i.e., the 
story, quite literally, becomes the telling); thirdly, the fractured pieces of the 
narration are arranged into a self-reflexive composite of imagined events. The result 
is a narrative that imagines itself out of the confining, mimetic representation of 
“actual” events by expanding the actual to include the imagined (and the re-
imagined). In so doing, the potential development of the protagonist, the narration, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See Scholes, “Language, Narrative, and Anti-Narrative,” 210. 
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and the events described are also expanded, lending the sequence an abstract, 
anagogic fluidity.112 This anagogically “additive” approach to narrative (as opposed 
to the “subtractive” approach of traditional realist fiction, which constantly limits the 
narrative field to a finite set of objects, events, and interpretations) might continue 
indefinitely if unchecked, however, the suggestion of such an infinite field is 
sufficient to establish the multiplicity of voice and the expansion of narratorial 
agency that occur in stories such as “The Elevator” and “The Babysitter”. 
Structurally, “The Elevator” is divided into fifteen distinct sections or 
“floors” that, although more or less thematically interrelated, might be said to 
compete for and complicate the authority of each of the other sections. In this 
signifying game of variation (a concept returned to later in chapter five), the narrator 
of each section presents some aspect of the protagonist’s relation to the elevator. As 
Martin, the protagonist, navigates each section, a unique set of circumstances is 
confronted. In the first section his curiosity leads him to the basement (106), in the 
second he is heckled by an abusive co-worker named Carruther (107-08), in the third 
he lasciviously ogles the girl operating the elevator (108), in the fourth he imagines 
meeting Death, incarnate, as the elevator doors open (109), and in the fifth his 
inability to “risk” a visit to the basement is described, thereby contradicting the 
content of the first section (109). As the sections progress some items begin to 
overlap, thematic fragments are continued or repeated, and new diegetic perspectives 
begin to appear.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 As described in greater detail later in the chapter, McCaffery likens this process (which he also 
locates in “The Magic Poker,” “The Gingerbread House,” and “The Babysitter”) to a kind of narrative 
“cubism.” See McCaffery, “Robert Coover’s Cubist Fictions,” 33-39.  
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Though at first it appears that certain events might be taken as objective 
accounts and others as purely imagined, the relevance of such a distinction quickly 
breaks down as these viewpoints continue to mutate and Martin’s fantasies collide. 
With each level of the story’s enumerated ascent, the extremity of the narration also 
escalates in intensity. Martin’s desirous glances soon become the mad writhings of 
sexual abandon. Meanwhile, as Martin and the elevator operator writhe in ecstasy on 
the floor, the elevator plummets toward destruction (110). And in a parallel universe, 
Martin lashes back at his abusive colleague only to find himself with a bloody nose 
and broken glasses (112). And in amongst the turmoil of these proliferating subplots 
a god-like voice also begins to make an appearance:  
But – ah! – the doomed, old man, the DOOMED! What are they to us, 
to ME? ALL! We, I love! Let their flesh sag and dewlaps tremble, let 
their odours offend, let their cruelty mutilate, their stupidity enchain – 
but let them laugh, father! FOREVER! let them cry! (PD 114, 
Coover’s emphasis)  
 
Immediately following the emergence of this omnipotent voice, the narration leaps 
out of Martin’s head and into the voice of some un-named heterodiegetic narrator. 
This external voice arrives in the penultimate section of the story and is told in the 
vernacular of an exaggerated, second-hand anecdote (of the dirty joke variety). The 
narration in this section takes the absurdity to new lengths — the main length of 
which is a description of Martin’s five-foot, uncircumcised penis. In summary: tiring 
of his duties as a phallic god (oil drilling in Arabia, stopping holes in Dutch dikes, 
spraying crops in Italy), Martin settles for the life of an office worker. One day, 
while riding the elevator, Martin’s “buddy,” Carruther, sexually assaults the elevator 
operator by lifting her skirts and revealing, to everyone’s surprise, that she is not 
wearing any underpants. This flash of bare flesh excites Martin to the extent that his 
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giant member rips through his clothing and smashes about inside the elevator until 
everyone has been knocked unconscious. The operator faints at the sight, the elevator 
is sent careening down the shaft, and with that, the narration abruptly trails off (116-
17).   
As the enormity of this hyperbolic imagery subsides (though with a few 
residual spasms of fantasy and apocalypticism at the beginning of the last fragment), 
the narration eventually returns to a calm, third-person equilibrium in the final 
section of the story. Rather than taking the elevator, as is Martin’s routine, “a strange 
premonition” convinces him to take the stairs instead: 
Halfway up, he hears the elevator hurtle by him and then the 
splintering crash from below. He hesitates, poised on the stair. 
Inscrutable is the word he finally settles upon. He pronounces it 
aloud, smiles faintly, sadly, somewhat wearily, then continues his 
tedious climb, pausing from time to time to stare back down the stairs 
behind him. (PD 117)  
 
Clearly, the word “inscrutable” does little to elucidate the bizarre nature of the events 
leading up to this anti-climax. And yet, it would be a misreading to take this final 
section as a return to some universal, objective reality. As McCaffery writes: 
Although at the end of “The Elevator” Martin decides not to take the 
elevator trip at all, we should not assume that the other sequences 
were all fantasies, daydreamed by Martin as he actually stands before 
the elevator. . . . Each of the events within the story’s “set” is equally 
real – or fictional – for every sequence creates its own reality as it is 
presented. (The Metafictional Muse 75-76) 
 
While each progressive “reality” augments and/or negates the previous in a sequence 
of constant transformation, the narrative’s ascending numerical chronology manages 
to hold this narrative “set” together as a whole (a structure which Coover also 
explores in “The Gingerbread House” and similar to Donald Barthelme’s numerical 
progression in “The Glass Mountain” [1970], as well as Joyce Carol Oates’s “29 
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Inventions” [1970]).113 This numerical chronology not only mirrors the mounting 
intensity of each sequential fragment and corresponds to the “floor” component of 
the story’s central metaphor (especially in its vertical arrangement of events), it is 
also a potential clue to the decoding of the parody taking place.  
On one level, the story can be taken as a parodic inversion of Dante’s travels 
through hell in the first book of The Divine Comedy, a reading reinforced by 
Martin’s comments in the first section: 
. . . Martin imagines suddenly that he is descending into hell. Tra la 
perduta gente, yes! A mild shudder shakes him. Yet, Martin decides 
firmly, would that it were so. . . . Martin smiles inwardly at himself, 
presses the number ‘14’. ‘Come on, old Charon,’ he declaims broadly, 
Hell’s the other way!’ (PD 106, Coover’s emphasis) 
 
And like the circles of hell described in Dante’s Inferno, each section of “The 
Elevator” steadily increases in extremity as the structure nears the conjunctio 
oppositorum of the last demonic ring.114 Another possible clue is the stairway 
leading away from the scene of the elevator’s annihilation, recalling Dante’s ascent 
from Beelzebub’s entombment in the thirty-fourth canto. But, instead of parodically 
re-appropriating the nine circles of suffering as described by Dante (which Coover 
could just as easily have done), the fifteen levels described in Coover’s version of 
hell appear to be a parodic conflation of the “fifteen sins of the flesh” as enumerated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 In “29 Inventions” (a story, incidentally, dedicated to Coover and in many ways a mixture of the 
techniques employed in his “The Magic Poker” and “The Elevator”) Oates also includes characters, 
events, and even elevators at risk of constant re-invention and/or erasure. As exemplified in the 
following passage: “Yes, I will erase Dr. Geddes too. It is a failure, our love. It didn't happen. No 
elevator; we always took the stairs, chastely. I will erase him too.” See Oates, “29 Inventions,” 390. 
114 Frye relates this section of Dante’s Inferno to the “demonic epiphany” of tragic irony: “. . . the dark 
tower and prison of endless pain . . . or, with a more erudite irony, the tour abolie, the goal of the 
quest that isn’t there. . . . Tragedy and tragic irony take us into a hell of narrowing circles and 
culminate in some such vision of the source of all evil in a personal form.” See Frye, Anatomy of 
Criticism, 238-39. 
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by Paul in the fifth chapter of Galatians.115 Running a verbal gauntlet of visceral 
oblivion, the narrative course of “The Elevator” takes Martin on an existential tour of 
several of these “sins”: sexual impurity, debauchery, witchcraft, hatred, discord, fits 
of rage, selfish ambition. The phallocentric focus of Coover’s story (e.g., the phallic 
elevator “shaft,” the vertical structure of the narrative, the pornographic imagery) 
also seems to support this reading, as this chapter of Galatians begins with Paul’s 
account of God’s word on circumcision and His divinely ordained penile handling 
procedures.116 
However, while this parodic layering seems to establish a tentative structural 
integrity, this symbolic numerical correspondence ultimately fails to assist a stable 
interpretation of the narrative. Like the multiplicity of voice that complicates the 
characterization of Martin, the multiplicity of the numerical systems at play in “The 
Elevator” resist any kind of programmatic interpretive approach (especially when 
these systems are assumed to fulfill some symbolic role as a means of synthesizing 
the layers of narration).117 When taken as a clue to the unraveling of the parody, the 
incongruity of the fourteen floors of the building and the fifteen sections of the 
narrative (not to mention the seven years leading up to the events and the seven or 
eight occupants of the elevator [107, 113]) complicates any type of definite decoding 
procedure because it is impossible to decide which number carries the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 “The acts of the flesh are obvious: sexual immorality, impurity and debauchery / idolatry and 
witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions / and envy; 
drunkenness, orgies, and the like.” See Galatians 5: 19-21; The Holy Bible: The New Testament 196. 
116 See Galatians 5:1-12, 6:11-15; The Holy Bible: The New Testament 196-97. 
117 Recalling the Valéry epigraph at the very outset of the collection: “They therefore set me this 
problem of the equality of appearance and numbers” (PD xv). 
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significance.118 As a result, the reader must add any projected parodic 
correspondence to the already proliferating layers of meaning and anti-meaning.119  
In the end, after all attempts at synthesis have been exhausted, the reader is 
left with a perpetual motion of mutation upon mutation. As one incarnation of Martin 
self-reflexively muses:  
This small room, so commonplace and so compressed, he observes 
with a certain melancholic satisfaction, this elevator contains them all: 
space, time, cause, motion, magnitude, class. Left to our own devices 
we would probably discover them all. . . . They stand apparently 
motionless, yet moving. Motion: perhaps that’s all there is to it after 
all. Motion and the medium. Energy and the weighted particles. Force 
and matter. The image grips him purely. Ascent and the passive 
reorganization of atoms. (PD 109) 
 
Like in one of Zeno’s paradoxes, Martin’s identity within each fragment of narrated 
reality is relative to the components of each fragment (i.e., space, time, cause, 
motion, magnitude, class, etc.). In and of themselves each of these narrated 
fragments is devoid of discernable origin and destination; each operates as a semi-
autonomous snapshot of Martin within a semi-autonomous context. Taken 
individually there is no movement (as all causal relationships are fractured), but 
when sequentially performed by the reader these fragments of identity are imagined 
into a semblance of movement (like the spinning slides of a praxinoscope). The 
result is not so much a representation of one continuous reality, but rather a multi-
voiced composite of imagined events that amount to a parody of reality. By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Interestingly, the secondary criticism of “The Elevator” also displays tremendous multiplicity in 
the interpretation of these ironic numerical system(s). Jackson I. Cope describes the story in terms of 
the fourteen floors (“Robert Coover's Fictions” 101), McCaffery treats it as fifteen sections (The 
Metafictional Muse 74), William H. Gass, in his 1969 review, seems to waver between fourteen and 
fifteen (“Look at Me”), and in his article, “Forking Narratives,” Ronald Christ somehow locates 
sixteen distinct pieces of narration (55). 
119 Although clearly a problematic stance, it is, perhaps, for this reason that Kathryn Hume writes: 
“The chief works in which Coover does not accept such mythic structuring are those in which he 
deliberately denies it: ‘The Elevator,’ and ‘The Babysitter’.” See Hume, “Robert Coover's Fiction: 
The Naked and the Mythic,” 134. 
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repeatedly “reorganizing the atoms” of Martin’s reality, any kind of developmental 
narrative continuity is short-circuited, his identity is revealed to be artificial and 
arbitrary, and the reader is reminded of the purely fictional nature of the process.  
This purposive subversion of developmental characterization and 
representational verisimilitude upsets the fictional projection of life-like characters 
inhabiting life-like worlds, but it also expands the narrator’s power of action by 
emphasizing the fundamentally discursive nature of fiction. As Mas’ud Zavarzadeh 
explains in The Mythopoeic Reality:  
[The] intense self-reflexiveness of metafiction is caused by the fact 
that the only certain reality for the metafictionalist is the reality of his 
own discourse; thus, his fiction turns in upon itself, transforming the 
process of writing into the subject of writing. The credibility of 
fiction, therefore, is re-established not as an illuminating commentary 
on life but as a metacommentary on fiction itself. (39) 
 
The fictional forms of this high ironic, metafictional discourse are responsible only 
to themselves as there is no other reality to which they pretend to relate. In contrast 
to representational realism, journalism, scientific discourse, and nonfictional forms 
of narrative, all of which attempt to project and totalize extralinguistic worlds and/or 
phenomena, the metafictional interaction with reality is always metalinguistically 
mediated and self-reflexive. 
According to Zavarzadeh, the metafictional approach to reality is inherently 
subversive because it undermines and/or intentionally confuses the distinction 
between the real and the fictional. Through the use of “counter-techniques” such as 
“two-dimensional, flat characterization, consciously contrived plots, and paralogical, 
non-causal, and anti-linear sequences of events” (39), the world is treated as an 
always already linguistically conceived and negotiated sub-category of the 
imagination, or, in other words, an intrinsically fictional construct. Through an 
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excessive “over-totalization” of experience that amounts to a “mock interpretation of 
the human condition,” Zavarzadeh writes, “the metafictionalist accentuates the 
arbitrariness of uniting the elements of a disjunctive universe into a significant 
whole” (39). This “over-totalization,” in its parodic approach to order, causality, and 
realistic forms of interpretation, effectively substitutes logic with paralogic, straight 
interpretation for ironic self-reflexivity. And through this parodic over-totalization, 
Zavarzadeh concludes, “the metafictionalist demonstrates the confusing multiplicity 
of reality and thus the naïveté involved in attempting to reach a total synthesis of life 
within narrative” (39-40). 
As described in the above analysis of “The Elevator,” this parodic over-
totalization can be achieved through the use of layered narration. The result is an 
expanded, abstract mosaic of Martin’s various (potential) identities within an 
artificially regulated set of conditions. But whereas the scattered layers of narration 
in “The Elevator” can all be traced back to some incarnation of Martin within some 
incarnation of the central metaphor (with the possible exception of the external voice 
in the fourteenth section), the metafictional world of “The Babysitter,” on the other 
hand, uses its central metaphor as the catalyst for a comparatively far more 
extravagant expansion of narration and narrative. 
 
Multiplicity of Choice 
In “The Babysitter,” plot lines and narratorial voices fly out in all directions, 
they deteriorate, blend, fall silent and fly out again. Events are described, re-
described, re-re-described in a (literally) dizzying array of permutations. The 
multiple choice, non-linearity that confronts the reader of this story completely 
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upsets the assumption of a logical, causal narrative progression. Indeed, for all 
intents and purposes, logic and causality are strictly confined to the syntax of the 
story’s hundred-plus fragments. And as these conflicting fragments pile up, the 
choice of which voice to believe/disbelieve and which plot mutation to follow/ignore 
becomes a non-question as all of the various voices and plots become equivalent. 
And yet, this process of increasing equivalency does not lead to a state of complete 
disorder. The entropic proliferation of voice and plot that occurs in “The Babysitter” 
approaches a mesmerizing verbal geometry analogous to zooming in on some kind of 
narrativized Mandelbrot set. And like the complex patterns of “self-similarity” that 
suddenly appear when fractal equations are allowed to spin towards infinity, the 
infinite regress of “The Babysitter” also starts with a fairly limited set of variables 
before exploding into a mass of involved convolutions. 
The tale begins as a seemingly routine account of a teenage girl’s evening gig 
as a babysitter. And as the scene is set and the principle characters (narrators) are 
introduced, it becomes clear that the girl has arrived in typical fashion to take care of 
two kids and a baby while their parents attend a party. Hopping about like the 
introductory montage of some television sit-com, the reader meets the babysitter 
(nameless adolescent), Harry Tucker (suburban father), Dolly Tucker (suburban 
mother), Jimmy and Bitsy (the kids), Jack (the boyfriend), Mark (boyfriend’s 
buddy), and the TV (itself an ever-shifting [channel-changing] narrative voice that 
constantly intrudes into the events, crossing its own artificial reality with the 
thought-worlds of the “real” characters).120  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 A structure used to similar effect by Clarence Major in his Reflex and Bone Structure (1974). 
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Rapidly switching narrators from fragment to fragment, the situation is 
reported from the perspective of Harry, then Jack, then the babysitter, then Jimmy, 
then whatever happens to be on the TV at that moment. And yet this initial switching 
of perspective from character to character seems more or less in keeping with the 
incremental development of what appears to be a fairly straightforward narrative 
progression. All of the fragments relate thematically and all of the narrated events 
give the impression of being (at least conceivably) on a unified track. However, in 
the sixth fragment, as Jimmy’s perspective skips into Jack’s perspective, the layers of 
perspective begin to overlap and present conflicting accounts (183).  
Gradually, the layers of narration start to impose and superimpose themselves 
upon the events and into the narrative perspectives of the other characters. What 
seems to originate in a repetition of events from differing perspectives eventually 
becomes a differing of the events themselves. As Ronald Christ observes:  
[In narrating each event], Coover refuses to distinguish between what 
did happen, what was thought to have happened, what did not happen, 
what was imagined to have happened, and what might have happened. 
Each possibility is carefully, precisely narrated in sequences of 
separated sections, all asserted with the same seamless narrative 
authority… (“Forking Narratives” 55).  
 
Indeed, all possible happenings become (in the widest, most ironic sense) probable 
happenings, as the fantasies, fears, and desires of the characters seem to materialize 
from imagination into “actual” occurrence. As this takes place, the more or less 
experiential fantasies of each character invade the thoughts and experiences of all the 
others, thoughts suddenly taking concrete shape and, thereby, continually shaping 
and re-shaping the fractured course of subsequent events. 
The boyfriend’s imagined sexual encounters with the babysitter (occasionally 
merging with the thoughts of his friend, Mark) are later depicted as a series of “real” 
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encounters that run from innocent play (189), to gang rape (199-200, 209), to murder 
(210). Likewise, Harry Tucker’s memory of the girl having taken a bath at their 
house during her last evening as a sitter leads to a series of actual encounters 
involving the bath. Harry becomes a bathroom voyeur (a scene replayed by both 
Jimmy and the boyfriend) (201), a bath companion (a scene which morphs from 
Jimmy to Harry in one telling) (194, 197, 199), and even imagines himself into a 
recurring sequence of “accidental” bathroom entrances during the course of the story 
(192, 193, 207, 208). Even the tentative fantasies of the little boy, Jimmy, become 
increasingly sexualized as the story progresses, his lingering glances turning to 
lecherous peepings and his tickles to aggressive gropings as his curiosity steadily 
turns more and more desirous (185, 188, 191, 192). 
While any kind of definitive reading of this story is complicated by the 
intense complexity of Coover’s layering technique (one critic even likening an 
attempt to trace the various voices, plots, and narrative permutations to the 
reconstruction of a scrambled egg),121 there is one unifying thread which weaves 
throughout each of the libidinally super-charged fragments: each of the male 
characters’ quest for carnal knowledge. And like the Sphinx at the Theban delta that 
held both the riddle of life and the key to death, Jimmy, Jack, and Harry (the Oedipal 
trilogy of four, two, and three — infancy, virility, and impotence), look to the “delta” 
of the babysitter (another un-named guardian) as an oracle and gateway to the 
infinite.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Ronald Christ writes: “One way to read ‘The Babysitter’ is to break it up into constituent 
sequences. (Such a reading would be practiced, I suppose, by people who unscramble their eggs 
before eating them.) Another way to read the story is to hear all the fictional possibilities as exactly 
that—fictional—and therefore not contradictory to anything at all….” See Christ, “Forking 
Narratives,” 55. 
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As the as final purveyor of meaning, the reader of this story is also implicated 
in this ironic quest for carnal knowledge. Indeed, the search for a direct interpretive 
angle on the events becomes a participative, prurient interest in the eventual 
outcome: will any of these perverse heroes actually penetrate the mystery, so to 
speak, cross the threshold, and come to some knowledge (in the Biblical sense, of 
course) of the mundane mystery that the Sphinx-like babysitter alone holds secreted 
away in her sublime anonymity? Or will theirs be a little death of another kind?  
The answer, as one might expect, is both yes and no, all and nothing. In one 
possible ending, the babysitter has been raped and drowned, the children murdered, 
and the boyfriend left in need of a (meaning drenched) cigarette (212). Yet, in the 
next fragment, the reader finds the babysitter awaking from the wonderland of a nap 
in front of the television, the Tuckers having returned, the children asleep, the dishes 
washed, the whole thing implied as a dream (212). And while it is a version of the 
darker ending that the story closes with, even this finality is anything but absolute. 
As Dolly Tucker, dumbfounded by the extremity of the foregoing events, 
nonchalantly suggests in the last lines of the story: “Hell, I don’t know . . . . Let’s see 
what’s on the late late movie” (212, Coover’s emphasis). Every possibility made real 
and every reality made possible, the reader is rendered equally bewildered by this 
violently twisting Möbius strip of narrative ambiguity. Even once the participative 
whirlwind of “The Babysitter” lurches to a halt and the lines of the narrative finally 
cease their proliferation, the reader is no closer to unravelling the twisted, narratorial 
knot.  
Rather than leading the reader out of this miasma of multiplicity, Coover’s 
approach to narrative in stories such as “The Elevator” and “The Babysitter”—
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indeed, in all of the stories collected in PD—actively immerses the reader into what 
he refers to as “the drama of cognition.” As Coover explains: 
The drama of cognition belongs to all forms of mental acts, including 
those of scholarship and research—indeed that of growing up itself—
though in its more dramatic forms, it is especially relevant to 
storytelling. It is a going from unknowing to knowing, and this 
process is often what shapes plots. Certainly it’s how jokes work. My 
personal such drama lies always in the effort, through immersion in 
the central metaphor, to grasp a story’s full potential. What is often 
seen as hypertextual or nonlinear in my writing is this effort to 
explore the whole. (“An Interview with Robert Coover”) 
 
While this immersion in the central metaphor certainly leads the reader into the 
“drama of cognition,” in Coover’s works the movement from “unknowing to 
knowing” is complicated by the fact that any final knowledge or conclusive 
understanding is precluded by the very terms of the reader’s immersion. For, 
Coover’s narrative does not proceed in balanced half-measures or minimalisms, it is 
a full fictional engulfment. However, as Coover’s statement clearly indicates (and 
the stories in PD exemplify), experience is not grounded upon a finality of 
understanding, but upon the search for greater understanding and further experience. 
In the service of making the reader more aware of his/her own experiential “drama of 
cognition,” Coover’s metaphorical immersions are always an effort to open and 
allow the reader access to every aspect of that metaphor, not to forward the reader 
some absolute version of it, but to involve the reader in a more thorough experience 
of that metaphor’s potential — what it might also mean, contain, and/or reveal if 
looked at from a variety of perspectives. 
In his approach to this impulse in Coover’s fiction, McCaffery draws an 
analogy to the cubist technique of formal manipulation and the fracturing of 
perspective. McCaffery writes:  
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Coover forces his audience to deal with the elements of his works as 
mere artifacts or conventions and creates a deliberate ambiguity of 
event which directly parallels the cubists’ spatial ambiguity and which 
confounds his audience’s desire for outer referents. (The Metafictional 
Muse 72)  
 
Comparable to the cubists’ departures from mimetic representation, spatial 
illusionism, and one-point perspective, Coover’s “relativistic view” presents a 
fragmented vision of the world and its processes in order to, as McCaffery puts it, 
“create realities whose ambiguities suggest something of our own relationship to the 
world” (72-73). In a sense, Coover’s project is one of capturing a fuller slice of 
human experience through an expanded range of complementary and contradictory 
realities.  
This expanded, cubistic range of realities also recalls Milorad Pavić’s theory 
of “reversible literature.” As Pavić describes in his essay, “The Beginning of the End 
of Reading—The Beginning and the End of the Novel”: 
Some arts are reversible and enable the recipient to approach the work 
from various sides, or even go around it and have a good look at it, 
changing the spot of the perspective, and the direction of his looking 
at it according to his own preference, as is the case with architecture, 
sculpture, or painting. Other, nonreversible arts, such as music and 
literature, look like one-way roads on which everything moves from 
the beginning to the end, from birth to death. I have always wished to 
make literature, which is a nonreversible art, a reversible one. 
Therefore, my novels have no end in the classical meaning of the 
word. (142-43) 
 
Coover clearly puts Pavić’s theory into practice in PD and, in so doing, moves 
beyond the “one-way roads” of linear narrative development and tidy closure. 
Through his explorations of the multi-faceted interiors of metaphor and the 
irresolvable indeterminacies of the meaning-making process, Coover’s high ironic 
metafiction pushes the reader into reversible readings and even reversals of the texts 
themselves. Like Pavić’s multi-dimensional literature, Coover’s multi-parodic 
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writing invites and even, quite frequently, requires the reader’s imaginative 
participation. 
Similar in ironic degree to Barthelme’s investigations of the collage aesthetic 
and his pseudo-aleatoric blendings of figment and fragment (as explored in the 
following chapter), Coover’s approach to narrative in PD also takes literature to the 
breaking point and discovers new levels of meaning among the fractured forms. 
Through these fractured forms and infinitely parodic levels of meaning, Coover, too, 
like el Maestro, al gran don Miguel Saavedra, to whom the collection is dedicated 
(59), teaches by comic example, “…that great narratives remain meaningful through 
time as a language-medium between generations, as a weapon against the fringe-
areas of our consciousness, and as a mythic reinforcement of our tenuous grip on 
reality” (61). And as this grip grows ever more tenuous, Coover’s finely-honed 
arsenal of meta-myths seems all the more timely, not only in their reaffirmation of 
the imaginative potential of fiction, but, perhaps even more importantly, in their 


































































DONALD BARTHELME: ANECDOTE, ADVENTURE, & PERFORMANCE 




Q: That’s a very common fantasy. 
A: All my fantasies are extremely ordinary. 
Q: Does it give you pleasure? 
A: A poor . . . A rather unsatisfactory . . . 
[ . . .] 
A: But I love my irony. 
Q: Does it give you pleasure? 
A: A poor . . . A rather unsatisfactory . . . 
 
--- Donald Barthelme, “Kierkegaard Unfair to Schlegel” 




Collage Narrative: Theory, Aesthetic, and Narrative Praxis 
A quiet beginning could never be claimed for the popular emergence of the 
collage, the works of Picasso and Braque, Duchamp and Schwitters, are far too 
frame-shattering for any such surmise. Nevertheless, the adoption and adaptation of 
collage concepts and techniques by American postmodern artists and writers during 
the 1960s and 70s not only expanded the collage aesthetic into new creative territory 
— including Joseph Cornell’s experiments in architecture and film, Andy Warhol’s 
aestheticized goods, the musical compositions of Dick Higgins, Nam June Paik’s 
video sculpture, James Rosenquist’s billboards, and Merce Cunningham’s 
multimedia choreography — this period also witnessed an intense, explosively 
innovative incorporation of collage theory into the praxis of postmodern literature.  
Involving an eclectic spectrum of elements from the plastic arts to poetry, 
from music to philosophy, writers and artists such as Laurie Anderson, Richard 
Brautigan, John Cage, Joseph Kosuth, Barbara Kruger, Tom Stoppard, and William 
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H. Gass (to name but a few) began experimenting with the radical hybridization of 
literary forms with other aesthetic forms, cultural processes, and methods of 
production. Mixing the hyper-conceptual anti-worlds of Cubism, Surrealism, and 
Dada with the hyper-literal word-worlds of Joyce, Beckett, and Borges, crossing the 
mythologic of Barthes and the bricologic of Lévi-Strauss with Wittgensteinian cum 
Derridean rules of rhetorical free-play, American artists of the 60s and 70s developed 
a veritable Molotov cocktail of hybrid literary forms and metafictional re-
formulations: surfiction, fabulism, maximalism, bossanova, parafiction, critifiction, 
superfiction, and the list goes on. 
While the various creative impulses, political reactions, and aesthetic agendas 
of the period are just as countless as they are divergent, one factor uniting each of 
these hybridized metafictional constructs is the subversively duplicitous nature of the 
collage. According to Lance Olsen, the collage narrative that emerged during this 
period signaled “the advent of performative critifictions dedicated to effacing, or at 
least deeply and richly complicating, the accepted difference between privileged and 
subordinate discourses” (130). Olsen continues:  
The collage imagination at the core of such a gesture is one 
committed to liberating juxtaposition, mosaic, conflation, fusion and 
confusion, Frankensteinian fictions, cyborg scripts, centaur texts, . . . 
narratologically amphibious writings that embrace a poetics of 
beautiful monstrosity. (“Notes Toward the Musicality of Creative 
Disjunction, Or: Fiction by Collage” 130) 
 
And few artists have been as successful in simultaneously refining and expanding the 
awkwardly beautiful monstrosity of collage narrative as Donald Barthelme.122 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 In fact, this “poetics of beautiful monstrosity” is precisely what Barthelme declared that he was in 
pursuit of. As Barthelme writes in “On ‘Paraguay’” in Lawrence Rust Hills’s 1974 edited collection, 
Writer’s Choice: “Every writer in the country can write a beautiful sentence, or a hundred. What I am 
interested in is the ugly sentence that is also somehow beautiful. I agree that this is a highly 
 
	   171	  
With the carnivalesque religiosity of Pieter Bruegel (the Elder), the skewed, 
haphazard eroticism of Max Ernst, tempered with the gritty iconoclasm of Jasper 
Johns, Donald Barthelme’s illustrated collage narratives offer a fascinating glimpse 
into the turbulent, anachronistic mind of this author. As in the liminal worlds of 
Bruegal, Barthelme’s bizarre, Menippean works inhabit the space between disparate 
realities, and like the fanciful relativities of Ernst, Barthelme’s stories often concern 
the complex schism between angles of perception. Melding these qualities with what 
Barthelme takes from Johns, is a vision of existence that takes chaos on its own 
terms and finds the resounding thrum of culture in the objects that surround it, 
pervade it, and define it. 
However, Barthelme’s cut-and-paste techniques and resonant juxtapositions 
are not limited to the crossings of the verbal and the visual that take place within his 
more literally illuminated works of collage narrative (no pun intended), a similar 
method of collage structuring and fragmented ekphrasis went into all of Barthelme’s 
stories and novels. It is precisely this quality in the works of Barthelme that this 
chapter intends to explore as this collage structure and its finely arranged tension, its 
multiple layers of narration, and its method of absurd ekphrasis are central to an 
understanding of the high ironic mode of metafiction.123 
Beginning with an in-depth, critical analysis of a selection of Barthelme’s 
illustrated stories, this chapter attempts to make some sense of the apparent chaos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
specialized enterprise, akin to the manufacture of merkins, say – but it’s what I do. Probably I have 
missed the point of the literature business entirely” (Qtd. in Not Knowing 57). First published in 
Writer’s Choice, Ed. Lawrence Rust Hills (New York: David McKay, 1974). See Barthelme, Not 
Knowing: The Essays and Interviews of Donald Barthelme, 56-57, 324. 
123 Jerome Klinkowitz proposes a similar approach to the collage aesthetic in Barthelme’s fiction in 
the “Toward Sustained Narrative Systems” chapter of Donald Barthelme: An Exhibition. However, 
despite Klinkowitz’s location of several examples of collage-like and montage-like constructs within 
Barthelme’s oeuvre, little analysis occurs beyond the level of identification. See Klinkowitz, Donald 
Barthelme: An Exhibition, 55-78. 
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and offers a means of approaching the complex verbal and visual parody that takes 
place within Barthelme’s works of collage narrative. Following the analysis of these 
illustrated works this chapter then considers Barthelme’s Snow White (1967) in the 
light of its fragmented, highly pictorial use of language and its montage-like method 
of intertextual citation and literary allusion. 
It is proposed that Barthelme’s works of collage narrative may be arranged 
into three primary categories: anecdotal collections, ad hoc adventures, and onto-
theatrical productions. While his illustrated works of collage narrative tend to fit, 
primarily, into one of these three categories, his novels favor a more varied approach 
and usually involve a compartmentalized synthesis of all three of these categories.124 
Following the way these categories repeatedly surface and re-surface in Barthelme’s 
writing, these categories begin to take on the distinct quality of, if not exactly tropes, 
then certainly rhetorical configurations with defined entrance points and balanced, 
carefully-timed points of fracture. By viewing his illustrated works as pictographic 
word puzzles whose tragi-comic anti-solutions reveal much about the culture from 
which they derive their symbology, the high ironic structure of Barthelme’s collage 
narrative becomes more comprehensible and the subversive nature of his 
transideological works of quotidian fantasy becomes more readily apparent. 
 
Anecdotal Collections 
In the first of these categories, his anecdotal collections, Barthelme 
parodically imitates and subverts the tone and style of historical narrative, scientific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Although Barthelme’s later novels, Paradise (1986) and the posthumously published The King 
(1991), also involve a number of the collage structures being discussed in this chapter, both of these 
novels (rather like extended short stories) tend to remain primarily within the onto-theatrical and ad 
hoc adventure categories, respectively, and are therefore less useful to the argument forwarded here. 
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discourse, and other epistemologically authoritative systems of meaning 
construction. Through tenuously interconnected fragments of quoted, paraphrased, 
and ironically deployed bits of cultural arcana, Barthelme pieces together a bizarre 
sequence of items that critically re-define and parodically re-appropriate the source 
materials from which they are composed. The resulting narrative sequence appears 
more like a collection of curiosities (of the “jackalope” variety) or pages from an 
encyclopedia of the absurd (à la Flaubert’s Le Dictionnaire des idées reçues, 1911-
13) rather than any kind of credible articulation of factual truths. In works such as 
“Natural History” (1971)125 and “At The Tolstoy Museum” (1969),126 Barthelme’s 
ludic manipulations undermine the areas of culture they pretend to represent by 
juxtaposing disparate and/or altered images and pairing these collaged illustrations 
with explanatory notes of an obviously doubtful or ironically humourous nature.  
In “Natural History,” purportedly an analysis of “animalisticism, or the 
practice of placing too much faith in animals” (The Teachings of Don B., 31; 
hereafter TTDB), the narrative begins with an account of an octopus that was, 
supposedly, once attached to Leonardo Da Vinci’s La Gioconda (see figure 4). The 
next pairing describes the cosmology of a certain Plenus of Diphthong who was 
“condemned to drink the fatal KóKA KóLá” (32) for his heretical belief that the 
world was suspended from the jaws of a seahorse rather than balanced upon the back 
of a tortoise (see figure 5). And as the narrative progresses, the reader also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 “Natural History” was first published, in its original illustrated form, in Harper’s, August 1971. 
The version referred to here is from the 1992 collection of Barthelme’s works edited by Kim 
Herzinger. See Barthelme, The Teachings of Don B.: Satire, Parodies, Fables, Illustrated Stories, and 
Plays of Donald Barthelme, 31-36, 342. 
126 “At The Tolstoy Museum” (1969) was first published in the May 24, 1969 edition of The New 
Yorker magazine. This story was also included in Barthelme’s City Life (1970) and was later selected 
as one of the two illustrated stories collected in Forty Stories (1987). All quotations of this story come 
from the 1971 Jonathan Cape edition of City Life. See Barthelme, City Life, 39-50. 
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encounters Lousia May Alcott and a child-eating boa constrictor (32), Archduke 
Maximilian of Austria and a rhino BBQ (33), Robert E. Lee and an omniscient 
porcupine (35), as well as the Brontë sisters’ little known reliance upon a clairvoyant 
cat (35). And finally leading the reader back to the introductory “argument,” the 
narrative concludes with a tiny treatise on the psychic nourishment received from the 
severed body parts, mythic virility, and wholesome symbology of the rabbit (36). 
Tour complete, the reader is left to make of these half-fictional, fully-farcical 
fragments what he or she will.  
 
 




Figure 5. From “Natural History,” in The Teachings of Don B., 32. 
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While these illustrated anecdotes are clearly playful and this ironic play 
provides ample clues to the decoding of the parody, Barthelme’s play also involves 
an aggressive disruption of privileged epistemological discourse and the authoritative 
language and rhetoric that supports such discourse. By interspersing his collage 
narratives with textbook-truisms, factoids, familiar characters, and historical events 
(some lifted entirely from other sources, some slightly altered, some purely 
fictional), Barthelme’s ironic re-writing of this discourse reveals the arbitrary nature 
of these narrated items and the thin metaphorical framework that conceals the socio-
cultural power mechanisms embedded in the nonfictional language of “factual” 
history. 
Another anecdotal problematizing of these historical and biographical power 
mechanisms takes place in “At the Tolstoy Museum” (one of his earliest published 
pieces of illustrated collage fiction).  Glowering through the back of the title page the 
hirsute monument of Tolstoy’s portrait introduces the tale. And, as if to further 
accentuate the immense gravity of that portrait and the towering influence of the 
individual depicted therein, it is repeated on the following page with the diminutive 
silhouette of Napoleon Bonaparte added for scale (see figure 6).127 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Using the Napoleon figure as a unit of measure (1.7m), the approximate dimensions of the portrait 
can be estimated to about 8.15 x 4.7m; truly an enormous piece and, in all likelihood, a jealousy-
inspiring affront to the portrait-loving Napoleon. 
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Figure 6. From “At the Tolstoy Museum,” in City Life, 42. 
 
Following this visual introduction, the disjointed prose accompaniment 
begins with a vague description, in the third-person ‘we’, of the museum and its 
collection of “some thirty thousand pictures of Count Leo Tolstoy” (City Life 43; 
hereafter CL). From the very outset the reader (even a reader familiar with 
Barthelme’s work, indeed, even a reader familiar with both Barthelme and Tolstoy) 
is thrown off balance and asked, not so much to suspend their disbelief, but rather to 
actively participate in a suspensive game of belief deconstruction. Barthelme’s story 
asks the reader to see the (ultimately) semantic game of credulity, authority, and 
authenticity for what it is, a game with invisible, arbitrary rules concerning objects 
that exist apart from the cognitive sphere. The story emphasizes this slippery 
semiotic relationship between cognition and context at the end of the story’s first 
block of prose: 
Tolstoy means “fat” in Russian. His grandfather sent his linen to 
Holland to be washed. His mother did not know any bad words. As a 
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youth he shaved off his eyebrows, hoping they would grow back 
bushier. He first contracted gonorrhea in 1847. He was once bitten on 
the face by a bear. He became a vegetarian in 1885. To make himself 
interesting, he occasionally bowed backwards. (CL 43, Barthelme’s 
emphasis) 
 
The immediate effect of such a passage is akin to convincingly supporting the case 
for the actual presence of something very odd (e.g., pink Chinese dolphins or a 
Czech presidential candidate with extensive facial tattoos; both of which do, 
incidentally, exist) and then winding up the argument with a statement so absurd that 
it renders the facts of the case immediately suspect (e.g., the Chinese dolphins and 
the tattooed Czech politician are said to be holding talks over the development of a 
new Sino-Czech space program, etc.). The result of this carefully structured, highly 
rhetorical deconstructive process — a process put to extensive use throughout 
Barthelme’s fiction — is the creation of a pervasive doubt as to the veracity of the 
claims made by the text and the provenance of the images and/or facts scattered 
throughout the story.   
“Exceptional as these facts are,” writes Jerome Klinkowitz in Donald 
Barthelme: An Exhibition, “they can probably be found in any biography of Leo 
Tolstoy” (63). Klinkowitz continues: 
There, however, they would be couched within a narrative of so many 
conventional items that their special nature might not be 
appreciated—surely not in the way that they strike the reader here, cut 
off as they are, in Beckettian fashion, from any consequential, 
didactic, or even conceptual order. (63)  
 
This sense that each of these individually narrated items has little more than a 
tangential relationship to the subject of Tolstoy not only describes the narrative itself, 
it also describes the erratic interaction of the text and the collage images dispersed 
strategically between these more or less free-floating sections of text.  
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Without the easy rhythmic balance of “Natural History,” where each pairing 
of image and text is more or less self-contained and the comedic aspect of the story 
derives from the ironic juxtaposition of disparate objects combined with humourous, 
ekphrastic descriptions, in “At the Tolstoy Museum” the reader’s interpretive 
balance is thrown off from the beginning by the variance of the story’s components 
and its utter lack of cohesive ekphrasis. And instead of providing an artificial 
structuring of items and events (or an easily decodable comic simulacrum of 
epistemological rhetoric, such as in “Natural History”) the imbalance created by the 
incongruity of the images and fragments of text becomes one source of the story’s 
ironic tension.128  
The fourth page of the story, for example, contains a full-page, late-
eighteenth or early-nineteenth century etching of a young boy with a rapacious smirk 
clutching a glass of wine in one hand and a book in the other, the caption below 
reading: “Tolstoy as a youth” (44; see figure 7). Facing this on the next page is a 
first-person description of the “amazing cantilever” of the museum building and how 
its design “suggests that it is about to fall on you” (45). This architecture, the narrator 
states, is meant to reflect “Tolstoy’s moral authority” (45). The next fragment of text 
contains a truncated description of the museum basement narrated in the free indirect 
voice. And in the final fragment of the page, the narration shifts to the third-person 
dramatic voice in order to describe the tremendous weeping induced by the portraits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 It should be noted that the pervasive “imbalance” in the City Life version of “At the Tolstoy 
Museum” is actually a very carefully structured incongruity that relies (significantly) upon the page 
arrangements of text and image. Much of this quirky cadence is lost in the versions published in The 
New Yorker and Forty Stories, which have drastically rearranged the components of the story to fit 
within a more condensed page layout. However, comparison of these three versions shows very 
clearly that the awkward architecture of this tale is not the result of randomness but is the outcome of 
a very deliberate process of arrangement. See Barthelme, “At the Tolstoy Museum” in Forty Stories 
109-19; Barthelme, “At the Tolstoy Museum,” The New Yorker (May 24, 1969): 29-35. 
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displayed in the museum. The overall experience of being continuously surrounded 
by the penetrating gaze of Tolstoy, ventures the last of these narrative voices, is not 
unlike “committing a small crime and being discovered at it by your father, who 
stands in four doorways, looking at you” (45). Indeed, Barthelme’s arrangement 
achieves a similar effect by surrounding the reader, walling him/her into the 
pictographic maze, and expecting and denying interpretation all at once. 
In the pages that follow, these abrupt changes of visual image and narrative 
direction continue from one free-floating metaphor to the next; each section of text 
and each image only capable of the slightest peripheral glance at one another. And 
like the rapid perspective shifts and narratorial heteroglossia that characterize 
Coover’s “The Elevator,” Barthelme’s museum also seems to take shape in the 
(negative) space created between the various trajectories taken by each of the 
narrative items and the farcical gaps created in the temporality of the story’s 
supposedly historiographical discourse.  
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Figure 7. From “At the Tolstoy Museum,” in City Life, 44. 
 
As Ulf Cronquist writes in his cognitive-semiotic textual analysis of “At the 
Tolstoy Museum,” the story’s “(mock) ekphrastic” structure combined with the 
constant circulation of the narration from view point to view point and voice to 
voice, “disrupts the temporal, linear processing of the text” (123). The result, argues 
Cronquist, is that:  
. . . since the illustrations are not directly connected to the running of 
the text, they too, of course, have an effect on the temporality. The 
spatial aspect of the story is instead emphasized, the fragmented 
positionality of the graphics read somewhat like literary tableaux 
vivants. . . . (“Donald Barthelme’s Art of Storytelling” 123)129 
 
And yet, as the narrative mutates from printed words into pictures and the museum 
comes alive, none of this life force ever seems to attach to Tolstoy directly or 
develop a discernable narrative course by which the reader might gain a greater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 This whirling blur of constant temporal and thematic shifts is put to similar use in another pseudo-
historical narrative concerning a Russian museum: Alexander Sokurov’s Russian Ark (2002), an 
uninterrupted, 96-minute tour through 300 years of Russian history. 
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insight into the world of Tolstoy’s writing, his period in history, or his unique set of 
biographical circumstances.130 Instead, the fractured ekphrastic process in this story 
says more about the infinite ways that Tolstoy, as an abstract metaphor for the artist, 
is subject to the volatile caprices of critical interpretation and cultural appropriation. 
And like the artist’s work (the traces and artifacts attributed to a given individual), 
the always semiotically mediated biography of the artist, too, is shown to be a fragile 
construct reliant upon an equally fragile grid of temporal relations. 
According to Michael Trussler’s study, “Literary Artifacts: Ekphrasis in the 
Short Fiction of Donald Barthelme, Salman Rushdie, and John Edgar Wideman,” 
breaking (or at least playfully reducing) the ties that bind both art and artist to these 
temporal relations expands the possibilities of the writing beyond the constraints of 
the fact/fantasy dichotomy.131 In the works of Barthelme, Rushdie, and Wideman, 
Trussler explains, this dichotomy and the temporal frame that supports it are often 
subverted through an interweaving of representational systems (e.g., narrative prose, 
illustration, citation, etc.) and methods of narratorial delivery (e.g., homodiegetic 
narration, heterodiegetic narration, heteroglossia, etc.).132 Trussler writes, “Wavering 
between representational systems becomes a strategic response to aesthetic, 
epistemological, or moral anxieties that threaten the work's formal or thematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 As Maurice Couturier and Régis Durand note in their description of the story: “Barthelme’s 
fictions are more like art galleries than lecture halls. It would be difficult, for instance, to read ‘At the 
Tolstoy Museum’ as a lecture on Tolstoy. . . . The rational interpretation of the text becomes as 
problematical as that of the pictures; it is bound to reflect the desires of the interpreter as much as the 
intentions of the artist.” See Couturier and Durand, Donald Barthelme, 59. 
131 Of this process, Cronquist writes: “‘At the Tolstoy Museum’ begins with a contract between the 
agency of the narrator . . . and a possible recipient . . . in the aphonic mode of relating what it is like at 
this museum. The crisis appears as the texture of the words and images turns surreal. And an 
escalation into the catastrophe takes place as there is an obvious blur of fact and fiction, transforming 
the aphonic agency into an absurd act of delegating words and images, with the possible discourse 
perspective being an ironic comment on Horace’s ut pictura poesis.” See Cronquist, “Literary 
Artifacts,” 128. 
132 See Cronquist, “Literary Artifacts,” 123. 
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integrity in some way” (252). And one of the most effective means of defending this 
threatened integrity is by removing a leg, so to speak, from the “trialectic” tripod of 
ekphrasis, as Trussler explains:  
While all ekphrastic texts rely on an interdependent ‘trialectic’—the 
art object is described by a narrator for the benefit of an audience—    
. . . [writers such as Barthelme, Rushdie, and Wideman complicate] 
this dynamic by localizing it within a limited temporal and dramatic 
frame. (“Literary Artifacts” 253) 
 
By severely manipulating or limiting the temporal frame, distorting it, or placing it 
within a series of alternating dramatic frames (a method also applied extensively and 
to a similar verbal-visual collage effect in Gass’s Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife 
[1968] and Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo [1972]), not only is the historicity of the 
object placed in a critical light, the object itself takes a new shape. Like the 
outrageously oversized portrait of Tolstoy introducing the tale, under these 
conditions of temporal warping and narratorial proliferation the uncertain object of 
Tolstoy is expanded to similar epic proportions. As this occurs the epistemological 
integrity of the object is also warped, breaking the false mirror of representation and 
displaying to the reader that, if something (e.g., Tolstoy) can be said to be anything 
(e.g., a tiger hunter; see figure 8), then anything can be said to be anything. 
Epistemological “truth,” in this context, is highlighted as a construct without any 
privileged bearing on the creative act. The only thing guiding speech, writing, and 
the creative act in general are the choices made by the speaker, writer, and/or artist.   
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Figure 8. From “At the Tolstoy Museum,” in City Life, 46. 
 
Also highlighted through this fundamental paradox (a paradox obviously not 
lost on Barthelme; one also explored in similar fashion by Coover) is the fact that 
this type of mythical expansion is not purely the extraordinary construct of fiction, it 
also describes the ordinary cultural/historical/commercial process of mythicization as 
certain objects—including both the art object as well as the artist as an object—are 
fashioned and re-fashioned in ever greater proportions.133 As Trussler comments at 
one point:  
[The] ekphrastic text doesn't encounter a pristine art object or visual 
image so much as it confronts an aesthetic phenomenon that has 
seemingly already undergone a translation into numerous discursive 
orders, among them art theory, capitalist marketing strategies, and the 
news media. (“Literary Artifacts” 253, Trussler’s emphasis) 
 
Barthelme’s “At the Tolstoy Museum” confronts and makes sport of this process of 
infinite socio-cultural inflation by reassembling these anecdotal pieces of Tolstoy-
ness into a monument to the writer that has (as with most monuments) very little to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Morton Gurewitch writes, “There are obvious targets in ‘At the Tolstoy Museum,’ for example, 
mad hero-worship, perversely inept cultural custodianship, colossal symbolism, and a great artist’s 
missionary urges metamorphosed into titanic self-aggrandisement.” See Gurewitch, The Ironic 
Temper and the Comic Imagination, 44. 
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do with the actual experiences, works, and intentions of the object being celebrated. 
And by building up a mock replica of the ordinary absurdity of this process of 
“monumentalism,” with all of its leaps and aporias proudly displayed, Barthelme’s 
fiction exposes this process in all of its epistemological emptiness and artificiality.  
Pasted together like the cardboard senator in “Robert Kennedy Saved from 
Drowning” (Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts [1968]; hereafter UPUA), 
Barthelme’s Tolstoy seems little more than an amalgam of fragments and farcical 
aphorisms. And like the patchwork narrative wonderland of “Paraguay” (also 
collected in CL), the surreal landscape of Barthelme’s imaginary museum is another 
hybrid panoply of façades and masks. As in these other stories, the central statement 
of Barthelme’s “At the Tolstoy Museum” is that whatever resides beneath the surface 
of these masks and façades is less important than the surface itself, for beneath the 
thin, chaotic membrane of the collage is the glaring blast of the endless anything and 
the dizzying regress of the signifier signifying into the infinite.134  
Obviously, any surface pretending to accurately represent every aspect of this 
endless anything would be false or, at best, incomplete. The collage surface, on the 
other hand, contains only hints to the subtle engineering of this endless anything 
without making any grandiose claims to infinite inclusivity. The collage puts its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 In The Metafictional Muse, Larry McCaffery writes: “Realistic characters and events, suggests 
Barthelme, are patently false because the elements out of which they are created—words, plot 
conventions, arbitrary connections—have proven unable to depict faithfully how human beings 
operate in the world. So, instead, Barthelme contents himself with creating literary fragments, 
anecdotes, and sketches which he skillfully builds out of the clichés and verbal drek of our 
contemporary idiom. Barthelme’s emphasis on ‘surface’ and on process is further heightened by his 
manipulation of style and the technological aspects of print on the page which serve to keep the reader 
aware of the writing itself and to discourage the reader’s search for ‘depth.’” See McCaffery, “Donald 
Barthelme: The Aesthetics of Trash” in The Metafictional Muse, 115. 
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“mere appearance of mere appearance” on display (as Nietzsche might put it),135 
making no effort to conceal the gaps, leaps, and contradictions that arise during the 
re-combinatory process, but rather foregrounding them in such a way as to refashion 
them into an improvised illusion or meaningfully flawed facsimile of experience. 
The resulting abstraction, as Ronald Sukenick speculates in his essay, “The New 
Tradition in Fiction,” is not only an amelioration of (incomplete, finite) experience, 
the deliberately flawed innovation developing out of this process is also a path to the 
discovery of new forms and relationships. Sukenick writes: 
As abstraction frees fiction from the representational and the need to 
imitate some version of reality other than its own, so improvisation 
liberates it from any a priori order and allows it to discover new 
sequences and interconnections in the flow of experience. In a 
situation where traditional patterns of order seem false or superfluous 
it may be better to open oneself as completely as possible to the 
immediacy of experience . . . . (“The New Tradition in Fiction” 44) 
 
The collage, as an inherently metafictional narrative construct, exists as the artist’s 
manifestation of this immediate re-ordering of experience. However, it must be 
emphasized that although the fractured structures and mixed messages of the collage 
tell a collection of stories, from a number of periods, and in a multitude of voices, 
each of the voices chosen to participate has been arranged to speak to the reader in a 
particular order. Also, it is worth noting that in Barthelme’s anecdotal collections this 
order-subverting order is not merely a matter of random composition and/or chance 
selection (e.g., in the style of Burroughs’s cut-ups). These collage narratives are the 
effect of a series of carefully nuanced, highly politicized, and transideologically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 In section four of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche argues: “[If] we conceive of our empirical 
existence, and of that of the world in general, as a continuously manifested representation of the 
primal unity, we shall then have to look on the dream as a mere appearance of mere appearance 
[Schein des Scheins], hence as a still higher appeasement of the primordial desire for mere 
appearance.’” See Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 45. 
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critical choices.  
As described above, in “Natural History” and “At the Tolstoy Museum,” 
Barthelme invents an entirely new arrangement of the semantic and semiotic 
structures used to define and control the epistemological concepts and constructs of 
institutionalized, authoritative discourse. And by breaking these structures apart and 
tinkering them down into their basic components, Barthelme’s fiction momentarily 
dismantles and re-configures the rigid discourses of the “institution” and the 
mechanisms of cultural aggrandizement that attend it, building from this mangled 
pile of parts a new socio-cultural arrangement—one more in tune with the violence, 
mysticism, and high-flown rhetoric of late 60s and early 70s urban America.136 
 
Ad Hoc Adventures 
As in his anecdotal collections, Barthelme’s ad hoc adventure narratives are 
equally subversive in their incongruous pairings of obscure objects and opaque 
textual fragments. In works such as “A Nation of Wheels” (1970)137 and “The Story 
Thus Far:” (1971),138 Barthelme challenges the archetypal quest pattern by 
apparently following no pattern at all (other than the pattern suggested by the collage 
elements themselves).139 There is only the quest and the ironic twisting of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 As Barthelme states in an interview with Michiko Kakutani: “In earlier times people could attempt 
to explain everything. Today there is too much to explain. The effort would be fruitless. So you have 
to try and do something else. For me it’s more attempting to deal with parts instead of attempting to 
deal with the whole,” Quoted in Tom LeClair, The Art of Excess: Mastery in Contemporary American 
Fiction, 25; see also Kakutani, “Donald Barthelme,” 20. 
137 “A Nation of Wheels” was first published in The New Yorker, June 13, 1970 and later revised for 
inclusion in Guilty Pleasures (1974). All quotations and illustrations are taken from the reprint of the 
story as published in The Teachings of Don B. See Barthelme, The Teachings of Don B., 127-33, 345. 
138 “The Story Thus Far:” was first published in The New Yorker, May 1, 1971. All quotations and 
illustrations are taken from the reprint of the story as published in The Teachings of Don B. See 
Barthelme, The Teachings of Don B., 181-88, 347. 
139 In a 1975 interview with Charles Ruas and Judith Sherman for Pacifica Radio, Barthelme reveals 
that, in preparation for the construction of his National Book Award winning The Slightly Irregular 
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monomythical structures. And while a number of the works in this category do push 
the narrative to the edge of the reader’s patience and come to seem a bit laborious in 
development and repetitive in their imagery (which is hardly a surprise, given that 
conventional characters and plots do not translate very well into the illustrated 
collage world), these narratives do, nevertheless, offer Barthelme another platform 
from which to launch his attack, as he puts it, against the overload of “cultural 
baggage.”140 
One such attack takes place within “A Nation of Wheels,” an account of a 
world suddenly taken over by advancements in the technology of the tire. The 
narrative begins: 
Originally linked to the internal-combustion engine to provide cheap 
individual transportation, the wheel assumed near-autonomous status 
in the 1970s with the arrival of (1) self-powering devices and (2) the 
so-called “elastic consciousness.” (TTDB 127)  
 
In many ways a parodic send up of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962),141 Barthelme’s account of this revolution in wheel consciousness 
(pun clearly intended) is also a satire of the period’s over-saturation in academic and 
pseudo-academic terms such as “paradigm shift,” “technological integration,” and 
“co-optation,” (all of which figure into the narrative in some revised form or 
context). Through snippets of complex, mystifying, and ultimately meaningless 
rhetoric, Barthelme’s narrative ridicules this type of language through its re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fire Engine (1971), another ad hoc adventure narrative: “I gathered together the pictures I thought I 
could use. That book was dictated by the pictures. The text was written for the pictures.” See 
Barthelme, Not Knowing, 245. 
140 In his 1975 interview with Ruas and Sherman, Barthelme states that his ironic approach to Western 
myth-making and the “cultural baggage” that attends this narrative process has to do with his being 
“pitted against historical actualities.” See Barthelme, Not Knowing, 256.  
141 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1962. 
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application to an absurd set of events.142  
Paired with this linguistic complexity, the relatively simple collage images of 
the narrative add a touch of ironic suspense to this doomsday scenario of complete 
technological domination. And by giving this concept of dominance a metaphorical 
substance in the form of giant, looming, faceless tires, Barthelme’s visual satire 
incites a number of simultaneous readings. On one level, the juxtaposition of these 
massive tires against the delicate, almost whimsical quality of the collaged etchings 
of nineteenth-century figures and scenery creates a strong visual contrast. And 
building on this contrast, the sheer size of these objects and the implication of their 
senseless capacity to crush humanity establish an unsettling surreality to the narrative 
(see figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. From “A Nation of Wheels,” in The Teachings of Don B., 129. 
 
 
At the same time, the faceless, empty signifier of the tire also acts as a surrogate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 1960s comic-book aficionados would also notice that the “elastic consciousness” referred to in the 
above passage is not a citation from Thomas Kuhn, but rather an oblique reference to Stan Lee’s 
Mister Fantastic, the rubberized leader of Marvel Comics’ “Fantastic Four.” 
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oppressor, an almost fill-in-the-blanks type of alien presence that might easily be 
replaced by any other technology from munitions to computers, fascist iconography 
to capitalist propaganda. And by showing revolution to be a mobile crisis, so to 
speak, Barthelme simultaneously engages with and ironically destabilizes the “real” 
threat of technological systems.  
One of the more serious implications of this crisis of meaning and 
signification, as Barthelme hints in the final fragment of the piece, is the inherent 
plasticity of historical discourse. Looking to the past as a rationalization, further, as a 
justification for contemporary trends and events, Barthelme’s story implies, is 
analogous to writing a narrative history of events in double reverse—the present 
already present in the past and the past always already present in the future (see 
figure 10). Thus, Barthelme’s “Venus of Akron” is not only a tiring out of history 
(i.e., another paronomastic product of postmodern fatigue and a wink to Robert 
Rauschenberg’s “Monogram” [1955-59]),143 it is also the myth of history shown in 
its full, authentic inauthenticity, in its true irony as a series of arbitrary constructions 
and re-constructions—merz of the collage-like process of haphazard temporal 
progression.144 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 In an introductory note to the catalogue of an exhibition of Rauschenberg’s work at the 
Contemporary Arts Museum, Houston (1985), Barthelme writes: “If the basic principle of collage is 
the juxtaposition of unlike things within a visual field . . . he need in theory only find stranger and 
stranger things and build not-quite-decipherable rebuses from them. The theory is straightforward 
enough but, of course, inadequate. It ignores the true source of [the] artist’s power, which lies in the 
mystery of particular choices. . . . Seizure, as it were, is always prior to understanding. It is an 
essential aspect of the tension . . . and it is where Rauschenberg’s real genius lies – the tire wrestled 
over the goat’s hind legs.” See Barthelme, Not Knowing, 186. 
144 In a similar context, Alan Wilde writes that Barthelme perceives the world “as a kind of haphazard, 
endlessly organizable and reorganized playground.” See Wilde, “Barthelme Unfair to Kierkegaard,” 
52. 
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Figure 10. From “A Nation of Wheels,” in The Teachings of Don B., 133. 
 
Barthelme’s approach in “The Story Thus Far:” contains a similarly absurd 
assault on technology, ideology, and the culture industry. This story concerns the 
other-worldly adventures of a certain Borys Althusser, “wealthy young manufacturer 
of sensitive electronic instruments” (TTDB 181), as he quests in search of a means of 
defeating the “Something” that seems to have spontaneously developed as a barrier 
between him and his wife, Evelyn.  
The opening collage image of this story includes an illustration of a man 
(Borys) recoiling in horror at the presence of a giant marble torso topped with a head 
composed entirely of the twisted metal bands of some kind of electrical mechanism. 
Behind this bizarre, Greco-motorized entity a young woman (Evelyn, it would seem) 
stands immobile, clutching hand to chest (see figure 11). Like one of Francis 
Picabia’s mechanical transformations accidentally wandering into pages of a Wilkie 
Collins novel, Barthelme’s atrocity announces its arrival through an extreme slippage 
of period and context. 
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Figure 11. From “The Story Thus Far:” in The Teachings of Don B., 181. 
 
Hidden in this pairing of image and text is also a rather complicated visual 
pun on Louis Althusser’s thesis in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
(Notes Towards an Investigation)” (1970).145 In this work (revisiting the concept of 
reproduction as framed by Karl Marx in the second volume of Capital) Althusser 
writes, “ . . . every social formation must reproduce the conditions of its production 
at the same time as it produces, and in order to be able to produce” (86). As 
graphically represented in Barthelme’s collage image, Borys Althusser’s monstrous 
“production” has come between him and his ostensible means of “reproduction” (i.e., 
disturbing the “social formation” of his relationship with his wife). No longer 
capable of (sexually) reproducing, Borys’s production begets a new social formation: 
the requirement of the producer to rid himself of his own product so that he might 
resume reproduction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Originally published as in the French journal La Pensée, Vol. 151 (1970), Althusser’s “Idéologie et 
appareils idéologiques d’État (Notes pour une recherche)” was later translated into English and 
collected in the volume, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. All quotations are taken from the 
reprint of this work as published in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta eds., The Anthropology of the 
State: A Reader (Malden: Blackwell, 2006): 86-111. 
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The quest pattern that develops out of this ludicrous dilemma is equally 
convoluted. Told in the third-person historical present with occasional fragments of 
dialogue, the story follows the meandering protagonist as the narrator leads him from 
one admixture of pseudo-mythical debris to the next. Like the pairings in “Natural 
History,” the pictorial content of each illustration is acknowledged and incorporated 
into the prose of the narrative, however, as in “A Nation of Wheels,” the illustrations 
appear to dictate the course of the story’s development without being (in and of 
themselves) solely responsible for the story’s narrative arch. For although the 
illustrations are instrumental in the direction of the story’s course, there is, again, the 
sense that the trilectic of ekphrasis has been critically altered. Indeed, as is often the 
case within Barthelme’s ad hoc adventure narratives, the ekphrasis has been adjusted 
in such a way as to require the prose content of the piece to act as both a verbal 
connective tissue uniting each of the elements and also as a verbal stimulant capable 
of focusing the reader’s attention toward the gaps in context that contain the coded 
ironies and cryptic paradoxes of the story’s illustrated message. As with Duchamp’s 
“L.H.O.O.Q.” (1919), or René Magritte’s “La trahison des images” (1928), much of 
the frisson generated in Barthelme’s collage (to use a favorite term of his) relies upon 
these pictorially directed, verbally stimulated rifts in context.146  
These illustrated collage narratives, as Maurice Couturier and Régis Durand 
describe in their brief study of Barthelme’s works, are arranged “like art galleries” 
(59), what is more, “disreputable galleries,” as Barbara Roe re-frames the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 The importance of this verbal stimulant in the process of visual re-contextualization is a point often 
lost on the art historian, the museum curator, and the journalist when dealing with readymade items 
such as Duchamp’s “Fountain” (1917). For by elevating the formal content of the readymade and/or 
the collage above its implied or verbally encoded context is to miss the point completely. The result, 
as is frequently the case with Duchamp’s “Fountain,” is praise for the gentle curves and pristine 
simplicity of an ordinary urinal without any recognition of the fact that such literal-mindedness is 
precisely the target of the large hole at the front of the urinal’s basin. 
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metaphor (49); each textual element placed in just such a way as to guide the 
reader/viewer through a deceptively-ordered, disorderly experience.147 And not 
unlike a hypothetical visitor’s cognitively challenging experience at an 
achronological and/or ambiguously organized exhibition, in “The Story Thus Far:” 
there is a distinct sense that Borys’s quest could, quite conceivably (i.e., given the 
requisite collage elements) continue indefinitely. Even the title of the story seems to 
deny finality and invite further additions to the narrative.  
This ironically charged, episodic uncertainty is also reminiscent of the 
lengthy series of ritualistic trials and pseudo-mythical ploys that complicate the 
hero’s ascent in “The Glass Mountain” (first published in CL) and which structure 
the wandering narrative trajectories in novels such as Snow White, The Dead Father, 
and The King. As in these narratives, each of the events confronted by Borys in “The 
Story Thus Far:” simply points to the next without leading to any deepening of the 
hero’s characterization or any further definition of the situation (i.e., the 
“Something”) that acts as his call to adventure. And, of course, along with Borys, the 
reader/viewer, too, is abruptly whisked along on Barthelme’s high ironic tour of this 
questionably archetypal “zone unknown.”  
As Joseph Campbell defines it in The Hero with a Thousand Faces, the “zone 
unknown,” is first and foremost a region outside of the quotidian confines of daylight 
reality.148 Answering the call to adventure, the hero ventures forth from the familiar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 In his 1981 interview with J. D. O’Hara for The Paris Review, Barthelme remarks: “The order of 
pieces in a given [story] is mostly a matter of trying to make sure they don’t get in each other’s way. 
Much like hanging pictures for a show. Some pictures fight other pictures, not because either is a bad 
picture, but because the scale fights or the color fights.” See Barthelme and O’Hara, “Donald 
Barthelme, The Art of Fiction No. 66,” 196. 
148 In his introduction to The Teachings of Don B., Thomas Pynchon writes: “[Barthelme] happens to 
be one of a handful of American authors […] who know instinctively how to stash the merchandise, 
bamboozle the inspectors, and smuggle their nocturnal contraband right on past the checkpoints of 
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and enters this obscure realm as the first step towards a alternate order of being.  As 
Campbell writes: 
This first stage of the mythological journey—which we have 
designated the “call to adventure”—signifies that destiny has 
summoned the hero and transferred his spiritual center of gravity from 
within the pale of his society to a zone unknown. This fateful region 
of both treasure and danger may be variously represented: as a distant 
land, a forest, a kingdom underground, beneath the waves, or above 
the sky, a secret island, lofty mountaintop, or profound dream state; 
but it is always a place of strangely fluid and polymorphous beings, 
unimaginable torments, superhuman deeds, and impossible delight. 
(The Hero with a Thousand Faces 48) 
 
And as if checking off each of the items on Campbell’s list, Barthelme’s “The Story 
Thus Far:” runs through a similar inventory of polymorphous beings and impossible 
encounters. 
And while following Borys on this journey, the reader meets: a “lady of the 
evening” leaning against a termite-shaped hat stand who attempts to sell Borys an 
ornately decorated “pornographic television set” (182, see figure 12); a seeress 
standing “in a grove of pictorial elements” who summarily states that she doesn’t 
deal with domestic problems (182); a “Masked Marvel,” depicted as a bearded mask 
suspended above the mantlepiece of an elaborate, rococo fireplace (183); a pair of 
“Sick Friends,” attended by a penitent saint, tickling each other in a brooding, Goya-
esque landscape (183); a “dragonlet” named Wolfgang perched upon a burial urn 
(184); an “Emptiness,” represented as a hollow suit of chainmail (184); and (among a 
host of other entities) a gathering of “Lone Rangers,” in trademark disguise, 
celebrating “the closing of the West” (185, see figure 13).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
daylight ‘reality.’ What he called his ‘secret vice’ of ‘cutting up and pasting together pictures’ bears 
an analogy, at least, to what is supposed to go on in dreams, where images from the public domain are 
said likewise to combine in unique, private, with luck spiritually useful, ways. […] The effect each 
time […] is to put us in the presence of something already eerily familiar . . . to remind us that we 
have lived in these visionary cities and haunted forests, that the ancient faces we gaze into are faces 
we know . . . .” See Pynchon, TTDB, xvi-xvii. 
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Figure 13. From “The Story Thus Far:” in The Teachings of Don B., 185. 
 
Despite the range of his travels, Borys fails to obtain any useful information 
from these questionable oracles. But just as he is beginning to despair, Borys 
receives a timely tip from an “eternally damned child prodigy” residing in a nearby 
inferno (187). The child, sizzling in the fires of damnation for committing “all the 
sins available to seven-year-olds, and some that are not” (187), reminds him of his 
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significant expertise in the area of sensitive electronic devices. Following this 
reminder, Borys rushes back to his laboratory and “gears up his baddest sensitive 
electronic instrument” (188). Finally, after testing his machine on some lilies, which 
immediately droop, Borys states, “Well, […] if I can make lilies droop, I can . . .” 
(188), but the mythical threshold conflict that would ordinarily mark the hero’s 
return from the unknown is conspicuously absent and is instead replaced with an 
ellipsis.  
In the last verbal-visual pairing of the narrative, the reader finds the tale 
rushed to a hasty conclusion. Next to an image of two hands clasped in friendship 
superimposed over an image of cloaked figures dashing with torches through a dimly 
lit street, the text reads: “Throughout the Free Word, the hills resound to the sound of 
the news of Borys’s improved position, vis-à-vis the threat. Now read on” (188). The 
adventure complete and the never altogether clear “Something” now (apparently) 
vanquished, the reader is faced with the choice of: a) reading a specific, limited 
meaning into the story’s images through the objects represented in them (e.g., taking 
the drooping of the lily—classical symbol of pregnancy—along with the scientific 
instruments as code for an abortion, a reading that would create an interesting ironic 
loop when connected with the production/reproduction pun that opens the tale); b) 
allowing the symbolism of the objects—along with all of the potential meanings, 
implications, and associations that attend each of the various images—to add to the 
richness of the reading/viewing experience without limiting the interpretive 
possibilities of the work to a specific epistemological or hermeneutic arrangement; 
or, c) connecting the fractured pieces of mythicized material back to the various 
scientific, literary, philosophical, and art-historical discourses from which each of the 
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story’s components originate and synthesizing a meaning from within the 
connections and juxtapositions created by this re-contextualization. 
The question of interpretation here, as Robert A. Segal writes of myth 
scholarship in general, is one of origin, function, and subject matter (2).149 However, 
Barthelme’s ad hoc adventure narratives anticipate and subvert each of these angles 
of critical approach by turning all attempts to locate a precise (mythical) origin, 
(social/literary) function, and (narrative) subject into a compound containing inverse 
proportions of each: origin paired with non-origin, function paired with dysfunction, 
and subject matter hidden within the semiotic murk of a deliberately incoherent 
symbolism. 
In Barthelme’s collage narrative, mythic origin compounds with pseudo-
mythic non-origin through the narrative’s mixture of disparate materials and the 
temporal displacement that occurs as a result of the re-appropriation of these de-
contextualized fragments. And yet, even were the reader to identify the original 
source and context of the pictorial elements, historical events, famous aphorisms, 
etc., this identification would not necessarily indicate a meaningful connection to a 
precedent discourse or context. In the place of a meaningful connection, Barthelme 
installs a generic, stencil-like pattern of “mythiness” sufficient to introduce an 
abstract structural similarity to certain monomythical and archetypal patterns, but 
with the original mythic content removed or displaced beyond recognition. Into this 
void Barthelme pours an altogether different set of contents, like bits of cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Segal writes: “What unite the study of myth across the disciplines are the questions asked. The 
three main questions are those of origin, function, and subject matter. By ‘origin’ is meant why and 
how myth arises. By ‘function’ is meant why and how myth persists. The answer to the why of origin 
and function is usually a need, which myth arises to fulfill and lasts by continuing to fulfill. . . . By 
‘subject matter’ is meant the referent of myth. Some theories read myth literally, so that the referent is 
the straightforward, apparent one, such as gods. Other theories read myth symbolically, and the 
symbolized referent can be anything.” See Segal, Myth, 2.   
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flotsam immersed in the plastic resin of mythical discourse. 
The interpretative impasse raised in pseudo-mythical narratives such as “The 
Story Thus Far:” also highlights one of the primary methodological paradoxes of 
myth interpretation, the paradox of imaginative projection. As Claude Lévi-Strauss 
writes in his introductory “overture” to The Raw and the Cooked (1964), no manner 
of deconstruction, morphological analysis, or semiotic dissection can ever pare a 
myth down to its last essential mytheme without the process being in some way 
directed by the imaginative postulations of the reader/critic (5). All attempts to locate 
the original “source” and/or social context of a given myth simply result in an 
endless jumble of more or less familiar parts that are constantly at risk of combining 
and re-combining in different, often contradictory ways during the deconstruction 
process. As Lévi-Strauss writes (quoted here at length): 
The study of myths raises a methodological problem, in that it cannot 
be carried out according to the Cartesian principle of breaking down 
the difficulty into as many parts as may be necessary for finding the 
solution. There is no real end to mythological analysis, no hidden 
unity to be grasped once the breaking-down process has been 
completed. Themes can be split up ad infinitum. Just when you think 
you have disentangled and separated them, you realize that they are 
knitting together again in response to the operation of unexpected 
affinities. Consequently the unity of the myth is never more than 
tendential and projective and cannot reflect a state or a particular 
moment of the myth. It is a phenomenon of the imagination, resulting 
from the attempt at interpretation; and its function is to endow the 
myth with synthetic form and to prevent its disintegration into a 
confusion of opposites. (The Raw and the Cooked 5) 
 
Defining the study of myths as an “anaclastic” science (i.e., analogous to tracing the 
refracted, reflected, and broken rays of optical phenomena), Lévi-Strauss argues that, 
because the origin, function, and subject can only ever be projected, the interpreter of 
myth can only ever propose a hypothetical hermeneutic model built from the 
available verbal fragments, ritualistic behaviors, and social residues of myth (5-6). 
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Following these measured, charted, and artificially re-directed fragments towards a 
postulated origin, Lévi-Strauss maintains, reflects both the spontaneity and essential 
multiplicity of myth as well as its “in-terminable” persistence in human culture (6). 
By emphasizing the anaclastic nature of myth construction and, thereby, 
ironizing the cultural forces that combine to perpetuate this “in-terminable” process, 
Barthelme’s ad hoc adventure narratives engage in an ironic dialogue not only with 
myth but also with the mythicized history of Western culture as well. Viewed in this 
light, Barthelme’s works of pseudo-myth might be seen as mocking, antagonistic 
commentaries on this socio-historical process of cultural (self-)mythicization.  
Rather than pretending to hold up a mirror to reality (which is, even in the 
moment of experience, always a construction—psychological, cognitive, linguistic, 
visual, etc.—and therefore incomplete, delimited, and artificial), collage narratives 
such as “A Nation of Wheels” and “The Story Thus Far:” identify reality instead 
with the mechanism of the mirror itself—showing it to be little more than a fun-
house matrix of stretched, multiplied and distorted images that reflect a culture’s 
every move and gesture without ever capturing anything as it is (or was) actually 
experienced. Barthelme’s ad hoc adventure narratives confront these deceptive, 
mytho-realistic mirrors and the warped histories contained in them by subverting the 
systems of archetype and authority that naturalize the myth-making process. And by 
presenting absurd “meldings” of myth and history that actively participate in the 
absurdity of experience, Barthelme’s collage narratives simultaneously capture and 
critique the pervasive, postmodern anxieties that attend all of these cluttered mythical 
projections of reality.  
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Onto-Theatrical Productions 
In the category of Barthelme’s onto-theatrical productions, this ironic 
dialogue with the problem of being with history shifts toward a dialogue with the 
problem of being in that history (i.e., not apart from but rather a part of the narrative 
of history). In collage narratives such as “Brain Damage” (1970)150 and “The Flight 
of Pigeons from the Palace” (c. 1972),151 the arbitrary events, identities, and settings 
of an examined existence become the re-contextualized elements of the collage. 
However, this existential re-contextualization is, in the Barthelmean sense, both the 
conjunctive integration of disparate realities and the issue of that integration — not 
just the chance encounter famously described by Lautréamont, but the chosen 
offspring of all such encounters. These re-contextualized offspring become the 
monstrous beings that populate the stage and act as the props and scenery in 
Barthelme’s onto-theatrical productions. As Barthelme states during an interview 
with Jerome Klinkowitz:  
The point of collage is that unlike things are stuck together to make, 
in the best case, a new reality. This new reality, in the best case, may 
be or imply a comment on the other reality from which it came, and 
may also be much else. It's an itself, if it’s successful. ("Donald 
Barthelme" 51-52, Barthelme’s emphasis) 
 
Barthelme’s onto-theatrical impulse is to place these re-combined, manipulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 “Brain Damage” was first published in the February 21, 1970 issue of The New Yorker and 
subsequently included in City Life (1970). And according to Kim Herzinger’s note in TTDB regarding 
the print history of “Brain Damage,” the City Life reprint included substantial changes and is also 
notable for its incorporation of a previously published story: “Blue Flower Problem,” previously 
published in Harvest 31.2, May 1967 (TTDB 345-46). Some sections of “Brain Damage” also 
appeared in another earlier story entitled, “Philadelphia,” (uncollected), which was first published in 
the November 30, 1968 issue of The New Yorker. All quotations and images here have been taken 
from the reprint of “Brain Damage” in the British first edition of City Life (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1971). See Barthelme, City Life, 131-146. 
151 “The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace” first appeared in The New Yorker. This story, with slight 
alterations, was subsequently reprinted in Sadness (1972) and again, with further alterations, in Forty 
Stories (1987). All quotations and illustrations are taken from the version collected in the British first 
edition of Sadness (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973). 
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and/or re-contextualized particles of “self-ness” into an order that satirically critiques 
the notion of a fixed, meaningful origin or singular reality. In so doing, Barthelme’s 
manufactured realities (in the plural) expose the emptiness of being and the 
precarious nature of art as a remedy (a meaningful, existential filling, if you will) for 
such emptiness.152  
 
Figure 14. From “The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace,” in Sadness, 131. 
 
 
In “The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace,” Barthelme takes the reader on a guided 
back-stage tour of one such attempt to fill this emptiness. Rising spontaneously from 
the crumbling desolation of an abandoned palazzo full of weeds and old blankets, 
Barthelme’s narratorial “we” recounts the heady rise and inevitable decline of an 
extraordinary show. The reader meets the “Numbered Man” (130) and the “Sulking 
Lady” (131; see figure 14), “loud-roaring strong-stinking animals” and an auditioned 
explosion (132). And as the cast members pile up and compete for attention, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 In the context of Barthelme’s “Paraguay” (City Life), John Leland writes: “In the strange countries 
of the imagination, one finds only the machinery or ordering, while the Meaning which would ‘fulfill’ 
rather than merely ‘fill’ remains inaccessible.” See Leland, “Remarks re-marked: Barthelme, What 
Curios of Signs!” 797. 
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distinctly allegorical self-reflexivity becomes increasingly apparent. For, from a 
certain perspective, as Alan Wilde observes in “Barthelme Unfair to Kierkegaard: 
Some Thoughts of Modern and Postmodern Irony,” this collage narrative can be read 
as “a parable of the artist in an age of the conspicuous consumption of schlock” (61). 
Immediately becoming buried in these mountains of schlock, pastiche, and aesthetic 
trash, the activities of the artist (like the quotidian events and experiences of daily 
existence) are easily replaced, simulated, and/or misplaced. Indeed, art and artist 
both become little more than items in a list of equivalencies, as implied in the show’s 
opening night lineup: 
A startlingly handsome man 
A Grand Cham 
A tulip craze 
The Prime Rate 
Edgar Allen Poe 
A colored light (Sadness 132) 
 
The artist is thrown in with their art, the ordinary in with the extraordinary, and 
schlock is heaped upon schlock in a towering pile of ever increasing equivalence. In 
such an environment the question of a meaningful existence becomes less an issue of 
the Aristotelian “How do we live?” or the Cartesian “How do we know?” but rather, 
as the tale’s narratorial voice frames it, “How can we improve the show?” (132)—
ego mutare, ergo sum.153  
Obviously, such a continual expectation of change, innovation, and 
“improvement” is not only exhausting for the artist, it creates an awkward tension 
between the artist and the audience (i.e., self and world), a tension which, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Larry McCaffery writes: “Compounding the difficulties of both the artist and the ordinary 
individual is the decay of the communication process itself at a time when modern man is becoming 
increasingly inundated with supposedly meaningful symbols. . . . The main problem facing us all, of 
course, is the trashy, brutalized condition of language itself which makes our communication process 
almost completely bog down. . . .” See McCaffery, The Metafictional Muse, 109. 
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implication, is also present in the art itself. “It is difficult to keep the public 
interested,” sighs the narrator on the final page, “The supply of strange ideas is not 
endless. . . . Some things appear to be wonders in the beginning, but when you 
become familiar with them, are not wonderful at all” (139). The show’s capacity to 
amaze now in decline, the audience losing interest, nevertheless, the narrator holds 
out one last, naive hope that conditions might improve with the addition of a volcano 
(see figure 15). And yet, as Wilde notes in his analysis, “The reader, observing it, 
violently smoking . . . is left to judge the likely efficacy of this and other wonders 
constructed or discovered for the salvation of art” (“Barthelme Unfair to 
Kierkegaard” 62).  
 
 
Figure 15. From “The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace,” in Sadness, 139. 
 
But even in the face of this bleak irony, the narrator’s chipper tone of hope 
remains strangely intact. In fact, it is precisely this sense of hope that Barthelme 
locates in the very act of fiction writing, in the creation of art, and especially in the 
construction of collage. As he states in Lawrence Rust Hills’s Writer’s Choice, 
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“Mixing bits of this and that from various areas of life to make something that did 
not exist before is an oddly hopeful endeavor” (Qtd. in Barthelme Not-Knowing 56). 
Such an endeavor is hopeful, in part, because the artist hopes against all hope that the 
venture will actually come off, however, as Barthelme admits in “Not-Knowing” 
(paraphrasing a statement made by Harold Rosenberg), the composition of collage is 
also a distinctly “anxious” business; anxious in that every such construction engages 
in a limit-discourse, a balancing act between masterpiece and junk, between the 
creation of “a magical object” with the capacity to create meaning simply in its being 
perceived and “a dumb idea” that simply falls flat (Not-Knowing 19-20).154  
Barthelme’s onto-theatrical collage fictions deliberately straddle both ends of 
this spectrum. Through cut-and-paste tales of magical idiocy, these patchwork 
compendiums of human preposterousness certainly prolong, as Viktor Shklovsky 
might have phrased it, the sensational sensation of perception.155 Or, as the anxiously 
hope-ridden narrator of Barthelme’s “See the Moon?” puts it: 
I wanted to be a painter. . . . You don’t know how I envy them. They 
can pick up a Baby Ruth wrapper on the street, glue it to the canvas 
(in the right place, of course, there’s that), and lo! People crowd about 
and cry “A real Baby Ruth wrapper, by God, what could be realer 
than that!” Fantastic metaphysical advantage. You hate them, if 
you’re ambitious. (UPUA 152) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Comparing the composition of Rauschenberg’s “Monogram” to the creation of a literary text, 
Barthelme writes: “We can, however, wonder for a moment why the goat girdled with its tire is 
somehow a magical object, rather than, say, only a dumb idea. Harold Rosenberg speaks of the 
contemporary artwork as ‘anxious,’ as wondering: Am I a masterpiece or simply a pile of junk? […] 
What precisely is it in the coming together of goat and tire that is magical? […] What is magical about 
the object is that it at once invites and resists interpretation. Its artistic worth is measureable by the 
degree to which it remains, after interpretation, vital—no interpretation or cardiopulmonary push-pull 
can exhaust or empty it.” See Barthelme, Not Knowing, 19-20. 
155 In his 1917 treatise, “Art as Technique,” Shklovsky writes: “And art exists that one may recover 
the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to 
impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is 
to make objects "unfamiliar," to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of 
perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged.” See 
Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 19. 
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Perpetually caught in a self-cancelling fluctuation between passive ambition and 
vigorous apathy, the multi-voiced (and multi-personalitied) narrators in this category 
of Barthelme’s fiction come across as somehow both more and less than the sum of 
their parts. Like the Baby Ruth wrapper, engineered to be both desirable and 
disposable, both infinitely meaningful (in the way Johns’s Ballantine cans and 
Rauschenberg’s cardboard boxes comment on themselves and generate endless 
interpretation) and infinitely meaningless (in the way a scrap of litter usually fails to 
attract even the slightest analytical attention), Barthelme’s narrators hang on to 
contradiction for dear life. Indeed, in this category of his fiction, contradiction takes 
on a distinct similarity to vitality itself. 
An appreciation of this oxymornonic resonance is central to an understanding 
of Barthelme’s onto-theatrical collage fiction and the way that paradox is coaxed into 
place in these works. Indeed, if the “drama of cognition” (as described in the 
previous chapter) captures the décollage method of Coover’s metafiction—a 
systematic denuding of myth and metaphor—the collage method of Barthelme’s 
metafiction does the reverse. Where Coover’s fiction cuts away to reveal the 
concealed, Barthelme’s “drama of vacillation” focuses instead on the sinuous, 
existential threads that bind the irresolvable oppositions of experience together at the 
fracture points of language, philosophy, art, and ritual.  
As explored in “Brain Damage” (collected in CL), this “drama of vacillation” 
takes the form of ten semi-autonomous prose fragments, entirely printed in italics, 
each describing an experience, dream, memory, or some supernatural mixture of the 
three. Each of these one-act fragments is separated from the others by a borrowed 
image or collage. These visual interludes are, in turn, intermittently attended by a set 
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of headlines printed in bold type. The images in this story and the figures that 
populate them do not, however, unite to perform an allegory of the artist (as in “The 
Flight of Pigeons from the Palace”). That level of diegesis is maintained chiefly by 
the prose. In “Brain Damage” the headlines and illustrations instead play the dual 
role of both extradiegetic narrator and metadiegetic audience. And like an eerie, 
disembodied anti-chorus, these narratorially active, narratologically critical text-
images seem to chant their remarks in unison, each commenting on the relative 
significance of the events taking place in the narrative. 
While it is always dangerous to place too much emphasis upon what appear 
to be identifiable literary influences when analyzing Barthelme’s short stories (as in 
the works of Coover and Reed, Barthelme’s parodic renderings and coded allusions 
are usually far too peripatetic for any one, particular correspondence to yield much 
beyond an instantial relevance), nevertheless, the wandering discourse in “Brain 
Damage” revisits in an interesting way Friedrich Nietzsche’s exploration of the 
classical Greek chorus, the Apollonian-Dionysian dialectic, and tragic drama as 
posited in The Birth of Tragedy (1872). But rather than engaging in an outright 
ridicule of the questions raised or an overt parody of Nietzsche’s unique style of 
argumentation, Barthelme’s narrative seems to appeal to the “generative grammar” 
of Nietzsche’s text (to apply a concept from Jerome Klinkowitz),156 an engagement 
that deals with The Birth of Tragedy both on the level of its metaphor as well as 
through its discursive metaphysics. In what might be viewed as an illustrated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 In Donald Barthelme: An Exhibition, Jerome Klinkowitz writes: “[Barthelme’s] method is not just 
one of parody or satire; those practices are helpful in finding a subject, but even to get the art process 
under way the author must look further to identify and understand the situation’s generative grammar, 
and then use that grammar to produce something that both comments on the original situation and 
yields a work beyond it.” See Klinkowitz, Donald Barthelme, 77. 
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dramatization of Nietzsche’s discourse on the ontology of tragedy, Barthelme replies 
to the arguments in The Birth of Tragedy and re-applies them as the contextual basis 
for an ironic rendering of the philosophical and aesthetic issues involved in the 
question of art. 
Barthelme’s story begins with a first-person account of the narrator’s 
discovery, in a garbage dump, of “a book describing a rich new life of achievement, 
prosperity, and happiness” (CL 133, Barthelme’s emphasis throughout). This new 
life, the narrator reads, cannot be achieved individually; it must be achieved with the 
aid of “spirit teachers,” supernatural helpers that communicate via ESP (133). 
Following the spirit teacher’s advice, so the book claims, “One could learn how to 
eliminate hostility from the hearts of others” (133). As in “The Flight of Pigeons 
from the Palace,” again Barthelme introduces the reader to a contradictory world of 
equivalencies: nature equated with artifice; rationalism equated with fideism; 
spirituality likened to the affects of consumerism within the naïve, uncritical mind. In 
fact, the only thing missing from this introductory passage is a mail-order address to 
which the reader might send away for his or her own set of “spirit teachers.” 
Nevertheless, the book’s location in a garbage dump makes the question of its value 
as a cultural artifact adequately clear (though it is a question that could never be 
adequately answered in either aesthetic or empirical terms). And riffing on 
Nietzsche’s idealized projection of a world of balanced Apollonian-Dionysian 
energies, this passage also seems to echo Nietzsche’s conceptual formula: “All that 
exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both,” (72) to which Nietzsche adds, 
quoting from Goethe’s Faust: “That is your world! A world indeed!—” (Qtd. in 
Nietzsche 72). And like Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus, who unite into the “saving 
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sorceress of art” and turn “the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with 
which one can live” (Nietzsche 60), Barthelme’s “spirit teachers” seem to hover over 
the wasteland of a culture in decline, an entropic culture of the masses, by the 
masses, and for the masses, where everything is equivalent and the magic mountains 
of the terrain are manufactured out of trash—that is to say, art. For in such a world 
of equivalencies there can be no distinction.  
In the next fragment of the narrative, this Apollonian-Dionysian dialectic is 
re-cast as an opposition between “the humanist position” and “the new electric 
awareness” concerning the question of whether or not to plug a bouquet of blue 
flowers into a wall socket (CL 134). The question at first seems a straightforward, 
purely mechanical one: either plug the flowers in, or do not. Where the issue gets 
sticky though is in the postulation of a philosophical rationale for either position. As 
the narrator explains, “The humanist position is not to plug in the flowers—to let 
them alone. Humanists believe in letting everything alone to be what it is, insofar as 
possible” (CL 134). The position of “new electric awareness,” alternately, “requires 
that the flowers be plugged in, right away” (134). To which the narrator adds, 
“Toynbee’s notions of challenge and response are also, perhaps, apposite” (134). The 
question, thus framed, presents itself as one of willful action or willful inaction; 
either the quasi-religious Dionysian intoxication of a “turned on” world, or the quasi-
scientific Apollonian conservatism of individual sovereignty and self-preservation.  
Unable, or unwilling (in the Nietzschean sense) to select between the relative 
merits of either position, the narrator hesitates:  
My own idea about whether or not to plug in the flowers is 
somewhere between these ideas, in that gray area where nothing is 
done, really, but you vacillate for a while, thinking about it. The blue 
of the flowers is extremely handsome against the gray of that area. 
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(CL 134, Barthelme’s emphasis) 
 
Like Nietzsche’s tragic artist enamored of both Apollonian plasticity and Dionysian 
musicality, whose inspired self-abnegation reveals to him a “symbolical dream 
image” of the world (Nietzsche 38), the liminality of Barthelme’s vacillating narrator 
effects a similar melding of symbol, dream, and image. And through the overlapping 
of metaphor and metaphysics that occurs in this liminal realm of active-inaction, of 
responsive non-response, the expressive range of the narration is liberated and 
expanded. 
Structurally reminiscent of the shifting narratorial perspectives that 
characterize Coover’s “The Elevator” and “The Babysitter,” Barthelme’s “Brain 
Damage” deals with its central onto-theatrical metaphor in a similarly existential 
fashion and with an equally dizzying array of narratorial voices. And as in Coover’s 
works, the structure of this shifting narration keeps Barthelme’s multiple narrators 
from becoming tied to any one point-of-view or cognitive framework. However, 
whereas Coover’s multi-layer drama of cognition often comes across as a repetitious 
attempt to locate and define a metaphor more fully (as the dynamic sum of its parts), 
in Barthelme’s fragmented drama of vacillation, any sense of metaphorical fullness 
or summation, once approached and questionably defined, is playfully denied.157 Or, 
to draw another analogy from visual art, in contrast to Coover’s cubist method of 
cognitive approximation, which charts its distance from reality in the measured 
geometry of point and counterpoint, the gray area of Barthelme’s dadaist method of 
responsive non-response often acts as a kind of opaque, contemplative ground for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 John Leland writes: “The effect of hesitation is built into Barthelme’s art, less in the form of overt 
blasts against criticism and the critical tradition than in subtle disjunctions as the meanings promised 
by the signifier are offered and then denied.” See Leland, “Remarks Re-marked,” 799-800. 
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free mixing of readymade realities and the playful linguistic colors of cognitive 
abstraction.158  
In spite of this playfulness, the captive audience in “Brain Damage,” like the 
projected audience in “The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace,” seems nonetheless 
bemused. Breaking in on the narrative with the exclamatory commotion of a classical 
Greek chorus, the first group of headlines read: “CROWD NOISES / MURMURING 
/ MURMURING / YAWNING” (CL 135). This pattern is repeated again following 
the next fragment of prose: “RETCHING / FAINTING / DISMAL BEHAVIOR / 
TENDERING OF EXCUSES” (136), and again two pages later: “RHYTHMIC 
HANDCLAPPING / SLEEPING / WHAT RECOURSE?” (138). And at one point in 








CONSUMPTION OF FOOD  
(CL 141, Barthelme’s typography) 
 
As if emerging from the haunted masks and anguished figures in the illustrations that 
attend them on the page (see figure 16), these headlines interrupt the flow of the 
narrative in a very interesting way. Rather than shocking the reader into a sudden 
awareness of the artificial nature of the story unfolding on the page (as often occurs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 It is precisely this opaque, abstract quality that Ronald Sukenick defines as “Bossa Nova”: “This 
new thing is a style that we have come to call the Bossa Nova, an elaboration of the new tradition. 
Needless to say the Bossa Nova has no plot, no story, no character, no chronological sequence, no 
verisimilitude, no imitation, no allegory, no symbolism, no subject matter, no ‘meaning.’ It resists 
interpretation: as with Kafka’s fiction, you can explain it and explain it, but it won’t go away. The 
Bossa Nova is non-representational – it represents itself. Its main qualities are abstraction, 
improvisation, and opacity. The degree of abstraction may be great, as in Donald Barthelme, a writer 
who is very bossanova….” See Sukenick, “The New Tradition,” 43-44. 
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when an intrusive narrator or the voice the “author” enters the narrative and 
highlights the contrast between text and external world), here the interaction of 
headline and image actually reinforces the inclusive quality of the narrative. And 
instead of dissolving the fourth wall and merely pretending to engage with the 
extratextual reader/audience, these verbally active graphic interludes seem to erect a 
fourth wall behind the reader, thereby immersing the reader more inclusively into the 
textual environment.  
Similar to the surrogate audience that Nietzsche locates in A. W. Schlegel’s 
concept of the chorus as the “ideal spectator” (Nietzsche 56-57), these images do not 
speak to the reader by emphasizing the performance as performance, or, in other 
words, by foregrounding the text as a simulacrum of events (as a work of metafiction 
this distinction is already adequately established and any such emphasis would 
simply create a greater sense of distance between the reader/audience and the implied 
stage of the text). Instead, these chorus-like interludes echo the abstract, 
contradictory tone of the narrative in the “ideal” voice of an abstract, contradictory 
audience. In this way the chorus simultaneously reifies and reinforces the 
abstraction, solidifying it into the substance of an immersive, metatextual 
performance. And standing in for the mixed reactions, emotional and physical 
responses, and critical variance of an actual audience, the repetition of these 
headlines not only enlivens the structure of the text and connects the fragments of 
prose into an awkwardly rhythmic progression, the placement of these headlines after 
each section of text also causes them to interfere with, indeed, to compete with the 
actual reactions and responses of the reader as the text is experienced.   
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Figure 16. From “Brain Damage,” in City Life, 135. 
 
Not unlike Nietzsche’s assessment of the chorus as described in the preface to 
Schiller’s Bride of Messina, “. . . where [Schiller] regards the chorus as a living wall 
that tragedy constructs around itself . . . to preserve its ideal domain and its poetical 
freedom” (58), so too does this choral element in Barthelme’s “Brain Damage” seal 
itself off, along with the reader, within the bounds of the narrative. Through this 
maneuver the absurd world of the text is not, however, extended outward or 
projected onto the extratextual world (i.e., text as object in the world), quite the 
reverse; by containing and actively including its own audience (and critic) within the 
diegetic sector of its own metatextual performance, the reader’s world is, in a sense, 
preemptively implicated in the textual simulacrum of the performance (i.e., world as 
object in the text). As Mary Robertson remarks in “Postmodern Realism: Discourse 
as Antihero in Donald Barthelme’s ‘Brain Damage,’” this method is essentially set 
up to “enact the proposition that language speaks us rather than the other way 
around” (127).159 Thus verbalized into existence, the simulated world created by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 In her analysis of “Brain Damage,” Mary Robertson describes this method at length, interpreting it 
as an indication of Barthelme’s attempt to create a super-realistic narrative environment in which 
discourse itself might be treated as a character. See Robertson, “Postmodern Realism: Discourse as 
Antihero in Donald Barthelme’s ‘Brain Damage,’” 127. 
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text becomes a reality in its own right, semi-autonomous, ontologically self-
referential, brought into being through its inclusion of the reader as a necessary 
character in the world of discourse, and yet, despite the apparently “secondary” 
nature of this world (as Michael Benton might term it),160 “Brain Damage” should 
not be seen as a work of realism. Such an assessment would subtract from the 
playful, high ironic dynamics of the piece. Instead, what Barthelme creates in this 
and other tales within the onto-theatrical category of his fiction is not a credible 
representation, but an incredible surrogate, an ironic facsimile of reality that thrives 
on the friction created by contradiction. And in place of the ontological and 
epistemological objectivism of realistic narrative fiction, Barthelme’s narrative offers 
an abstract metafictional substitute that acts as both an indefinite ontological proxy 
and a deliberately mis-representative replacement for the assumed epistemological 
stability of quotidian reality.  
“TO WHAT END? / IN WHOSE NAME? / WHAT RECOURSE?” asks the 
final set of headlines (145). Where to look for answers when the answers are false? 
Who to look to for moral guidance when morals, along with the cultural myths and 
social mores that attend them, are revealed to be little more than arbitrary 
instructions plucked at random from the great fortune cookie of existence? And what 
to do in response to such a readymade world of artifice, contradiction and 
equivalency? It is here, in suggesting the ominous nature of these questions, that 
“Brain Damage” perverts (and/or exposes the latent perversion in) the youthful 
enthusiasm of the final section of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy.  
Imagining an aestheticized world of Apollonian and Dionysian harmony, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 See Benton, Secondary Worlds: Literature Teaching and the Visual Arts, 2-7. 
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sublime, tragic world of pleasurable pain and beautiful dissonance, in such a 
balanced world, Nietzsche proposes, the animated, heterogeneous individuality of 
man can only be preserved through a “transfiguring illusion.” Nietzsche writes: “If 
we could imagine dissonance become man—and what else is man?—this dissonance, 
to be able to live, would need a splendid illusion that would cover dissonance with a 
veil of beauty” (Nietzsche 143). As if taking Nietzsche at his word, Barthelme 
translates this veil of illusion into a veil of “brain damage” (CL 146).  
Falling from a “great big blubbery cloud” in a metaphysical flurry of 
unconsciousness (146), this all-pervading brain damage, like the sediments of time, 
history, language, and art that make up the dissonant residues of man (both 
Nietzsche’s and Barthelme’s), attaches to everything, blanketing existence itself in a 
shroud of equivalence: 
Oh there’s brain damage in the east, and brain damage in the west, 
and upstairs there’s brain damage, and downstairs there’s brain 
damage, and in my lady’s parlor—brain damage. Brain damage is 
widespread. […] And you can hide under the bed but brain damage is 
under the bed, and you can hide in the universities but they are the 
very seat and soul of brain damage— Brain damage caused by bears 
who put your head in their foaming jaws while you are singing 
“Masters of War” . . . Brain damage caused by the sleeping 
revolution which no one can wake up . . . Brain damage caused by 
art. I could describe it better if I weren’t afflicted with it . . . (CL 146, 
Barthelme’s emphasis) 
 
This thought-muffling world where ignorance is bliss—further, where blissful 
ignorance is the “seat and soul” of the educational experience and where un-
knowingness issues from the merest encounter with art—follows Nietzsche’s 
concept to its inevitable conclusion by suggesting not only the level of human 
consciousness necessary for such an utopian veil of “splendid illusion,” but also the 
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homogenizing consequence of any such process of universal artificialization.161  
As Robert Scholes observes in “Metafiction,” this final passage is also 
parodically reminiscent of the last section of Joyce’s “The Dead” in Dubliners; and 
like the “quasi-religious” snow described at the end of Joyce’s tale (Scholes 
“Metafiction” 109), Barthelme’s brain damage, too, is at once un-differentiating and 
de-differentiating, silently covering the world in an opaque sheet of blankness. 
However, extending beyond the parodic dimension, Scholes argues, Barthelme’s 
story is also “a measure of how far we have come since Dubliners” (109). As 
Scholes remarks:  
This snow-like fallout of brain damage is not just a reminder of the 
pollution of our physical atmosphere, it is the crust of phenomenal 
existence which has covered our mental landscape, cutting us off from 
the essence of our being, afflicting even the artists. For Barthelme 
man has become a phenomenon among phenomena. "WHAT 
RECOURSE?" ask the bold-type headlines of “Brain Damage” . . . . 
What recourse, indeed, for those gripped by phenomenological brain 
damage? They are beyond good and evil, beyond being, barely 
existing, snowed under. (“Metafiction” 109) 
 
And yet, covered in the cultural fallout of discursive trash as he is, Barthelme’s 
man—if we are to take the manifold voices of his collective narrators and the 
expanded power of action of this narration as any indication—is only at risk of 
succumbing to the thought-silencing effects of phenomenological brain damage 
when the play stops. As the narrator seems to imply in the final line of the story, 
“Skiing along on the soft surface of brain damage, never to sink, because we don’t 
know the danger—” (CL 146); the danger is falling below the surface of the trash and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Jean Baudrillard warns of this same process of aesthetic equivalency in The Consumer Society 
(1970). Locating the “Pop” sensibility that exploded in the 1960s as a paradigmatic threshold crossing 
of sorts, Baudrillard writes: “Whereas all art up to Pop was based on a vision of the world ‘in depth,’ 
Pop on the contrary claims to be homogeneous with their industrial and serial production and so with 
the artificial, fabricated character of the whole environment, homogeneous with this immanent order 
of signs: . . . homogeneous with the allover saturation and at the same time with the culturalised 
abstraction of this new order of things.” See Baudrillard, The Consumer Society, 33. 
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becoming one with the trash, getting stuck in it, recognizing with it and merging with 
it by not remaining above it, on the surface.162 The trick, Barthelme’s fiction 
indicates time and again, is to stay up and maintain velocity without collapsing.  
 
Trash, Meta-Trash, and the Aesthetics of Kitsch 
 While this velocity certainly requires the swiftness of ironic play and the 
agility of a ready wit, as the pataphysical analysis of “buffalo hump” production in 
Snow White suggests, an appreciative recognition of trash is another possible means 
of staying above the surface and remaining “on the leading edge of this trash 
phenomenon” (Snow White 104). As one of the novel’s dwarf-narrators explains: 
Now you’re probably familiar with the fact that the per-capita 
production of trash in this country is up from 2.75 pounds per day in 
1920 to 4.5 pounds per day in 1965, the last year for which we have 
figures, and is increasing at the rate of about four percent a year. Now 
that rate will probably go up, because it’s been going up, and I hazard 
that we may very well soon reach a point where it’s 100 percent. Now 
at such a point, you will agree, the question turns from a question of 
disposing of this ‘trash’ to a question of appreciating its qualities, 
because, after all, it’s 100 percent, right? And there can no longer be 
any question of ‘disposing’ of it, because it’s all there is, and we will 
simply have to learn how to ‘dig’ it—that’s slang, but peculiarly 
appropriate here. So that’s why we’re in the humps, right now, more 
really from a philosophical point of view than because we find them a 
great moneymaker. They are ‘trash,’ and what in fact could be more 
useless or trashlike? It’s that we want to be on the leading edge of this 
trash phenomenon, the everted sphere of the future, and that’s why we 
pay particular attention, too, to those aspects of language that may be 
seen as a model of the trash phenomenon. (Snow White 103-04) 
 
When an exponentially increasing rate of production is matched by an exponentially 
increasing rate of consumption and man equals his own daily weight in excrement, 
trash appreciation becomes the only recourse; Duchamp’s urinal; Rauschenberg’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 As Gass writes in his essay on Barthelme, suitably titled, “The Leading Edge of the Trash 
Phenomenon”: “anything dropped in the dreck is dreck, at once, as an uneaten porkchop mislaid in the 
garbage,” see William H. Gass, Fiction and the Figures of Life (Boston: Nonpareil, 1971): 101. 
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cardboard boxes; Cornell’s archive of debris; all items selected from the heap and re-
made through the process of re-contextualization into new, transcendental forms of 
trash, trash about trash: metatrash. These items of metatrash rise above the dump by 
commenting on the dump, transforming the dump as world metaphor into an 
uncomfortable, high ironic critique of postmodern reality. And in the same way that 
metatrash rises above its own object status by refusing to remain bound to the 
function for which it was originally produced, so too does Barthelme’s collage 
metafiction operate (in hump factory fashion), re-producing itself from the found 
items of an artificial culture already buried in its own furnishings.  
This playfully self-reflexive incorporation of the “trash phenomenon” is what 
prevents Barthelme’s collage narrative from uncritically participating in the kind of 
nostalgic pastiche condemned by Fredric Jameson,163 or naively adding to the 
eclectic postmodern kitsch described by Jean-François Lyotard.164 As described 
previously, Barthelme’s works are in no way an apology for the cultural decline they 
seem to document, nor do any of these works suffer from a romantic yearning for a 
yester-year that never was. Rather, running parallel to the biting, critical assessments 
of Jameson and Lyotard, Barthelme’s fiction represents a similar attempt to chart the 
demise of Western culture, history, and art, and salvage a way forward from the 
wreckage.   
Comparable to the late capitalist process of cultural equivalence explored in 
works such as “Flight of Pigeons from the Palace” and “Brain Damage,” Lyotard’s 
critique of postmodernity is also concerned with the vacuity of meaning and depth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism,16-19, 133-153. 
164 See Jean-François Lyotard, “Answer to the question: what is the Postmodern,” in The Postmodern 
Explained to Children: Correspondence 1982-1985, 9-25. 
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that develops when cultures and cultural artifacts become commodified and global 
markets begin to direct the course of the culture industry. As Lyotard states in The 
Postmodern Explained to Children: 
Eclecticism is the zero-degree of contemporary general [postmodern] 
culture: you listen to reggae, you watch a western, you eat 
McDonald’s at midday and local cuisine at night, you wear Paris 
perfume in Tokyo and dress retro in Hong Kong, knowledge is the 
stuff of TV game shows. (17) 
 
It is easy to find a public for such a postmodern hodge-podge, Lyotard argues, 
because everything is on offer; every manner of expression is employed, every 
potential desire catered to and entertained. According to Lyotard, it is this 
predominating emphasis upon the artwork’s potential to entertain (i.e., appeal to the 
consumer) that turns it from a cultural artifact reliant upon the political mechanisms 
of aesthetic evaluation into an object of kitsch reliant upon the market-driven 
mechanisms of commercial valuation (17).165 Lyotard explains, “When art makes 
itself kitsch, it panders to the disorder which reigns in the ‘taste’ of the patron. 
Together, artist, gallery owner, critic and public indulge one another in the Anything 
Goes — it’s time to relax” (17). In such an “Anything Goes” cultural economy, the 
artwork that sells, is published and distributed within the global network of cultural 
commerce, and becomes (through its ready availability to the public) the dominant 
mode of artistic creation, is the eclectic object, performance, or event that best 
announces its capacity to entertain and offers both producer and audience the best 
return on investment. Though disposable and sensitive to constant fluctuations in 
fashion (i.e., the reigning order of “taste”), these weaknesses are advertised as 
strengths, as signs of genuine authenticity, of constant freedom of choice and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 This section of Lyotard’s description of “postmodern kitsch” is also discussed in similar terms by 
Simon Malpas. See Malpas, The Postmodern, 1-3. 
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immediate currency. And in offering an interminable variety of temporary 
distractions (note the trademark postmodern paradox in such an oxymoronic 
construct), Lyotard argues, these items of postmodern kitsch dispel doubt and 
anxiety (17). Their endless variety soothes, relaxes, and benumbs the mind as 
effortlessly as TV.  
This “Anything Goes” aspect of postmodern kitsch, as well as its 
questionable function as a socio-cultural analgesic, plays a prominent role in 
Barthelme’s unique brand of parody. Indeed, if the anxiety-generating, deeply self-
doubting aspects of his writing were not adequately clear, the label of “eclectic 
postmodern kitsch” might easily apply. He adopts may of the eclectic traits described 
by Lyotard and includes a steady stream of kitsch-like tropes, situations, and cultural 
icons into his writing. However, what Lyotard’s approach fails to adequately address, 
and what saves the high ironic works of writers such as Barthelme, Coover, and Reed 
from unconsciously falling into this category, is the way in which these writers 
consciously turn the kitsch-making process against itself.  
By pretending to be a harmless manifestation of individual “taste,” kitsch 
refuses to respond to itself with any sense of doubt; it states only, I am—flaws and 
all—what I am, and equates all criticism as describing little more than an 
insensitivity to its purely individual value (i.e., marking a difference in taste). 
However, as with the common proverb, the empty cliché, the popular metaphor, and 
other objects of pervasive cultural influence (e.g., the Mona Lisa, Lev Tolstoy, Snow 
White, etc.), the falsely unassailable certainty of kitsch makes it a prime target for 
the self-reflexive, skeptical tension of irony. It is the introduction of this ironic 
tension that turns the kitsch object of highly individualized certainty into an object of 
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comic ridicule (e.g., through the frivolous gaps in “seriousness” created by the pun, 
double-entendre, Freudian slip, exaggeration, awkward transition, or other verbal 
winks that hint to the reader, “The author knows that Tolstoy was a womanizer,” 
even as the author extols the virtues of the Tolstoyan vow to celibacy).166 And it is 
precisely this ironic tension that Barthelme introduces into his tongue-in-cheek 
manipulations of kitsch in his short prose, novels, and especially in his collage 
narratives. By accentuating the kitsch quality of the source material and turning the 
certainty of its pervasive cultural influence against itself through hyperbole, absurd 
semantic dislocations, outlandish vocabulary, and imagined events involving these 
objects, Barthelme’s ironic applications of kitsch and other trash phenomena critique 
the kitsch-making process and actively participate in a (self-)mocking appraisal of 
the culture of nostalgia and novelty that continues to blindly reproduce and consume 
these objects of kitsch.  
 
Collage Narrative in Snow White 
Nowhere is this (self-)ironizing process more evident than in the selection of 
collage narrative short stories described above and in collage novels such as 
Barthelme’s Snow White.167 As stated earlier in the chapter, the three general 
categories of Barthelme’s collage narrative “method”—his anecdotal collections, ad 
hoc adventures, and onto-theatrical performances—each find their genesis in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Susan Sontag argues a similar point in her descriptions of the ironic tension inherent in the camp 
sensibility. For example, in item 41: “The whole point of Camp is to dethrone the serious. Camp is 
playful, anti-serious. More precisely, Camp involves a new, more complex relation to ‘the serious.’ 
One can be serious about the frivolous, frivolous about the serious.” See Sontag, Against 
Interpretation, 288. 
167 Other collage novels such as Barthelme’s The Dead Father (1975), as well as his collaboration 
with graphic designer, Seymour Chwast, in Sam’s Bar: An American Landscape (1987), would also 
fit into this self-ironizing context.  
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novel. Together these fragmented, yet awkwardly interwoven patterns emerge to 
form the “metafictional fabric” of the Snow White textual collage.168 The resulting 
text, as Larry McCaffery notes in The Metafictional Muse, “is not so much a novel as 
a sustained collection of fragments, organized loosely around the Snow White fairy 
tale” (138). Nevertheless, it would be a mistake (a mistake the novel constantly asks 
the reader to make) to read Barthelme’s Snow White as holding the fairy tale tradition 
as some kind of pure “mythic center,”169 or as a sacred essence akin to “Frost’s 
Secret,” as Barthelme describes in “Not-Knowing,” which simply “sits in the center 
of a ring and Knows” (Not-Knowing 15).170 Barthelme’s novel does not imply that 
there is any kind of essential purity residing within the great globe of discourse 
around which the fragments of his collage seem to rotate and collide (falling in and 
out of orbit like deranged semiotic satellites). On the contrary, it is the sublime 
impurity of the Snow White object, as both an item of kitsch and a world unto itself, 
which concerns the greater part of the novel. And, as if sifting through the vast layers 
of trash that have accumulated around Snow White (as an object, subject, metaphor, 
personality, concept, ritual, symbol, fetish, marketing tool, ad infinitum), 
Barthelme’s Snow White re-constructs from this enormous amalgam of significations 
a ludicrous collection of anecdotes, a series of ad hoc adventures, and a sustained 
onto-theatrical performance that brutally interrogates (ultimately seeking to destroy, 
it would seem) the distinction between art as being about the world and art as being 
in the world.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 See McCaffery, The Metafictional Muse, 137.  
169 McCaffery echoes this in saying: “Since for Barthelme the changes in modern society make 
holding of any mythic center impossible, we find that the mythic parallels [in Snow White] follow the 
story only up to certain points and then find appropriate alterations.” See McCaffery, The 
Metafictional Muse, 141. 
170 Robert Frost’s two-line poem, “The Secret Sits,” runs: “We dance round in a ring and suppose, / 
But the Secret sits in the middle and knows.” see Frost, A Witness Tree: New Poems, 15. 
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Fundamental to the breaking down of this distinction is an awareness of the 
text as object. As Barthelme writes in his essay, “After Joyce” (1964), a rather 
“mysterious shift . . . takes place as soon as one says that art is not about something 
but is something” (Not-Knowing 3, Barthelme’s emphasis). Barthelme explains that 
the result of this shift from the descriptive nature of about-ness to the existential 
nature of is-ness is that:  
. . . the literary work becomes an object in the world rather than a text 
or commentary upon the world—a crucial change in status which was 
also taking place in painting. With Joyce, and to a lesser degree 
Gertrude Stein, fiction altered its placement in the world in a 
movement so radical that its consequences have yet to be assimilated. 
(Not-Knowing 3-4) 
 
No longer satisfied with the distance between literature and world, Barthelme states, 
Joyce and Stein create the “literary object—which is then encountered in the same 
way as other objects in the world” (4). Barthelme continues: 
The question becomes: what is the nature of the new [literary] object? 
Here one can see the immediate result of the shift. Interrogating older 
works, the question is: what do they say about the world and being in 
the world? But the literary object is itself “world” and the theoretical 
advantage is that in asking it questions you are asking questions of the 
world directly. This sounds like a species of ventriloquism—the 
writer throwing his voice. But it is, rather, a stunning strategic gain 
for the writer. He has in fact removed himself from the work, just as 
Joyce instructed him to do. The reader is not listening to an 
authoritative account of the world delivered by an expert . . . but 
bumping into something that is there, like a rock or a refrigerator. 
(Not-Knowing 4, Barthelme’s emphasis) 
 
However, Barthelme takes care to note, the literary object “does not declare itself all 
at once, in a rush of pleasant naïveté” (4), instead, it requires the reader to ask, “What 
is it?” rather than, “What is it about?” In this way, Barthelme maintains, “The reader 
reconstitutes the work by his active participation, by approaching the object, tapping 
it, shaking it, holding it to his ear to hear the roaring within” (4). The literary object, 
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in other words, is always a work-in-progress, problematic, infinitely incomplete, 
indeed, only ever tentatively completed within the imagination of the reader. 
In just such a manner does Barthelme’s Snow White simultaneously construct 
and deconstruct itself. By packing into its pages everything that has to do with Snow 
White (interspersed with just as much that doesn’t) Barthelme charges the reader 
with the task of connecting the dots to complete the suggested picture. In fact, 
Barthelme literalizes this same metaphor on the very first page of the novel: 
SHE is a tall dark beauty containing a great many beauty spots: one 
above the breast, one above the belly, one above the knee, one above 
the ankle, one above the buttock, one on the back of the neck. All of 








The hair is black as ebony, the skin white as snow. (Snow White 9) 
 
Racing, zig-zag, over the surface of Snow White’s body before aligning into an 
overtly artificial linearity, this arrangement immediately scrambles the reader’s 
expectations while also calling to mind, in the last line, precedent versions of the 
tale. From the outset the tone is both set and unsettled, vacillating between an appeal 
to the known and an anxious entry into realm of abstraction. 
Although much has been made of Barthelme’s inversions and perversions in 
Snow White of the Grimm brothers’ “Schneewittchen” (collected in Kinder- und 
Hausmärchen, 1812; 1857) and Walt Disney’s Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs 
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(1937), the relationship is not a matter of direct adaptation or straight parody. As 
McCaffery notes:  
If we examine the structure of Snow White more closely, we find that 
like Coover, but unlike Joyce in Ulysses, Barthelme prevents his 
perspective from being seriously mythic to any extent. The big 
problem for Barthelme—as for any writer today who wishes to rely 
on myth in one way or another—is a self-consciousness about myth 
that has reached such paralyzing proportions that most myth is now 
employed only for comic purposes. (The Metafictional Muse 138-39) 
 
An important part of the question here, as McCaffery suggests in the passage above, 
is one of reliance. But what is the extent to which a work can be said to actually 
“rely” upon some other work? How reliable is this reliance? And, as discussed 
previously, in what sense is any sort of structural correspondence a valid method of 
determining or interpreting this contingency?  
In Snow White the nature and extent of this reliance is certainly investigated 
and even, in the fashion of the beauty spots that introduce the novel, becomes 
another literalized metaphor—the novel itself actively “testing” the reader through 
the inclusion of an actual multiple-choice questionnaire at the close of part one: 
QUESTIONS: 
1. Do you like the story so far?  Yes  (  )  No  (  ) 
2. Does Snow White resemble the Snow White you remember?  
Yes  (  )  No  (  ) 
3. Have you understood, in reading to this point, that Paul is the 
prince-figure?  Yes  (  )  No  (  ) 
4. That Jane is the wicked stepmother-figure?  Yes  (  )  No  (  ) 
5. In the further development of the story, would you like more 
emotion  (  ) or less emotion  (  )? 
6. Is there too much blague in the narration?  (  ) 
Not enough blague?  (  )      
(Snow White 88, Barthelme’s emphasis and typography) 
 
As implied in Snow White’s mid-novel exam (indeed, as leadingly spelled out), 
correspondence is inevitable. Nevertheless, although previous tellings of the Snow 
White tale provide the source material and genealogical background to which 
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Barthelme’s metafictional re-working of the tale corresponds (in the sense defined in 
the second chapter of this dissertation), the structural arrangement of Barthelme’s 
Snow White actually bears about as much textual resemblance to these precedent 
versions of the tale as Jasper Johns’s “White Flag” (1955) bears to the American 
standard (apocryphally) attributed to Betsy Ross (1777). And like the implicit 
antagonism of Johns’s collage to the “stars and stripes” fantasy of unity and 
independence embodied in the American flag (as a political icon and object of 
cultural kitsch), the structure of Barthelme’s narrative proceeds in a similar inverse 
relation to its own iconic fairy tale source material. In fact, a close morphological 
comparison of Barthelme’s version to precedent versions of the tale would find very 
little in the way of direct, textual citation or stylistic similarity. Instead, Barthelme’s 
Snow White parodies its source material, as John Leland writes, by becoming “a form 
of a form, absorbing the aspirations of the original structure yet surviving only as it 
endlessly repeats itself without resolution” (804). In this way Barthelme radically 
reshapes the content and context of the Snow White narrative into an actively 
participative critique of its own parodic discourse.    
According to Nicholas Sloboda’s study of heteroglossia and collage in Snow 
White, this reactionary critique “delays and modifies the traditional plot and, at the 
same time, draws attention to the (un)making of the story itself” (114).171 Indeed, 
Barthelme’s tale seems closest to the “Schneewittchen” of the Grimms when it 
recalls the symbolic objects that appear in the nineteenth-century German version 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 In Fantasy and Mimesis, Kathryn Hume states a similar point: “Barthelme erases most of the usual 
linking elements in Snow White, and those remaining are mostly ironic. A gruesomely distorted 
version of the fairy tale mocks us with its insufficiencies as a giver of meaning.” See Hume, Fantasy 
and Mimesis: Reponses to Reality in Western Literature, 93. 
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and presents them as possible notes towards a Freudian analysis of tale (centered and 
printed in bold type):  
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SNOW WHITE: 
IN THE AREA OF FEARS, SHE FEARS 
MIRRORS 
APPLES 
POISONED COMBS (Snow White 23) 
 
This pattern, as in “Brain Damage,” is repeated at intervals throughout the text: 
“WHAT SNOW WHITE REMEMBERS: / THE HUNTSMAN / THE FOREST / 
THE STEAMING KNIFE” (Snow White 45). And to a similar extent, the animated 
Disney version is most clearly evoked in the episodes of Barthelme’s telling that are 
the anti-Disney in structure—such as in the mundane renaming of the dwarfs (Bill, 
Kevin, Edward, Hubert, Henry, Clem, and Dan [10]), in the dwarfs’ re-assignation to 
a new set of personality types (Bill is anxious and dislikes physical contact [10-1], 
Dan is skeptical [10], Kevin is easily discouraged [12], Henry is hypercritical [26-
27], etc.), as well as in the various accounts of the dwarfs’ sexual relations with 
Snow White in the shower (10-11, 28-29, 40).  
These constant reversals and inversions are important to the structure of Snow 
White not so much in their disruption of coherent structure, but rather in their appeal 
to the questionable coherence of the structures that already exist in the mind of the 
reader. In line with Johns’s famous comment regarding the structure of the flag as 
“[something] the mind already knows”172 (a phrase frequently quoted by Barthelme), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 In an interview for Time magazine, Johns remarks: “It all began with my painting a picture of an 
American flag. Using this design took care of a great deal for me because I didn’t have to design it. So 
I went on to similar things like the targets things the mind already knows. That gave me room to work 
on other levels. For instance, I’ve always thought of a painting as a surface; painting it in one color 
made this very clear. . . . A picture ought to be looked at the same way you look at a radiator.” See 
“His heart belongs to DADA,” Time 73 (4 May, 1959): 58; quoted in Varnedoe, ed., Jasper Johns, 
Writings, Sketchbook Notes, Interviews, 82. 
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Snow White actively recruits the memory of the reader both in the construction of 
meaning and relevance, as well as in the completion of the parodic loop implied by 
each of the disconnected, seemingly random, and/or open-ended fragments.173 And 
by augmenting the already known, or stating the opposite, the already known is 
constantly appealed to as an abstract narrative background against which the reader 
must, in a very real sense, piece together his or her own personally constructed, 
parodic “Snow White” collage narrative. As Richard Gilman writes in The Confusion 
of Realms: 
[The Snow White tale] is here refracted through the prism of a 
contemporary sensibility so that it emerges broken up into fragments, 
shards of its original identity, of its historical career in our 
consciousness . . . and of its recorded or potential uses for sociology 
and psychology. (45) 
 
Paradoxically, in providing the reader with all of its “potential uses” and every 
conceivable means of interpreting it, Snow White actively resists the same 
interpretive approaches it suggests. Taking the novel’s various incorporations and 
replies to psychology, for example, with its frequent quotations (35, 82), scraps of 
pseudo-analysis (10, 23, 45, 76, 105-107), and allusions to Freud (81, 145, 160), the 
reader is left with little more than a collection of self-ironizing anecdotes that 
actually do more to discredit than to forward psychological analysis (intratextually 
and extratextually) as a fruitful method of interpretation. Following such an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 R. E. Johnson, Jr. writes: “. . . for Barthelme, to deconstruct the origin is not the same as to 
eliminate it. His is neither an ontology of presence nor one of absence, but of both presence and 
absence. It is neither as closed as the ‘old’ ‘writerly’ fiction is supposed to be nor as open as the do-it-
yourself games celebrated in certain of the essays collected in Federman's Surfiction. Both open and 
closed, it is one of those fictions Frank Kermode describes as both a projection and a 
‘disconfirmation’ of the possibility and the impossibility of closure. Similar to that characteristic 
which Kermode, in another essay, finds in The Crying of Lot 49, Barthelme's fiction ‘indicates the 
enormous absurdity of both assumptions: that there is a structure, and that there is not.’” See Johnson, 
Jr., “‘Bees Barking in the Night’: The End and Beginning of Donald Barthelme's Narrative,” 75-76. 
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approach, the reader is left with little more than a list of page numbers not unlike the 
one above.  
Equally pointless as an approach to the novel, is any attempt to actually 
connect the metaphorical dots and recreate a narrative arch for the novel based on the 
few points where Barthelme’s Snow White overlaps or seems to directly respond to 
precedent versions of the tale (e.g., the story as told by the Grimm brothers, or 
Disney, etc.). Such a reduction of the novel’s myriad ad hoc adventures, narrative 
currents, sub-plots, and thematic threads can only effect a series of arbitrary leaps 
from point to point, from isolated symbol to isolated symbol, and result in either: a) a 
summary of alterations to the always already problematic concept of Snow White’s 
“original identity” (i.e., yet another anecdotal collection, such as the list of 
psychology references described previously or an itemized inventory of 
correspondences similar to those listed in the novel’s “questionnaire”); or, b) a thin 
facsimile of the story as it is already known, which ignores Barthelme’s novel 
entirely.   
A third route into the novel (which, incidentally, starts to make the tripartite 
structure of this analysis itself begin to approach the structure of a fairy tale) is one 
that takes into account the onto-theatrical nature of Barthelme’s production of Snow 
White as an “itself” (in the sense forwarded in “After Joyce”), or in other words, as a 
literary object existing in the world of discourse created by its interaction with the 
reader. 
Looking at Snow White in this way it becomes apparent that the text’s 
resistance to all attempts at a clear course of interpretation is its performance. Like 
the repetitive string of “reactions” to Snow White’s hair that concerns the greater 
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part of the novel’s second section (musings and pet theories that never succeed in 
truly defining it or usefully comprehending it [95, 96, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 117]), 
the novel continually faces the reader with the same question: What is it? As Bill, the 
de facto leader of the dwarfs, deliberates: 
Whereas once we were simple bourgeois who knew what to do, now 
we are complex bourgeois who are at a loss. We do not like this 
complexity. We circle it wearily, prodding it from time to time with a 
shopkeeper’s forefinger: What is it? Is it, perhaps, bad for business? 
Equanimity has leaked away. There was a moment, however, when 
equanimity was not the chief consideration. That moment in which we 
looked at Snow White and understood for the first time that we were 
fond of her. That was a moment. (Snow White 94) 
 
While the nature of parody makes the question of what Snow White is “about” 
considerably less pressing—any work of parody will always be, implicitly, “about” 
the circumstances in which it was written—still the question remains open as to what 
exactly it is that makes Barthelme’s Snow White an existence in the world, or rather, 
an “itself.” The answer to this question, indeed, the answer to the existential question 
posed by most of Barthelme’s collage fictions, has an incredibly simple answer—an 
answer nonetheless profound for its simplicity. The answer is precisely the question 
it asks of the reader: What is it? In that act the text becomes an object in the world, 
like a rock or refrigerator—the word suddenly made thing by virtue of the profound 
doubt it creates in being confronted.  
And like Picasso in his studio, circa 1912, no longer content with painting 
likenesses of this and that—mere representations of guitars—bending some paper 
and adding some frets, an actual instrument suddenly leaps into the world. Not 
merely a representation of the guitar, or the concept of “guitar-ness”, but a real guitar 
that plays music by simply being perceived. In just such a fashion does Barthelme 
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bend words into shapes, temporal verbalizations into spatial experience, and the mere 
































i am outside of  
history. i wish 
i had some peanuts, it 
looks hungry there in 
its cage 
 
i am inside of 
history. its 
hungrier than i 
thot 
 
--- Ishmael Reed, “Dualism: in ralph ellison’s invisible man” 




Ironic Play in the Signifyin(g) Tradition 
Before this chapter moves into an exploration of Ishmael Reed’s The Free-
lance Pallbearers (1967), Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down (1969), and Mumbo 
Jumbo (1972), and an analysis of how these novels figure within the metafictional 
spectrum of the high ironic mode, it might be useful to begin by considering the 
parodic mechanism of the poem above. Featuring prominently in such seminal works 
of African-American literary theory as Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s Figures in Black 
(1987) and The Signifying Monkey (1988), introducing Reginald Martin’s influential 
study of the author in Ishmael Reed and the New Black Aesthetic Critics (1988), and 
playing an important role in the “Postcolonial Stylistics and Postmodern Logic” 
section of Paul Hamilton’s Historicism (1996),174 Reed’s poem, “Dualism: in ralph 
ellison’s invisible man” (collected in Conjure: Selected Poems, 1963-1970 [1971]), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 See Gates, Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the “Racial” Self, 275-76; Gates, The Signifying 
Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism, 237-38; Martin, Ishmael Reed and the 
New Black Aesthetic Critics, 1; and Hamilton, Historicism, 190-91. 
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not only displays a number of the central elements in Reed’s humourously polemical 
perspective, analysis of this poem also provides a critical point of entry into Reed’s 
deceptively complex, multi-layered method of parodic encoding and citation, or, 
what Gates (among others) refers to as, “signifying.” 
In keeping with Reed’s “signifying,” one response to this poem might be to 
ask: does the poem’s disembodied voice carry in its cartoon pocket, as it were, the 
1,369 matches necessary to resolve this predicament, or, is this the point at which the 
music surges into its finale and a fanciful “That’s all (black) folks!” zooms into 
view? As does the narrator in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952), Ishmael Reed’s 
narrator leaves the reader in the dark as to how it all turns out, though it certainly 
does not bode well. Indeed, despite the playful, ludic tone of Reed’s treatment of 
Ellison’s novel, the absent object in Reed’s poem is no less frightening for its 
comical disappearance, quite the contrary. Tricked into the voracious maw of history 
simply by sympathizing with its pitiful state, the narrator becomes one with its 
appetite, corporeally contained and conceptually absorbed, shifting from raw to 
cooked (or, perhaps, raw to eaten) in the space of a single prefix.  
In these two brief stanzas, Reed’s parody not only condenses Ellison’s novel 
into a tight binary system of metaphorical oppositions, it also connects the dualism 
formed by this construct back to its own rhetorical tradition within African-American 
poetics. As noted by Gates in Figures in Black, Reed’s poem caricatures the either/or 
dualism of W. E. B. Du Bois’s “double-consciousness” by metaphorically 
connecting the existentialist dualism of in-/visibility in Ellison’s Invisible Man to the 
essentialist dualism of “two-ness” described by Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk 
 
	   233	  
(1903).175 In so doing, Reed’s poem draws a direct, parodic parallel between these 
rhetorical formulations, pitting them against one another and, thereby, subjecting 
both to an aggressively (self-)mocking critique. As Gates writes in The Signifying 
Monkey, “Reed’s poem parodies, profoundly, both the figure of the black as outsider 
[Ellison] and the figure of the divided self [Du Bois]. For, he tells us, even these are 
only tropes, figures of speech, rhetorical constructs like ‘double-consciousness,’ and 
not some preordained reality or thing” (238). Avoiding a portrayal of this dialectic of 
otherness and “double-consciousness” as either concretely real or purely imagined, 
Reed’s poem warns the reader of the risk of mistaking rhetoric for reality while at the 
same time recognizing the very real threat of certain formulations of imagination. 
One such threatening formulation confronted by Reed in “Dualism” is 
precisely the rhetoric of this “divided self” as it is imagined by Du Bois in The Souls 
of Black Folk, “this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and 
pity” (Du Bois 16). In Reed’s poem, this pitying, self-othering gaze is precisely the 
gaze that annihilates autonomous identity. By sympathizing and ultimately 
identifying with this sense of division, one becomes divided, surrogated to an 
incomplete, artificial image of oneself and, thereby, separated from any coherent 
sense of identity. To Du Bois, it is precisely through this falsely reflexive act of 
“double-consciousness” that one’s own identity (or, “soul,” in Du Bois’s idiom) is 
seen to be pitiful, contemptible, and eternally other. Applying this construct as the 
rhetorical ground for his parody, in Reed’s poem this self-dividing transformation 
from pitying to pitiful (as in Du Bois), along with its implied shift from alienated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 See Gates, Figures in Black, 275-76; W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and 
Sketches, 16. 
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exclusion to self-annihilating inclusion (as it figures in the epilogue to Ellison’s 
Invisible Man), is re-cast as a process of historical appropriation.  
Replacing Du Bois’s term, “soul” (as it occurs in the passage above), with the 
figure of “history,” Reed’s poem suggests that a measuring of one’s (invisible) 
expereince by the historiographic tape of an othering, dialectical sense of history 
(i.e., the totalizing [Hegelian] sense of historicity created and enforced by the highly 
visible “cage” of [Western] historiography) effects a destructive appropriation of the 
outsider’s experience. This experience, defined as the outsider’s history in Reed’s 
arrangement, sustains the caged beast of historiographic totality by exchanging its 
alterity for inclusion. As this exchange occurs, the invisible outsider—along with the 
autonomous identity and distinct history that attend the outsider’s exclusion from the 
realm of a more visible, mainstream discourse—is negated by inclusion into its 
opposite. As Robert Elliot Fox comments in Conscientious Sorcerers: 
[The] achievements of blacks and other oppressed peoples have been 
frequently expropriated by whites. History is also ‘herstory,’ their 
story, individual tales of joy and sadness, confusion and survival that 
constitute the collective narrative of a people. Appropriation of a 
people’s history, Reed insists, is a denial of their identity. (72, Fox’s 
emphasis) 
 
For the outsider, identification (whether imagined or material) with such a process of 
historical appropriation is, in Reed’s poem, sufficient to result in one’s own erasure.  
In his discussion of the poem in The Signifying Monkey, Gates traces the key 
element in Reed’s parody of Du Bois and Ellison to a statement made by the 
anonymous narrator in the epilogue to Ellison’s Invisible Man: “Now I know men 
are different and that all life is divided and that only in division is there true health” 
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(Ellison 576).176 According to Gates, Reed’s poem parodically contradicts Ellison’s 
narrator by exposing the truly destructive nature of the dualism implicit in such a 
figuration of division. Gates writes, “For Reed, this belief in the reality of dualism 
spells death” (Signifying 238). However, one point that Gates neglects in his study 
and which highlights the interaction of the rhetorical figures in this poem as 
absolutely key to an understanding of Reed’s position, both poetically and 
politically, is the poem’s ironic play on the concept of division.  
For, to the extent that the poem argues that the (self-)division inherent in 
“double-consciousness” results in self-negation, such a rhetoric of division is clearly 
condemned (albeit comically) by Reed’s ironic arrangement. And yet, in the original 
context of Invisible Man, the division that Ellison’s narrator is referring to 
(especially in the line from the epilogue quoted by Gates) is not so much a division 
of one’s self in the sense forwarded by Du Bois, but rather a division from the 
inherently violent processes of social and racial integration (re-interpreted as 
historical appropriation in Reed’s poem) which the invisible man’s grandfather 
describes in the prologue to the novel: 
I never told you, but our life is a war and I have been a traitor all my 
born days, a spy in the enemy’s country ever since I give up my gun 
back in the Reconstruction. Live with your head in the lion’s mouth. I 
want you to overcome ‘em with yeses, undermine ‘em with grins, 
agree ‘em to death and destruction, let ‘em swoller you till they vomit 
or bust wide open. (Ellison 16)177 
 
Nagged and chastised by his grandfather’s dying words throughout the novel, in the 
epilogue there is a clear sense that Ellison’s narrator has finally accepted his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See Gates, Figures, 276. 
177 This passage from Ellison’s novel, which Reed parodically re-interprets (i.e., signifies upon) 
repeatedly in his writing, figures in a similar way in the poem, “Crocodiles,” published in Reed’s 
1973 collection, Chattanooga: “A crocodile dont hunt / Him’s victims / They hunts him / All he do is 
/ Open he jaws.” See Reed, Chattanooga: Poems, 43. 
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grandfather’s solution to the question of division (despite his supposition of the 
relative “health” to be found in division). And by leaving his well-lit underground it 
is clear that the narrator is making a consciously self-sacrificing (yet sincerely 
hopeful) decision to emerge from his otherness and re-enter the world as a potential 
agent of change with a “socially responsible role to play” (Ellison 581). Ultimately 
acquiescing to his grandfather’s logic, Ellison’s narrator begrudgingly allows that 
change can, in all likelihood, only be effected through such a process of self-
sacrificing integration (i.e., from within the “lion’s mouth”). And so, with this as his 
chosen fate, he leaves behind the safe, peripheral liminality of his place of 
“hibernation” and ventures out into the chaos of the mainstream (Ellison 580-81). 
As previously discussed, Reed’s parodic interpretation of the invisible man’s 
dilemma clearly indicates this decision to be the narrator’s undoing. So where or 
what exactly is Reed’s position vis-à-vis the question of division? In order to answer 
this question it is necessary to return to the concept of “signifying” as mentioned 
earlier in the chapter. 
Through an extended synthesis of earlier socio-linguistic and anthropological 
studies of “signifying” by scholars such as Roger D. Abrahams, Kimberly W. 
Benson, and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan,178 Gates offers the following (dualistically 
nuanced) definition in Figures in Black: “The Afro-American rhetorical strategy of 
signifying is a rhetorical act that is not engaged in the game of information giving. 
Signifying turns on the play and chain of signifiers, and not on some supposedly 
transcendent signifier” (238). With its own highly sophisticated social and semantic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 See Mitchell-Kernan, “Signifying,” in Mother Wit from the Laughing Barrel: Readings in the 
Interpretation of Afro-American Folklore, 310-28; Mitchell-Kernan, Language Behavior in a Black 
Urban Community 87-138; and Abrahams, Deep Down in the Jungle: Negro Narrative Folklore from 
the Streets of Philadelphia, 51-52, 66-67, 264.  
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rules of play, the game of signifying (also occasionally denoted by Gates and others 
as “signifyin[g]” and/or “Signifying” as a way of registering its multiple functions 
both within, between, and above rhetorical and dialogical acts)179 can be used to 
communicate, confuse, interpret, and encode via the physical and/or verbal 
deployment of an array of rhetorical tropes and dialogical tactics.180 As Gates writes: 
Signifying is a trope in which are subsumed several other rhetorical 
tropes, including metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony (the 
master tropes), and also hyperbole and litotes, and metalepsis. . . . To 
this list we could easily add aporia, chiasmus, and catechesis, all of 
which are used in the ritual of signifying. (Figures 236) 
 
While signifying play can be analyzed and explored in terms of its rhetorical 
structures and tropological interactions (as Gates does quite successfully), Gates is 
also careful to point out that the rhetorical game of signifying—like the 
dissimulation, parodic displacement, and intertextual citation that often occur in 
written and verbal forms of irony—typically takes place in the space between written 
and verbal events (Figures 238). In fact, this unspoken and often strategically 
unspeakable area of language is precisely the space that signifying play most 
effectively occupies. As Mitchell-Kernan writes in “Signifying”: 
The Black concept of signifying incorporates essentially a folk notion 
that the dictionary entries for words are not always sufficient for 
interpreting meanings or messages, or that meaning goes beyond such 
interpretations. Complimentary remarks may be delivered in a left-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 In her own study of signifying, Mitchell-Kernan notes: “Since many of the terms are used on more 
that one level of contrast (i.e., as labels for the game or speech event and as labels for tactics 
employed in the game) when they are used superordinately (as labels for the speech event) they will 
be capitalized.” See Mitchell-Kernan, “Signifying,” 312. 
180 As Roger D. Abrahams writes: “Signifying seems to be a Negro term, in use if not in origin. It can 
mean any number of things; in the case of the toast about the signifying monkey, it certainly refers to 
the trickster’s ability to talk with great innuendo, to carp, cajole, needle, and lie. It can mean in other 
instances the propensity to talk around a subject, never quite coming to the point. It can mean making 
fun of a person or situation. Also it can denote speaking with the hands and eyes, and in this respect 
encompasses a whole complex of expressions and gestures. Thus it is signifying to stir up a fight 
between neighbors by telling stories; it is signifying to make fun of a policeman by parodying his 
motions behind his back; it is signifying to ask for a piece of cake by saying, ‘my brother needs a 
piece of cake.’” See Abrahams, Deep Down in the Jungle, 51-52. 
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handed fashion. A particular utterance may be an insult in one context 
and not another. What pretends to be informative may intend to be 
persuasive. The hearer is thus constrained to attend to all potential 
meaning carrying symbolic systems in speech events—the total 
universe of discourse. (314)181 
 
The epistemological fluidity of signifying relies upon a constantly shifting interplay 
of implication and allegation, insinuation and distraction, all of which takes place at 
the meta-level of discourse.  
The signifying use of the word apple, for example, does not simply function 
as a semiotic signifier for the signified object of a phenomenological apple, but exists 
at the verbal nexus of every possible connotation of apple and apple-ness: as a food 
metaphor; as a symbol from and/or for the Bible; as a metalepsis implying sex or 
virginity; as an allusion to Max Apple, Apple Records, or Apple Computers, Inc.; as 
the makings for a pun on the euphemistic phrase “a pull,” and so on. Each of the 
items in this chain of dynamic signifiers, in turn, leads to another set of potential 
semantic relations. The signifying use of apple in a hip-hop cipher as an allusion to 
Apple Records, for example, might yield any of a number of further implications 
depending on the context of its usage (e.g., as a reference to pop music and/or the 
pop sensibility, as a reference to The Beatles, as a reference to the “whiteness” of 
such a record company [in contrast to the “blackness” of record companies such as 
Def Jam or Death Row], etc.). Furthermore, not only does each signifying reference 
rely upon the context of its utterance, each instance of that reference also stands in 
relation to previous similar utterances (i.e., signifying is often done upon well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 This quote from Mitchell-Kernan’s “Signifying” also figures in a similar context in the “Black 
Structures of Feeling” chapter of Gates’s Figures in Black. See Gates, Figures, 240. 
 
	   239	  
known, precedent uses of a given trope or metaphor).182 This type of playful citation, 
as both Gates and Mitchell-Kernan attest, is often both a nod of recognition to past 
players of the game as well as a critical revision of their stylistics and signature 
rhetorical tactics.183 
In order to successfully navigate the various semantic and rhetorical levels of 
this complicated game the player must display a comprehension of the double-voiced 
message (or “left-handed” distraction) masked as information and re-deploy that 
message. Essential to this process is an ability to decipher the double meaning hidden 
behind a given code and either continue the signifying play within that code or shift 
the play to a new rhetorical matrix (e.g., apples to cherries; record labels to labeling). 
All the while, in order to keep the game moving, each signifying act must be played 
forward at the same time as it is played back upon the event, trope, or situation that 
initiated the play. The game of signifying, in other words, can only be successfully 
played by responding in kind—that is, by responding with equal duplicity and/or by 
resetting the code—and at every point (like Schlegel’s irony) it is always possible to 
misread the message entirely by taking it seriously (i.e., following the flow of 
signifiers in the wrong [purely literal/purely figurative] direction) and, thereby, 
failing to properly respond to the implicit duplicity of the message.  
As suggested by Gates, signifying play typically takes place at the liminal 
crossroads of the figurative and the factual (Figures 236-37). This is precisely why 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 One brief example of this in the context of the hip-hop cipher might be the playful use of the 
phrase “chamber music.” As this phrase has been previously used by several members of the group 
Wu-Tang Clan as a play on the classical music genre and to refer to both the sound of gunfire (i.e., the 
percussive “music” made as a bullet exits a gun’s chamber) as well as to the Wu-Tang Clan’s own 
debut album, Enter the Wu-Tang (36 Chambers) (1993), any subsequent use of the phrase “chamber 
music” in a hip-hop cipher will contain an implicit link to these previous uses and their various 
implications. 
183 See Mitchell-Kernan, “Signifying,” 314-16; Gates, Figures, 244-50. 
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the signifying relations in Reed’s poem cannot be entirely rectified and why any 
definite sense of the poem’s “true” intent remains elusive to the critic. Slippery and 
elastic, “Dualism” appears mythical when approached from a literal standpoint and 
literal when approached from a mythical standpoint.184 This indeterminacy, 
according to Gates, is ultimately attributable to the dual-voiced nature of signifying 
as a self-reflexive mode of meta-discourse, or, to put it in other (yet no less circular) 
terms, the indeterminacy of the signifying speech act relates directly to its medial 
status as a scripted yet speakerly oral text (Figures 249).185 As Gates explains:  
The determinate meanings often sought in criticism often run counter 
to the most fundamental values of the tradition as encased in myth. In 
this sense, the literal and the figurative are locked in a Signifyin(g) 
relation, the myths and the figurative Signified upon by the real and 
literal, just as the vernacular tradition Signifies upon the tradition of 
letters, and as figures of writing and inscription are registered, 
paradoxically, in an oral literature. This is another example of the 
presence of the dual voice. (Signifying 22) 
 
Though obviously rich in a variety of narratological implications, the most 
significant aspect of this assessment (for the purposes of the following exploration of 
Reed’s early novels) is the correlation that Gates traces through the duality of voice 
inherent in the signifying, speakerly text to what Mikhail Bakhtin describes as the 
“hidden polemic” within the parodic structure of double-voiced discourse.186  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Gates relates this sense of rhetorical indeterminacy to the hallucinated sermon (“The Blackness of 
Blackness”) in the prologue of Ellison’s Invisible Man: “blackness is...an’ blackness ain’t. . . . it 
will…an’ it won’t. . . . it do...an’ it don’t,” see Gates, Signifying, 235-37; Ellison, Invisible Man, 9-10. 
185 Reed acknowledges the speakerly aspect of his writing in referring to his second novel, Yellow 
Back Radio Broke-Down (1969), as: “an oral book, a talking book.” In an interview for Black World 
magazine, Reed states: “I based the book [Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down] on old radio scripts in 
which the listener constructed the sets with his imagination; that’s why ‘radio’; also because it’s an 
oral book, a talking book . . . there’s more dialogue than scenery or description.” See Reed, “Ishmael 
Reed: A Self Interview,” 25; see also Gates, Figures, 249. 
186 See Mikhail Bakhtin, “Discourse Typology in Prose,” in Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist 
and Structuralist Views, 190; see also Gates, Figures, 247-49. 
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Quoting at length from Bakhtin’s “Discourse Typology in Prose,” Gates 
declares Bakhtin’s concept of hidden polemic to be absolutely crucial to an 
understanding of the intertextual relations and critical revisions that occur within 
Reed’s double-voiced, highly vernacular parody (Figures 247). Defining this 
concept, Bakhtin writes: 
In hidden polemic the author’s discourse is oriented toward its 
referential object, as in any other discourse, but at the same time each 
assertion about the object is constructed in such a way that, besides its 
referential meaning, the author’s discourse brings a polemical attack 
to bear against another speech act, another assertion, on the same 
topic. Here one utterance focused on its referential object clashes with 
another object on the grounds of the referent itself. That other 
utterance is not reproduced; it is understood only in its import. 
(“Discourse” 199)187  
 
As established by Gates, consideration of the double-voiced configuration of this 
hidden polemic is crucial to an understanding of the type of intertextual parody 
employed in novels such as The Free-Lance Pallbearers, Yellow Back Radio Broke-
Down, and Mumbo Jumbo. However, while Gates limits the scope of his analyses 
primarily to the intertextual relationships Reed shares with previous African-
American texts and traditions, it is the contention of this chapter (without in any way 
arguing against Reed’s rightful inclusion within the African-American literary 
tradition and with a full awareness of the tremendous importance of this canon and 
its continued development) that the metafictional structure of Reed’s parody also 
presents an obvious case for an analysis of Reed’s writing in relation to the high 
ironic mode. For, as already discussed in this dissertation’s previous analyses of the 
works of Coover and Barthelme, the parodic mechanism of Bakhtin’s double-voiced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 See Gates, Figures, 247. 
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polemic, which Gates locates in Reed’s fiction, is also fundamental to the intertextual 
and metafictional structures of high ironic narrative. 
By expanding Gates’s appraisal of Reed as another in a distinguished line of 
signifying African-American literary parodists (a tradition that Gates follows back 
through the works of Reed, Ellison, James Baldwin, Richard Wright, Jean Toomer, 
and Zora Neale Hurston to the writers of some of the first “black experience” 
narratives published in America during the eighteenth century),188 this chapter seeks 
to orient its analysis of Reed’s novels to within the context of his place in the 
tumultuous American arts scene of the 1960s and early 70s. This is not to say that 
Reed’s writing during this period is in any way a direct product of the influences and 
theories of those times (whether African-American, Anglo-American, Franco-
American, or otherwise). For the most part Gates’s placement of Reed squarely 
within the African-American canon is justified and explains far more about the 
various forms and functions of Reed’s writing than it conceals. Nevertheless, it is 
impossible (indeed, it would be doing Reed’s writing a blatant, critical injustice) to 
ignore the striking formal and political similarities between the works of Coover, 
Barthelme, and Reed.189 For as Neil Schmitz contends in his essay, “Neo-HooDoo: 
The Experimental Fiction of Ishmael Reed”: 
. . . contemporary Afro-American writing is as diverse and generally 
parodic in its modes as contemporary Anglo-American writing—the 
milieu and idiom differs, not the fictional tactics. Reed's . . . [writing] 
moves finally along the same metafictive angle that Pynchon and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 See Gates, Figures, 248-49. 
189 It should also be noted that, while it is not the project attempted here in this chapter, an entirely 
justifiable case might well be made describing the significant influence that the African-American 
canon (e.g., Ellison, Wright, Toomer, Hurston, Du Bois, et al.) has had in the shaping the parodic, 
Anglo-American literature of the 1960s and 70s (especially as this influence figures in the works of 
writers such as Barthelme, Brautigan, Coover, Tim O’Brien, Grace Paley, Thomas Pynchon, and Kurt 
Vonnegut). Such a study would offer another very interesting angle through which to view the 
emergence of the type of high ironic metafiction that developed during this period. 
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Barthelme [and Coover] take in their fiction, probing folklore and 
myth with the same seriocomic intent, to wrench from them their own 
truths. (Schmitz 139)190  
 
As Schmitz notes in his essay, the “fictional tactics” employed by Barthelme, 
Coover, and Reed do not merely display a number of formal similarities, their 
common project of “probing folklore and myth” also indicates a shared metafictional 
goal of anatomizing precedent narrative forms and exploring the veracity of all 
textual formulations, especially those purporting to contain or convey notions of 
“truth.” Indeed, what makes a consideration of the works of Ishmael Reed absolutely 
crucial to a full exploration of the high ironic mode is the way in which his writing 
ties together the metafictional forms and abstract re-formulations previously 
analyzed in the works of Coover and Barthelme.  
As the preceding chapters of this dissertation have described, the high ironic 
is a mode of textual revision predicated upon a formally parodic matrix of 
metaphorical deconstruction, metafictional collage, and an expansion of narratorial 
agency. While this parodic matrix is not unlike the signifying intertextual relations 
described by Gates as connecting works such as Jean Toomer’s Cane, Richard 
Wright’s Native Son, and Ellison’s Invisible Man into a coherent literary tradition 
(Signifying 87-88), it is proposed that Reed’s synthesis of metaphorical 
deconstruction, metafictional collage, and narratorial expansion is, in terms of form, 
most comparable to that of Barthelme and Coover. For the question of concern here, 
in this chapter, is not one of determining which literary tradition into which Reed’s 
fiction might best be placed, but rather where his fiction is located in terms of form. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 “[Coover]” has been inserted here as Robert Coover, as well as Pricksongs & Descants, are both 
mentioned in the same context and within the same paragraph that this quote is taken from. See 
Schmitz, “Neo-HooDoo: The Experimental Fiction of Ishmael Reed,” 139. 
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In fact, formal comparison of Coover’s Pricksongs & Descants and 
Barthelme’s Snow White to the parodic mechanisms at play in Reed’s The Free-lance 
Pallbearers, Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down, and Mumbo Jumbo reveals that each 
of these works stands at a similar distance to its own tradition, both structurally and 
transideologically. Nevertheless, none of these works can be said to be outside of the 
tradition that it also subverts and critiques. As already discussed in chapter three, 
Coover’s parodic intertextual relations with the fairy tale genre in Pricksongs & 
Descants, with Western myth and legend in works such as Ghost Town, and with 
historiographic forms of narrative in The Public Burning, are best viewed as attempts 
to anatomize the literary traditions from which these forms derive, thereby re-visiting 
and revising the creative potential of the metaphors upon which these traditions are 
built. Likewise, as described in the foregoing chapter, Barthelme’s fragmented 
explorations of both novel and narrative in Snow White and in the stories collected in 
Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts and City Life (among others) cannot be 
separated from the forms and traditions being parodied. The works of Coover and 
Barthelme, like those of Reed, are part and parcel of the very traditions they seek to 
parodically redress. 
One of the points stressed throughout this dissertation has been this 
relation between form and tradition, for it is precisely this gap that postmodern 
parody most frequently exploits. As specified by Linda Hutcheon in The Politics of 
Postmodernism, postmodern forms of parody are engaged in a repetition with a 
difference, never a nostalgic return, and a major part of this engagement is a critical 
investigation of the traditions from which contemporary forms have emerged: 
[The postmodern] reprise of the past of art is not nostalgic, it is 
always critical. It is also not ahistorical or de-historicizing; it does not 
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wrest past art from its original historical context and reassemble it 
into some sort of presentist spectacle. Instead, through a double 
process of installing and ironizing, parody signals how present 
representations come from past ones and what ideological 
consequences derive from both continuity and difference. (89)  
 
Like the dual-voiced interactions in signifying play, postmodern parody contains an 
intrinsic recognition of the influence and historical resonance of the forms and 
traditions being parodied.191 As Hutcheon is careful to note in her study, “As [a] 
form of ironic representation, parody is doubly coded in political terms: it both 
legitimizes and subverts that which it parodies” (97). Hutcheon’s approach to 
postmodern parody highlights one of the unavoidable paradoxes of ironic critique 
(one shared with the process of signifying): it is always—for better or worse—a 
legitimization of its target; for it is impossible to attack, revise, and/or subvert 
something (even in the most violent, antagonistic terms) without first identifying it 
and recognizing its influence. 
As discussed previously, such a process is clearly at work within the 
signifying textual relations described by Gates and is also present in the parodic 
arrangement of Bakhtin’s hidden polemic. Indeed, part of the utility of Bakhtin’s 
explanation of the hidden polemic is the way in which it allows the critic to 
differentiate between the two voices of the parodic text and, thereby, triangulate the 
terms of the intertextual relationship between the parodic text, the source material, 
and the referent.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 In many ways echoing Hutcheon’s definition of postmodern parody in his The Signifying Monkey, 
Gates writes: “When one text Signifies upon another text, by tropological revision or repetition and 
difference, the double-voiced utterance allows us to chart discrete formal relationships in Afro-
American literary history. Signifyin(g), then, is a metaphor for textual revision.” See Gates, 
Signifying, 88. 
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As Bakhtin describes in the passage quoted earlier, the dual voice of the 
parodic text is engaged with the referent on two levels. On the primary level, the 
parodic text relates to the referent satirically, often through the tone, style, and the 
voices of its narration. On the secondary level, what Bakhtin describes as the text’s 
hidden polemic, is the indirect parodic relation of the text to its referent through its 
intertextual relation to a set of precedent forms (i.e., the ostensible source material of 
the parody). This relation is often discernable in the structural similarity between the 
narrative forms of the parodic text and those of its source material. In this sense, the 
parodic text following this pattern is engaged with the referent on both a direct 
satirical level, as well as on an indirect, formally polemical level.  
This tripartite structure is structurally analogous to the arrangement of the 
metafictional “core-response” as outlined in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
For, as discussed in this earlier chapter, the inherently parodic structure of 
metafiction typically stands in a similar relation to both the source material—to 
which it corresponds—and the referent—to which it responds. While Gates is correct 
in his analysis of the signifying hidden polemic that connects the works of Toomer, 
Wright, and Ellison (et al.) into a coherent canon (i.e., as a literary repository of texts 
directly concerning the African-American experience; textually exemplified in the 
narrative pattern of “the black experience novel”),192 analysis of Reed’s fiction 
shows that his relation to this canon—like the critical difference in “core-response” 
that delineates the work of mythopoesis from the work of metafiction—is not one of 
a direct correspondence (or, in other words, an earnest advancement of “the black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Gates writes, “Much of the Afro-American literary tradition can be read as successive attempts to 
create a new narrative space for representation of the recurring referent of Afro-American literature, 
the so-called black experience.” See Gates, Figures, 248. 
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experience novel” as handed down from writers such as Hurston, Toomer, Wright, 
and Ellison), but is instead a self-mocking, parodic attack against the ideological 
limitations and formal conventions of this canon. While any such attack, as 
Hutcheon’s statement reminds, is also a critical legitimization, nevertheless, Reed’s 
fiction, like that of Coover and Barthelme, is involved in a legitimization that does 
not take the truths of the canon as self-evident but instead subjects them to intense 
ironic scrutiny and comic ridicule. 
 
The Signifyin(g) Relations Between Ellison’s Invisible Man and Reed’s The Free-
Lance Pallbearers 
This is especially the case in Reed’s debut novel, The Free-Lance 
Pallbearers (1967; hereafter referred to as, Pallbearers). In this novel Reed’s ironic 
narrative playfully deconstructs conventional notions of black identity and satirically 
undermines the intellectual and moral integrity of “the black experience novel.”193 In 
fact, pushing the metaphor of “attack” to its extreme, it might even be more 
accurately said that Reed’s Pallbearers takes a Menippean bazooka to “the black 
experience novel” and re-assembles the scattered pieces into a self-reflexive, 
carnivalesque narrative collage. 
The main parodic target of Reed’s Menippean blast, as several critics have 
pointed out, is clearly Ellison’s Invisible Man.194 And the traces of Ellison’s novel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 See Gates, Signifying, 218; Martin, “FreeLance PallBearer,” 36; Schmitz, “Neo-HooDoo,” 128. 
194 Robert Elliot Fox writes in Conscientious Sorcerers: “On at least one level, Pallbearers is an 
extended parody of Invisible Man. . . . The advice of Sam’s mother to her son on her deathbed 
parodies the advice given to Invisible Man’s family by his dying grandfather; Invisible Man’s 
expulsion from college is paralleled by Bukka’s resignation; Bukka’s ‘crying-the-blues’ recalls 
Trueblood; his job emptying bedpans parallels Invisible Man’s job in the factory basement; 
Hairyman’s recruitment of Bukka on the basis of his speech is a counterpart to Brother Jack’s 
recruitment of Invisible Man into the Brotherhood; I am even tempted to hear linguistic echoes of 
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are discernibly present in the overall narrative structure of Pallbearers as well as (as 
both Gates and Schmitz also note) in the faux “confessional mode” of the novel’s 
narration.195 However, far from playing it safe with his narration, Reed’s novel is 
peppered with frantic expository sketches, self-consciously surreal dream sequences, 
and awkward, narratorial code switches between stereotypically Anglo-American 
and African-American dialects and idioms. And as far as the high ironic expansion of 
the narratorial power of action is concerned, Pallbearers pushes its narration right to 
the very edge of the “receiveable” (see chapter two), skirting the outer perimeter of 
the mode like a metafictional roller-derby with a party of HooDoo zombies in a race 
to the death, rolling wild and wreaking havoc in every turn.  
Told from beyond the grave by the novel’s protagonist and narrator, Bukka 
Doopeyduk, the narrative dashes from one tangled verbal exchange to another. 
However, as Schmitz comments in his study of Pallbearers, the result is not a 
polished assembly of convoluted colloquial episodes (such as in Burroughs’s Naked 
Lunch or Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow), nor does the narration ever approach the 
pathological tone or stylistics of a true confessional narrative (in the mode of 
Wright’s Native Son or Ellison’s Invisible Man), but instead Pallbearers more 
closely approximates a vernacular bedlam of wanton “funkyness,” “talltalk,” and 
“roughened discourse” (130). As Schmitz writes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ellison’s opening sentence, ‘I am invisible man,’ in Reed’s opener, ‘I live in HARRY SAM.’” See 
Fox, Conscientious Sorcerers, 40. See also Hume “Ishmael Reed,” 507, 516; Gates, Figures, 242; and 
Schmitz, “Neo-HooDoo,” 128-29. 
195 In his assessment of Pallbearers, Gates notes: “The Free-lance Pallbearers is, above all else, a 
parody of the confessional mode which is the fundamental, undergirding convention of Afro-
American narrative, received, elaborated upon, and transmitted in a chartable heritage from Briton 
Hammon’s captivity narrative of 1760, through the antebellum slave narratives, to black 
autobiography, and into black fiction, especially that of Hurston, Wright, Baldwin, and Ellison.” 
Gates, Signifying, 218. See also Schmitz, “Neo-HooDoo,” 126. 
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 The language of Pallbearers is an orchestration of idiolects, 
conflicting types of speech that caricature their speakers. . . . Brought 
back from the novelistic life he so badly lived, Doopeyduk retells 
[the] novel like a theatrical impressionist, a mimic skillfully doing all 
its characters. (Schmitz 131)196 
 
And like the “pedants, bigots, cranks, parvenus, virtuosi, enthusiasts, rapacious and 
incompetent professional men of all kinds” that make up the cast of the Menippean 
satire in Northrop Frye’s definition of the form (Anatomy 309), Pallbearers is filled 
to brimming with cartoon mouthpieces, each of them out deceive, or, “dupe” the 
narrative protagonist.  
In parodying the company of shadowy apparitions that people Invisible Man 
and that continually attempt to rally Ellison’s narrator to their respective causes (e.g., 
Mr. Norton, Mr. Emerson, Jr., Dr. Bledsoe, Lucius Brockway, Brother Jack, and Ras 
The Exhorter/Destroyer, among others), Reed’s novel is crowded with self-serving 
opportunists and those all too willing to sacrifice Doopeyduk (both literally and 
figuratively) in order to get ahead. However, while the characters in Invisible Man 
are portrayed with a morally indistinct opacity of intention balanced with an acute 
lexical precision to their respective characterizations and personalized speech 
patterns (not unlike the type of characterizations found in Kafka’s The Trial and 
Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment), the caricatures in Pallbearers (as in the 
satires of Swift and Voltaire, as well as in postmodern Menippean satires such as 
Coover’s “Panel Game” and Barthelme’s The Dead Father) are depthless, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Although Schmitz is quick to denigrate Reed for his ventriloquism, Reed’s characterization in 
Pallbearers actually follows the typical form of the Menippean satire. As Northrop Frye’s notes in 
Anatomy of Criticism: “The Menippean satire deals less with people as such than with mental 
attitudes. . . . The Menippean satire thus resembles the confession in its ability to handle abstract ideas 
and theories . . . . The Menippean satirist sees [evil and folly] as diseases of the intellect, as a kind of 
maddened pedantry which the philosophus gloriosus at once symbolizes and defines.” See Frye, 
Anatomy, 309. 
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inarticulate, and betray their intentions almost immediately—the only mystery in 
Reed’s novel is the extremity of its madness.  
Further accentuating this intertextual lunacy is the impression that several of 
the characters in Pallbearers seem to have been rather unceremoniously wrenched 
from Ellison’s serious, low ironic narrative and roughly re-installed in the pages of 
Reed’s high ironic madhouse—Ellison’s Liberty Paint company doctor is recast as 
Reed’s Dr. Christian, Ellison’s Brother Jack as Reed’s Cipher X, Mr. Norton as 
Aboreal Hairyman, Reverend Barbee as Eclair Porkchop, Rinehart as Elijah Raven—
the appearance of each throwing off signifying sparks of mimicry, symbolic citation, 
and allusion in every scene in which they materialize. And caught in the middle of 
this twisted, parodic miasma of buffoons, bozos, and burlesque charlatans is Bukka 
Doopeyduk, king of the dupes. 
Perpetually hoodwinked and as monotonous in his single-minded response to 
the world as his aviary namesake, Doopeyduk’s posthumous narration follows the 
course of his fantastic (former)197 adventures in the never-never-land of HARRY 
SAM. Beginning, as does Invisible Man, with a brief prologue of sorts, Pallbearers 
opens with a short biography of HARRY SAM, dictatorial leader (a tenuous spoof of 
Richard Nixon)198 and eponymous symbol of the Technicolor hallucination within 
which Doopeyduk and the other characters battle for survival: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 In his essay, “Images of Subversion: Ishmael Reed and the Hoodoo Trickster,” James Lindroth 
notes: “Duppy [is] a hoodoo word for the spirit ‘who returns from the grave and causes mischief,’” 
(191). Reed’s signifying use of “Duppy,” Lindroth also notes, is traceable to Hurston’s definition of 
the term in Tell My Horse (1938). See Lindroth, “Images of Subversion,” 191; Hurston, Tell My 
Horse, 54-74. 
198 Fox writes: “HARRY SAM is Uncle Sam—America—as well as a cartoon version of various U. S. 
presidents. It also brings to mind ‘Sam’s plantation,’ an expression used by a minstrel of the Civil 
War period to describe the Union . . . . SAM, however, is identifiable with more than simply the 
nation or its chief of state; it is a mode of consciousness, characterized by a desire for mastery and 
control.” See Fox, Conscientious Sorcerers, 42. 
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I live in HARRY SAM. HARRY SAM is something else. A big not-
to-be-believed out-of-sight, sometimes referred to as O-BOP-SHE-
BANG or KLANG-A-LANG-A-DING-DONG. SAM has not been 
seen since the day thirty years ago when he disappeared into the John 
with a weird ravaging illness. 
    The John is located within an immense motel which stands on 
Sam’s Island just off HARRY SAM. (Pallbearers 1) 
 
It is to this island that the course of Doopeyduk’s trials will eventually lead, thus 
guiding him to the fulfillment of the prophecy foretold at the close of the first section 
of the novel: 
Legend has it that when the fateful swimmer makes it from Sam’s 
Island to HARRY SAM . . . old men will sneeze, swoop up their 
skiffles and rickety sticks, then lickety-split to rooms of widow 
executioners in black sneakers. It is at this time that the Free-Lance 
Pallbearers will take SAM. (Pallbearers 4) 
 
That the fulfillment of this prophecy—like the realization of the vague utopian dream 
of a scientifically perfected, culturally informed, racially integrated future which 
drives the narrator in Ellison’s novel—would involve a radical overhaul of American 
society and its systems of governance and control is, however, beyond the meager 
scope of the protagonist. For, although most of the other characters in Pallbearers 
appear to be aware of the imbalances of power and the network of organizations in 
place to oppress them, Doopeyduk remains, until the very end of the novel, blind to 
the reality of his own subjugation (another signifying riff on Invisible Man).  
Throughout the novel Doopeyduk repeatedly rails against anyone that might 
dare to question or denigrate what he sees as the pristine purity of HARRY SAM—
as a man, a place, and an institution (28, 74, 87-88, 114). And despite his withdrawal 
from the Harry Sam College, where he was studying as a Nazarene apprentice on 
track “to becoming the first bacteriological warfare expert of the colored race” 
(Pallbearers 4), he continues to devote himself reverently to his studies of the 
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Nazarene code. This code, like the obscure doctrines of the Brotherhood in Invisible 
Man, becomes Doopeyduk’s shield against the absurd realities that surround him: the 
abject state of black urban poverty, the poor conditions of the public housing, 
healthcare, and educational systems, the brazenly racist nature of American foreign 
policy, and, perhaps most frequently, the brazenly racist nature of American society 
in general. And whenever he encounters moments of strife or circumstances that he 
is unable to comprehend (which are numerous), Doopeyduk simply pulls out his 
Nazarene manual and recites the following set of oaths: 
Harry Sam does not love us. If he did, he’d come out of the John and 
hold us in his lap. We must walk down the street with them signs in 
our hands. We must throw back our heads and loosen our collars. We 
must bawl until he comes out of there and holds us like it was before 
the boogeyman came on the scene and everybody went to church and 
we gave each other pickle jars each day and nobody had acne nor bad 
breath and cancer was just the name of a sign. (Pallbearers 26, Reed’s 
syntax) 
 
But despite his rabid piety and his complete devotion to the Nazarene order (a 
pseudo-Christian worldview of scientific progress and mono-cultural [Anglo-Saxon] 
supremacy; not unlike the philosophy of the “Wallflower Order” in Mumbo Jumbo), 
his living conditions do not improve. In quick succession he loses his wife (the 
unabashed Fanny Mae; in many ways a downtown version of Ellison’s uptown 
Sybil), he loses his position as an orderly at a mental hospital (for service at which he 
was initially awarded an engraved, golden bedpan [57, 92]; an ironic play on the 
invisible man’s briefcase), and thus, being divorced and out of a job, he subsequently 
loses his apartment in the Harry Sam housing projects (98-99). Doopeyduk ends up 
alone, unemployed, homeless, and without anywhere to turn, and yet his dedication 
to HARRY SAM and the Nazarene order is unflagging.  
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It is at this point in the narrative that Doopeyduk suddenly finds himself an 
unwitting (in every sense of the term) artist and celebrity. For in his destitution 
Doopeyduk takes a job as a living stage prop in a theatre production called, “Git It 
On,” organized by a black-acting white artist named Cipher X (93-95). The 
production (an ad-hoc pastiche of the “battle royale” scene and the final Brotherhood 
committee meeting in Invisible Man) involves Doopeyduk’s confinement in a set of 
stocks, the rapid-fire pelting of his face and arms by a baseball-hurling robot, the 
screening of Nazi propaganda films, and the broadcasting of anti-white threats from 
a tape recorder (101-03): 
WHITEY YOU DIE TOMORROW RIGHT AFTER BREAKFAST 
AND IF YOU DON’T DIE THEN CHOKING ON YOUR 
WAFFLES DON’T BREATHE A SIGH OF RELIEF AND SAY 
THANK GOD FOR BUFFERIN ‘CAUSE THAT WILL ONLY 
MEAN THAT YOU WILL MEET YOUR MAKER COME THE 
VERY NEXT DAY. HEAH THAT. HEAH THAT, WHITEY, ON 
THE NEXT SUNNY DAY YOU WILL MEET YOUR DEMISE, 
YOU BEASTS CREATURES OF THE DEEP. ‘CAUSE YOU 
CAN’T HOLD A CANDLE TO US VIRILE BLACK PEOPLE. . . . 
(102, Reed’s typography and syntax) 
 
To Doopeyduk’s surprise, the all-white audience reacts with a standing ovation 
(103). He is immediately inundated with requests for interviews and media 
appearances, and word quickly gets around to HARRY SAM that a powerful new 
black personality has emerged on the world’s stage (with bruises and cuts to his 
face). Doopeyduk believes that he has finally made it. But as with the unfortunate 
protagonist in Coover’s “The Marker,” everything changes drastically when the 
authorities enter and lights come on. For with his fame comes an invitation to Sam’s 
Island and an opportunity to enter the hallowed precincts of HARRY SAM’s John, a 
dubious honor it turns out. For although he is respectfully received and venerated 
with the title of Nazarene Bishop (with the task of repeating to the people of 
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“Soulsville”: “IT’S GOING TO BE ALRIGHT, BY AND BY IN THE SKY. . . . 
IT’S GOING TO BE ALRIGHT, BY AND BY IN THE SKY” [135]; another 
oblique reference to Ellison’s Reverend Barbee), that night, in the Harry Sam motel, 
he finds himself surrounded by echoing screams (135). Doopeyduk follows the 
screams to their source in the basement and, once there, he not only catches HARRY 
SAM engaged in acts of sexual debauchery (similar to the famous buggery scene in 
Coover’s The Public Burning involving Uncle Same and Nixon [The Public Burning 
650-53]), but he also discovers the putrid, half-eaten corpses of all of the nation’s 
kidnapped children (137-140). Fleeing the scene in terror, Doopeyduk swims back 
across the Black Bay to the shores of HARRY SAM, and fulfills the prophecy (141-
42).  
The final section of Pallbearers (roughly corresponding to the “Harlem riots” 
episode in chapter twenty-five of Invisible Man) finds Doopeyduk at the head of a 
vast army of the disenfranchised (144-46). He leads his army through the polluted 
waters of the bay back to the Harry Sam motel and, upon arrival, the motel is looted 
(151), HARRY SAM is killed after being chased down a toilet (151), and a new 
leader is quickly appointed (152). But instead of being exalted as a hero (or assuming 
the dictatorship, as he briefly fantasizes), Doopeyduk finds himself dangling from 
meat-hooks in “Emperor Franz Joseph Park,” babbling aimlessly to a dwarf named 
Rapunzel (152-154). Doopeyduk now dead and a new regime now in place, however, 
nothing seems to have changed. The same fixtures remain, the same helicopters 
bounce and twirl above the urban skyline, and the same sign blinks from atop the 
motel (although now, Doopeyduk observes, the sign is written in Chinese): 
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EATS-SAVE GREEN STAMPS-BINGO-WED-EATS-SAVE GREEN  
STAMPS-BINGO-WED-EATS-SAVE GREEN STAMPS-BINGO-
WED-EATS-SAVE GREEN STAMPS-BINGO-WED-EATS-SAVE 
WRITTEN IN CHINESE          NO LESS 
 (Pallbearers 155, Reed’s typography and syntax) 
 
While the fate of Doopeyduk’s America remains undetermined, one thing at least is 
certain, his narrative has left the America of Ellison’s Invisible Man in tatters. For 
although Doopeyduk is martyred to a causeless cause, his triumph is his narration of 
the demise of not just a single segment of American culture (e.g., the African-
American community), but American culture in general—from the top down. 
This America, as Kathryn Hume writes in “Ishmael Reed and the 
Problematics of Control,” is portrayed in Pallbearers as consisting of little more than 
a rigorously guarded set of social, economic, and political controls. These controls 
are in place, Hume writes, specifically to ensure continuous consumption: 
In the country of HARRY SAM, control manifests itself not just 
through the hooks of public execution but also through secret 
cannibalism and sodomy in high places and through the media's 
shaping of the public mind. . . . Even when Chinese invaders take 
over the country, the message for the poor is the same: “EATS-SAVE 
GREEN STAMPS-BINGO-WED.” In other words, the poor are urged 
to consume goods, be consumed, and beget more consumers, while 
comforting themselves with the promise of luck in a game of chance. 
(Hume 508) 
 
No recourse to any manner of social, economic, or political control is given to this 
set of brainwashed consumers. The only things offered to these Americans are the 
inalienable rights and freedoms of perpetual craving, perpetual illusion, and an 
endless appetite for more. Broadcast across every imaginable media and woven into 
the fabric of the meritocratic American philosophy of education (satirized via the 
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many philosophi gloriosi that populate the pages of Pallbearers), this social-
Darwinism does not, however, describe the survival of the fittest, but rather the 
survival of the fattest—a gorging of the elite on the (social) blood, (economic) body, 
and (political) spirit of the financially destitute masses (which happen to be 
disproportionately represented by African-Americans and other minorities). It is this 
reality that Pallbearers confronts through its parody of Ellison’s novel and its satire 
of circa 1966-67 America as seen through the eyes of a circa 1951-52 protagonist. 
The high ironic critique in Pallbearers also involves a condemnation of what 
Madhu Dubey defines as, “the narrative strategies of texts such as Ralph Ellison's 
Invisible Man [which] seek to convey an historically specific and materially 
burdensome reality of social marginalization” (152). According to Dubey, texts such 
as Invisible Man, “. . . reinforce a cluster of modern Western paradigms and modes 
of thought, including teleological patterns of historical development, totalized 
models of social order, rationalist epistemologies, and unitary and centered norms of 
subjectivity” (154). These are precisely the high Modernist conventions that 
postmodern metafictions such as Pallbearers set out to ridicule and debunk.199 
Through radical shifts in idiom, non-linear and/or non-causal narrative progression, 
and the direct subversion of omniscient third-person forms of narration, Reed’s high 
ironic metafiction in Pallbearers strips the “black experience novel” of its concealed 
ideology and puts it prominently on display. 
Like Coover’s anatomy of Western forms of myth and magic in “The Magic 
Poker,” and “J’s Marriage,” or Barthelme’s playful dismantling of 1960’s American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 To a list of contemporaneous “black postmodern” metafictions might be added texts such as LeRoi 
Jones/Amiri Baraka’s Tales (1967), Clarence Major’s All-Night Visitors (1969), No (1972), and Reflex 
and Bone Structure (1975), Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1970), as well as Samuel R. Delany’s 
The Einstein Intersection (1967), Nova (1968), and Dahlgren (1975). 
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(fairy tale) archetypes in Snow White and in stories such as “The Story Thus Far:”, 
Reed’s Pallbearers focuses its powers of revision on the neglected reality of spiritual 
and cultural marginalization that attends the material circumstances of social 
marginalization. For Reed’s signifying, parodic take on Ellison’s novel also lays bare 
the loss of traditional folk-ways, humour and oral culture in the clinical language of 
social realism, as well as in the clean, scientific lines of the Modernist aesthetic and 
its consuming logic of totality. 
In poems such as “Dualism” and novels such Pallbearers, Reed refuses to 
acquiesce to the American dictate of eat or be eaten, and instead offers the reader a 
third alternative: a philosophy of conscientious objection to the cannibalistic feast of 
American history that is neither a retreat from an engagement with the past nor in 
any way a self-negating apology for the fact that the all-you-can-eat American buffet 
of political imperialism, cultural conquest, and consumerism contains a substantial 
amount of “dark meat” in its gruesome recipes. In response (to continue the 
metaphor), Pallbearers hi-jacks the textual kitchen where all of these social, 
economic, and political narratives are prepared and interrupts the process, revealing 
that the supposedly wholesome goodness of the American apple-pie is actually filled 
with the gore of the brainwashed millions employed in its preparation.  
 
Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down and the Neo-HooDoo Aesthetic 
Reed’s sabotage of the cooked-up, palatable poison of American history, as 
becomes increasingly apparent in works such as Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down, 
Mumbo Jumbo, Flight to Canada (1975) and The Terrible Twos (1982), is not simply 
reactionary. Reed offers his readers a down-home remedy to counter the poison, a 
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kind of signifying, necromantic antidote, as it were, in the form of “neo-
HooDooism.” As Reed indicates in his poem, “The Neo-HooDoo Aesthetic,” neo-
HooDooism is all- natural, contains no chemical additives, preservatives, or human 
bi-products, and beyond a few basic components to the recipe (okra, for example), its 
ingredients are completely up to the preferences of the cook. 
Gombo Févi 
 
    A whole chicken—if chicken cannot be 
had, veal will serve instead; a little ham; 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 




    Same as above except the okra is pul- 
verised and oysters are used 
 
    Why do I call it ‘The Neo-HooDoo Aesthetic”? 
 
The proportions of ingredients used depend  
upon the cook!  
(Conjure 26, Reed’s emphasis and syntax) 
 
At once a theory and a practice, an transideological weapon and a means of cultural 
defense, Reed’s neo-HooDooism is a syncretic gumbo of African-American folk-
ways and voodoo evocations.200 However, as Reed is quick to acknowledge, the neo-
HooDoo philosophy may have its roots in Africa, but its contemporary presence is 
international and pluralistic. As Reed explains in an interview with Joseph Henry: 
The “Neo-Hoodoo” aesthetic comes out of my personal experience 
and represents my need to find something that I could be at home 
with. It was something that I became devoted to even before I became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Reginald Martin defines Reed’s neo-HooDoo/VooDoo aesthetic along the following lines: 
“Voodoo, a religion formed under the pressure of degrading social conditions to give human beings 
dignity and a connection with helpful supernatural forces, thrives because of its syncretic flexibility; 
its ability to take anything, even ostensibly negative influences, and transfigure them into that which 
helps the horse [i.e., the subject]. It is bound by certain dogma or rites, but such rites are easily 
changed when they become oppressive, myopic, or no longer useful to current situations.” See Martin, 
Ishmael Reed and the New Black Aesthetic Critics, 71. 
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aware of Black Nationalism. “Neo-Hoodoo” is international. So I 
don't know whether “Neo Hoodooism” comes out of the Black 
Movement or not. I don't think it does, because I was personally 
looking for material that no one had used or tried before. It is 
possible, though, that the Black Movement may have influenced my 
need to find a different approach to art and writing, since like it, I was 
ultimately reaching for a different set of aesthetic values in reaction to 
Western literary standards. (Reed and Henry 86) 
 
Reed’s reaction to these “Western literary standards,” like much of the writing that 
emerged from the authors and academics that more actively aligned themselves with 
the Black Nationalist Movement (e.g., LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka, Addison Gayle, 
Jr., and Houston Baker), is as violent in its incendiary militancy as it is fantastic in its 
forms, images, and rhetoric. In poems such as “Black power poem” (Conjure 19), 
“Neo-HooDoo Manifesto” (Conjure 20-25), and “catechism of d neoamerican 
hoodoo church” (Conjure 36-42), Reed blasts the Western cultural establishment for 
its central role in demonizing black experience, black history, and black culture. In 
these poems, Reed calls out artists and writers such as Bix Beiderbecke, Irene Castle, 
Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, Allen Ginsberg, and Timothy Leary for normalizing racism 
while at the same time shamelessly stealing from the experiences, histories, and 
cultures that they simultaneously defame in their works and public statements.  
Banging on the white-washed door of the American culture industry, Reed’s 
poetry in Conjure: Selected Poems, 1963-1970 (1972) and Chattanooga: Poems 
(1973) demands justice with a raised black fist and a raised black voice. As Reed 
writes in “Black power poem”:  
A spectre is haunting america—the spectre of 
    neo-hoodooism. 
all the powers of old america have entered into a holy alli 
ance to exorcise this spectre: allen ginsberg timothy leary 
richard nixon edward teller billy graham time magazine the 
new york review of books and the underground press. 
… 
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may the best church win. shake hands now and come 
out conjuring (Conjure 19) 
 
Reed’s Neo-HooDooism, in this context, is a both a rallying cry for political 
rebellion and a method of spiritual resistance.  
In response to what he sees as an ahistorical process of cultural division, 
racial segregation, and the “compartmentalization that people [both black and white] 
try to impose on history” (Henry and Reed 89), Reed’s neo-HooDooism represents 
an attempt to counter the dis-integrative forces of Western civilization through a 
syncretic rectification of history. As is apparent in “Black power poem,” this 
rectification cannot be attempted without a fight against the (Anglo-American) 
powers that be. However, as is implicit in Reed’s poem, the battlefield of the neo-
HooDoo resistance is not only external (social, economic, political), it is also internal 
(personal, spiritual, experiential). And, as Reed states in his interview with Henry, 
triumph in this proposed battle is subject entirely to the full participation of all 
members of society, of every shade and origin, without any preference being made 
for this or that group based upon arbitrary guidelines for acceptability, competence, 
or relative worth (Henry and Reed 89). 
Clearly, the neo-HooDoo concept is a utopian one. And were his HooDoo-
utopianism not shot through with signifying irony and other-worldly, occult violence, 
it would be very difficult not to smile at Reed’s grandiose vision. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that the majority of his high-flown utopian rhetoric is ironically self-
cancelling (by reflexive default) and couched in terms that are deliberately absurd, 
one of the truly innovative and narratologically significant impacts that Reed’s 
highly rhetorical, ideologically pluralistic, neo-HooDoo vision has had on the 
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postmodern narrative forms of his period has come about through his syncretic 
lexical and dialogical combinations of high and low idioms, dialects, and grammars.  
Throughout Reed’s works, academic discourse is frequently mixed with street 
slang, hippie-speak is cut with jive-talk, and honky-tonk, ghetto, prairie, and delta 
dialects are all thrown together into Reed’s own unique neo-HooDoo, syncretic 
Creole. As Reginald Martin writes in Ishmael Reed and the New Black Aesthetic 
Critics: 
Reed extends the notion of syncretism into the level and texture of 
language he uses, thus creating a kind of contemporary bathetic 
language, whose principal rules of discourse are taken from the 
streets, popular music, and television. It is not uncommon to find the 
formal blend of language mixed with the colloquial because it is 
Reed’s contention that such an occurence in a narrative is more in 
keeping with the ways contemporary people influenced by popular 
culture really speak. (73) 
 
While the location of realism in Reed’s narratorial syncretism is difficult to accept 
(the language of Reed’s writing being far too conspicuous in its lexical flash and too 
studied in its rhetoric for any such assessment), nevertheless, Martin’s detection of 
postmodern bathos in Reed’s writing is certainly worthy of note.  
As in works such as Coover’s “Panel Game” and “The Hat Act” (both in 
Pricksongs & Descants) and Barthelme’s “Bluebeard” and “Brain Damage,” Reed’s 
writing makes frequent use of bathetic sentence structures and lofty sentiments that 
quickly wind up in the gutter. But these rhetorical ruptures are not merely staged to 
disappoint the expectations of the reader (although, as discussed in this dissertation’s 
previous explorations of the works of Coover and Barthelme, the upsetting of 
conventional form does figure prominently in the high ironic mix), it is important to 
remember that the bathetic forms in the works of Coover, Barthelme, and Reed also 
function for the sake of humour. And by “signifying on the sign of seriousness,” as 
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Sharon A. Jessee puts it (127), these writers bring the formal down to street level, 
play the dirty dozens with it, and watch gleefully as the formal collapses, as Frye 
writes, into an empty heap “of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, 
crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that 
impede the free movement . . . of society” (Anatomy 233).201 
In Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down (hereafter referred to as, Yellow Back 
Radio), Reed traces the “lumber” of these social impediments back to the actual 
lumberyards and sawdust saloons of the Western novel. Turning his ironic gaze to 
America’s pioneer past, Reed’s “break-down” of the Western novel, both as a genre 
and as a vehicle of Western (i.e., Anglo-European) epistemology, is a 
characteristically scathing one.202 Firing wildly from his HooDoo revolver, so to 
speak, Reed’s Yellow Back Radio is a full-tilt, signifying assault on the legacy of 
genocide, greed, religious zealotry, and Enlightenment logic that typify America’s 
murderous westward expansion and continue to underwrite the fiercely selfish, 
cowboy spirit of American society and the consumer culture that developed during 
this period in American history (circa 1830 to 1890).  
As Kathryn Hume writes in her appraisal of the novel, like in his parody of 
1960’s America in Pallbearers, Reed’s Yellow Back Radio critically interrogates the 
historical roots of control as they play out in the formative fables and legends of 
America (“Ishmael Reed” 508). Hume writes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 It is worth noting that this passage, from the “Theory of Myths” chapter in Frye’s Anatomy of 
Criticism, is also quoted by Gates in his description of the double-voiced, satirical mechanism of 
Bakhtin’s hidden polemic. See Gates, Signifying, 112. 
202 In an interview with John O’Brien, Reed states: “I think the Western novel is tied to Western 
epistemology, the way people in the West look at the world. So it is usually realistic and has character 
development and all these things that one associates with the Western novel.” See O’Brien, Interviews 
with Black Writers, 172. 
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 The novel reinterprets the cowboy myths of taming the American 
West as grotesque and perverse cultural rape. Reed also challenges 
Christianity as a form of control in this book, opposing the Pope to his 
Hoodoo protagonist, Loop Garoo, a banished older son of God, 
cloven-hoofed, but a genuine spiritual power to be reckoned with. The 
cultural intolerance derived from Christianity and the contempt for 
those with less sophisticated technology and therefore less firepower 
are both important targets in this mock Western. . . . (“Ishmael Reed”  
508) 
 
As Hume’s description of the novel suggests, Reed is loathe to take any prisoners in 
Yellow Back Radio. And yet, Yellow Back Radio does not come across as a didactic 
morality tale or a trite list of socio-cultural grievances (tendencies that Mumbo 
Jumbo and The Last Days of Louisiana Red [1974] both suffer from to some extent). 
Instead, the novel is primarily driven by its attention to the art of storytelling and the 
mechanics of myth-making.203 However, as Schmitz points out in his critique, in 
Yellow Back Radio, “Reed does not write mythically—he writes about writing 
mythically” (“Neo-HooDoo” 132). And this metafictional distance is very carefully 
maintained throughout the work, informing the style of the novel’s satirical narration 
and carefully directing the terms of the novel’s parody of the wild-West romance 
form. 
Narrating Reed’s tall tale, is the Loop Garoo Kid:  
A cowboy so bad he made a working posse of spells phone in sick. A 
bullwhacker so unfeeling he left the print of winged mice on hides of 
crawling women. A desperado so onery he made the Pope cry and the 
most powerful of cattlemen shed his head to the Executioner’s swine. 
(Yellow Back Radio 9) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 In his introduction to Interviews with Black Writers, O’Brien writes: “Rather than overtly attacking 
racism, black writers are more concerned with establishing a black mythology which grapples with 
the imagination (where myths originate), rather than with politics. There we find Ishmael Reed’s 
novels retelling the story of the old West. . . . The black writer is trying to establish alternate myths to 
those which have fashioned the Western and American mind so far, myths that will not depict the 
black man as the symbol of evil and the black race as the threat to civilization.” See O’Brien, 
Interviews, xi. 
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From the outset it is clear that whatever might follow, Yellow Back Radio is not 
going to be an orthodox pulp Western.204 For in the place of the lonesome, pure-
hearted drifter archetype (the typical protagonist of the genre), is Reed’s werewolf-
hearted, HooDoo comedian—a time-traveling, jet-black, VooDoo-magical, super-
cowboy with ESP and a wild dog mojo.  
Loop arrives from the supernatural realm of a travelling voodoo circus and 
sets things right in the town of Yellow Back Radio. But in doing so, his adventures 
lead him into conflict with the novel’s arch-villain, Drag Gibson, a homoerotic 
hustler and would-be cattle rustler who has taken over the town and claimed its 
population and property as his own. And paired with Drag in his plot to lynch Loop 
is Bo Shmo and his “neo-social realist gang” (a satirical signifying on “Imamu” 
Amiri Baraka, Addison Gayle, Jr., Houston Baker and other “black aesthetic critics” 
concerned with the issues of black nationalism and the promulgation of “the black 
experience novel”). Bo and his posse attack Loop for his deliberate narratorial 
obscurity and his flagrant refusal to construct his narrative in the manner of “those 
Christian confessionals,” or, in other words, as a true-to-life account of the trials of 
oppression and the agonies of alienation (35). As Bo spouts to Loop in the second 
chapter: 
The trouble with you Loop is that you’re too abstract. . . . Crazy dada 
nigger that’s what you are. You are given to fantasy and are off in 
matters of detail. Far out esoteric bullshit is where you’re at. Why in 
all those suffering books that I write about my neighborhood and how 
hard it was every gumdrop machine is in place while your work is a 
blur and a doodle. . . . All art must be for the end of liberating the 
masses. A landscape is only good when it shows the oppressor 
hanging from a tree. (Yellow Back Radio 35-36) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 In his interview with John O’Brien, Reed defines the “yellow-back” of the title thusly: “Quoting 
from the Random House Dictionary of the English Language definition of the Western novel: ‘An 
inexpensive, often lurid, novel bound in yellow cloth or paper.’” See O’Brien, Interviews, 172. 
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To which Loop replies: “What’s your beef with me Bo Shmo, what if I write 
circuses? No one says a novel has to be one thing. It can be anything it wants to be, a 
vaudeville show, the six o’clock news, the mumblings of wild men saddled by 
demons” (36). And as if to demonstrate the power of the imagination over the 
constraints of mimetic literary convention, Loop conjures a helicopter-flying Indian, 
Chief Showcase (Loop’s occasional spirit helper), who comes to his aid with a 
canteen of champagne (37).  
Much of the novel progresses in a similar manner—Loop is confronted with a 
thinly veiled allegory or ironically redeployed symbol representing an embarrassing 
and/or tragic episode from American history (i.e., historiography of the sort usually 
suppressed by or deleted from the “official” story of the typical U.S. history text; 
e.g., the impact of automatic firearms on the direction of American domestic policy 
[23, 92], the distribution of diseased blankets to the Native Americans [169], the 
various murderous land-grabs disguised as “cessions,” “purchases,” and 
“annexations” [42, 91]), and in response Loop uses his supernatural powers to 
narratorially defeat the wrong-doers and restore spiritual, HooDoo balance to the 
American frontier. 
As in the works of Barthelme, Yellow Back Radio, too, is flooded with 
historical references, pop culture icons, and celebrity appearances. Among the many 
personalities represented are John D. Rockefeller (39), George Gershwin, (39), Beau 
Brummels (42), Meriwether Lewis and William Clark (88), Guillaume Apollinaire 
(103), John Wesley Hardin (114), John Quincy Adams (121), and T. S. Eliot (161). 
While many of these personalities, as in Barthelme’s fiction, are present in the 
narrative simply to complicate the novel’s chronology and remind the reader of the 
 
	   266	  
narrative frame, as a group these names also function quite effectively as an example 
of the conspicuous scarcity of Black, Asian, and Native American names in the story 
of the West. And as the novel nears it’s final “showdown” sequence, Loop’s 
narrative narrows in on the supposition that most of the factual suppressions, 
deletions, and obfuscations that have gone into fashioning the blindingly white, 
Anglo-European myth of the American West might be traced back, like puppet 
strings, to a bejeweled hand in the Vatican. Enter, the Pope, transhistorical world 
emperor of whiteness and supreme purveyor of white history in Reed’s anti-
Christian, HooDoo logic (163-66).205  
Nevertheless, when the Pope is finally called in by Drag to assist in his 
bumbling attempts to kill Loop (Drag presenting his Holiness with a “jumbo-size 
cheeseburger” [148] and a “plastic hotdog” [167] in honor of his visit), the Pope is 
revealed to be on familiar terms with Loop. In fact, the only reason that the Pope 
bothered to show up in Yellow Back Radio was to request Loop’s help in 
suppressing the riotous rampages of Black Diane, voodoo high priestess and Loop’s 
former lover (165). Refused assistance by Loop, the Pope immediately returns to 
Rome. As a result Drag loses his grip on the town and is eventually devoured by two 
pigs named Matthew and Waldo (a signifying allusion to T. S. Eliot’s poem, “Cousin 
Nancy”)206 and Loop is emancipated at last (174). The novel comes to a close with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Reed states: “[Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down] is really artistic guerilla warfare against the 
Historical Establishment. I think the people we want to aim our questioning toward are those who 
supply the nation with its mind, tutor its mind, develop and cultivate its mind, and these are the people 
involved in culture. They are responsible for the national mind and they’ve done very bad things with 
their propaganda and racism.” See O’Brien, Interviews, 179. 
206 Also figuring in Pallbearers, Mumbo Jumbo, and a number of Reed’s other novels, [T. S. Eliot’s] 
Matthew and Waldo are repeatedly portrayed as interlopers privy to the secrets of an Anglo-European 
conspiracy to displace, control, and/or annihilate all forms of black culture and society. The final lines 
of Eliot’s poem read: “Upon the glazen shelves kept watch / Matthew and Waldo, guardians of the 
faith, / The army of unalterable law.” See Eliot, Prufrock and Other Observations, 31. 
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Loop riding off into the ocean (beneath a sunset, of course) in pursuit of the Pope’s 
ship (177).  
The frenetic language and wanton absurdity in Yellow Back Radio are 
certainly on par with that of his first novel and Reed’s second novel certainly retains 
the punchy, aggressive tone of Pallbearers. But in comparison, Yellow Back Radio is 
far more fluid in its narrative structures and considerably more episodic in its textual 
rhythm; each paragraph and, occasionally, even single sentences and unattributed 
exclamations are printed separately like lines in a radio script or the transcription of 
an oral performance. This sense of oral performance is also reflected in the overall 
structure of the novel’s narration (a structure quite similar to the narration in 
Coover’s “The Elevator” and reminiscent of the shifting tenses and narratorial 
perspectives in Barthelme’s “At the Tolstoy Museum”). For between paragraphs and 
even within individual speech acts, the narration flies from verbal tense to verbal 
tense and rapidly shifts from the descriptive mode to the expository to the persuasive. 
This mobile grammar lends Yellow Back Radio a range to its narration that 
approaches that of a storyteller on a stage (or in front of a radio microphone). In this 
way the novel projects and pronounces itself aloud in the reader’s ear. 
 
Mumbo Jumbo and the Pseudo-Mythical Collage of (Afro-)American History 
In Mumbo Jumbo, Reed breaks up the performative fluidity and orality of 
Yellow Back Radio’s narratorial voice by interspersing his text with visual data. This 
maneuver, which Gates explores extensively in his various assessments of Mumbo 
Jumbo,207 does not, however, inhibit in any way the full expression of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 See Gates, Figures, 247-49; see also Gates, Signifying, 22, 88, 223-29. 
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performative orality of the text. Instead, Reed’s introduction of visual material in 
Mumbo Jumbo succeeds in creating a dual-voiced narration that relies as much upon 
the reader’s skills of visual literacy as it does upon the reader’s capacity to create 
meaning from the verbal material of the text. In Mumbo Jumbo this visual material 
(consisting of cartoons, anagrams, photographs, annotated diagrams, statistical data, 
pamphlets, newspaper clippings, hand-written letters, and much else)208 visually 
narrates one half of the novel, while the prose narration of PaPa LaBas, the novel’s 
(ostensible) protagonist and interlocutor, provides the novel with a running, self-
reflexive commentary and a certain measure of narrative continuity. The result is a 
novel with two distinct, intertextually related voices engaged in two discrete parodic 
acts: visually, the novel suggests a mock-textbook; verbally, the novel suggests a 
mock-detective story.  
Taken separately, the novel narrated by PaPa LaBas, HooDoo houngan and 
the novel’s “noir-ish” transhistorical detective, concerns the sudden re-appearance in 
the 1920’s of a “psychic epidemic,” referred to in the novel as “Jes Grew” (4-5). Jes 
Grew, in many ways a HooDoo sensibility and mode of existence, manifests itself (in 
the “J. G. C.’s,” or, Jes Grew Carriers) as a fit of illogical ecstasy and a desire to 
dance and celebrate. As stated in the novel’s prologue, “It knows no class no race no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Gates’s itemized list is even more exhaustive in its detail: “Let us examine the text of Mumbo 
Jumbo as a textbook, complete with illustrations, footnotes, and a bibliography. . . . This documentary 
scheme of notes, illustrations, and bibliography parodies the documentary conventions of black 
realism and naturalism, as does Reed’s recurrent use of lists and catalogues. . . . Reed’s text also 
includes dictionary definitions, epigraphs, epigrams, anagrams, photoduplicated type from other texts, 
newspaper clippings and headlines, signs (such as those that hang on doors), invitations to parties, 
telegrams, ‘Situation Reports,’ . . . yin-yang symbols, quotations from other texts, poems, cartoons, 
drawings of mythic beasts, handbills, photographs, dust-jacket copy, charts and graphs, playing cards, 
a representation of a Greek vase, and a four-page handwritten letter, among still other items.” See 
Gates, Signifying, 223. 
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consciousness. It is self-propagating and you can never tell when it will hit” (5). The 
prologue continues: 
Actually Jes Grew was an anti-plague. Some plagues caused the body 
to waste away; Jes Grew enlivened the host. . . . Some plagues arise 
from decomposing animals, but Jes Grew is electric as life and is 
characterized by ebullience and ecstacy. Terrible plagues were due to 
the wrath of God; but Jes Grew is the delight of the gods. (Mumbo 
Jumbo 6, Reed’s emphasis) 
 
After first arising in Egypt under the nurturing guidance of Osiris, the Jes Grew 
“disease” was suppressed and driven into hiding (following the murder of Osiris) by 
the vengeful god Set (mythical usurper and god of chaos) where it lay dormant until 
the opening of the novel (3-7, 161-191). The re-appearance of the epidemic, which 
PaPa LaBas observes and interprets through the “investigations” of his narration, is 
intimately connected with a lost Egyptian text. It is this text (purported to be an 
anthology of ancient dance moves dictated to Thoth by Osiris [164]) that the Jes 
Grew epidemic is attempting to reunite with. As stated at the end of the prologue,    
“. . . Jes Grew is seeking its words. Its text. For what good is a liturgy without a 
text?” (6, Reed’s emphasis). By following the spread of the disease, runs the logic of 
the novel, the Jes Grew text will eventually reveal itself. 
Following the course of PaPa LaBas’s narration (as the novel’s HooDoo 
mythographer and conspiracy theorist extraordinaire) the entire history of the 
dualistic struggles between light and dark, Europe and Africa, mind and body, 
science and spirituality, Set-Apollo and Osiris-Dionysus (24-26, 161-191), is woven 
together by LaBas into the matrix of a timeless, global conflict between the unseen, 
chthonic forces of Jes Grew and the machinations of a transhistorical secret society 
of sun-worshipping (i.e., logic-worshipping) white-supremacists called the Atonists 
(18, 45) and their military wing, the Wallflower Order (made up of members of the 
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Knights Templar, and Teutonic Knights [187-89]). According to LaBas, the 
outbreaks of Jes Grew charted in the novel (and tracked via the “S.R.’s,” or, situation 
reports that punctuate the text [32, 59-60, 77, 105-06, 115, 204-05]) roughly 
correspond to the flourishing of the voodoo religion in New Orleans during the 
1890’s, the popular emergence of the Black literary voice during the Harlem 
Renaissance of the 1920’s, and the rise of the civil rights, Black arts, and Black 
power movements of the 1960’s (the period into which LaBas’s narration shifts at 
the end of the novel [218]). Erupting and receding like natural (anti-)disasters, these 
explosions of Jes Grew keep the balance of history in check by countering the 
solipsistic, fascist, intellectual forces of the Atonists (218). Unfortunately, the actual 
Jes Grew text is never recovered (the only copy having been burnt by Abdul Sufi 
Hamid, a Black nationalist radical who is, himself, eliminated by the Atonists during 
the course of the novel, thereby extinguishing all traces of the Jes Grew text [95, 
199-203]). Nevertheless, the story of the possibility of such a sacred text, as La Bas’s 
narration implies, is contained in the pages of Mumbo Jumbo itself. 
Built in harmony with this pseudo-historical, mock-detective story is the 
novel’s second narrative. Told in a language of pictures, images, icons, and signs, the 
collage elements in Mumbo Jumbo resemble a sort of postmodern American form of 
hieroglyphics. And like the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs that these pictographic 
objects evoke, there is a mystery behind every image, a story in the pictures that 
must be decoded, translated, and interpreted by the reader.  
Taken individually the images suggest the scope and variety of a textbook, a 
manual not unlike the Jes Grew text that PaPa LaBas is searching for (a reading that 
Reed clearly intended). Taken together, however, they approach the complexity of a 
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cryptographic code and the mysterious nuance of a secret, cultural history told in 
images, replete with its enjoyments (e.g., dancing [7, 118], music [77, 184], drama 
[27, 99], and art [123, 161, 181]), its gods and political monarchs (61, 88, 145, 169), 
its secret societies (14, 65, 66, 155, 184), its rituals (148, 214, 215), and wars (84, 
155, 163, 210). All are catalogued, often with academic citations, references, and 
footnotes, and there is even a “Partial Bibliography” (219-23) appended to the end of 
the work (at once signifying on the self-referential nature of academia and subverting 
the structure of the novel as a conventional form).209 Taken together with the novel’s 
parody of the noir-detective genre (a construct involving a pun not lost on Reed), 
these postmodern hieroglyphs provide a very interesting pseudo-historiographic 
portrait of America. 
Because these two parodic forms share a common context (i.e., the reader’s 
incremental construction of the Jes Grew text itself), these forms communicate with 
each other very effectively despite the fact that very little reference is ever made 
between them (with the possible exception of the hand-written letter that appears 
towards the end of the novel [200-03]). For the most part, each “voice” tells its own 
story independently. Rather than directly referring to one another, these two distinct 
voices relate primarily on the level of interpretation and in the novel’s paring of 
encryption (the clues) and decryption (the detection), which in turn also ironically 
signifies on the relationship between text and reader, event and history.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Gates views this bibliography as a further example of Reed’s parodic subverstion of Ellison’s 
Invisible Man. Gates writes: “Let us examine the text of Mumbo Jumbo as a textbook, complete with 
illustrations, footnotes, and a bibliography. A prologue, an epilogue, and an appended ‘Partial 
Bibliography’ frame the text proper, again in a parody of Ellison’s framing devices in Invisible Man. 
(Reed supplements Ellison’s epilogue with the bibliography, parodying the device both by its repeated 
presence and by the subsequent asymmetry of Mumbo Jumbo.)” See Gates, Signifying, 223. 
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Similar in structure to the array of non-linear trajectories and shifting 
narratorial voices in Coover’s “The Babysitter” and alike in its blurring of myth and 
history to Barthelme’s Snow White, Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo meanders from one end of 
the metafictional spectrum to the other. Also familiar is the collage-like quality of 
Mumbo Jumbo’s highly involved matrix of media and metafictional fragments. The 
level of participation required of the reader in Reed’s novel is also similar to the 
imaginative visual/verbal navigation required of the reader in Barthelme’s illustrated 
collage narratives, especially Barthelme’s anecdotal collages such as “Natural 
History” and his self-reflexively allegorical pieces such as “At the Tolstoy Museum” 
and “The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace”. As in these high ironic works, Reed’s 
Mumbo Jumbo is also engaged in narrating a variety of stories via a variety of media 
from within the metafictional boundaries of a text that only ever coheres in the 
reader’s imagination.210  
This arrangement insists upon the reader’s active participation in the “drama 
of cognition” (to borrow from Coover) that takes place in the unwritten margins of 
the novel’s dual-voiced discourse. However, the movement from unknowing to 
knowing in Mumbo Jumbo is constantly undermined by the terms of the novel’s own 
textual indeterminacy. As W. Lawrence Hogue observes in his essay, 
“Postmodernism, Traditional Cultural Forms, and the African American Narrative,” 
Reed supplies the reader with sufficient facts to make Mumbo Jumbo’s version of 
history plausible enough that it cannot be rejected outright, and yet, Hogue remarks, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Gates writes: “The story of the present is narrated from the limited but multiple points of view of 
the characters who people its subplots and submysteries; the story of the past, however, is narrated in 
an omniscient voice, which reads the story of the present, in the manner of a literary critic’s close 
reading of a primary text. Mumbo Jumbo’s double narrative, then, its narrative-within-a-narrative, is 
an allegory of the act of reading itself. Reed uses this second mode of ironic omniscient narration to 
Signify upon the nature of the novel in general but especially upon Afro-American naturalism and 
modernism.” See Gates, Signifying, 229. 
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“he also makes the telling of the story so outrageous and fantastic . . . that the reader 
cannot trust the text completely” (182). Mumbo Jumbo provides substantial proof in 
the form of quotations, verifiable statistics, and factual information that might easily 
be checked against data already recorded in the “official” annals of history, however, 
as Hogue notes, “Reed mixes these verifiable historical figures and events with a 
kind of alternate mythical history that includes Moses, an Egyptian god and goddess, 
an ageless Knight Templar, and a mysterious ship from Haiti. This history is pure 
mythology” (182). Indeed, in Mumbo Jumbo history and myth are treated as 
equivalencies, both to be venerated and critiqued in equal terms and with the same 
attention paid to the role of imagination as an intrinsic component of interpretation 
(no matter how quotidian or fantastical that interpretation might be). 
According to Mas'ud Zavarzadeh’s analysis of contemporary metafictional 
forms in “The Apocalyptic Fact and the Eclipse of Fiction,” this grey area between 
myth and history (as mentioned in the second chapter of this dissertation), is best 
described as “fictual,” or, a syncretic melding of fictional and factual forms. As 
Zavarzadeh writes (quoted here at length): 
For the nonfiction novel, facts—objects of the senses—are the only 
available ultimate ontological reality. This is, by the Modernist 
criteria, a “reduced reality” which eliminates, as far as possible, the 
pattern-making mind of the artist and substitutes for private 
mythologies the myths outflowing from contemporary facts. This 
fiction of fact can be mapped out only in the intermediary zone of 
experience I have referred to as “fictual,” an area which language with 
its entrenched factual-fictional polarization of experience cannot 
currently identify. The metaphysical void and the consequent moral 
vacuum which permeates contemporary experience cannot be willed 
away by enforced, imaginable solutions. In the absence of binding 
beliefs, the nonfiction novel replaces made-up mythological systems, 
and its writer assumes the position of the mythographer of the “global 
village” in which daily experience eludes simple 
meaningful/meaningless reality testing and, in Robbe-Grillet's words, 
is  “neither significant nor absurd. It is, quite simply.” Today’s 
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American narrative artist, in the forms of metafiction and the 
nonfiction novel, attempts to map this is-ness of the world — the 
myth of the obvious. (The Apocalyptic Fact and the Eclipse of 
Fiction” 82-83, Zavarzadeh’s emphasis) 
 
In Reed’s metafiction, the “moral vacuum” that obtains in the removal of  “enforced, 
imaginable solutions” only describes the space required for the development of a 
morality based upon new, self-enforced imaginative solutions. And in works such as 
Mumbo Jumbo, Reed makes an attempt to reinstate what Zavazadeh refers to as the 
“pattern-making mind of the artist” as the fundamental basis of his own writing 
process while also encouraging his reader’s involvement with that process. Indeed, 
Reed requires the reader to construct a system of “private mythologies” as an integral 
part of the reading process without in any way substituting the primacy of the 
reader’s imagination for the inherently limited selection of “contemporary facts” that 
surround and pervade his texts. Reed’s metafiction requires the reader to make up his 
or her own mind as to what to believe and what to do with one’s own experience and 
history. 
Despite the obvious literary and political merits of Reed’s metafictional 
approach, critics such as Addison Gayle, Jr. have found Reed’s loose interpretations 
of historical events, cultural myths, and the solid facts of experience to represent 
more than just a disregard for the “ontological reality” of factual accounts and 
documentary descriptions; Gayle claims that Reed’s writing displays a flagrantly 
damaging disregard for the integrity of black experience. In critical works such as 
“Black Women and Black Men: The Literature of Catharsis,” Gayle deprecates 
Reed’s ironic stance and his viciously parodic significations on his own literary 
tradition, labeling Reed a “victim of the myths of others” (49). Gayle draws a 
rhetorical line in the sand, and pronounces that he sees no place in the “black 
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aesthetic tradition” for writers, such as Reed, who do not manifest the utmost 
deference for the black tradition in their writing (51).211 However, recalling both 
Hutcheon’s definition of postmodern parody and Gates’s assessment of the 
signifying structure of the black literary canon, it is clear that the stylistic, political, 
and historiographical lines drawn by critics such as Gayle are not only completely 
out of tune with the very tradition they purport to defend, Gayle’s line of reasoning 
also betrays an incredible misreading of the inherent paradoxes of parodic fiction as 
a form of critical literary revision, as a medium of political protest and, not least 
importantly, as a means constructing a truly authentic identity in terms of one’s self 
and one’s historical moment.  
Reed’s high ironic metafiction illustrates that the perversely complicated  
problem of history continues to haunt every aspect of American cultural and social 
experience, permeating every act of literacy and orality, pervading all concepts of 
private and group identity, and lurking at the very center of any contemporary sense 
of responsibility, authority, and authenticity. And from this undead complex of past 
and present constructs Reed’s fiction invokes the insane phantom of historical 
discourse (like the neo-HooDoo spectre that haunts Reed’s “Black power poem”), 
dodging, disappearing, weaving text with text, artifact with artifice, and answering 
every riddle with a dual-voiced discourse of its own.  
In novels such as Pallbearers, Yellow Back Radio, and Mumbo Jumbo, 
Reed’s narrative demands of the reader: What culture’s history? What society’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Reed’s response to Gayle in his prose poem, “Harlem Renaissance Day,” is equally scathing: 
“Some sullen, humourless critics of the Black Aesthetic movement seem to have long since 
abandoned rational argument and take their lead from Addison Gayle, Jr., who at the conclusion of his 
careless new book, The Way of the New World, recommends the machine-gunning of those who 
disagree with him, surely a sign of intellectual insecurity.” See Reed, Shrovetide in Old New Orleans, 
297. And for further analysis of this conflict, see also Martin, Ishmael Reed, 50. 
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history? Who is to write this history? How is it to be written, or, should it even be 
written at all? What or whom does it represent? And from whence does the 
unequivocal authority, or, indeed, the unequivocal responsibility to excavate, 
compose, or revise history originate? Reed’s parody underlines repeatedly the fact 
that each of these questions is a pressing question that leads to its own important, 
area-specific perspectives, prescriptions, and projections, but that no single 
perspective is ever sufficient in itself to capture the enormous complexity of the 
question of history. As Reed suggests at the end of Mumbo Jumbo (playing on 
metaphors taken from the introduction of Arna Bontemps’s Black Thunder [1936]): 
“Time is a pendulum. Not a river. More akin to what goes around comes around” 
(218). Reed recognizes that circularities and cycles exist, but also imminent in 
Reed’s use of this phrase is a signifying reminder that, what comes around is always 
around, present even in its absence, and like Ellison’s boomerang (Invisible Man 6), 
it can get you if proper attention is not paid to its direction.  
Reed’s fiction proposes that one way of avoiding being knocked unconscious 
by the boomerang of history is to step outside of the realms of essentialist single-
consciousness and/or dualist double-consciousness and embrace one’s unique 
otherness and alterity. In novels such as Pallbearers, Yellow Back Radio, and 
Mumbo Jumbo, Reed not only describes, in surreal detail, the horrors of essentialist 
convention and the damages caused by single-minded conformity to dogma, these 
novels also specify that the only means of separating the truth of history, myth, and 
identity from enforced dogmatic cant is to maintain a position of otherness. This 
position, Reed’s writing indicates, does not require a removal from history or a 
denial of myth, but simply the maintenance of a safe distance from the intellectual 
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and spiritual rigor mortis that sets in when beliefs are enforced and histories are 
closed to amendment.  
In Reed’s writing, as in the works of Coover and Barthelme, this distance is 
achieved primarily through the use of ironic narrative forms, humourous rhetorical 
tropes, and a style of performative, speakerly narration that constantly blurs the 
distinction between imagination and reality, history and myth. However, even 
beyond the level of formal similarity these three prominent postmodern writers also 
share a common awareness that, as bell hooks puts it in her essay, “Postmodern 
Blackness”:  
Postmodern culture with its decentered subject can be the space where 
ties are severed or it can provide the occasion for new and varied 
forms of bonding. To some extent, ruptures, surfaces, contexuality . . . 
create gaps that make space for oppositional practices which no 
longer require intellectuals to be confined by narrow separate spheres 
with no meaningful connection to the world of the everyday. (631) 
 
Indeed, the legacy of literary postmodernism and its metafictional excursions into the 
realm of abstraction is a renewed space for authentic communication and, as 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation, the possibility of new, more 
sincere forms of narrative irony. The writing of these three authors has participated 
in the movement towards these new forms of narrative irony by showing that the 
grand narratives of authority and officially sanctioned authenticity are only as strong 
as their enforcement. Take out the guards with leveling, satirical ridicule, storm the 
gates with magical metaphors and supernatural agency, and a personally authentic, 
politically-poetic narrative discourse is made possible—one that rejects the 
polarization of experience and recognizes the “fictual” nature of all constructs. This 
inherently paradoxical ironic sincerity is not, however, a retreat from the larger 
socio-cultural terrors of control that characterize the high irony of the 1960s and 70s, 
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but rather a widening of the discourse made possible during this period of American 
letters to also accommodate the personal terrors of control that affect experience on a 
daily basis. This return to the primacy of experience, and its resultant modal descent 
(i.e., a shift in modal dominance from the high ironic modal position to a mode of 
fiction closer in proximity to the threshold of experience) maintains its formal, 
intertextual ties with the metafictional techniques and parodic devices of the high 
ironic, but the explosive, quantum agency of the high ironic narrator and protagonist 
have been replaced by interlocutors more sensitive to the limitations of indirect 
ironic dialogue and the significance of  compassion and communication.  
The works of writers such as Coover and Barthelme suggest that such a shift 
might be possible, but it is in the works of Reed that the means of deploying the 
rhetorical arsenal of ironic forms in the service of compassionate communication is 
fully demonstrated. Standing beside the cage of history, Reed’s writing reverses the 
polarities and finds the voracious monster locked on the outside and his own vision 




























So we have a difficulty. What shall we call the New Thing, which I haven’t 
encountered yet but which is bound to be out there somewhere? Post-Post-
Modernism sounds, to me, a little lumpy. I’ve been toying with the Revolution of 
the Word II, or the New Revolution of the Word, but I’m afraid the Jolas estate may 
hold a copyright. It should have the word “new” in it somewhere. The New 
Newness? Or maybe the Post-New? It’s a problem. I await your comments and 
suggestions. If we’re going to slap a saddle on this rough beast, we’ve got to get 
moving. 
 




Locating the Post-Postmodern 
“Dear Gaston,” the narrator begins in Barthelme’s mock-letter to a fictitious 
literary critic, “Yes, you are absolutely right—Postmodernism is dead” (Not-
Knowing 45).212 The letter continues: 
A stunning blow, but not entirely unanticipated. I am spreading the 
news as rapidly as possible, so that all of our friends who are in the 
Post-Modernist “bag” can get out of it before their cars are 
repossessed and the insurance companies tear up their policies. Sad to 
see Post-Modernism go (and so quickly!). I was fond of it. As fond, 
almost, as I was of its grave and noble predecessor, Modernism. But 
we cannot dwell in the done-for. The death of a movement is a natural 
part of life, as was understood so well by the partisans of Naturalism, 
which is dead. (Not-Knowing 45) 
 
And in the thirty odd years since the writing of Barthelme’s satirical letter, he and his 
narrator have not been alone in this pronouncement. With tedious regularity, the 
death of postmodernism has been echoing through the halls of academia, strewn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Barthelme’s “Letter to a literary critic” has seen a number of incarnations. Beginning with an 
appearance in the “Notes and Comment” section of the August 11, 1975 issue of The New Yorker, this 
text also appeared as a letter from Gaston to Alphonse in the story “Not-Knowing” as well as being 
incorporated into a variety of conference papers and other textual deployments. The version quoted 
here comes from the text selected by Kim Herzinger for inclusion in the “Here in the Village” section 
of Not-Knowing. See Barthelme, Not-Knowing, 44-45, 322-24.  
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across the pages of countless critical journals, and publicly mourned at literature and 
cultural studies conferences for decades. But somehow the death of postmodernism 
(fittingly) seems to have maneuvered its own obituary into some kind of endless 
mise-en-abîme feedback loop of sudden passings (usually linked to some historical 
event of global significance; e.g., November 9, 1989, Fukuyama’s “End of History,” 
Y2K, 9/11, etc.)213 and Lazarus-like miracle reappearances. And yet in spite of the 
absolute, unambiguous, immaculately documented certainty of these recurring 
reports of postmodernism’s demise, as Charles B. Harris writes in a recent piece for 
the American Book Review, “the corpse remains suspiciously lively. Like 
Barthelme’s Dead Father, it continues to walk among us, not only prompting 
frequent sightings (a new novel by Barth here, one by Federman there) but producing 
offspring . . . .” (“PoMo’s Wake, I”). And reminiscent of the list of ungainly 
neologisms suggested by Barthelme’s narrator, these “offspring” of the undead and 
undying fathers of postmodernism have had to put up with (or have coined for 
themselves) all manner of new denominative propositions for the supposedly “New 
Thing” imagined as the successor to first-wave postmodernism: “Image-Fiction,” 
“Blank Fiction,” “Tragic Realism,” “Psychological Realism,” “Speculative 
Realism,” “Crackpot Realism,” “Avant-Pop,” “New-New-Post,” “PoPoMo,” “Long 
Modernism,” “New Sincerity,” and even “the novel of intimacy.”214 However, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 See McHale and Stevenson, The Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Literatures in 
English, 274; Tabbi, “American World Fiction in the Longue Durée,” 84-85; McLaughlin, “Post-
postmodern Discontent,” 107; Milletti, “Innovative Fiction and the Poetics of Power: Gertrude Stein 
and Christine Brooke-Rose ‘Do’ Language,”18; Murphy, “To Have Done with Postmodernism: A 
Plea (or Provocation) for Globalization Studies,” 31; Burn, Jonathan Franzen at the End of 
Postmodernism, 9-15; Grausam, “‘It is only a statement of the power of what comes after’: Atomic 
Nostalgia and the Ends of Postmodernism,” 310-311. 
214 Arranged in order of appearance: see Wallace “E Unibus Pluram” 171; Annesley, Blank Fictions: 
Consumerism, Culture, and the Contemporary American Novel, 135-36; Franzen, “Perchance to 
Dream,” 53; Bukiet, “Crackpot Realism: Fiction for the Forthcoming Millenium,” 13; Saldívar, 
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category most generally attached to this contemporary generation of metafictions 
(notwithstanding its lumpiness) appears to be “post-postmodernism.”215 But what 
does this second prefix entail? And where is the post- in post-postmodernism 
actually pointing? 
While each of the above categories (as well as the texts and tendencies each 
describes, some more playfully than others) varies significantly in the emphasis it 
places on matters of textual form, cultural and/or historical moment, and 
phenomenological referentiality (among other literary problematics carried over from 
the postmodern), throughout the contemporary criticism of post-postmodernism runs 
a recurring theme of “post-ironic sincerity.”216 This post-ironic sincerity, as variously 
articulated by critics and writers such as Samuel R. Delany, Lynne Tillman, Jonathan 
Franzen, David Foster Wallace, and Robert L. McLaughlin (among a host of others), 
describes a critical re-assessment of the ironic nature of the postmodern text and a 
movement toward a new set of aesthetic positions and political responsibilities no 
longer directly guided by ironic narrative forms and parodic constructs.217  
The final section of this dissertation is an attempt to trace the development of 
this post-postmodern literature of post-ironic sincerity and briefly examine its formal 
and political relationships to the type of high ironic metafictional parody practiced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Historical Fantasy, Speculative Realism, and Postrace Aesthetics in Contemporary American 
Fiction,” 575; McGurl, “The Program Era: Pluralisms of Postwar American Fiction,” 102-05; 
Amerika and Olsen, In Memoriam to Postmodernism: Essays on Avant-Pop, 2; Federman 
“Critifictional Reflections” 228; Harris “PoMo’s Wake, I”; Hungerford, “On the Period Formerly 
Known as Contemporary,” 418; Burn, Jonathan Franzen, ix-xi; Delany, “Fiction’s Present: Brief 
Notes,” 12-13. 
215 See Burn, Jonathan Franzen, 17; McLaughlin, “Post-postmodern Discontent,” 108, 115-16; Harris, 
“PoMo’s Wake, I.” 
216 The phrase “post-ironic sincerity” is borrowed from Monika Gehlawat’s 2008, UC Berkeley 
doctoral thesis, Boom: The New York City Flâneur in Postwar American Literature and Art. See 
Gehlawat, Boom, 1-4. 
217 See Delany, “Fiction’s Present,” 12-13; Tillman, “Critical Fiction/Critical Self,” 21; Franzen, How 
to Be Alone, 68-70; Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram,” 180-84; Burn, Jonathan Franzen, 21; and Robert L. 
McLaughlin, “Post-postmodern Discontent,” 115-16. 
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postmodern writers such as Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, and Ishmael Reed. It 
is proposed that the critical, self-reflexive, metafictional narrative forms explored 
and popularized by Coover, Barthelme, and Reed during the period of high ironic 
modal dominance have led to an increasing tendency toward a more direct, 
unaffected mode of narrative. This post-postmodern mode of post-ironic sincerity not 
only signals a change in the cultural values and political crises of late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century America, this change also indicates that the high ironic 
mode, with its matrix of playful linguistic acrobatics, parodic subversions of 
orthodox ontology and epistemology, and its radical ironic indeterminacy, is no 
longer adequate to the task of confronting the problems faced in today’s post-
postmodern world.  
 
The End of Irony? 
Despite the reactionary opinions of media pundits and journalists such as 
Vanity Fair’s Graydon Carter, who on September 18, 2001, famously announced 
that, “There’s going to be a seismic change. I think it’s the end of the age of irony. . .  
Things that were considered fringe and frivolous are going to disappear” (Qtd. in 
Beers), the “seismic change” declared by Carter had actually been rumbling through 
American literature since the late 1970s. Even in the mid-career works of the first-
wave fathers of postmodern American literature a shift in narrative form and political 
focus is readily apparent. In claustrophobic works such as Coover’s Gerald’s Party 
(1985) and Barthelme’s Paradise (1986) and Sam’s Bar: An American Landscape 
(1987) it is clear that a new sense of isolation and contradiction had entered the 
postmodern metafictional mix by the 1980s. And comparison of Reed’s The Terrible 
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Twos (1982) to his The Terrible Threes (1989) provides a similar trajectory away 
from the maddening rush of complex, signifying rhetoric that characterizes his early 
poetry and fiction towards an increasingly personal mode of revisionary historicism. 
In each of these works the prose is directed gradually further away from the grand 
histories and myths of the past, towards a more personal, domestic, if somewhat 
uncomfortably tense, approach to the grand histories and myths of the present. 
As explored in the previous chapters of this dissertation, this continual modal 
shift toward new narrative explorations of the experiential moment, toward 
innovative approaches to the depiction of personal and group identities, and toward 
the formulation of new narrative means by which to conceive and question issues of 
personal responsibility and agency, was brought to the forefront of American 
literature by the radical, high ironic poetics of the 1960s and early 70s. Through the 
parodic metafictional critiques of these early postmodern writers the hypocrisies of 
history and myth that exist throughout American culture and society were exposed 
through humour, deconstructive fragmentation, signifyin(g) wordplay, and an 
incendiary irony that sought to identify the aporias in all ontological and 
epistemological constructs through a self-reflexively critical approach to the 
language of narrative. As argued in this dissertation’s analyses of the works of 
Coover, Barthelme, and Reed, by looking at the inner workings of Western myth and 
American history through the ironic bullet-holes shot in them by the writers, artists, 
and other subversives of the early postmodern period, many of the dangerous 
ideologies hidden behind the falsely authoritative, hypocritical, and self-privileging 
constructs of Western society and culture are revealed and opened up for 
questioning. These revelations and questionings were made possible by means of a 
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violently critical, high ironic mode of metafictional parody. 
As David Foster Wallace writes in his oft-cited essay, “E Unibus Pluram: 
Television and U.S. Fiction”: “. . . irony—exploiting gaps between what’s said and 
what’s meant, between how things try to appear and how they really are—is the 
time-honored way artists seek to illuminate and explode hypocrisy” (182). That the 
first-wave postmodern writers and artists turned their ironic weaponry upon the 
“lone-gunman Westerns, paternalistic sitcoms, and jut-jawed law enforcement circa 
1960,” Wallace argues, was due to the fact that these artificial idols and images of 
authority represented, celebrated, and perpetuated, “a deeply hypocritical American 
self-image” (182). Through ironic narrative forms, postmodern writers such as Ken 
Kesey, Thomas Pynchon, William S. Burroughs, William Gaddis, Robert Coover, 
Donald Barthelme, and Ishmael Reed attacked the metaphors and myths of this false 
American image. As Wallace describes in his itemized list of exploded hypocrisies: 
Kesey’s dark parody of asylums suggested that our arbiters of sanity 
were maybe crazier than their patients [e.g., One Flew over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest, 1975]; Pynchon reoriented our view of paranoia from 
deviant psychic fringe to central thread in the corporo-bureaucratic 
weave [e.g., The Crying of Lot 49, 1966]; DeLillo exposed image, 
signal, data, and tech as agents of spiritual chaos and not social order 
[e.g. Americana, 1971]. Burroughs’s icky explorations of American 
narcosis exploded hypocrisy [e.g., The Nova Trilogy, 1961-67]; 
Gaddis’s exposure of abstract capital as dehumanizing exploded 
hypocrisy [e.g., JR, 1975]; Coover’s repulsive political farces 
exploded hypocrisy [e.g., The Public Burning, 1977]. (183) 
 
And to this list might easily be added Barthelme’s humourous manipulations of 
clichéd American icons and Western cultural trash in Snow White and The Dead 
Father as well as Ishmael Reed’s militant neo-HooDoo mayhem and violent 
mythical deconstructions in Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down and Mumbo Jumbo—all 
works aimed at exploding hypocrisy through ironic narrative parody.  
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In “E Unibus Pluram,” Wallace argues that, “Irony in sixties art and culture 
started out the same way youthful rebellion did. It was difficult and painful, and 
productive—a firm diagnosis of a long-denied disease” (183 Wallace’s emphasis). 
“The assumptions behind this early postmodern irony,” writes Wallace, were frank, 
idealistic, and very convincingly maintained “that etiology and diagnosis pointed 
toward cure; that revelation of imprisonment yielded freedom” (183). However, 
despite the intense idealism behind the political aesthetics of first-wave 
postmodernism, much of the tension and self-awareness present in the literature of 
the 1980s is directly informed by the anxiety surrounding the disappointing 
realization that, while these 1960s and 70s “revelations” did manage to yield 
significant advancements in the actualization of the freedoms necessary for un-
repressed artistic expression (within the Cold War-era Western world at least), these 
explosive attacks on American hypocrisy did not yield much freedom beyond the 
insulated bounds of the privileged sectors of American society, (white) academia, 
and the elite culture of the American art world. 
Rather than a new world order of free expression and unbridled creativity, 
with the deconstructive undermining of the grand narratives of pure ontological myth 
and pure epistemological history came the location of the economic and inter-
personal mechanisms of power and control that continue to exert their influences on 
the course of world events. In response to the location of these new threats, the 
character of narrative irony also changed. Flights of high ironic fancy are replaced by 
a growing disaffection for the bounds of the prison-house of language that the early 
postmodern artists and theorists had identified and explored. In the 1980s, parody 
and self-reflexivity turns increasingly inward, and is often directed narcissistically 
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and self-destructively against the frustrating, insular limitations of the supposedly 
autonomous object of the text and its linguistically mediated ontology.  
In works such as Lynne Tillman’s Living with Contradictions (1982), 
Ntozake Shange’s Sassafrass, Cypress & Indigo (1982), Audre Lorde’s Zami: A New 
Spelling of My Name (1982), and Kathy Acker’s Blood and Guts in High School 
(1984), metafictional tactics of parody and narrative collage are brought to bear 
against the object of the text, the object of the self, and the place of these objects 
within an American culture of production and consumption. And in Acker’s 1983 
novella, My Death, My Life, by Pier Paolo Pasolini, these forms of objectification 
are investigated by the text’s multiple narrators and ever-shifting angles of narrative 
approach. As one of the novella’s mercurial narrators states: 
I’m an object. Do you, reader, know anything about human objects, 
what caused them: you with your clawings, your gripes, your grippes, 
your petty boyfriend complaints? This, all this, is object. Scream. I 
dream of being punished. Scream. I dream of torment that will carry 
me over the edge and make me act without considering the action. I 
dream of having a body and it and thinking being one monster. (My 
Death, My Life 281-82) 
 
This terrible realization that all is only language creates a similar anxiety in Acker’s 
Don Quixote (1986). Finding herself the object of a medical procedure, at once 
surrounded by unfamiliar objects, and also experiencing the insertion of unknown 
objects into her body to remove still other foreign objects, Acker’s protagonist 
tangentially exclaims, “Why can’t I just love?” to which the protagonist’s own 
internal narrator replies: 
‘Because every verb to be realized needs its object. Otherwise, having 
nothing to see, it can’t see itself or be. Since love is sympathy or 
communication, I need an object which is both subject and object: to 
love, I must love a soul. Can a soul exist without a body? Is physical 
separate from mental? Just as love’s object is the appearance of love; 
so the physical realm is the appearance of the godly: the mind is the 
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body. This,’ she thought, ‘is why I’ve got a body. This is why I’m 
having an abortion. So I can love.’ (Don Quixote 10) 
 
Similar riddles of mind and body, love and desire, self and other surround the stories 
in Lynne Tillman’s Living with Contradictions, especially in the collection’s 
eponymous title story. Musing self-reflexively to herself on the contradictory nature 
of her inherently limited, verbally constructed, commercially mediated experience, 
Tillman’s narrator wonders, “What would it be like not to have a contemporary 
mind? Intimacy is something people used to talk about before commercials. Now 
there’s nothing to say” (“Living with Contradictions” 121). She continues: 
People are intimate with their analysts, if they’re lucky. What could 
be more intimate than an advertisement for Ivory soap? It’s 
impossible not to be affected. 
. . .  
The manufacture of desire and the evidence of real desire. But ‘real’ 
desire is for what—for what is real or manufactured? (121) 
 
In marked decline is the flippant, satirical humour of Coover, Barthelme, and Reed— 
the ribald nonchalance of high ironic absurdity and grotesque enigma gradually 
replaced by a growing sense of insecurity and the knottiness of personal paradox and 
mundane contradiction. Indeed, in throwing back the curtain of semiotic 
referentiality to reveal the verbal nature of all interpretations and articulations of 
experience, many of the characters and narrators of 1980s metafiction, like the 
narrators in Acker’s Don Quixote and Tillman’s “Living with Contradictions,” 
discover, as a result, that they share only as much stake in reality as an Ivory soap 
advertisement or a string of subject-verb agreements.  
As is apparent in the examples above, the sense of crippling insignificance 
that developed in the texts of this period also reflected an angst that many artists and 
writers of the period were feeling in regards to their tentative place within an 
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American culture increasingly crowded with the false art of marketing propaganda, 
big-budget fluff, and commercial everything. In other works of the period, such as 
DeLillo’s White Noise (1984), Ellis’s Less Than Zero (1985), Tim O’Brien’s The 
Nuclear Age (1985), and Paul Auster’s In the Country of Last Things (1987), the 
objectification of experience, of identity and all aspects of individual expression is 
portrayed as the source of a distinct absence of authenticity. This absence is 
interrogated in these novels through an ironic assessment of the disparate and often 
directly contradictory things that Americans buy—both materially and consciously—
to confirm their success, assert their independence, and affirm their identity. In 
grueling and frequently gruesome detail, these works catalogue and quantify the loss 
of self that attends the expansion of popular (commercial) culture into the lives of an 
American mass-market populace of greedy, paranoid, image-obsessed consumers.  
The “image-fiction” that developed as a reply to this mass-market America, 
according to Wallace’s analysis in “E Unibus Pluram,” followed the terms of a pop-
centered narrative irony straight into the mirror that it held up to itself. In definition, 
Wallace writes: 
Image-fiction is basically a further involution of the relations between 
lit and pop that blossomed with sixties postmodernists. If the 
postmodern church fathers found pop images valid referents and 
symbols in fiction, and if in the seventies and early eighties this appeal 
to the features of mass culture shifted from use to mention, certain 
avant-gardists starting to treat of pop and TV and watching as 
themselves fertile subjects, the new fiction of image uses the transient 
received myths of popular culture as a world in which to imagine 
fictions about ‘real,’ albeit pop-mediated, public characters. (171, 
Wallace’s emphasis) 
 
The advantage of the image-fiction approach to the problems of immaterial 
authenticity, “real” reality, and the late twentieth century proliferation of 
dissimulative rhetoric and “fictual” simulacra, Wallace claims, is a “re-imagining 
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[of] what human life might truly be like over there across the chasms of illusion, 
mediation, demographics, marketing, image, and appearance” (172-73). However, 
Wallace states with obvious disappointment, in becoming one with the “passive, 
addictive TV-psychology” of consumer America, image-fiction does not move 
beyond the self-stifling constraints of its own irony-saturated discourse (173). 
Wrapped in the numbing, and ultimately self-silencing entropy of extreme ironic 
self-consciousness, the soul-crushing corporate world projected by the image-fictions 
of writers such as DeLillo, Ellis, O’Brien, and Auster in the 1980s, as well as those 
of Douglas Coupland (Generation X [1991]), Mark Leyner (My Cousin, My 
Gastroenterologist [1990] and Tooth Imprints on a Corndog [1996]) and Ricardo 
Cortez Cruz (Premature Autopsies [1997]) in the 1990s, according to Wallace’s 
assessment, act more to support the expansion of the corporate ogre of neoliberal 
Capitalism than they do to secure the further advancement and/or the innovation of 
new forms of individual expression and the creative renovation of American culture 
(182-83).  
For just below the surface of the simulacrum (in novels such as those in 
Auster’s New York Trilogy [1985-87]), beneath the labels and items of consumer 
capital that arrive already bearing the name of some designer or some producer (as in 
Ellis’s Less Than Zero, American Psycho [1991], and Glamorama [1998]), and 
within the myth of some resonant substantiality that a given product is said to 
contain, represent, or satisfy (such as the Dylar in DeLillo’s White Noise or the 
baseball in his Underworld [1997]), is nothing but desire and solipsism. As Jedediah 
Purdy interprets it in his analysis of post-postmodern irony in For Common Things, 
through the profound emptiness and paranoia explored in works such as these, “we 
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[as reader] sense an unreal quality in our words and even in our thoughts. They are 
superficial, they belong to other people and other purposes; they are not ours, and it 
may be that nothing is properly ours" (Qtd. in O’Brien “On Death and Donuts” 
157).218 But how did the tables turn so completely on the idealistic radicalism and 
cathartic black humour that evolved during the period of high ironic modal 
dominance? 
According to both Wallace and Franzen, the profound emptiness in much of 
the literature of the 1980s is due in part to the contemporary appropriation of ironic 
forms and parodically self-reflexive constructs by popular media such as television 
and other market-driven vehicles of commercial advertising (“E Unibus Pluram” 
183; “Perchance to Dream” 40-42). By evacuating ironic forms and parodic narrative 
constructs of their social purpose and refashioning them into flashy, multi-voiced, 
self-reflexive tools of consumer appeal, irony becomes a highly effective weapon in 
the commercial battle to subvert consumer suspicion, create desire, and, through 
dissimulation and double-speak, to divert consumer attention from the insidious 
solicitations of its own sales-pitch. Writers and critics such as Wallace, McLaughlin, 
and Christy Wampole make a very plausible case for this development, for the 
humourous, signifyin(g) forms of ironic dissimulation and the self-denigrating (and, 
therefore, self-acquitting) reflexivity of ironic meta-fictuality do make the high ironic 
mode of narrative an ideal mode for the creation of entertaining, persuasive pieces of 
advertising.219 However, as this shift occurs and pop-critical irony begins to overlap 
with and become indistinct from simple pop-irony, the socio-critical purpose is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 See Purdy, For Common Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America Today, xiii. 
219 See Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram,” 181-84; McLaughlin, “Post-Postmodern Discontent,” 112-14; 
Wampole, “How to Live Without Irony.” 
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replaced by a financial purpose and the ironic mode is, thereby, drained of its 
supposedly meliorative edge. 
That this is so, Wallace argues (with more than a trace of Kierkegaard in his 
analysis), is due to the fact that, “irony, entertaining as it is, serves an exclusively 
negative function. It’s critical and destructive, a ground-clearing. Surely this is the 
way our postmodern fathers saw it. But irony’s singularly unuseful when it comes to 
constructing anything to replace the hypocrisies it debunks” (183). To Wallace this 
negativity amounts to a kind of tyranny of emptiness and vacuity based on a rhetoric 
of, “I don’t really mean what I say” (183-84), and to Wallace and other 
contemporary American artists and writers such as Jonathan Franzen, Dave Eggers, 
Jonathan Safran Foer, and Jeffrey Eugenides, such a position runs counter to any 
form of creative expression that consciously—and conscientiously—conceives of 
itself as other than a marketing tool or simply another unit to be shifted from 
producer to consumer. 
 
Ironizing Irony, or, Sincerity in the Post-Postmodern Moment 
As McLaughlin writes in “Post-Postmodern Discontent,” because the hyper-
visual, sales-driven culture of American media has, in the opinion of these authors, 
“co-opted postmodernism’s bag of tricks to deleterious effect, writers of fiction, 
especially those who see themselves as the heirs of postmodernism, need to find a 
way beyond self-referential irony to offer the possibility of construction” (114).220 In 
answer to this possibility, post-postmodern fictions seek to show by means of 
contrast, McLaughlin writes, that “self-referentiality by itself collaborates with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 A similar call for the reversal of cynicism and a return to traditional values is also present 
throughout Franzen’s “Perchance to Dream.” See Franzen, “Perchance to Dream, 35–54. 
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culture of consumer technology to create a society of style without substance, of 
language without meaning, of cynicism without belief, of virtual communities 
without human connection, of rebellion without change” (115). While this literary 
exhaustion (not unlike the exhaustion described by Barth at the very beginning of the 
postmodern period)221 was certainly not the intended socio-cultural consequence 
behind the writing of such self-reflexive texts as Coover’s Pricksongs & Descants, 
Barthelme’s Snow White, and Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo, nevertheless, such is the 
character of the endlessly changing, instantly dynamic chimera of “consumer 
technology” that the subversive nature of irony must, itself, be subverted in order for 
literature to remain subversive.  
Wallace’s suggestion in “E Unibus Pluram,” a suggestion echoed throughout 
texts such as his Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999), Consider the Lobster 
(2005), This is Water (2009), and woven into the dialogical rhetoric and 
metafictional fragments of his posthumously published The Pale King (2011), is that 
the next step forward, towards genuine substance and the negation of negative ironic 
negation, is precisely that—the construction of a counter irony, or, reverse “anti-
irony” through an embracing of sincere forms of expression and “single-entendre 
values.” Wallace writes:  
The next real literary ‘rebels’ in this country might well emerge as 
some weird bunch of ‘anti-rebels’ . . . who have the childish gall 
actually to endorse single-entendre values. Who treat old untrendy 
human troubles and emotions in U.S. life with reverence and 
conviction. Who eschew self-consciousness and fatigue. These anti-
rebels would be outdated, of course, before they even started. Too 
sincere. Clearly repressed. Backward, quaint, naïve, anachronistic. 
Maybe that’ll be the point, why they’ll be the next real rebels. (“E 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 McLaughlin draws a similar parallel in his discussion of Boswell, Barth, and Eco. See 
McLaughlin, “Post-Postmodern Discontent,” 104-07. 
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Unibus Pluram” 192-93) 222 
 
Although it is, perhaps, too early to say what influence these proposed “anti-rebels” 
will have on the course of future literary developments, nevertheless, formally 
conservative, highly “sincere” novels such as Dave Eggers’s A Heartbreaking Work 
of Staggering Genius (2000), Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections (2001), Jonathan 
Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated (2002), and Jeffrey Eugenides’s Middlesex 
(2002), have already made their collective mark on the American literary landscape. 
And between the four of them, these novels have also won almost every prestigious 
literary award on offer, sharing between them: a Time magazine “Book of the Year” 
award, a National Book Award, a James Tait Black Award for Fiction, a National 
Jewish Book Award, a Guardian First Book Award, and a Pulitzer Prize for Fiction 
(among a lengthy list of other prizes, short-listings, and literary honors).223 
Pushing the dominant literary mode away from the abstract realm of 
metafictional high irony and ever closer to the realm of subjective identification (as 
outlined in the first chapter of this dissertation), these works have been lauded for 
their genial humour, their mastery of observed detail, their earnest concern for 
human relationships, and their heartfelt attempts to articulate the paradoxes of daily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Wallace locates this kind of questionably ironic anti-rebellion in works such as Zbigniew 
Herbert’s Mr. Cogito (1994), as he writes in his review of the work for Spin magazine: “Since any 
great poem communicates an emotional urgency that postmodernism’s integument of irony renders 
facile or banal, postmodern poets have a tough row to hoe. Herbert’s Cogito-persona permits ironic 
absurdism and earnest emotion not only to coexist but to nourish one another. . . . It seems significant 
that only writers from Eastern Europe and Latin America have succeeded in marrying the stuff of 
spirit and human feeling to the parodic detachment the postmodern experience seems to require. 
Maybe as political conditions get more oppressive here, we Americans’ll get good at it, too.” See 
Wallace, Both Flesh and Not, 121-22. 
223 See Erin Skarda, “A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius”; National Book Foundation, 
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experience.224 Convivial, full of quirky, carefully developed characters, and rife with 
uncomfortably awkward “real life” situations and relationships, these novels do not, 
however, represent the sort of rebellion one might expect as sufficiently radical to 
shake up the literary world and move it in a new direction. And yet, all evidence 
suggests that such a move is definitely in the process of taking place. Whether this 
move simply represents a market fluctuation, or is actually indicative of a deeper 
transition is unclear, but one thing is certain, the difference in mode between the high 
ironic metafiction of the postmodern period and its post-postmodern successor is 
noticeable and significant. 
With this return to character, emotion, and personal intimacy comes a drastic 
alteration to the polymorphic narrations and rhetorical contortions explored in the 
texts of Coover and Reed. Likewise, the collage-narrative flatness of Barthelme’s 
intertextual curiosity shop of etchings, lists, and one-liners is critically revised in 
these post-postmodern texts and expanded into increasingly referential textual 
territory. Instead of heaping the rubbish of the world onto the reader—in the manner 
of Reed’s machine-gun signifyin(g) and Barthelme’s philosophical dreck—post-
postmodern writers (at least, those writers mentioned above) are far more likely to 
pick through the rubbish of contemporary experience and describe it to the reader in 
detail, itemizing every ingredient, enumerating its provenance, and proposing its 
potential function within a global matrix of socio-cultural relations.  
As explored by Wallace in “Octet” (in many ways a signifyin[g] post-
postmodern revision of the “questionnaire” form as it figures into the structure of  
Barthelme’s Snow White and the self-reflexive Q&A format in “Kierkegaard Unfair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 See Adam Begley “Come to the Cabaret”; Andrew O’Hehir “‘The Corrections’ by Jonathan 
Franzen”; Francine Prose “Back in the Totally Awesome U.S.S.R.”; Mark Lawson “Gender Blender.” 
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to Schelgel”),225 language, even at its most abstract, self-reflexive extreme, is always 
inadequate to the task of formulating (let alone answering in any meaningful way) 
the inconceivable intricacy of experience. In this metafiction Wallace presents a 
number of generic scenarios, one of which involves the friendship and eventual 
falling-out of a certain X and Y. Rife throughout this hypothetical dilemma is the 
presence of real human drama, for the ethical questions and moral quandaries faced 
by the nameless entities in “Octet” describe the type of quotidian choices and 
interpretations “real” people make on an everyday basis. But what becomes 
increasingly clear as the abstract language ventures ever closer to the concrete, is the 
frustrating impossibility of ever meaningfully discerning the various intentions, 
desires, and psychological mechanisms and personal quirks involved in interactions 
between individuals (let alone the absurdity of attempting to articulate the true nature 
of these interactions in words). As the ostensible narrator states at the end of one of 
the quizzes, “In fact, the whole mise en scène here seems too shot through with 
ambiguity to make a very good Pop Quiz, it turns out” (113). And yet, throughout the 
works of Wallace as well as in the works of several of his contemporary post-
postmodernists, is the sense that although language will always be incapable of the 
dispelling problem of experience, it is only through language that the problem of 
experience can become, at the very least, a shared problem.    
The current post-postmodern modal shift back towards the threshold of 
experience marks a departure from the realm of narrative abstraction and a distinct 
movement towards a more realistic mode of shared, multiply-negotiated, 
interpersonal discourse, but is this emerging “post-ironic” mode actually any less 
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ironic in its sincere approach? Might not the post- in post-ironic, like the post- in 
postmodern, be better thought of as a relational demarcation? Could not the post-
ironic actually indicate a further advance in the evolution of irony as a mode of 
literature and discourse? 
 Obviously, it is far too early to propose an articulate reply to these post-
postmodern questions. But if there is one, clearly discernible thing that connects each 
of the authors considered in this dissertation—whether modern, postmodern, or post-
postmodern—it is their enduring appeal to the continued exploration of language. As 
Ihab Hassan writes in The Dismemberment of Orpheus, gesturing towards (and 
becoming) both the end and the beginning of the discourse engaged in this 
dissertation, “Language, after all, still remains the deepest habit of our mind, our 
most thorough inheritance from dead or vanished gods” (17). And like any 
inheritance, it is now up to its inheritors to decide the future of its use. For the 
question of language will always remain: which habits of use to discard and which 
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